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Preface 
Background 
Today, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) are one of the most modern and 
powerful armies in the world. However, their history is relatively short; only a 
half-century long. Despite this, Israel has been involved in five conventional 
wars and several more or less regional conflicts since it came into being in 
May 1948.1 This is not to mention the battle against the activities of different 
Palestinian guerrilla groups between the major wars, or "rounds" as the Israelis 
call them. At the operational level, the Israelis have succeeded to a great 
extent in the face of their numerically much more powerful opponents. This has 
drawn the attention of academic researchers and military analysts from all over 
the world. The result has been that the Arab-Israeli wars have been the subject 
of numerous studies and have had more books written about them than any 
other regional conflict; with the exception perhaps of the Vietnam War and the 
American Civil War. 
Despite the sheer volume of research on the Arab-Israeli wars, there is one 
striking similarity in these works. The great majority of the sources about these 
wars concentrate on either the political context of the wars or — from the 
military point of view — on individual wars or even on individual events in the 
wars. In addition, much of the literature on the wars of the Middle East was 
written soon after the conflicts. It therefore more or less lacks a critical 
perspective of the art of war of each side. Thus, it is not possible to find the 
military philosophy that provided the underpinnings of the armies that waged 
war in the Middle East in these books and studies. Only a couple of books and 
articles partly analyse the Israeli art of war, but they — except for the most 
recent ones — deal with the period up to the Yom Kippur War in 1973 
(inclusive). No detailed official histories have been published for any of Israel's 
wars. In addition, the works mentioned above focus more on investigating the 
Israeli Defence Forces as an entity in Israeli society and, although military 
matters have also been dealt with, they do not penetrate deep into the 
foundations of Israeli military thinking. 
It seems that the principal reason for the lack of study of the Israeli art of 
war has been the sensitive security situation of the state. Israel, a society that 
has almost always been endangered by different types of external military 
threats since it came into being, is not prone to releasing information about its 
military doctrine and the foundations thereof. Not enough time has passed for 
Israeli or Arab archives to be opened to foreign researchers to the extent that 
would be expected on the basis of security classification and time elapsed. 
Nevertheless, some information has been continuously available to the public 
and to military commentators and analysts in Israel and abroad since Israel's 
independence. This includes battle reports, the strengths of the armed forces 
The War of Independence in 1948 — 1949, the Sinai Campaign in 1956, the Six Day War in 
1967, the War of Attrition in 1969 — 1970 and the Yom Kippur War in 1973 are classified as 
conventional wars. Israel's operation "Peace for Galilee" in 1982 in Lebanon is categorised 
as a so-called "compound war, which is a combination of counter-guerrilla war and 
conventional war. Operation "Litani" against the Palestinian guerrillas in Lebanon in 1978 
can be seen as a regional conflict that does not have the status of an all-out wari 
and interviews and memoirs of key military personnel and political decision-
makers. Therefore, despite the seeming shortage of research material, there is 
a lot of detailed, though mostly scattered, material about the Israeli art of war 
in different sources. However, they do not adequately explain the background 
of Israeli military thinking nor do they describe in any theoretical sense the 
outcome of the past wars of the Middle East or their influence on the 
development of the IDF. Thus, it can be said that some hints of the origins of 
the Israeli art of war can be found in several sources, but in most cases they 
are statements without deeper analyses of the original concepts and their 
Israeli applications. From this point of view, it is amazing that while the Israeli 
tendency for mobile warfare at the operational level has been striking, no one 
has properly tried to explain and analyse its philosophical background over the 
long-run. One explanation for this could lie in the difficulties in understanding 
the whole operational level of warfare from the scientific point of view. While to 
professional soldiers this might have been more clear than to those who are 
civilians, there seems to be some truth in Professor Robert E. Harkavy's 
statement that "usually it is only military officers — and perhaps a few 
professional historians and social scientists — that can operate at the levels of 
grand tactics and of even smaller-scale tactics."2 In addition, the tradition of 
studying the art of war among military circles has never been very widely 
spread, and Israel, where practical matters have guided military education, is 
not an exception to this. 
Research problem 
The purpose of this work is to examine the background and reasons 
behind the search for operational mobility within the Israeli Defence 
Forces. This study covers the years from the beginning of the 20th century to 
the wake of the Yom Kippur War in 1973. The years before Israel's 
independence provide a background for this study, but the main emphasis is 
on the time since Israel's independence. During this period, the IDF's doctrine 
and operational principles became a coherent entity that were tested in five 
wars. The stress is on conventional wars and not so much on peacetime low 
intensity operations. The major reason for this definition is the wider political 
and social dimensions of unconventional warfare. Although military methods 
are also partly used in counter-insurgency, and although units of the Israeli 
Defence Forces have also been used in these missions in Israel, many of the 
methods have not, however, been of a purely military nature. Besides, until the 
1980s the scope of counter-guerrilla operations, with some exceptions, does 
not necessitate a connection of the analysis of the basis of counterinsurgency 
with the operational military thinking behind conventional warfare. Therefore, 
the Israeli counter-insurgency doctrine should rather be a subject of an 
2 Harkavy, Robert E: The Lessons of Recent Wars: Toward Comparative Analysis, Harkavy, 
Robert E./Neuman, Stephanie G. (ed.): The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World. 
Volume I, Approaches and Case Studies, Lexington Books, Massachusetts/Toronto 1985, pi 
5 — 6 and 8. 
Robert E Harkavy was a professor of political science at Pennsylvania State University in 
1985. 
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independent study. This is the main reason why Israel's operation "Peace for 
Galilee" in 1982 in Lebanon is excluded. Nevertheless, there are some 
connections between the doctrines of conventional and unconventional 
warfare. These cases will be studied in chronological order. 
The primary aim of this thesis is to examine the foundations and origins of 
Israeli military thinking. No attempt has been made to provide a detailed 
historical account of specific battles and individual engagements. In order to 
achieve the primary aims, the following goals have been set: 
- To examine the thinking, and especially the intellectual foundations, of the 
people who have been responsible for the development of the operational 
doctrine. 
To collect and analyse the backgrounds of the doctrinal principles that have 
been adopted. 
- To view the application process of these principles from theory to practice. 
This means an examination of the development of the overall military 
system both in peacetime and wartime, a study of the training system, and 
also an examination of organisation and procurement issues. 
- To consider the role of war experiences in the Middle East and abroad on 
the development of doctrine. An important question is how the collection 
and analysis of data has been arranged and how experiences have been 
connected to the development of doctrine. 
In addition, in the analyses, Israeli operational concepts have also been 
considered from the viewpoint of the theory of manoeuvre warfare when 
possible. Although this theory is not an Israeli invention and lies outside the 
years this study covers, philosophically Israeli operational concepts and 
practise have had basic similarities with the principles of manoeuvre warfare 
theory. This also provides an interesting viewpoint for assessing past Israeli 
operational applications in today's terms. 
Previous research: sources on the development of the Israeli Defence Forces 
and the Arab-Israeli Wars 
Studies, books and articles written on the Arab-Israeli Wars and on the Israeli 
Army are mostly of Israeli-origin or have been written by Jews outside Israel, 
although several works have also been written in the United Kingdom and in 
the United States. However, since the Yom Kippur War of 1973 the Americans 
have shown still more interest in the wars of the Middle East. It is also obvious 
that the Soviets — whose equipment had been used by the Arabs and whose 
doctrine most of the opponents of Israel have applied in their preparations for 
war — have studied the Arab-Israeli wars and the Israeli art of war. The Arabs 
have also apparently conducted studies after their defeat in 1967. 
Nevertheless, most of the Soviet and Arab sources are still either unavailable 
to foreign researchers or their information is not published. It also must be 
noted that there are studies and books written in Hebrew. Because of the 
world's interest in the wars of the Middle East, the most significant works in 
Hebrew have been translated into English, with the possible exception of the 
most recent ones. 
XX 
From the viewpoint of this study, previous research on the development of 
the Israeli Defence Forces and on the Arab-Israeli Wars can be divided into 
three main categories: The first includes studies and literature that examine 
the Israeli Defence Forces in chronological order both during peacetime and 
wartime. The second group consists of works that deal with particular wars in 
the Middle East. The third group includes studies and literature that are 
concerned with some other aspects, such as the development of doctrine or 
the structure and activities of the IDF. Some of these sources also overlap and 
can be placed in more than one category. 
In the first category, the most important works are: Yigal Allon's The Making 
of Israel's Army (1970), Nigel T. Bagnall's The Israeli Experience: A Study of 
Quality (1973), Edward Luttwak's and Dan Horowitz's The Israeli Army (1974), 
Gunther Rothenberg's The Anatomy of the Israeli Army (1979) and Martin van 
Creveld's The Sword and the Olive (1998). 
General (IDF) Yigal Allon, one of the early military leaders of the Jewish 
defence organisations during and after WW II and later a minister in the Israeli 
government, provides a perspective on the bases of the development of Israeli 
doctrine. Some details about the Israeli art of war can be found in his book as 
well. Nevertheless, Allon doesn't particularly analyse the background of the 
operational thinking behind the development of the IDF. Therefore, the 
doctrine is mostly analysed at the strategic level and in the political context. In 
addition, this book only covers the years up to the late 1960s. However, 
because of Allon's status in Israel, The Making of Israel's Army gives one 
rather important point of view with some insights behind the doctrinal 
framework of the IDF during the 1950s and 1960s. 
Nigel T. Bagnall's (Brigadier, British Army, later General, Sir) study is a 
longitudinal analysis of the background of the performance of the IDF. The 
viewpoint is of the military art, in many cases also at the operational level. The 
obvious explanation for this is Bagnall's military background. The conclusions 
that have been drawn are sound. Nevertheless, in a way they lack depth. 
Bagnall neither thoroughly considers what has been typical of the Israeli art of 
war in certain phases in the past, nor does he analyse where the operational 
art might come from despite the fact that he has interviewed several Israeli 
military leaders. Whatever the reasons behind this, one explanation might be 
the shortness of the study or the sensitivity of this question at the time this 
work was conducted. 
The first rather detailed analysis of the Israeli Army was made by Edward 
Luttwak and Dan Horowitz in 1975. This book is based mainly on Israeli 
sources, though not on archival documents. It also has endnotes that give the 
researcher the possibility of judging the value of the information. The authors 
go into the development of the IDF in chronological order. They analyse, 
according to the introduction, the IDF's development from the tactical, strategic 
and political viewpoints. A more thorough familiarisation with this division 
shows that the word "strategic" in Luttwak's and Horowitz's vocabulary is 
parallel to the term operational because several operational concepts are also 
included. On this basis, the book also provides the reader with a good 
framework for perceiving some major features of the Israeli art of war. Instead, 
the weakness in this context is that although some central tactical and 
operational principles are presented and also explained, an analysis of the 
origins rests only on a few thinly supported statements. Thus, Luttwak and 
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Horowitz don't consider more thoroughly the links and similarities/differences 
between foreign influences and Israeli application. This obviously fell outside 
the scope of the book, although it might also have been a question of 
sources.3 
Professor Gunther Rothenberg's book The Anatomy of the Israeli Army is, in 
a way, a combination of Allon's and Luttwak's and Horowitz's works. This is 
natural, because both books are included in Rothenberg's source list, and also 
the source base seems similar to Luttwak's and Horowitz's with the exception 
that Rothenberg's book was published five years later than Luttwak's and 
Horowitz's and also includes material from between 1975 and 1979. 
Obviously, because of the quality of the sources and of the viewpoint, 
Rothenberg also does not describe the reasons behind the adopted principles 
and models of action in the IDF, although he provides some review of several 
aspects of the military art. This is mostly at the tactical and strategic levels 
without more closely examining the philosophical background.4 
Martin van Creveld's The Sword and the Olive is a comprehensive study 
that tries to see the IDF as a part of Israeli society. Van Creveld has also 
extended the coverage of his work up to our own time and filled in the earlier 
picture given by Luttwak and Horowitz and, to a lesser extent, the others with 
new sources and information. In addition, this book consists of a reference 
apparatus that allows the reader to follow the sources of the information. 
Despite its broad viewpoint, The Sword and the Olive also provides a view on 
purely tactical and operational matters within the IDF. In addition, van Creveld 
has had a critical perspective of his subject and has therefore succeeded in 
forming a rather convincing picture of the IDF's past. Nevertheless, like the 
other studies dealing with the IDF', this book neither contains an analysis of 
the typical traits of Israeli operational doctrine nor an examination of its origins. 
In any event, The Sword and the Olive provides a good framework for 
perceiving the changes in the IDF in chronological order.5 
The second group; i.e., previous research on the Arab-Israeli wars, contains 
a large number of books that concentrate on the events and details of the 
belligerent armies in the Middle East. Their shortcomings are a lack of 
analysis. They mainly include only battlefield descriptions, dates, names of 
commanders, numbers and strengths of forces etc. Of course, there are also 
exceptions. Trevor Dupuy's Elusive Victory (first published in 1978) is one of 
them. As a soldier, Colonel (U.S. Army) Dupuy, a well-known military analyst, 
has been able to conduct a very thorough analysis of the Arab-Israeli wars 
3 In 1975 Professor Luttwak was an Associate of Georgetown University's Center of 
Strategic and International Studies and a Visiting Professorial Lecturer at the John Hopkins 
University School of Advanced International Studies. At that time, Doctor Horowitz was 
senior lecturer in political science and sociology at the Hebrew University of Jerusalemi 
This book includes appendices that contain information on the organisation and personnel of 
the IDF. 
4 When The Anatomy of the Israeli Army was published in 1979, Rothenberg was Professor 
of Military History at Purdue University, Indiana. He is a WW II veteran of the British Army. 
In addition, he served in the U.S. Air Force from 1949 to 1955. 
5 Professor Martin van Creveld is a well-known military historian who has taught at the 
Hebrew University in Jerusalem since 1971. He has written twelve books. 
from the War of Independence to the Yom Kippur War (inclusive). This book 
can be seen as a base for starting research on the wars of the Middle East. 
The sources of Dupuy's book are also broad and contain both Arab and Israeli 
materiel, among them many interviews. In addition, Dupuy has conducted a 
comparative analysis of the armies during the period covered by his book, 
including tables of the strengths, losses and orders of battle in belligerent 
armies. Excluding the short summaries of the experiences of individual wars, 
the study does not, however, include an analysis of the development of the 
Israeli art of war or its background, which obviously was not even the purpose 
of this wide-ranging book. 
The third category consists of studies and literature that deal with the 
development of the IDF and its doctrine, but in the strategic and political 
context. The most important works in this group are: Zeev Schiff's A History of 
the Israeli Army (1974 and 1985), Louis Williams' The Israeli Defense Forces 
(1989), Eliezer Cohen's Israel's Best Defence (1993), Zvi Lanir's Israeli 
Security Planning in the 1980s (1984), Yoav Ben-Horin's and Barry Posen's 
Israel's Strategic Doctrine (1981), Raanan Gissin's dissertation Command, 
Control, and Communications Technology: Changing patterns of Leadership in 
Combat Organizations (1988), Michael I. Handel's The Evolution of Israeli 
strategy (1994) and Ariel Levite's article Offense and Defense in Israeli Military 
Doctrine (1990). 
Zeev Schiff, a respected Israeli military journalist of the Israeli newspaper 
Ha'aretz and commentator for both the New York Times and the Washington 
Post, has written several books on the wars of the Middle East and on the 
Israeli Army. A History of the Israeli Army has two editions. The second edition 
extends the period of time covered up to the mid 1980s. These books, 
although they do not analyse the Israeli art of war, offer, nevertheless, a lot of 
basic facts on the development of the IDF, including training. Louis Williams' 
The Israeli Defense Forces, an official publication of Israel's Ministry of 
Defence, gives the same view as Schiff's books. Williams' work is more 
detailed and includes a lot of basic information on the IDF, and some views on 
the art of war. It reaches up to the end of the 1980s. Eliezer Cohen's book 
Israel's Best Defense, an account of the Israeli Air Force, can also be included 
in this category. Colonel Cohen (IDF, ret.) is a former pilot and helicopter 
squadron commander of the Israeli Air Force. His book, although focusing 
more on battlefield descriptions of the Israeli wars than on peacetime 
development, deals with several key lines of development in both the IAF and 
the IDF. Nevertheless, the narrative of the book progresses more via 
observation than by any analysis of the background of the development. 
Finally, several studies concentrate on the doctrinal issues of the IDF. Yoav 
Ben Horin's and Barry Posen's Israel's Strategic Doctrine is a short, but 
illustrative, study of Israel's political-military environment and its influence on 
the evolution of the IDF's doctrine. This study is a part of a Rand research 
project for the Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
United States, and was supervised by several Israeli and American scholars. 
The study, including footnotes, is based on a large pool of source material, 
including published Israeli articles and interviews with people who have been 
involved in the development process. Ben-Horin's and Posen's study is able to 
outline the central principles behind Israeli doctrine, extending from the 
operational level to war policy, but because of its brevity cannot explain in 
detail the thoughts behind the development. Instead, Doctor Ariel Levite's 
analysis Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine concentrates on the 
operational level of warfare and provides a critical survey of the dilemma of 
offence and defence in Israeli operational doctrine. Although Levite's military-
professional extract is solid, he, like other researchers, accords the 
examination of the backgrounds of the chosen doctrinal principles and 
operational concepts a secondary place and, instead, explains more the 
deficiencies of offensive principles in the historical context in the IDF.6 
Raanan Gissin's thesis Command, Control, and Communications 
Technology: Changing patterns of Leadership in Combat Organizations offers 
insights — though on a quite narrow scale — on the Israeli way of thinking on 
the operational art. This work concentrates on the organisational development 
of the Israeli Air Force (IAF), but also introduces the development of central 
command principles within the context of the entire IDF. Gissin has included a 
study of organisational theory in his research. This approach allows a broader 
analysis of the military art with regards to the "hard" facts formed by 
organisational matters behind the art of war, in addition to philosophy. The 
origins of Israeli military thinking and operational issues are, however, 
analysed less. 
Israeli Security Planning in the 1980s, a collection of articles edited by 
Colonel Zvi Lanir (IDF, ret.), concentrates on Israeli defence planning at the 
strategic level. However, this book has a historical base, as has Ben-Horin's 
and Posen's study. Professor Michael I. Handel's The evolution of Israeli 
strategy: The psychology of insecurity and the quest for absolute security 
concentrates on the strategic level of warfare, also providing examples from 
the past. Together both Lanir's and Handel's studies complement Ben-Horin's 
and Posen's research and, despite their lack of operational analysis, provide 
an opportunity to arrange the central elements behind the Israeli art of war.7 
Previous research on the theory of mobile and mechanised warfare 
There are adequate sources on the general theoretical background of this 
study. The most important of them are the works dealing with the philosophy 
behind the concept of mobility, and the studies and books describing the ideas 
of the theoreticians of mechanised warfare as well as the thinking of those 
military leaders who have applied these concepts. Several translated versions 
of Sun Tzu's Art of War (1963, 1987, 1993) provide sufficient proof of the long-
term tendency of armies towards mobility. In the 20th century, thoughts of 
combining mobility with the military technology of mechanised armies arose. 
The concepts of the early phases of mechanised warfare in the 1920s and 
1930s can be seen in the contemporaneous works of the British military 
6 Doctor Levite is a former IDF officer who has been an analyst at the Israeli Ministry of 
Defence and Senior Research Associate at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel 
Aviv University. Levite's article is a summary of his book Offence and Defense in Israeli 
Military Doctrine. 
Handel has been Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College. He has published 
numerous books on the theory of the art of war. 
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analyst Major General John Fredrick Charles Fuller, The Foundations of the 
Science of War (1926) and Armored Warfare: An Annotated Edition of 
Lectures on F. S. R. 111 (1943), and in the works of Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, 
with the most significant of them being Strategy (1954, 1967, 1991) and 
Memoirs (1965). On a limited scale, the writings of the Soviet theoreticians 
Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky and Vladimir Kiriakoviz Triandafillov can also be 
included. In addition, information on the evolution of mechanised warfare can 
be found in the memoirs of several WW II commanders, the most important of 
them being German General Heinz Guderian's Panzer Leader (1952) and 
Erinnerungen Eines Soldaten (1956), and in the biography of British Field-
Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery, Monty (1981), written by Nigel Hamilton. 
Despite the abundance of sources, there are several problems in the study 
of the development of mechanised warfare. The first is the dispute over the 
theoretical origins of armoured warfare. Although scholars and military men, 
including Germans, agree upon the British impact on the German style of 
armoured warfare in WW II, they have different opinions about Fuller and 
Liddell Hart. In addition, Liddell Hart, unlike Fuller, continued writing after WW 
II and also modified his early thoughts. Therefore an analysis is necessary to 
find out the key thoughts of these men, in order to make possible the further 
examination of their influence on the Israeli art of war and to separate their 
influence from the influence of German practice. The most important of the 
studies and books in this context are: Brian Bond's Liddell Hart: A Study of his 
Military Thought (1977), Kenneth Macksey's The Tank Pioneers (1981), John 
Mearsheimer's Liddell Hart and the Weight of History (1988), Paul Dyster's 
dissertation In the Wake of the Tank: The 20th-century Evolution of the Theory 
of Armoured Warfare (1988), R. M. Ogorkiewicz's Armoured Forces: A History 
of Armoured Forces and their Vehicles (1970), Robert O'Neill's Doctrine and 
Training in the German Army 1919 — 1939 (1965), Anthony Trythall's "Boney 
Fuller': The Intellectual General 1878 — 1966 (1977) and Brian Holden Reid's 
J. F. C. Fuller. Military Thinker (1987). 
Professors Brian Bond and John Mearsheimer provide perspectives on 
Liddell Hart's role as a military theoretician. In the context of the development 
of armoured warfare, they have mildly divergent views. This problem will be 
discussed in greater detail in chapter 1. However, in brief Brian Bond tends to 
see Liddell Hart as the most important opinion-maker behind the German 
Blitzkrieg doctrine, although he also accords value to the other British tank 
pioneers and theoreticians. Doctor O'Neill and R.M. Ogorkiewicz have similar 
interpretations to Bond. In addition, Brian Bond has devoted one chapter of his 
book to Liddell Hart's Israeli connections. John Mearsheimer sees Liddell Hart 
as being less influential in armoured warfare. He stresses the importance of 
other British thinkers, like Fuller and the early tank officers, on the 
development of armoured warfare concepts between WW I and WW II; as do 
Anthony Trythall and Kenneth Macksey to a greater or lesser degree. Doctor 
Holden Reid concentrates on Fullers life and military thinking and also 
evaluates the differences and similarities of Fullers and Liddell Hart's thoughts 
in his book. Paul Dyster's descriptive dissertation provides an overview of the 
development of armoured warfare doctrines from the birth of the tank up to the 
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1980s. Although it contains a lot of details, this work does not, however, deeply 
penetrate the thinking behind the development.8 
Finally, the modern theory of manoeuvre warfare is also studied in this work 
to show the continuity of the development in the pursuit of mobility in the latter 
part of the 20th century. Although the theory of manoeuvre warfare is an 
invention of the 1970s, philosophically it can be seen as a combination of the 
concepts of "indirect approach" and "deep battle". William S. Lind, an 
American military analyst, presents the birth of manoeuvre warfare theory in 
his book Maneuver Warfare Handbook (1985). This work, furnished with 
endnotes, gives a short overview of the history of warfare and of the problems 
of mobility, but mainly concentrates on the problems of mobility in the Unites 
States Armed Forces. Christopher Bellamy's The Evolution of Modern Land 
Warfare: Theory and Practice (1990) and Richard Simpkin's Race to the Swift: 
Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare (1985) can be included in this 
category. These works represent the views of European officers on the 
concept of manoeuvre warfare and are mostly along the lines of the 
Americans. Clayton R. Newell's The Framework of Operational Warfare (1991) 
illustrates the theoretical background of manoeuvre warfare. Newell also tries 
to explain a method of researching operational art. This part of the book 
remains opaque because it is difficult to read but it provides, however, some 
ideas on perceiving the complexity of operational art. Finally, Robert 
Leonhard's book The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theory and 
AirLandBattle (1991) combines studies of manoeuvre warfare theory. 
Leonhard has succeeded in describing the history of the pursuit of mobility in a 
simplified form and has, in addition, been able to see several key clearly 
distinctive principles in manoeuvre warfare. Both Newell's and Leonhard's 
books have endnotes. This enables the reader to see the thinking and origins 
of their thoughts with regards to the early interpreters of mobility like Fuller, 
Liddell Hart and the Germans.9 
Central definitions 
Definitions, in particular of the levels of the art of war, have a special 
significance in this work. Because the concepts are often used in different 
ways, they must be defined precisely. The idea of the term the art of war" or 
its synonym "military art" has varied greatly in Israel depending on who is 
defining it: civilian scholars, scholars with a military background or purely 
8 Brian Bond was a personal friend of Liddell Hart's during the latter's final years. In the 
1990s Bond was Professor of the Department of War Studies, King's College London. 
Doctor Brian Holden Reid is a well-known Fuller researcher and Professor Brian Bond's 
colleague at King's College. 
John Mearsheimer is an American scholar, who was Professor of Political Science at the 
University of Chicago when he wrote his book on Liddell Hart. 
Anthony Trythall and Kenneth Macksey are British officers, who both are known for their 
contributions to military literature. 
R. M. Ogorkiewicz is a British researcher who specialises in fighting vehicles and armoured 
warfare. 
9 Newell and Leonhard are both U.S. Army officers and historians. 
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professional soldiers. It is generally accepted that the military art was divided 
in the IDF from its early years into three levels, although the exact term might 
vary from corresponding words elsewhere. While the understanding of the 
word "tactics" has been clear, such words as "grand tactics", "management" 
and "strategy" have typified the operational level of warfare, while "strategy" 
(partly) and "grand strategy" have typified that level where policy has also been 
involved. One characteristic has also been that the operational level has 
typically been defined according to the objective, i.e., what has been the 
desired outcome of the operation, and not according to the size of the force for 
the task. According to Doctor, Colonel (IDF, ret.) Meir Pa'il, the method of 
dividing the military art into three was adopted from the British. In this model, 
"grand tactics" was a synonym for organising military issues at the operational 
level of warfare. According to him, however, during the first two decades of 
Israel's independence Israeli officers were not very well aware of the level 
between "strategy" and "tactics", as was the case in the Anglo-Saxon world at 
that time.1° 
10 Interviews of Professor, Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Yoav Gelber 11 May 2000 in Haifa, 
Professor Alon Kadish 14 May 2000 in Jerusalem, Major General (ret.) Uri Simhoni 15 May 
2000 in Tel Aviv, Colonel (ret.), Professor Yehuda Wallach 16 May 2000 in Tel Aviv, 
Colonel, Doctor Shai Shaul 17 May 2000 in Tel Aviv, Lieutenant General (ret.) Dan Shomron 
22 May 2000 in Tel Aviv, Major General (ret.) Avraham Adan 22 May 2000 in Tel Aviv and 
Colonel (ret.), Doctor Meir Pa'il 26 May 2000 in Tel Aviv. 
Professor Yoav Gelber, Haifa University, is an expert on the history of the founding of the 
IDF, a specialist on the Yom Kippur War and an expert on the history of Israeli intelligence. 
Professor Gelber was also in active service before his civilian career. 
Professor Alon Kadish, Hebrew University in Jerusalem, is one of the top lecturers on 
military history in Israel and an expert on Israel's War of Independence. 
General Simhoni ended his military service as deputy commander of the Northern Command 
in which post he served during operation "Peace for Galilee". Simhoni served in several 
paratroop and infantry assignments during his career, including a stint as commander of the 
Golani Brigade. 
Professor Wallach is a well-known Israeli historian. He was also a personal friend of Sir 
Basil Liddell Hart. During the Sinai Campaign of 1956, he commanded a divisional task 
force. 
Colonel Shaul is Head of the Department of History, IDF. 
General Shomron was the 13th Chief of Staff, IDF. During his active career he served in 
different missions ranging from paratrooper actions to being the commander of an armoured 
brigade during the Yom Kippur War. 
General Adan ended his service in the post of Deputy Chief of Staff. His military career 
consisted mostly of assignments in the armoured forces, including Commander-in-Chief 
Armoured Corps. 
Doctor Pa'il is a well-known Israeli scholar and lecturer. During his active service, Pa'il 
served in several assignments, mostly in the mechanised infantry. Before his resignation he 
was the commander of the Israeli Central Officer School. He has written a manual called 
Combat Doctrine. 
Professor Wallach tends to divide the art of war in a Clausewitzian way; between tactics and 
strategy where strategy is the interaction of policy and military means. Wallach, however, 
admits that there has been an area between strategy and tactics that could also form an 
independent entirety. 
According to General Simhoni, the operational level of warfare was clearly understood in 
Israel after the Vietnam War. However, he stresses that since the 1940s the IDF actually 
had four levels in the definitions; tactical, management, strategy and grand strategy, of 
which management and strategy together were near the present definition of operational. 
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The tendency to associate the art of war with more practical concerns rather 
than philosophical issues has been also striking. According to Professor Yoav 
Gelber, the art of war is not an art but the ability to organise, prepare and wage 
war. Generals Shomron and Adan support this view. In Israel, military art has 
been less about theory and more about the means to organise forces prior to 
battle, and their use in battle. Colonel Shaul tries to analyse this in a more 
theoretical way. According to his assessment, the Israeli art of war has been a 
combination of the thoughts of the military theoreticians Antoine Henri de 
Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz. Jominianism has been a way of 
understanding the military art as science, meaning mathematics and the 
organisation of forces. Clausewitz can be seen more as holding a 
philosophical point of view, giving choices to the imagination. Doctor Pa'il has 
similar views. He tends to see that both the practical and philosophical 
approach have existed at all the levels of the art of war in Israel. According to 
him, some 40 percent of all activities of the IDF can be included in the category 
of science or professionalism while the remaining 60 percent consist of mental 
items or art; such as how to use professionalism to outmanoeuvre the enemy 
or how to use your open-mindedness." 
However, it is important to note that until quite recently, Israeli war policy -
or strategy in today's terms — has been quite restricted. The emphasis has 
merely been on military aspects, i.e., on the operational level of warfare which 
might be a derivative of the dominance of the practical aspect in Israeli military 
thinking. Within this framework, the Israelis have greatly invested in winning 
battles. The strategic level, where whole wars are won or lost, has been less 
important, as Professor Handel describes in his article The Evolution of Israeli 
Strategy.12 For these reasons, the key definitions are examined quite 
thoroughly in this thesis. It is also important to note that although the 
generalisations of the central concepts that have been used in this work are 
given here; the contents of the definitions and terms have varied. This problem 
will be analysed more in the context of the subject, if necessary. In addition, 
certain definitions that are not essential to the understanding of the framework 
of this study are provided in the main text. 
According to Colonel Shaul, the term grand strategy belonged to Prime Minister David Ben-
Gurion's vocabulary; it meant the final outcome of the defence policy. 
11  Interviews of Professor, Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Yoav Gelber, Colonel, Doctor Shai 
Shaul, Lieutenant-General (ret.) Dan Shomron, Major General (ret.) Avraham Adan and 
Colonel (ret.), Doctor Meir Pa'il. 
Carl von Clausewitz was a Prussian General and military theoretician, and a contemporary 
of Napoleon as was also the Swiss military theoretician, General Baron Antoine Henri de 
Jomini. Jomini, however, tended to see war in a practical manner at campaign level while 
Clausewitz analysed warfare more in a political context. 
12 
 Handel, Michael I: The evolution of Israeli strategy: The psychology of insecurity and the 
quest for absolute security in Murray, Williamson, Knox, MacGregor and Bernstein, Alvin 
(ed.): The Making of Strategy. Rulers, States and War, Cambridge University Press, New 
York 1994, p. 570 and 572. 
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Historical context of the definitions: the art of war 
The most quoted and traditional definition of the art of war is the one presented 
by Clausewitz. Simplifying, Clausewitz described the art of war with the term 
"the conduct of war", which consists of the planning and conduct of fighting. 
According to him, the art of war is "the art of using given means in combat". In 
a wider sense the art of war also includes the creation of fighting forces: their 
raising, armament, equipment and training. In order to separate planning and 
fighting, Clausewitz divided the art of war into two levels: tactics and strategy. 
Tactics in his concept consists of "the use of armed forces in an 
engagement", which can be defined as a greater or lesser number of 
individual fighting acts. Strategy in Clausewitz's vocabulary means "the use of 
engagements for the object of the war".13 
For centuries this dichotomy was regarded as satisfactory. Wars consisted 
of tactical battles and strategic manoeuvres aimed at seeking the most 
favourable circumstances for an engagement. Christopher Bellamy gives an 
illuminating view of the development of these definitions in the military art in his 
book The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare: Theory and Practice. After the 
adoption of national conscription in Napoleon's Army, the mere growth of 
armed forces inflated individual battles to series of battles; i.e., to operations. 
This lead to a recognition of grand tactics, originally Jomini's definition. In this 
analogy, grand tactics, the third level of the art of war between strategy and 
tactics, was, according to Bellamy, "the art of posting troops upon the 
battlefield according to the accidents of the ground, of bringing them into 
action, and the art of fighting upon a map." Grand tactics decide the manner of 
execution and the employment of troops. Strategy was "the art of making war 
upon the map and comprehending the whole theatre of operations." It decided 
where to act, but grand tactics lead to the destruction of the enemy. Today 
grand tactics are commonly called the operational level of war or the 
operational art.14 
In the latter half of the 19th century, Helmut von Moltke the Elder, a Prussian 
and German Field-Marshal, began to use the term operations to describe 
activities between tactics and strategy. However, it was only after WW I that 
the concept of the operational level was adopted in the German military art: as 
was also the case in the Soviet Union. According to Bellamy, simultaneously 
with the Prussians the terms operational, as well as the operational level of 
warfare, were adopted in the Anglo-Saxon armies, only the terminology was 
different. Nevertheless, Bellamy later concedes a little and adds that the British 
knew the German way of thinking very well and wrote glowing articles about it, 
but they then forgot the whole thing. This statement is interesting, because it is 
quite commonly acknowledged that the British and Americans did not at this 
13 Howard, Michael & Paret, Peter: Carl von Clausewitz. On War, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey 1984, pp. 127 — 128. 
14 Bellamy, Christopher: The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare. Theory and Practice, 
Routledge, London and New York 1990, p. 56 and Jomini: Art of War, Greenwood Press 
Publishers, Westport Connecticut 1971, pp. 69 — 70. 
Jomini used a definition of "grand tactics" that can be linked to the operational level of 
warfare in his work The Art of War. 
time understand the operational level of warfare as an independent entity. It is 
obvious that before the 1970s neither the British nor the Americans had widely 
crystallised the interface between the strategic and the tactical levels of 
warfare with several exceptions, the best known of them being Captain, Sir 
Basil Liddell Hart and General J. F. C. Fuller. Their roles will be discussed 
more in chapter 1. As late as after WW II, the British divided the military art, 
according to British General Peter Young, a former deputy commander of the 
Arab Legion of Jordan and instructor at the Royal Military Academy of 
Sandhurst, into four levels: grand strategy, strategy at lower level, grand 
tactics and tactics. In this construct, grand strategy covered war policy, 
strategy at lower level or campaign level was the battle between two military 
plans, and grand tactics consisted of the broad movements of formations -
divisions and brigades — upon the battlefield.15 
Doctrine 
The term doctrine describes how an army fights. Raanan Gissin divides 
Israel's doctrine into two levels: a national-strategic level and an operational-
military level. The former can be interpreted as the grand strategic level and 
the latter as the operational level. According to Gissin, the national-strategic 
level of doctrine incorporates the military means and constraints used to 
formulate and prescribe the likely courses of action open to a nation in pursuit 
of its policy." At this level, doctrine encompasses the whole spectrum of the 
threat or actual use of force, including the use or the threat of nuclear weapons 
for the purpose of deterrence as the ultimate guarantee. At the operational-
military level, "doctrine provides the basic principles that govern the 
employment of combat forces of a given military organisation." At this level, 
doctrine includes components of force structure, tactics and certain rules of 
15 
 Bellamy, p. 60 — 63, Young, Peter: The Israeli Campaign 1967, William Kimber and Co. 
Limited, London 1967, p. 60 — 61 and Glantz, David M: Soviet Military Operational Art. In 
Pursuit of Deep Battle, BPCC Wheatons Ltd, Exeter 1991, p. 19. 
According to Bellamy, von Moltke also adopted the principle of strategic deployment, the 
"march-manoeuvre", which preoccupied military thinkers for almost the next hundred years. 
This concept was related to strategy and logistics and should not be connected to 
operational manoeuvre. 
See also The Royal United Service Institution Debates the Arab-Israeli War, Thursday, July 
6, 1967, LH 15/5/304, part 2 and FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations, 
Headquarters, Department of the (U.S.) Army, Washington, D.C., February 1962, p. 3 — 4 
and 15 — 16. 
In the 1960s, the Americans did not speak of the operational level in their Field Manual FM 
100-5, they only mentioned the operational environment, which is connected only to the level 
of command, not to the aim, as is the case today. Although the employment of military force 
was understood as a means to support national policy, the operational environment was not 
seen as an entity but a complex spectrum that makes (it) impossible to reduce the conduct 
of military operations to a series of precise axioms and simple directions." 
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engagement.16 Although it is obvious that these definitions have at least 
slightly varied since the creation of Israeli doctrine, they are still precise 
enough to be used in this study. 
Tactics 
Generally speaking, the term tactics is understood in the same way both in the 
Western countries and in the former Soviet Union and Russia. Tactics is "the 
art and science of employing available means — especially mental, 
environmental and battle-technical ones — to win battles and engagements." At 
the tactical level of war, battles and engagements are planned and executed to 
accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. These 
victories, put together, achieve operational results. Engagements are "small 
conflicts or skirmishes, usually between opposing forces, and they are 
normally short in duration." A battle consists of "a series of related 
engagements; it lasts longer than an engagement, involves larger forces, and 
can affect the course of the campaign." A campaign is "a connected series of 
military operations that form a distinct phase of war. It is waged to accomplish 
a long-range major strategic objective." According to this view, battles can also 
be controlled at the operational level, as the Israelis have done. This question 
will be further discussed later in this section.17 
16 
 Gissin, Raanan: Command, Control, and Communications Technology: Changing patterns 
of Leadership in Combat Organizations, Ph.D dissertation, Graduate School of Syracuse 
University, U.M.I., Dissertation Information Service, Michigan 1988, p. 4 and Handel, p. 553. 
See also Ben-Horin & Posen, p. vi — viii and Herbert, Paul Hardy: Toward the Best Available 
Thought: The Writing of Field Manual 100-5, "Operations" by the United States Army, 1973 -
1976, PhD dissertation, The Ohio State University, U.M.I., Dissertation Information Service, 
Michigan 1988, p. 1, Glantz, p. 37 and The British Military Doctrine (1989), p. 3 — 4. 
Ben-Horin and Posen use logically the same division as Gissin, although they use different 
terms (political-military and operational). Gissin's definition is used because it explains more 
thoroughly the contents of the concepts. 
Today's British and American definitions, quite similar to the Israeli practice and to the 
definitions in general, can be seen in Paul Hardy's dissertation. He defines doctrine as 
"authoritative fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions." 
17 
 Field Manual FM 100-5 Headquarters 100-5, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 
14 June 1993, http://www.atsc-army.org/cgi-bin/ atdl.d11/fm/100-5/100-5c6a.htm#LINK, 
28.5.1998 at 08.25, Leonhard, Robert: The Art of Maneuver. Maneuver-Warfare Theory and 
AirLand Battle, Presidio Press, Novato CA 1991, p. 9, British Defence Doctrine (1996), Joint 
Warfare Publication (JWP) 0-01, MOD CS(M)G 1996, p. 1.9, Glantz, p. 13 and Tsouras, 
Peter, Watson, Bruce W, Watson, Susan M (ed.): United States Army. A Dictionary, Garland 
Publishing Inc., New York & London 1991, p. 104. 
Usually tactics have also been related to the size of forces; an engagement is fought at 
division level or lower. These engagements may or may not develop into a battle. Battles 
occur when a division, corps, or an army fights for significant objectives. They may be short 
and fought in relatively small areas or they last several weeks and cover large areas. In 
small armies, like in the IDF, this interpretation has been proportioned to the size of the 
forces, i.e., even brigades can be operational, if their objectives are at that level. 
Operational art 
Clayton R. Newell provides the simplest definition of operational art. It is the 
variety of measures how military commanders conducting war from the 
operational perspective balance the ends, ways, and means of war."18 This is a 
good foundation for analysing the Israeli terms as well. Generally in Israel 
before the 1970s, strategy was quite near to today's definition of operational 
art. Liddell Hart's definition of strategy, also used in the forms of pure strategy 
or military strategy, meant a sound calculation and co-ordination of the ends 
and means. Mearsheimer confirms this and interprets Liddell Hart's definitions 
as follows: "Strategy is concerned with how all the major units of an army and 
its supporting tactical air forces are deployed and moved about the theatre of 
operations to achieve the overall campaign objective. Strategy, in other words, 
is concerned with the ways in which the different battles that comprise a 
campaign fit together to produce the desired military outcome." The connection 
between the Israeli definition and the British way of thinking becomes apparent 
in Leo Heiman's article. Heiman, who gives no name to this entity, sees the 
activities between tactics and war strategy as follows: "Actual command of the 
armed forces and the conduct of military, naval, and air operations, which were 
the responsibility of the Chief of the General Staff." This definition reveals that 
an operational entirety was understood in Israel at least to some extent, 
according to Colonel Shaul, already since the late phases of the War of 
Independence. Nevertheless, Heiman's definition doesn't fully explain activities 
between the General Staff level and the tactical level, i.e., activities that can be 
included in grand tactics.19 
Before the 1950s this undefined operational entity can be seen in the Israeli 
manner of defining tasks for their combat formations. In Israel the different 
levels of warfare have not only been measured by the scale of the forces 
involved but, exactly as von Moltke had said, in terms of aims. This is apparent 
in the overall tasks assigned to Israeli brigades. In general, a brigade was 
seen as a tactical echelon engaged mainly in one task at a time. Nevertheless, 
the brigade was also defined as the primary force in the IDF. This means that it 
had the capability of carrying out the majority of tasks on the battlefield 
independently and for a defined period of time, usually a few days. By doing 
so, the Israelis measured — in a matter of fact way — operative goals in terms of 
18 Newell, Clayton R: The Framework of Operational Warfare, Routledge, London 1991, p. 
38 and 79. 
19 Heiman, Leo, War in the Middle East, p. 58 — 59, Mearsheimer, p. 16 and Liddell Hart, B. 
H: Strategy, second revised edition, A Meridian Book, New York 1991, p. 321 — 322 and 
interview of Colonel, Doctor Shai Shaul. 
A Polish-born Israeli foreign press correspondent Heiman studied in the Soviet Union and 
fought during WW II with Soviet partisan forces against the German Army. 
See also Rothenberg, Gunther E: The Anatomy of the Israeli Army, B. T. Batsford Ltd., 
London 1979, p. 77. 
Rothenberg explains the role of the Chief of Staff in Israel. In the IDF, there did and still 
does not exist a Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces and therefore the Chief of Staff 
was defined as the sole executive head of the entire multi-service army. Because he was 
always chosen from the ground forces, there was no need for a separate ground forces 
commander. 
their tactical formations. Apparently the lack of the term operational modified 
the practice. Although a brigade was defined as a tactical formation, the 
definition primary force gave it grand tactical goals, only an exact term for this 
didn't exist. Therefore, the overall task of a brigade was defined rather freely, 
but mentally the definition of the primary force can be linked to the operational 
level of warfare. In addition, before the introduction of a divisional echelon of 
command the brigades were the only formations to implement operational 
tasks.2°  
The Israeli definition of strategy also coincides with the general definitions of 
operational art today. According to the British and the American definitions, at 
the operational level of war, joint and combined operational air, land, and naval 
forces within a theatre of operations perform subordinate campaigns and major 
operations, and plan, conduct, and sustain to accomplish the strategic 
objectives of the unified commander or higher military authority." The 
operational art can also be derived from the statements above as follows: the 
disposition of forces, selection of objectives, and actions taken to weaken or 
out-manoeuvre the enemy in the battles and exploit tactical gains." In addition, 
these definitions of operational art reinforce, contrary to the field manuals in 
the first decades after WW II, that the intended purpose, not the level of 
command, determines whether a unit functions at the operational level. This 
also suits the Israeli definitions well where just the objective was the 
touchstone of the level of military art. Therefore, in this work the terms 
"strategy" and "operational art" are used in the same literal sense of the word, 
and if there is a need for exceptions they are mentioned.21  
20 Avidor, Gideon: From Brigade to Division, Military Review, October 1978, p. 65 — 66 and 
68 — 69. 
See also Field Manual FM 100-5 Headquarters 100-5, Department of the Army, Washington, 
DC, 14 June 1993, http://www.atsc-army.org/c/s.d11/ atdl.d11/fm/100-5/100-5c6a.htm#LINK, 
28.5.1998 at 08.25, Design for Military operations - The British Military Doctrine, 1989, p. 37, 
British Defence Doctrine (1996), p. 1.9 and Tsouras, Watson & Watson, p. 104. 
It has not been unique to define the levels of warfare according to the aims. In large armies, 
however, quite usually tactics and operational art have also been related to the size of 
forces; an engagement is fought at division level and lower. According to this view, the 
border between the tactical and operational level of warfare — when measured by the size of 
a force — lies at the divisional level where a division can be both a tactical and operational 
force. 
In addition, British field manuals mentioned that the term operational also describes a unit's 
military effectiveness as follows: "Unit X is operational, Unit Y is not." 
21 
 Newell, p. 79, Field Manual FM 100-5 Headquarters 100-5, Department of the Army, 
Washington, DC, 14 June 1993, http://www.atsc-army.org/cgi-bin/atdl.d11/fm/100-5/100- 
5c6a.htm#LINK, 28.5.1998 at 08.25, Design for Military operations - The British Military 
Doctrine, 1989, p. 37 and British Defence Doctrine (1996), p. 1.9. 
See also Glantz, p. 10, Gay, Mark P: Soviet and US Operational Styles of War, Military 
Review, September 1985, p. 48 and Tiberi, Paul: German versus Soviet Blitzkrieg, Military 
Review, September 1985, p. 64. 
Glantz, Tiberi and Gay all are U.S. officers. They give an overview of the Soviet concepts. In 
the Soviet Union, there was one difference with the Western definitions. Although the 
Soviets also stressed that it was the purpose that determined the level of the military art, 
they also connected the size of forces to their definition as follows: "Operational art 
encompasses the theory and practice of preparing for and conducting combined and 
independent operations by large units, i.e., fronts and armies." 
The term mobility is linked to operational art because it is seen as the 
essence of conducting war from the operational perspective. Mobility can be 
defined as "a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move 
from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfil their primary mission." By 
extension mobile warfare, also known as warfare of movement, occurs when 
"opposing sides seek to seize and hold the initiative by the use of manoeuvre, 
organisation of fire and use of terrain." These definitions coincide with the 
terms manoeuvre and manoeuvre warfare, which are the current terms for 
mobile warfare. Today, attrition or attrition warfare is generally seen as the 
opposite of manoeuvre. Attrition can be defined as the reduction of the 
effectiveness of a force caused by the loss of personnel or equipment to 
enemy fire." However, the dividing line between manoeuvre and attrition is 
usually not so clear as can be seen in the following statement. At the 
operational level, manoeuvre is usually understood as the "employment of 
forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire 
potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order 
to accomplish the mission."22 
The word manoeuvre also has a more philosophical interpretation, which fits 
well with the Israeli operational art. According to Fuller, a "grand tactician does 
not think of physical destruction but of mental destruction of the enemy. 
Instead, when the mind of the enemy's command can be attacked only through 
the bodies of his men, it is a question of minor tactics, which though related, is 
a different expression of force." In this concept, manoeuvre means the battle 
between two plans energised by two wills, and not so much the struggle 
between two or more military forces. The operational commander designs a 
campaign to attain the grand strategic goals, so that when the tactical forces 
fight their battles, they will concentrate against their opponent's weaknesses 
rather than pitting strength against strength. This way of thinking has 
characterised the Israeli art of war. According to Doctor, Colonel (IDF, ret.) 
Hanan Shai, at the operational level the aim is also to break the opponent's 
plan. In Israel this is called independent thinking. This means that small forces 
will also act at the operational level, if their action is directed against an 
opponent's plan. In addition, the idea of concentrating on the opponent's 
weaknesses is among the principles that are seen as the central pillars behind 
the manoeuvre warfare theory of today. The concepts of mobility and 
manoeuvre will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 1.23 
Finally, the concept of the centre of gravity (COG) is key to all operational 
design. It derives from the fact that an armed combatant is a complex 
organism whose effective operation depends on the performance of each of its 
22 Bellamy, p. 60 — 61, The Official Dictionary of Military Terms, second edition, Global 
Professional Publications, Washington 1992, p. 218 and 233 and Tsouras, Watson & 
Watson, p. 67 and 472. 
23 Fuller, J. F. C: The Foundations of the Science of War, Hutchinson & CO., London 1926, 
p. 96 — 97 and discussions with Colonel (IDF, ret.), Doctor Hanan Shai 8 and 25 May 2000 
in Tel Aviv. 
Doctor, Colonel Hanan Shai is a lecturer at several Israeli universities and other institutions. 
He is also a decorated veteran of the Yom Kippur War. 
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component parts and on the smoothness with which they implement the will of 
the commander. In Israel the revealing of the enemy's COG has, according to 
Shai, been central at all levels of warfare. In addition, this way of thinking is 
central in manoeuvre warfare. As with any complex organism, some 
components are more vital than others to the smooth and reliable operation of 
the whole. If these are damaged or destroyed, their loss unbalances the entire 
structure, producing a cascading deterioration of cohesion and effectiveness, 
which may result in complete failure and will invariably leave the force 
vulnerable to further damage. The COG of an armed force refers to the 
sources of strength or balance. It is that characteristic, capability, or locality 
from which the force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to 
fight. Clausewitz defined it as the hub of all power and movement, on which 
everything depends." Its attack is — or should be — the focus of all operations. 
Usually and more usefully the concept of COG is applied at the operational 
level, where the size of the enemy force and scale of its operations make it 
difficult to decide where and how best to attack it. Even at this level, the COG 
may be a component of the field force — the mass of the enemy force, the 
boundary between two of its major combat formations, a vital command and 
control centre, or perhaps its logistical base or lines of communication. Despite 
the tendency to understand the concept of the COG as a function at the 
operational level of warfare, it also exists, however, at the tactical and strategic 
levels. Tactical formations can and frequently have centres of gravity or points 
of gravity (e.g., a key command post or a key piece of terrain on which the 
unit's operations are anchored). At the strategic level, the COG may be a key 
economic resource or locality, the strategic transport capabilities by which a 
nation maintains its armies in the field, or a vital part of the homeland itself.24 
Strategy 
Leo Heiman examines the Israeli definitions of the military art in his article War 
in the Middle East: An Israeli View, Military Review, September 1967. 
According to Heiman, up to the 1970s the Israelis divided strategy into two 
parts: "grand strategy' and "war strategy'. Grand strategy "combined the 
military effort with political, economic, psychological, and diplomatic campaigns 
and was the responsibility of the War Cabinet." War strategy, which 
"determined the general course of action, timing, and objectives of war", was 
handled by the Supreme Command Council, whose chairman was the Minister 
of Defence. These definitions coincide with Liddell Hart's grand strategy, which 
was, according to Mearsheimer, the relationship between military means and 
international commitments.25 Heiman's manner of analysing grand strategy 
and war strategy reveals similarities with the British definitions at this time. On 
the whole, the Israeli ways of defining the levels of military art were, until the 
late 1970s quite similar to the British. 
24 Tsouras, Watson & Watson, p. 109 and discussions with Doctor, Colonel Hanan Shai. 
25 Heiman, Leo, War in the Middle East: An Israeli View, Military Review, September 1967, 
p. 58 — 59, Ben-Horin, Yoav and Posen, Barry: Israel's Strategic Doctrine, Rand Publications 
Series, Santa Monica, California 1981, p. 1 and Mearsheimer, p. 17. 
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Other definitions 
Combined arms and joint (activities) 
The definitions of combined arms and of joint (activities) are also linked to the 
operational level of warfare. The generalisations below are made on the basis 
of the American definitions. They are also useful in the Israeli context. 
Universally, combined arms refers to the "synchronised use of two or more 
separate units of different type of weapons systems. Thus, the aim of 
combined arms tactics is to create a multiplier effect where the capacity of the 
combined arms team is greater than the sum of the units operating 
independently." The term joint (activities) is an extension of the previous term. 
Joint (activities) means "activities, operations, organisations, etc., in which 
elements of more than one service of the same nation participate." In many 
cases, combined arms and joint (activities) can be defined in a similar manner. 
The difference between combined arms actions and joint (activities) is that 
combined arms actions can only consist of elements of one service. 
Sometimes the level at which decisions are made has also been decisive in 
the definitions.26 
In Israel, the term "combined arms", Shiliv Kochot, is relatively new. It was 
adopted after the Yom Kippur War to describe the post-1973 combat ethic of 
ground forces, especially the co-operation between armoured forces and 
infantry. Despite the lack of a definition, the principles of co-operation between 
different branches already existed earlier, although they mainly were not in 
balance in today's terms. Joint operations were implemented at the General 
Staff level between the War of Independence and the Yom Kippur War. 
Basically this was a question of the economical use of small forces. Already in 
June 1948 territorial commands, consisting of units of different branches of the 
ground forces, and commands for the Air Force and Navy were formed as 
commands under the General Staff. According to Netanel Lorch, this was done 
for three reasons: to co-ordinate every type of military operation closely with 
ground forces, to economise manpower and avoid duplication, and to 
streamline procurement and unify training methods to facilitate inter-service 
co-operation. However since the Yom Kippur War (inclusive), the Israelis have 
also conducted joint exercises at territorial command leve1.27 Today, the 
definitions of joint and combined arms are closely linked together. In addition, 
since the 1960s a tendency of also favouring inter-service operations in 
counter-guerrilla and counter-terrorism operations can be seen, although to a 
lesser extent than in conventional warfare. This type of action can be called 
"small combined arms" operations: a term that approaches the U.S. definition 
of "compound war". 
26 Tsouras, Watson & Watson, p. 136 — 137 and The Official Dictionary of Military Terms, p. 
196. 
27 
 Lorch, Netanel: Shield of Zion. The Israel Defense Forces, Howell Press Inc., 
Charlottesville, VA, 1991, p. 56 — 57 and 59, Katz, Samuel, M: Follow Me! A History of 
Israel's Military Elite, Arms & Armour Press Ltd., London 1989, p. 140 and Luttwak, Edward 
and Horowitz, Dan: The Israeli Army, Allen Lane Penguin Books Ltd., London 1975, p. 97. 
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Compound War 
The Americans define the combination of conventional warfare and counter-
guerrilla warfare" as compound warfare. The Vietnam War, the Soviet war in 
Afghanistan and Israel's war in Lebanon were wars of this type. This definition 
is also linked to the terms insurgency and counter-insurgency, whose 
definitions will be discussed later in this chapter.28 
Conventional warfare 
Conventional war is an armed conflict without the use of nuclear weapons." 
Generally the use of biological and chemical weapons are also excluded in 
conventional warfare. In Israel, nuclear weapons are not a self-evident fact. 
Their role is seen as minimal; in conventional war, in low-intensity conflict, or in 
a war of attrition. According to Professor Handel, nuclear weapons are the 
"ultimate guarantee" for Israeli strategists.29 
Mid-intensity conflict 
According to both Robert Leonhard and Clayton Newell, the crises of the 
Middle East illustrate the phenomenon of mid-intensity conflicts. Mid-intensity 
conflict can be described as "classical or traditional warfare to a degree, 
where organised military forces confront each other in relatively well-defined 
and organised theatres of operations." 3° 
Low intensity conflict (LIC) 
Low-intensity conflict is defined as "a limited politico-military struggle to 
achieve political, social, economic, or psychological objectives." Close to this 
definition are both the terms revolutionary warfare and insurgency. Low 
intensity conflict is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic and 
psycho-social pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Low-intensity 
conflict is generally confined to a geographic area and is often characterised 
by constraints on the weaponry, tactics and the level of violence. Counter-
measures in low intensity conflicts are called counterinsurgency or counter-
revolutionary warfare. Counterinsurgency and counter-revolutionary 
warfare consist of "military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, 
and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency." Therefore, in a 
counterinsurgency operation, firepower — and particularly antitank firepower — 
28 Discussions with Doctors Christopher Gabel and Robert Baumann in Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas in 13.11.1997. Both men are researchers at the Combat Studies Institute and 
instructors at the U.S. Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth. 
29 United States Army Dictionary (1991), p.166 and Handel, The Evolution of Israeli strategy 
(1994), p. 553. 
39 Leonhard, p. 232 and Newell, p. 21. 
The Korean War and Iran-Iraq War are also typical examples of mid-intensity conflicts in 
modern warfare. 
is of less importance than the imperative of finding the elusive enemy and 
bringing him to battle.31  These definitions are also sufficient to describe the 
Israeli peace-time paramilitary threat, including the Palestinian Intifada uprising 
since 1987. Because of the wider social dimensions of low intensity conflicts, 
purely military counter-measures, even including the use of special forces, 
have proved to be inadequate in this type of threat. 
The means of unconventional warfare are closely linked to low intensity 
conflicts. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Military Terms Dictionary defines 
unconventional warfare as follows: "A broad spectrum of military and 
paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled or 
politically sensitive territory. Unconventional warfare includes, but is not limited 
to, the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, 
sabotage, and other operations of a low visibility, covert or clandestine nature. 
These interrelated aspects of unconventional warfare may be prosecuted 
singly or collectively by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported 
and directed in varying degrees by (an) external source(s) during all conditions 
of war or peace." Guerrilla warfare is defined almost identically as "military 
and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held or hostile territory by 
irregular, predominantly indigenous forces." Counter-measures in 
unconventional warfare are termed counter-guerrilla warfare, which includes 
operations and activities conducted by armed forces, paramilitary forces, or 
non-military agencies against guerrillas. These definitions are also suitable in 
Israel's case.3  
Finally, there is the definition of terrorism. Generally terrorism is defined as 
the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or 
property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve 
political, religious, or ideological objectives." The Israelis also include violence 
against military objectives — i.e., against personnel and materiel — in peacetime 
in their definition of terrorism. Correspondingly counter-terrorism consists of 
"offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism." Israeli 
counter-measures are officially described as being directed against only 
military targets, but increased use of force has occurred occasionally.33 
Methods 
A Finnish professor and authority on military history, Matti Lauerma, describes 
the history of the art of war as the cultural history of warfare, which examines 
phenomena that have been typical of warfare or been an impetus for further 
31  Joint Chiefs of Staff Military Terms Dictionary CD-rom, Dictionary of Military Terms, p. 93 
and Leonhard, p. 225. 
32 Dictionary of Military Terms, p. 161 and 383. 
33 Dictionary of Military Terms, p. 94 and 370 and Feldt, Mikael: Israelin sotilaalliset 
vastatoimet lntifadan kukistamiseksi Lansirannalla ja Gazassa (Israel's Military Counter-
Measures to Thwart the Intifada in the West Bank and Gaza Strip), a study from the General 
Staff Officer Course, National Defence College of Finland, Gummerus Kirjapaino Oy, 
Saarijanti 1997, p. 15. (Original in Finnish, contains an English summary). 
development.34 According to this framework, this study can be placed in areas 
of history, the history of ideas and the military sciences, which do not form 
separate entities but overlap. History as a science has held a central role and 
provided the basic tools to approach the subject. Thus, primary sources — in so 
far as they have been available — have formed the skeleton of the study and 
their role has been important in placing the events in logical order. Therefore, 
the research problem is also approached in historical-chronological order. The 
analysis of the development of Israeli military thinking, especially in the long 
run, demanded, however, strategic, operational and tactical analyses. 
Nevertheless, these analyses were also conducted in a historical context and 
were mostly qualitative. In this way, the method of approaching Israeli military 
thinking resembles the study of the history of ideas, and further on, reinforces 
Professor Lauerma's views of the role of the history of the art of war in the 
discipline of history. 
The main method of this thesis, as described above, has been historical-
descriptive longitudinal analysis. However, other methods have also been 
used to a lesser degree. The abundance of sources makes the (random) study 
of the art of war difficult. Therefore, a systematic plan is needed so that 
maximum benefit can be achieved. Professor Robert E. Harkavy, a specialist 
in national security policy, arms control, and U.S. foreign policy, analyses this 
dilemma in his article The Lessons of Recent Wars: Toward Comparative 
Analysis. According to Harkavy, methodologically the "lessons learned" or 
"insights gained" can be seen as various dimensions of the familiar "levels of 
analysis" problem, among others things: 
- various time perspectives or temporal vantage points, 
- differing national or sub-national perspectives on lessons learned, 
- ideological perspectives, 
- negative versus positive lessons, 
- the role of leadership, 
- the application of "time-tested principles" — for instance, the use of 
Clausewitz as a checklist, 
- a spectrum running from macro- to micro-level approaches to lessons 
learned — grand strategy, grand tactics, operational levels, small unit tactics 
and so on. 
In this context there is cause to restate professor Harkavy's statement on 
the difficulties of studying the art of war from the operational point of view. This 
was that usually only military officers — and perhaps a few professional 
historians and social scientists — can operate at the levels of grand tactics and 
even smaller-scale tactics. Therefore, according to him, different scholars will 
generally prefer to focus on more than one level of the list above and maybe 
not on purely military issues.35 
34 
 Lauerma, Matti: Sotahistorian tutkimuksen problematiikkaa ja metodiikkaa (Research 
Problems and Method in Military History), Tiede ja Ase n:o 35/1977, Suomen 
Sotatieteellisen Seuran vuosijulkaisu, Pohjois-Karjalan Kirjapaino Oy, Joensuu 1977, p. 74. 
This article is published in the annual of the Finnish Society of Military Science. 
35 Harkavy, p. 5 — 6 and 8. 
Professor Harkavy and his colleague Dr. Stephanie G. Neuman, also 
consider the question of what is a lesson. To some scholars the term implies 
"conclusions about cause-and-effect relationships in warfare" but according to 
Harkavy and Neuman lessons can be learned both from questions and from 
answers. This remark is important, especially if the sources are of an uneven 
quality or quantity or if the relevant source materiel is not available at all. In 
addition, according to Professors Harvey Starr and Benjamin A. Most, the 
"lessons learned" can be approached from any of three distinct methodological 
angles: case studies or the cross sectional approach, comparative analysis 
and longitudinal analysis. However, most of these methods are empirical and 
in the case of soft data sources (literary sources and interviews) must 
therefore be applied in a different manner with combinations of other methods 
and techniques. Social theory is a viable one, especially when common and 
separate traits of some phenomenon are studied. In this regard, Professor 
Peter Burke sees that it is useful to construct some models to simplify reality to 
find out typical traits of a phenomenon, though in the meantime he also warns 
that the researcher should be aware that the different backgrounds of the 
issues that are compared limit the possibility of making generalisations. In 
addition functionalism, i.e., the description and interpretation of the function of 
customs and institutions, is also, according to Burke, a commonly used 
method among historians. This provides a possibility to explain events in the 
past in a certain political and social framework. In addition, in this context it is 
also possible to explain the change between the starting point and the 
outcome, especially if the influence behind the phenomena has been external. 
Functionalism provides a means to replace the items that have been analysed 
in the research process in their logical context.36 
In this thesis, the case study method is used as a means to provide a 
collection of data. Differences and similarities between the military theories 
and the applications have been studied by using comparisons. This means 
that some central military theories have been analysed and modelled to find 
out the characteristic traits that have then been compared to the existing Israeli 
practise. The change and the different conditions behind the phenomena have 
been taken into consideration by examining the framework of the military art 
over a long-term interval. In the synthesis, the descriptive information has then 
been put in chronological or functional order with a more thorough longitudinal 
36 Neuman, Stephanie G: Summary of Lessons, Harkavy, Robert E. / Neuman, Stephanie G. 
(ed.): The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, Volume I, Approaches and Case 
Studies, Lexington Books, Massachusetts/Toronto 1985, p. 281 — 282, Starr, Harvey and 
Most, Benjamin A: Patterns of Conflict: Quantitative Analysis and the Comparative Lessons 
of Third World Wars, Harkavy, Robert E /Neuman, Stephanie G. (ed.): The Lessons of 
Recent Wars in the Third World, Volume I, Approaches and Case Studies, Lexington Books, 
Massachusetts/Toronto 1985, p. 34 — 35 and 38 and Burke, Peter: History & Social Theory, 
Polity Press, Oxford 1992, p. 22 — 31, 104 — 105, 107, 109, 130 — 131 and 144 — 145. 
Dr. Neuman was a senior research scholar at Columbia University's Research Institute on 
International Change in 1985, and the director of the Comparative Defense Studies 
Program. 
Harvey Starr was professor and chair of political science at Indiana University in 1985 and 
Benjamin A. Most was associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the 
University of Iowa. 
In the early 1990s Peter Burke was Professor of cultural history at Cambridge University. 
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analysis, which has been used to analyse the development of the Israeli 
operational doctrine during the years of independence. The role of the cross 
sectional approach was to produce more detailed information on the 
operational practise in times of change and during wars, which can be seen as 
laboratories of doctrine. Finally, with historical description the central elements 
of operational mobility have been put both in functional and in chronological 
order within the doctrinal framework. 
Because interviews play a central role in this study, the methods of oral 
history require some explanation. Interviews are, according to Jan Vansina, 
the only way to construct a picture of the past if documents do not exist or if 
they are not available. However, if other sources also exist, interviews should 
not be used as the only source. The validity of oral sources has generally been 
underestimated by historians because it was, and still in some circles is, 
thought that the interviewees change the truth. This assumption has been 
proved to be wrong. Scholars that have studied and used oral sources in their 
research — David Thelen, Kristiina Graae and Marjatta Hietala, for example -
share the opinion that in an interview, instead of re-processing, interviewees 
try to recall issues from their memory. Therefore, the information of this 
process is authentic evidence of the experiences and feelings of the 
interviewee. Nevertheless, the information is not an accurate description of the 
past, and if the information comes from the distant past, there is a possibility 
that it has been receptive to change, especially if the subject has been in the 
limelight after it occurred. Besides, it should be remembered that interviewees 
recall issues, consciously or unconsciously aware of their own viewpoint, which 
additional is prone to personal, social and cultural influence. This all could, 
however, be avoided if the interviewer is familiar with the larger framework of 
the subject that he studies. In addition, according to Paul Thompson, oral 
history should be used, not as the main method but as a technique to enliven 
the past. Thompson, however, sees oral history as useful especially in social 
history and in the history of ideas where interviews can be used to study the 
backgrounds behind the fait accompli. Oral evidence can also provide 
information on organisations and people and on their backgrounds and 
motives in the areas of political and military history. This becomes more 
obvious if documented sources are not available. Anthony Seldon and Joanna 
Pappworth also stress the validity of oral history in contemporary history when 
there are gaps or irregularities between the documented sources. In this case, 
by interviewing persons that have been central to the process that is studied, 
the researcher could picture the past and in this way study the process of 
change and try, by systematic analysis, to reach an even more general 
conclusion .37 
37 Vansina, Jan: Oral Tradition. A Study of Methodology, Aldine Publishing Company, 
Chicago 1961, p. 1 and 8, and 75 — 76, Thelen, David (ed.): Memory and American History, 
Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis 1990, p. vii, ix, xiii, 72, 138, 147 -
148 and 176 — 179, Graae, Kristiina ja Hietala, Marjatta: Suullista historiaa. 
Veteraanikansanedustajat haastateltavina (Oral History. Veteran Members of Parliament 
Interviewed), Painatuskeskus Oy, Helsinki 1994, p. 71, Thompson, Paul: The Voice of the 
Past. Oral History, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1988, p. 2, 5, 72 and 82 and Seldon, 
Anthony and Pappworth, Joanna: By Word of Mouth. Elite Oral History, Methuen & Co. Ltd., 
London 1983, p. 7, 43 — 45, 57 and 167 — 168. 
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In this study, interviews have been used for three purposes. Firstly, 
interviews of people who have taken part in the development of the IDF — in 
one way or another — were used to find out new information on the 
backgrounds of a number of different issues. Secondly, the group of former 
commanders represents contemporaneous experience that supports or 
overturns the picture that is formed from the other sources. Thirdly, the 
information from the interviews of the specialists has been used to fill in 
missing links between the separate items of this study that have not been 
found in written sources. In addition, the interviewees — military men, scholars 
and both — represent a part of Israeli society, both past and present. This has 
also provided an opportunity to assess different opinions of the role of the 
military art in Israel. 
There are several models of research on operational art after WW II. The 
methods that are used are based in many ways on similar considerations to 
those presented above. The tendency to examine warfare from the viewpoint 
of the levels of military art is quite common. This way of thinking provides a 
broad if somewhat abstract model to analyse warfare, and though the view 
from these perspectives may be infinite in their variety, the advantage is that 
the perspectives do remain constant, as Clayton Newell notes. This gives the 
researcher a framework to organise the abundance of detailed information. In 
other words, a theoretical framework, which examines the planning and use of 
armed forces to achieve national goals, provides the basis for a theory of war. 
Understanding the strategic, operational, and tactical perspectives of warfare 
is, however, a prerequisite to further analysis of organising the details of the 
problem. After this, according to Newell, research can concentrate on the 
questions and answers of the situation, objective, conduct, support, and 
control of the war. This method coincides with the thoughts of Professor 
Harkavy and Dr. Neuman. Newell only specifies the means; in his concept 
each of the five elements shown above must be analysed from each level of 
the military art in the appropriate order to find out the interactions between 
these factors. This means that questions must be put in the correct manner so 
that, in each case, the situation forms the basis for a militarily achievable 
object, which determines the way that the war is conducted, sets demands for 
the necessary support, and maintains control over the war.38 
The most illuminating example of the type of research described above is 
David Glantz's study Soviet Military Operational Art. The similarities to 
Newell's method are striking, which is no wonder because, in the late 1970s 
after the traumatic experiences in Vietnam, Americans began to intensively 
study the wars of the past. Glantz bases his work on Soviet research of the 
history of warfare and the military art. The Russians have studied war within an 
overall multi-scientific framework, which has helped explain historical 
processes. According to Glantz, this manner of thinking, which has no Western 
counterparts is, beneath the theory and rhetorical surface, a tough-minded, 
practical and comprehensive analytical process for understanding and 
exploiting the dynamics of war. By design, the main problem of Glantz's study 
is the development of operational art, which is analysed both functionally and 
chronologically. For continuity's sake, the evolution of operational art is 
38 Newell, p. 33 — 35 and 149. 
connected to strategy and tactics, which have provided it with direction, form 
and meaning. In addition, a survey of the force structure is included in the 
study to give depth to the cause-effect analysis.39 Glantz's and Newell's 
methods have proved, in addition to historical-descriptive analysis, to be the 
most useful methods for this thesis. 
Research works similar to those described above have not been published 
about the Arab-Israeli wars. However, the problem of studying the wars of the 
past was already recognised in Israel in the early 1960s. On the occasion of 
Liddell Hart's visit to Israel in 1960, Doctor Israel Beer, an Israeli politician and 
scholar, considered the research of military art in the Israeli newspaper 
Ha'aretz as follows: The lessons of wars from the earliest time until today 
prove, that the decision between conceptions and ideas not only preceded the 
decision on the battlefield but, in most cases even determined it. It is true that 
the translation of theory into practice in the military field is a difficult, prolonged 
and sometimes dangerous process. This science has neither laboratories nor 
experiments to test an idea and to prove its correctness in an irrefutable 
manner, before such an idea shapes the defence establishment of a nation. In 
modern times establishments of that kind are based on numerous factors: 
technical, scientific, political, economical, ideological and many others — only 
an accurate assessment of all these factors together and their mutual 
interdependence can determine correct strategy, organisation and use of the 
armed forces."49 This opinion is interesting, because if inverted it coincides 
with Glantz's method; i.e., if the art of war has been developed in a certain 
manner, it can be studied the other way round, which is just posing questions 
and arranging answers. 
Sources 
The fact that the documentation that would normally be used for a historical 
study is still not more than partly available has already been stated. However, 
since this study looks at the patterns of warfare and not the details of different 
wars, this problem should be manageable. In addition, it seems that in the 
documentary primary sources there are very few references to other 
documents that reveal the thinking behind the adopted solutions. More of this 
kind of philosophical consideration can be found in memoirs and other 
published sources that also include, among other sources, interviews of Israeli 
political and military leaders. According to this, the sources of this thesis are 
divided as follows: 
39 Glantz, p. xxiii and 1 — 2. 
The models for Glantz's study are A. A. Strokov's and M. M Kirian's works Istoriia voennogo 
iskusstva (a history of military art), published in 1966 and 1984 and Istonia voin I voennogo 
iskusstva (a history of war and military art), edited by I. Kh. Bagramian and published in 
1970. Rhetoric in this context means theoretical precepts as "inevitable victory," "moral 
superiority," and the classification of "just and unjust wars". 
40 Beer, Israel: The Role of Military Commentator, Ha'aretz, 25 March 1960, LH 15/5/304, 
part 2, p. 1. 
▪ Studies carried out at several universities and military academies, mainly in 
the United States. This category consists of a few dissertations dealing with 
the development of military theories and doctrines and smaller studies on 
different subjects of warfare in the Middle East. The most important of the 
former have been: Paul Dyster's dissertation In the Wake of the Tank: The 
20th-century Evolution of the Theory of Armoured Warfare (1988), which 
provides a view on the development of armoured warfare; Paul Herbert's 
Toward the Best Available Thought: The Writing of Field Manual 100-5, 
"Operations" by the United States Army, 1973 — 1976 (1988), analysing the 
overall theoretical background of doctrinal development; Anthony H. 
Cordesman's and Abraham R. Wagner's The Lessons of Modern War, 
Volume l: The Arab-Israeli Conflicts, 1973 — 1989 (1990), which analyses in 
detail tactical, operational and technical data of the Middle East wars in 
1973 and 1982; and Raanan Gissin's thesis Command, Control, and 
Communications Technology: Changing patterns of Leadership in Combat 
Organizations (1988), which offers insights — though of a quite specific 
scope — on the Israeli way of thinking in the operational art. From the rather 
numerous studies that concentrate on certain subjects of warfare in the 
Middle East, the following can be mentioned: Nigel T. Bagnall's The Israeli 
Experience. A Study of Quality (1973), which provides a view on several 
elements behind the IDF's operational performance, and George Gawrych's 
Key to the Sinai: The Battles for Abu Ageila in the 1956 and 1967 Arab-
Israeli Wars (1990) and The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of 
Decisive Victory (1996), which together provide views on the IDF's 
organisation and planning in certain operations during the 1956, 1967 and 
1973 wars. In this source group, all the above mentioned studies include 
some sort of primary sources like archive material or interviews. The rest 
are mostly made up of secondary sources. Therefore, these studies contain 
rather a lot of operational analyses that are viable in this research work. 
▪ Memoirs of Israeli military leaders. These works have been used to analyse 
the thinking and perspectives of different people who have been 
responsible for developing the operational doctrine or have played a key 
role in that process. This group contains the autobiographies of Moshe 
Dayan, Diary of the Sinai Campaign (1966) and Story of my Life (1976), 
Yitzhak Rabin's The Rabin Memoirs (1979) and Ariel Sharon's The Warrior 
(1989) as well as Yigal Allon's The Making of Israel's Army (1970). 
Christopher Sykes' biography Orde Wingate (1959) and Michael Bar-
Zohar's Ben-Gurion (1977) also have extra value in surveying the 
backgrounds of the principles in the Israeli military doctrine. Christopher 
Sykes was a British Middle East specialist who was educated at Oxford and 
the Sorbonne in Paris and served in WW II in the Middle East and Persia 
and also in the Special Air Service. Doctor Michael Ben-Zohar is an Israeli 
scholar who has written several books on Ben-Gurion and also on the 
Israeli wars. All these sources should be — and have been — used with an 
understanding of the rules of oral history. 
• Literature and articles concerning the Arab-Israeli wars. This wide range of 
sources includes military and military-political books concentrating either on 
individual wars and topics or on wider subjects of military history in the 
Middle East. A great number of these books, written by both Israelis and 
foreigners, are written in English, which means that significant Israeli works 
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originally published in Hebrew have usually been translated at least into 
English. Excluding Hebrew literature, only a few books are written in other 
languages. Several works in this category also fulfil the scholarly demands 
of having a note apparatus, which, however, further on reveals that some 
sources — like Luttwak's and Horowitz's The Israeli Army — appear 
repeatedly in lists of references and in bibliographies. On the whole when 
considering the literature written on the wars of the Middle East, the 
question of the reliability of the evidence is not a serious problem. Outside 
the books equipped with notes the quality of the rest varies greatly and they 
may also be less reliable. Realising this, the latter mentioned have, 
however, been used to fill in gaps in the information of the other sources. 
Articles in the military professional annuals and magazines represent a 
wide variety of issues in military history and the art of war extending from 
theories to battlefield practice. Although not comprehensive in their scale, 
they include a lot of information on warfare both from the purely military 
point of view but also including the wider context of the military. 
Methodologically their value as a source can be seen as being between 
studies and literature. In this thesis, military annuals are used both to collect 
basic information about the wars of the Middle East and to provide the 
perspective of military thinking, and also to fill in the gaps between other 
sources. In the scope of the subject of this work, the articles of the 
American military annual Military Review form the major part of the article 
sources. Writings dealing with the subject of this study and published 
outside the United States seem to be rare. 
Literature concerning the theory of the art of war and its history. The main 
sources in this group are books related to the concepts of manoeuvre 
warfare and armoured warfare. This category of sources is used in two 
ways: first to analyse the contemporaneous thoughts of the theoreticians of 
mechanised warfare in the 1920s and 1930s. This can be best seen in 
Liddell Hart's and Fuller's works, as well as in the autobiography of General 
Heinz Guderian and in the biography of Field-Marshal Bernard Law 
Montgomery. The second purpose has been to survey the development of 
mechanised warfare after WW II to shed light on the continuity in the 
pursuit of mobility and judge the disputes linked to the origins of 
mechanised manoeuvre warfare. This point of view is taken into 
consideration in the following works: Richard Simpkin's Race to the Swift: 
Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare (1985); Christopher Bellamy's 
The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare: Theory and Practice (1990); 
Clayton R. Newell's The Framework of Operational Warfare (1991); and 
Robert Leonhard's The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theory and 
AirLand Battle (1991). Excluding the literary works of Liddell Hart and 
Fuller, which are especially used to show the originality of their thought, the 
most important sources to examine the different opinions related to Liddell 
Hart's and Fuller's thoughts are Brian Bond's Liddell Hart. A Study of his 
Military Thought (1977); John Mearsheimer's Liddell Hart and the Weight of 
History (1988); Brian Holden Reid's J. F. C. Fuller: Military Thinker (1987); 
and Kenneth Macksey's The Tank Pioneers (1971). 
Unclassified archive material. In this thesis this group of sources consists of 
documents and other sources of the IDF and Defense Establishment 
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Archive in Tel Aviv, the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives at King's 
College in London and the Public Record Office in London. 
The IDF and Defense Establishment Archive 
This group of sources consists of documents of the IDF General Staff, 
the Armoured Corps, the Air Force and some other echelons between 
the years of Israel's independence and 1958. In the spring of 2000, 
more recent archival documents were not as yet in public use. The 
sources of the IDF archive have been used in two ways. Firstly, the 
documents have been sources of new information on numerous details 
concerning the everyday life of the IDF both during peace and wartime. 
Secondly, the documents have been a means of verifying already written 
sources that do not have a reference apparatus, because they were 
based on secondary information or because security reasons prevented 
the publication of the exact sources. 
® The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives 
The collections of the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives that have 
been used can be divided into three parts: Liddell Hart's correspondence 
with Israelis, the Orde Wingate files consisting of different material from 
memorandums and articles and files on the Middle East, which include 
correspondence and a large variety of different articles. 
Liddell Hart's correspondence with the Israelis extends from 1951 to 
1969. For some reason, this file is rarely used in research. The 
explanation might be that up to Liddell Hart's death in 1970, the papers 
were in Liddell Hart's private archive and only since then has this large 
collection been organised for limited public use. This correspondence 
contains not only the letters received from Israeli military leaders but 
also copies of the letters sent and gives the researcher a possibility to 
follow the discussions between Liddell Hart and the Israelis and 
therefore also offers a perspective on the thinking of Liddell Hart and the 
Israelis in the context of the military art. 
The Orde Wingate files contain several memorandums sent by 
Captain (later Major General) Wingate to Liddell Hart and a substantial 
number of different articles on Wingate's career. The memorandums 
have provided primary information on Wingate's thoughts and to a 
limited scale also of the daily life of his Jewish force, the Special Night 
Squads. Secondly, the spectrum of articles — although less scientific -
have provided much information on detailed issues linked to Wingate's 
life, especially in Palestine and in addition this material has been used to 
fill in the gaps of other sources. 
The files on the Middle East are the largest part of the collections in 
the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives that have been used in this 
study. These files include correspondence with authors and editors who 
were involved in the Arab-Israeli wars, published and unpublished 
memorandums concerning military matters in the Middle East and plenty 
of articles from newspapers and magazines dealing with Israel and its 
xlvi 
defence forces. Like the Wingate files, the Middle East files have been 
useful in filling in the gaps of other sources. 
• The Public Record Office 
The role of the sources of the Public Record Office is rather small. There 
are two reasons for this. First, although the British and the Jews have a 
common past in Palestine between the end of WW I and May 1948, 
documents in which the British have studied the Israeli military art are 
rare. Some information on the Sinai Campaign of 1956 does exist 
because both Israel and Great Britain committed their forces in this 
campaign, but the role of this group of sources in this study has not 
been decisive. Second, because Israel's operation in 1956 was mostly 
separated from the Anglo-French offensive, the reports concerning 
Israel are limited to some overall estimates of the results that Israel was 
able to achieve against the Egyptians. Assessments of the Israeli 
military art and its backgrounds in these sources cannot be found. An 
equivalent situation also exists in the case of the other military archives 
— like the French or American. 
Interviews. The list of the interviewees consists of several former Israeli 
senior commanders, officers in the background of the development of the 
Israeli military art and some other individuals who can be classified as 
being specialists in the subject of this study. The interviewees are people 
who have been able and willing to provide information. Despite this 
seeming limitation, the chosen interviewees, both civilian and military 
personnel, represent the theme of this work rather extensively. The list of 
the interviewees can be found in the source list and their curriculum vitae in 
the notes. 
The reader must still be aware of one issue, the problem of transliteration. 
This is related both to geographical names and the names of different 
organisations. Although some might find that the transliterations from Hebrew 
and Arabic are not always consistent, simpler and more readable versions 
have been used for consistency's sake. In addition, Hebrew acronyms have 
been treated as English ones. The acronyms have been written in capital 
letters followed by the real names and their possible translations or 
explanations in brackets, the real name is in italics; for example, PALMACH 
(Plugot Mahatz, strike or shock companies). 
1. THE 20th CENTURY CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF MOBILE WARFARE 
An analysis of the ideas behind mobility and the concept of armoured warfare 
in the 20th century is a precondition for further examination of the origins and 
application of the Israeli operational art. The concept of operational mobility is 
not new. William S. Lind, an American scholar and military advisor, dates 
manoeuvre warfare (mobile warfare) to the time when a caveman surprised his 
enemy instead of meeting him club-to-club. The basic idea of manoeuvre 
warfare has been that when a side is weaker, mainly in terms of manpower 
and firepower, it is not possible, from an operational point of view, to adopt 
defensive principles. In manoeuvre warfare the purpose of manoeuvre is to 
achieve a favourable situation that makes an enemy unable to continue 
fighting. In this model, the opponent is pinned down with a small holding force 
while the best forces are levelled against the enemy's weaknesses, rather than 
pitting strength against strength. The final objective is to finish the war quickly 
and save resources.41  
Mobility was also one of the key themes of Sun Tzu, a Chinese military 
leader who lived circa 500 B.C., though only at a mental level. According to 
Sun Tzu, the best war policy was to strike an opponent's strategy and to defeat 
the enemy without fighting. If this fighting technique was not successful, the 
armed forces could be let loose and then the purpose of the fight was to end 
the war as quickly as possible and without causing unnecessary losses. Sun 
Tzu's thinking on the final aim of a campaign or war can be seen in his text: 
To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. 
To subdue the enemy without fighting is the supreme excellence." Sun Tzu, 
who saw advantages both in defence and offence, stressed the significance of 
superiority. Invincibility in his thinking was based on defence and the possibility 
of victory was based on offence. Nevertheless, despite his emphasis on 
superiority, Sun Tzu also saw possibilities for the weaker side if its troops were 
well-trained and ready for battle. This concept and the strategic and tactical 
doctrines that Sun Tzu developed in The Art of War link him to the concepts of 
manoeuvre warfare. These doctrines were based on deception, indirect 
approach, a readiness to adjust to the situation, flexible and co-ordinated 
deployments and command systems, and on rapid concentration of forces on 
enemy weaknesses.42 In addition, Sun Tzu already used the word 
manoeuvring. This occurs in Samuel Griffith's translation of The Art of War, 
where Sun Tzu says, He who knows the art of the direct and the indirect 
41  Lind, William S: Maneuver Warfare Handbook, Westview Press, Boulder Colorado and 
London 1985, p. 4 and 73 — 75. 
In the 1970s, William S. Lind was an advisor on military affairs to U.S. Senator Gary Hart, 
who was the President of the Military Reform Institute and Resident Scholar at the Institute 
for Government and Politics of the Free Congress Foundation. 
42 Sun Tsu: Sodankaynnin taito, a Finnish translation of Samuel B. Griffith's English 
translation of The Art of War in 1963, WSOY, Juva 1998, p. 20, 26, 49, 86, 89 and 93, Sun 
Tzu: The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford University Press, N.Y. 1963, p. 
85 and 106 and Leonhard, p. 28. 
Leonhard's text is based on Sun Tzu, Art of War, quoted in Tao Hanzhang, Sun Tzu's Art of 
War: The Modern Chinese Interpretation, New York: Sterling Publishing Co., 1987, p. 15. 
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approach will be victorious. Such is the art of manoeuvring." On the basis of 
these principles a German researcher, Lieutenant Colonel Gertman Sude, has 
drawn up a list of several parameters and rules that were to be taken into 
account in conventional warfare in Sun Tzu's writings. They are as follows: 
- Invincibility lies in the defence, the possibility of victory in the attack. 
- Know the enemy and yourself. 
Strike only when the situation ensures victory. 
- Strike the enemy where he is least prepared. 
- Weigh the situation before moving. 
Be flexible. 
Recognise the hazards and the weather. 
Deceive the enemy. 
Surprise the enemy. 
Separate the enemy from his allies.43 
1.1. Early 20th century thinking on mobility 
Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart and Major General J. F. C. Fuller represent the 20th  
century interpretation of mobile warfare during the inter-war period in the 
1920s and 1930s. Both men are often connected to the German Blitzkrieg 
doctrine and also to the Israeli art of war, Liddell Hart in particular. Therefore it 
is necessary to examine their thoughts in this context in greater detail. 
According to Brian Holden Reid, Liddell Hart and Fuller were not partners; 
rather they were collaborators who extended each others ideas. Brian Bond 
confirms this. Originally light infantrymen, Liddell Hart and Fuller concluded 
that to avoid the stalemate or attrition of modern war, it was necessary to do 
more than just improve infantry techniques. Therefore, they demanded a 
revolution in military thinking. Nevertheless, the adoption of the tank and other 
armoured vehicles was not in itself the solution. The role of new weapons 
technology, especially that of the tank, should be expanded from its role as 
support weapons to higher levels of warfare, in other words from tactical 
support functions to operational use. Liddell Hart and Fuller both saw the 
development of independent armoured forces, capable of operational and 
even strategic envelopment, as a decisive and effective means of waging war. 
The same basic facts could also be connected to naval power. Later they, and 
especially Liddell Hart, stressed the role of air power as wel1.44 
The common conception is that Fuller advocated an all-tank army, while 
Liddell Hart called for mechanised forces that also incorporated other combat 
arms, including the air force. In addition, it is thought that Liddell Hart 
understood the importance of deep strategic penetration in his famous theory 
the "Strategy of Indirect Approach", while Fuller favoured deep tactical 
43 Sude, Gertman: Principles of War in Brassey's Encyclopedia of Land Forces and Warfare, 
Brassey's, Washington and London 1996, p. 856. 
44 Holden Reid, Brian: J. F. C. Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hart. A Comparison, Military Review 
May 1990, p. 67 and 69 and Bond, Brian: Liddell Hart. A Study of his Military Thought, 
Cassell & Company Limited, London 1977, p. 28 — 29. 
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penetration. The truth is that the origins of these ideas are difficult to 
determine. Although Liddell Hart's idea of deep strategic penetration can be 
interpreted as also extending outside the deployments of armed forces to 
civilian rear areas and to the mental level of warfare, in most cases Liddell Hart 
and Fuller were discussing the same matters. They only used different terms. 
However, it seems likely that Fuller understood the operational level of warfare 
better. He saw the usefulness of manoeuvre as a link between the tactical and 
strategic levels of warfare in actual operative terms, while Liddell Hart 
conceived of manoeuvre as a sum of tactical battles in his inter-war writings. 
Fuller's principles of war and his operational principles as well as the tactical 
principles of Liddell Hart are presented in Appendix 1. 
John J. Mearsheimer, who has also compared the similarities and 
differences of Liddell Hart and Fuller, states that "a careful examination of their 
writings produced no evidence of differences in their thoughts." In any case, 
Mearsheimer questions Liddell Hart's ideas on deep penetration; i.e., his 
influence on the operational art before WW II. According to Mearsheimer, 
Liddell Hart did not understand indirect approach as a Blitzkrieg style strike 
against the vulnerable command and control network of an enemy; rather he 
saw it as strategic attacks against an opponent's home front. However, it is 
obvious that Liddell Hart did not lose the important distinction between the 
levels of warfare. This is revealed in The Future of Infantry, published in 1933, 
where Liddell Hart emphasised the idea of the use of motorised infantry in 
strategic movements. Nevertheless, Liddell Hart also mentions in this book 
that the dividing line between strategic and tactical levels can never be clearly 
drawn. This again shows that Liddell Hart did not understand the operational 
level of warfare as an independent entity before WW II, as Fuller obviously did 
and as we do now. According to Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart sought the opinions 
of others and took their comments seriously, especially Fuller's. Finally, 
Mearsheimer goes so far as to state that Liddell Hart manufactured the 
differences between himself and Fuller after WW II by saying that "Liddell Hart 
wrote that his idea of the deep strategic penetration was the central element in 
the German Blitzkrieg and Fuller's all-tank army concept was a fundamentally 
bad idea." Brian Holden Reid is not so harsh. In his comparative article on 
Liddell Hart and Fuller, Holden Reid notes that while Liddell Hart was a skilled 
writer, he sometimes lacked self-confidence; thus Liddell Hart consolidated his 
early writings several times. In any case, men who have sought to rewrite 
history have rarely succeeded in the long run and this has obviously been the 
main reason why Liddell Hart has become controversial.45 
 
However, the real differences in the thinking of Fuller and Liddell Hart are in 
their philosophical approach to warfare. In addition, the criticism of Liddell Hart 
is not directed at his "Strategy of Indirect Approach" because it is obviously a 
vague and elastic theory. The "Strategy of Indirect Approach" was first 
presented in 1929 in Liddell Hart's book The Decisive Wars of History, but the 
main conclusions are summarised at length in Liddell Hart's Memoirs, 
published in 1965. According to Robert Leonhard, Liddell Hart used the term 
45 Mearsheimer, John J: Liddell Hart and the Weight of History, Cornwell University Press, 
New York 1988, p. 42 — 44, 205 — 206, 208 and 220, Holden Reid (1990), p. 70, Liddell Hart, 
B. H: Strategy, second revised edition, A Meridian Book, New York 1991, p. 321 — 323 and 
Liddell Hart: The Future of Infantry, Faber & Faber Ltd., London 1933, p. 44 — 45. 
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"indirect approach" to describe strategic, operational, and tactical moves 
designed to defeat the enemy as economically as possible. That is why the 
"Strategy of Indirect Approach" is today linked to manoeuvre warfare and can 
also be seen as a logical extension of Sun Tzu's strategic and tactical thinking. 
However, it should be remembered that Liddell Hart did not use the word 
"operational" before WW II. Therefore Leonhard's interpretation, though sound 
in today's terms, is based on Liddell Hart's later writings, which already include 
the German practice and experience of mobile warfare during WW II. In Liddell 
Hart's theory, the main keys to success or to decisive victory, as Liddell Hart 
calls it, are subtlety, surprise and innovation performed with a combination of 
speed and flexibility in the use of mechanised forces. However, Liddell Hart 
comes very close to a circular argument, a "decisive victory is an event, which 
is secured by an indirect approach." Therefore, decisive victory is also difficult 
to define, although it can loosely be interpreted as meaning a swift victory with 
a low expenditure of resources. According to Brian Bond, Liddell Hart's method 
is unscientific as well. In fact there are a lots of cases in history where indirect 
approaches have ended in failure. Nevertheless, whatever shortcomings the 
"Strategy of Indirect Approach" might have from the viewpoint of scholarship, 
Bond regards it as an educational, ideological military doctrine or philosophy 
that influenced the thinking of officers in Britain and abroad: the most important 
of them were Bernard Law Montgomery and Archibald Wavell, who later 
became Field-Marshals, and German General Heinz Guderian.46 
The "Strategy of Indirect Approach" can be interpreted from two viewpoints. 
At a tactical level, because of his experiences of the stalemate in WW I, Liddell 
Hart believed that mobility was the solution for winning future battles and 
avoiding attrition. Instead of moving large-scale units, like corps and armies 
rapidly on the battlefield, manoeuvre would be restored by relying on the 
tactical manoeuvring of many small units, whose segments would then form a 
base for enlarging successes into large-scale offensives. In addition, Liddell 
Hart also adopted tactical principles to his theory. It is interesting to note that 
they are quite similar to the common principles of war — surprise, economy of 
force, and manoeuvre or flexibility. Liddell Hart only consolidated them as can 
be seen in Appendix 1. In addition, they can be seen as derivatives of the 
principles of Fuller, who published his list in the Journal of the Royal United 
Services Institution in February 1916; principles that, according to John 
Keegan, formed the immediate source of the Liddell Hart list.47 
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At the strategic level, Liddell Hart used the philosophical concept of the 
"expanding torrent", an analogy that ultimately belonged to Sun Tzu. Robert 
Leonhard explains the idea of the "expanding torrent" as follows: An attack in 
war should follow the pattern of flowing water. As water proceeds downhill, it 
naturally avoids strong surfaces. Instead, it flows about seeking weak points 
and gaps through which the water begins to trickle. When such gaps are 
found, the whole body of water rushes toward it, speeds through it, and then 
expands on the other side." So, an attack should also avoid enemy strengths 
and exploit his weak spots or gaps. To buttress this point of view, Leonhard 
has summed up the three distinguishable goals of manoeuvre in Liddell Hart's 
thinking. They are 1) to avoid enemy strength, 2) to deceive the enemy in 
order to deny him the opportunity of bringing his strength to bear and 3) to 
attack enemy geographical, functional and psychological vulnerabilities.48 
These three principles are also more commonly seen as the basic pillars of the 
modern theory of manoeuvre. Only the means by which they are achieved 
vary. 
There are still two principles that are central to the concept of mobility. They 
are force dichotomy; i.e., the division of forces, and the command and control 
system. Liddell Hart recognised that it might be necessary for an attacking unit 
to also directly engage a defender's forces to effect a breakthrough. To explain 
this idea, he offered a concept called the "Man-in-the-Dark Theory'. In his 
example, two unarmed men are fighting in the dark. In its basic form, this 
means that each man tries to locate his opponent with one arm outstretched, 
but each also tries to cover himself. Once a man touches his enemy, he tries 
to keep his opponent stationary with his outstretched hand while delivering the 
main blow with the other hand. In this example, Liddell Hart claimed that 
modern armies used the same pattern on the battlefield. Therefore, Liddell 
Hart's analogy is useful. It represents — as Leonhard also notes — a modern 
application of Sun Tzu's model of force dichotomy. Sun Tzu's idea was that 
part of the armed forces, the "ordinary force", would pin the enemy, while 
another part of the army, the "extraordinary force", would manoeuvre to 
envelop or outflank the enemy. In Liddell Hart's dichotomy, the "advance 
force", acting as Sun Tzu's "ordinary force", is used to hold the enemy and 
occupy his attention. The "main attack", conducted by the "extraordinary 
force", is designed to push the enemy off balance by rapid manoeuvre. 
Mearsheimer also refers to Liddell Hart's force dichotomy. According to 
Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart used manoeuvre in two quite different but 
complementary ways. One is manoeuvre around strong points to drive deep 
into a defender's rear. This is the "expanding torrent". The other is manoeuvre, 
According to him, Fuller was a keen advocate of Napoleon's military art. Fuller's list of the 
principles of war has its origins in the principles of Jomini. 
According to Tsouras, the principles of war, which are more or less similar in different 
countries, have been derived by military professionals through critical historical analysis of 
warfare. These chosen fundamental principles — and their combinations and applications -
have historically been successful on the battlefield. In the United States, these principles 
were also adopted for the U.S. list in the early 1920s and have since only been modified 
slightly. This was a continuation of the line of thought that had prevailed until then, in the 19th  
century the Americans used Jomini's principles. 
48 Leonhard, p. 47 and 50 and Mearsheimer, p. 27. 
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where the aim is to eliminate points of resistance that cannot be bypassed. 
This latter method is described in the "Man-in-the-Dark formula".49 
1.2. The German Blitzkrieg doctrine 
It is widely accepted that the German concept of armoured warfare, more 
popularly known as the Blitzkrieg doctrine, was especially influenced by the 
thoughts of both J. F. C. Fuller and Liddell Hart. This question is also 
fundamental in the context of the Israeli art of war, which has similarities to 
Fuller's and Liddell Hart's thoughts and to German practice. According to Paul 
Dyster, the real key to German success in the early phases of WW II was an 
innovation of their own. William S. Lind sees the activities against enemy 
strengths and weaknesses as action against surfaces and gaps, derived from 
German WW I infiltration tactics; i.e., Flaschen and Likentaktik. In its basic 
form, this means that rather than wasting lives, time, and materiel in foolish 
attacks against enemy strong points, manoeuvre constantly probed for 
weaknesses. In this concept, enemy strong points were surfaces that were to 
be avoided and enemy weak points were gaps that provided an opportunity to 
breakthrough. These gaps also included mental concepts, like use of the dark. 
Richard Simpkin goes further still. He states that in the context of German 
military thought over the previous 50 years or more, the German tactical 
concept was only evolutionary and the tank emerged as a conclusion from the 
German studies." Therefore, he regards the tank not as a starting point for the 
Germans, but as a tool for principles that were already in existence. Economy 
of force and strategic mobility had also been a part of the German tradition 
since von Moltke the Elders times in the latter part of the 19th century. Many of 
the other key elements of the Blitzkrieg doctrine were also in place by the end 
of WW I; e.g., the preoccupation with the two or multi-front problem, 
confidence in the feasibility of large-scale flanking manoeuvres and in battles 
of encirclement, and the use of elite units to probe and penetrate the weak 
spots of the enemy front. All this used the indirect as opposed to the frontal 
approach in the attack.5°  
49 
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According to Paul Dyster, the principles of the German Blitzkrieg doctrine 
were written down by a Staff Colonel, Hermann Foertsch, in his 
comprehensive work Kriegskunst Heute und Morgen in the late 1930s. 
However, according to the American officer and researcher Daniel J. Hughes, 
several researchers have found that Blitzkrieg was not an official doctrine and 
that the Germans did not have any documented principles on Blitzkrieg before 
WW II. In any case, Foertsch, whose research work was also translated into 
English in 1940 under the title The Art of Modern Warfare and into Finnish a 
year earlier, considers the character of the future war and the role of 
mechanised forces within it in his book. Several central overall principles for 
the use of different branches, especially those of armoured forces, were 
included in the book. Therefore, these principles could also have been 
interpreted as principles of the Blitzkrieg doctrine. It is also obvious that 
Foertsch was not personally behind the ideas that he presented in this work. 
General Heinz Guderian, the builder of the German armoured forces, had 
already written on the use tanks in several field manuals earlier in the 1930s. 
He also wrote about his central philosophy of armoured warfare in his book 
Achtung — Panzer!, published in 1937. It seems likely that Foertsch's book was 
something between a simplified handbook on modern warfare and a field 
manual. Nevertheless, it is a window on German military thinking in the 1930s. 
In this thesis, the German theory of Blitzkrieg is called a doctrine.51  
Foertsch's ideas reinforce Dyster's statement that the German Blitzkrieg 
doctrine was an innovation of their own, but this does not explain everything. 
International, Dissertation Information Service, Michigan 1988, p. 104 and 221, Simpkin, p. 
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Foertsch refers to his opponents' ideas and experiments in the use of tanks in 
many places and although the names of the opponents are not directly 
mentioned, several hints reveal that they were the British in particular and the 
French to a lesser degree. The central role of the British can be explained by 
the fact that Englishmen were in charge of the development of armoured 
warfare, though some Frenchmen, Colonel Charles de Gaulle and Major F. O. 
Miksche in particular, also had similar thoughts on the use of independent tank 
formations. Nevertheless, today the most current research tends to stress the 
German originality behind their WW II armoured warfare doctrine, which at 
least partly might stem from Liddell Hart's post-WW II analysis of the German 
Blitzkrieg doctrine for his own purposes. This might also be partly due to the 
fact that it was the Germans who mostly applied these new ideas.5  
According to Simpkin, the distinguishing feature of the Blitzkrieg doctrine is 
an avoidance of battle. The fundamental idea was to surprise the enemy, take 
advantage of weak spots, and finally penetrate to an operational depth through 
a gap in enemy lines. This ideology can also be seen in Foertsch's book. 
Foertsch favoured offensive operations and, within this context, the idea of 
transferring battles onto enemy soil. Operational out-flanking and encirclement 
held a central place. Foertsch also recognised that every encircling attack 
must first penetrate the enemy front by seeking gaps. After penetration, 
success had to be guaranteed by the use of massed force at a decisive point 
that was one of the enemy's weak spots. All this also appears in Guderian's 
Achtung — Panzer!, which in addition provides an overview on tactics, 
armament and the co-operation of tank forces and motorised infantry.53 
At the operational level, German thinking — the seeking of gaps — seems to 
owe much to Liddell Hart's concept of the "expanding torrent", although the 
idea of "terrain before combat" might also have its origins in Jomini. General 
Heinz Guderian in particular favoured the hazards of difficult terrain to the 
hazards of combat." This is why scholars, particularly Brian Bond, have seen 
Liddell Hart's philosophical concepts of long-range strokes and operations 
against enemy communications as thought-provoking to the Germans. 
52 
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However, the sources of Liddell Hart's influence on German operational 
philosophy are ambiguous and therefore the origins of the ideas are difficult to 
determine. According to General Fritz Bayerlein, who was Chief of Operations 
to Guderian's Panzer Group in 1940 and Field-Marshal Erwin Rommel's Chief 
of Staff during part of the North African campaign, the "Strategy of Indirect 
Approach" as a theory was unknown to the Germans when WW II broke out. 
On the other hand, Major General F. W. von Mellenthin, Chief of Staff of the 4th  
Panzer Army in 1944, stated after the war that German tank successes in the 
first year of the war were mainly due to the fact that the Germans adopted the 
theories taught by Captain Liddell Hart.54 
In the tactical and technical matters of armoured warfare, General Guderian 
came, according to Brian Bond, already as early as 1923 or 1924 across the 
ideas of Fuller, Liddell Hart and a British tank officer by the name of Giffard le 
Quesne Martel (later a General) in the special periodical review 
Wehrgedanken des Auslands. Later the books and articles of these men gave 
Guderian initial ideas on combining Panzer and Panzer-infantry units into self-
contained armoured divisions. On the whole, however, Fuller's, Liddell Hart's 
and other British officers' influence on German armoured and mechanised 
warfare has occasionally been heavily disputed up to our days. It is also 
difficult to give a simple answer about their influence on armoured warfare. In 
addition, the developers of armoured warfare all adopted each others' 
thoughts.55 
Despite the dispute over the origins of armoured warfare, there is reason to 
stress some central differences in the British and German concepts of 
mechanised warfare because they are significant in the context of Israeli 
armoured warfare. According to Christopher Bellamy and Paul Dyster, Fuller 
and two British tank officers, Charles F. N. Broad (later Lieutenant General) 
and George M. Lindsay (later Colonel), all recognised a tank force's potential 
for deep penetration but emphasised pure tank formations. They favoured the 
need for firepower in shock action at the expense of the combined arms 
principle and therefore did not assign any special value to infantry, except 
54 Simpkin, p. 27 — 28 and 34, Leonhard, p. 50, Guderian (1952), p. 20 and Frieser, Karl-
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when it was needed to hold ground seized by tanks or protect them from 
infiltration attacks. In addition, Fuller largely neglected air power as a means of 
imposing one's will on the enemy far behind his forward positions. Martel and 
Liddell Hart had a more balanced view of a mechanised combined arms force. 
They also saw a need for armoured infantry in the offensive to help clear 
obstacles so that tanks could advance and preserve the pace of the attack. 
However, according to Brian Bond, Liddell Hart also considered Fuller's 
thoughts. Thus, it is reasonable to suppose that both Liddell Hart and Fuller 
were combined arms advocates. Fuller only emphasised the battlefield 
potential and firepower of tanks more, while Liddell Hart saw the co-operation 
of different branches and arms, including the use of air power, as centra1.56 
In 1931 — 32, Guderian was, according to Robert O'Neill, ready to turn his 
ideas into reality and in 1935 the first three Panzer divisions were created. 
Brian Bond regards it as likely that Guderian had read Liddell Hart's article The 
Development of a New Model Army in the Army Quarterly in October 1924. In 
this article, Liddell Hart expressed his opinion on future land forces composed 
of composite brigades of tanks, self-propelled artillery and aircraft to strike 
defended positions, and infantry in armoured carriers acting both offensively 
and defensively: In 1927 this concept was also put to the test in extensive trials 
of the Experimental Mechanised Force on Salisbury Plain. According to 
Dyster, this force seemed to follow the ideas of Liddell Hart and was also a 
model for Guderian on what an armoured division should look like. In 1927 the 
Germans set up their own Experimental Mechanised Brigade and instructions 
that were intended to secure the co-operation of the conventional arms with 
the tank forces were drawn up. In this concept, the solution was to motorise 
infantry and artillery to enable them to follow the tanks. In addition, the support 
of air power was connected to the use of armoured forces later in the 1930s. In 
Guderian's concept, air power had a triple role. The first was to halt the flow of 
enemy reserves. The second was air power's usefulness in attacks against 
other targets in the enemy's operational depth. The third was the fact that 
armoured thrusts needed air cover.57 
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However, Brian Bond also stresses that it would be straining the evidence 
too far to suggest that the first German Panzer divisions resembled the "New 
Model Division" too closely. This seems probable. Although Guderian realised 
that special tank divisions supported by infantry, artillery, engineer and signal 
units with a cross-country performance equal to that of the tanks had to be 
formed, the first three Panzer divisions were more tank-heavy than combined 
arms divisions. Therefore they did not, according to Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, 
differ much from other contemporary developments such as the French 
Division LegOre Mecanique (D.L.M.) and the British Experimental Tank 
Brigade of 1934, each based on tanks and backed by infantry. The first Panzer 
brigade, like the British tank brigade, consisted of two tank regiments of two 
tank battalions each, for a total of 561 tanks. However, only the best German 
divisions reached the stage where about half of the infantry was on tracks and 
support units were put on tracks even more seldom.58 
British influence on German armoured warfare also continued in the late 
1930s. In 1934 and 1935 the British had additional tank trials in Bovington and 
on Salisbury Plain. Macksey states that Guderian in particular read what Fuller 
had written and assimilated whatever the British learned at the exercises. He 
recognised that armoured tanks were the best way to impose the essential 
factors of destruction and suppression upon an enemy. The Germans used 
these experiences in their training exercises, but selectively. This is revealed in 
Richard M. Ogorkiewicz's Design and Development of Fighting Vehicles. 
According to Ogorkiewicz, the Salisbury trials encouraged two divergent lines 
of development, neither of which made the most effective use of tanks in 
Britain. The first was embraced by tank enthusiasts and led to the creation of 
armoured formations composed largely of tanks, which supports Fuller's role in 
all-tank concepts. The other line of development was dictated by traditional 
ideas about the pre-eminence of infantry and led to the creation of specialised 
tank units for co-operation with the infantry. Therefore, paradoxically, despite 
the ideas on modern tank warfare, the quest for new methods of employing 
tanks resulted in the creation of two categories of tanks and tank units in Great 
Britain, France and the United States. In Ogorkiewicz's words, the 
development was "in keeping with the traditional division of armies into 'horse' 
and 'foot'." The Germans, on the other hand, applied only those ideas from the 
British experience that they considered useful. This can be seen in Guderian's 
emphasis on developing the principle of freedom for the armoured divisions.59 
proposed a type of armoured division combining Panzer and Panzer-infantry units. Deeply 
impressed by these ideas, I tried to develop them ... for our army." 
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1920s and afterwards was, especially in the 1930s, more interested in grand strategy than in 
tactical matters. 
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The German organisations were built with the overall aim of flexibility in the 
mobile deep battle. Therefore, the Germans opted, according to Dyster, for 
"the creation of forces with the maximum possible adaptability to the greatest 
possible number of separate environments." This means that, at the 
operational level, a corps of two Panzer divisions and one motorised division 
was seen as the best combination for the encircling attack. Macksey also sees 
the corps as a balanced combined arms force capable of and trained — unlike 
its British and French counterparts — to form enough powerful all-arms ad hoc 
battle groups to deal with varying situations in different types of terrain. The 
Panzer division itself was regarded as the best tactical formation that could 
survive alone on the battlefield and provide the flexibility needed.6°  
To properly utilise the advantages of their Blitzkrieg doctrine in practice, the 
Germans developed a special command and control system called 
Auftragstaktik. According to Paul Dyster, Colonel Foertsch's ideas can also be 
seen in the background of these ideas. Because of the unpredictability of 
battle, Foertsch saw success or failure as depending on what happened when 
an attack reached its high point. This meant a need for flexible decision-
making. A centralised command process in rapidly changing, uncertain 
situations was seen as insufficient to lead troops tens of kilometres behind 
enemy lines because the knowledge of the situation at the front would always 
be too old for real-time orders. A decision about whether a success could be 
exploited further, and in which direction, had to be made quickly. Therefore the 
entire leadership group, from the top to the lowest tactical levels had, 
according to Glen Scott, to be encouraged to believe in initiative and flexibility 
to the extent that decisions were instinctive and automatic. The real basis was 
an unbroken chain of trust and mutual respect running from the controlling 
operational commander to the tank or section commander. In this concept, 
sub-commanders would be given a task of their own, and told the resources -
and constraints as well, if needed — that were seen as necessary for carrying 
out the task. In the German version, according to Simpkin however, the 
subordinate commander was also free to modify the task set for him without 
referring back to his superior, if he judged that further pursuit of that aim would 
not represent the best use of his resources in furtherance of his superior's 
intention. In this command process, operational commanders were made to 
accept greater risks than in traditional order tactics. The advantage was a 
more real-time picture of the situation on the battlefield in support of decision- 
See also Bond, p. 229 — 230 and O'Neill, p. 157. 
According to General Wilhelm von Thoma, Guderian had used reports on the British 
manoeuvres as a blueprint for the training of his own Panzer division. These reports also 
included Liddell Hart's writings. 
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 Dyster, p. 212, 250 and 260 and Macksey (1981), p. 141. 
According to Macksey, the direction taken by the German tank advocates appears clearly in 
Guderian's Achtung! Panzer!, published in 1937. This book showed the lines of Guderian's 
all-arms mechanised formations. Each Panzer division had a tank brigade of four tank 
battalions, a motorised rifle brigade of two infantry battalions in lorries and on motorcycles, 
and auxiliary units composed of a motor-cycle battalion, a reconnaissance battalion of 
armoured cars and motor-cycles, an anti-tank battalion with 37 mm guns, and a field artillery 
regiment of two battalions of howitzers. 
According to Dyster, the Germans also used a force of infantry and parachute troops aided 
by two Panzer corps in the combination described above in France in 1940. 
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making. Delegation of authority to lower ranks provided an opportunity to 
maintain the initiative and continuity, which both were and still are the central 
pillars of mobile warfare.61  
Auftragstaktik was also a method that included technical matters, the most 
important of them being the organisation of staff duties and the signals service. 
Martin van Creveld, who has studied command systems in different armies, 
gives the credit for recognising the importance of delegated decision-making to 
Generals Guderian and Fritz Fellgiebel, who was the commanding officer of 
the Wehrmacht's Signals Service. With the guidance of these men, the 
Germans streamlined their staff organisations and communications. A dozen 
officers at the operational level headquarters, including the commander and 
combat support advisers, were seen as adequate. In addition to executing staff 
duties, this command post would also have been capable of forming a tactical 
headquarters or a forward command post of the commander and two staff 
officers for limited periods.62 
The last point about the German armoured offensive was that it was based 
on the success of the establishment of superiority at a continually shifting set 
of critical points at the very beginning. Reconnaissance troops sought gaps 
that concentrated units could drive through. Tanks and infantry supported by 
aircraft and artillery then spearheaded the attack, deliberately bypassing the 
strongest centres of organised resistance in order to reach and destroy the 
command, control and communication centres deep in the enemy rear, beyond 
the belt of fortified defences. Bypassed pockets of resistance were the 
responsibility of follow-on forces, especially of the mechanised infantry 
divisions. Anti-tank guns, guarded by infantry and artillery, were emplaced on 
vital ground after it was seized. The enemy was then lured into destroying 
himself in attacks on this "hammer-and-anvil" style trap. In addition, the follow-
on forces protected the walls of the corridor that supplies had to pass along to 
the armoured forces in the spearhead. An illustration of the German Blitzkrieg 
doctrine can be seen in Appendix 2.63 
Finally, it must be remembered that at the same time that the armoured 
warfare concept developed in Western Europe, the Soviets developed their 
61  Dyster, p. 211, Simpkin, p. 230 — 232 and Scott, Glen L: British and German Operational 
Styles in World War II, Military Review, October 1985, p. 40 — 41. 
62 
 van Creveld, Martin: Command in War, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London, England 1985, p. 192 and Simpkin, p. 261. 
See also Mearsheimer, p. 29 and 41. 
The British role in the development of Auftragstaktik remains unclear. According to van 
Creveld, there is very little in Liddell Hart's and Fuller's writings to indicate that they paid the 
least attention to command problems. This is obvious. Ideologically, however, Liddell Hart at 
least seems to have also paid attention to the command question. Liddell Hart, who studied 
the battle-drill system of the Mongols, already emphasized the importance of taking military 
actions that would throw the enemy's command and control structure off balance both 
physically and psychologically. His understanding of the problem is also revealed in his book 
Paris quoted by Mearsheimer as follows: "With a mobile army, control must be more prompt 
and flexible than ever." 
63 Dyster, p. 104 — 105 and 514, Macksey (1981), p. 141 and Higgins, George A: German 
and US Operational Art: A Contrast in Maneuver, Military Review, October 1985, p. 24 — 25. 
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own concept of mobile warfare during the inter-war period. However, this 
concept, which in many ways was a combined arms approach, came into 
being prematurely and its development was interrupted by Stalin's purges. It 
only really came into being in the Red Army after WW II. Like their Western 
counterparts throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Soviet military theorists, 
especially Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky and Vladimir Kiriakoviz Triandafillov, also 
pondered how to restore mobility and manoeuvre to the relatively stagnant 
battlefield. In addition, according to the American Soviet expert David M. 
Glantz, the Soviets, like the Germans and Fuller, but unlike their Western 
colleagues, understood that the operational level of the art of war was a 
distinct entity, and not a sum of the results of tactical battles.64 
Tukhachevsky, who wrote over 100 articles and published 22 different 
books between 1920 and 1937, mainly in the 1920s, described the concept of 
"maximum contact area" in his writings. In its basic form, this meant that a 
mass army, composed of infantry, artillery and tanks, operated over a broad 
front to achieve decisive superiority at the critical time and place. After that 
came the second phase, the exploitation at chosen weak points where cavalry, 
with air and mechanised support, rushed through the gap. Triandafillov, on the 
other hand, focused more on the second phase of the operation and described 
an all arms force, a "shock army", used for the breakthrough in his concept.65 
Therefore, while both Tukhachevsky and Triandafillov favoured deep 
penetration of the enemy's lines of communication and also saw a need for 
different troops in the forward lines and in depth, Triandafillov's concept was 
more similar to the classic ideas behind mobility. His purpose was to take 
advantage of enemy weaknesses. Tukhachevsky, on the other hand, favoured 
64 Glantz, David M: Soviet Military Operational Art. In Pursuit of Deep Battle, BPCC 
Wheatons Ltd, Exeter 1991, p. 19. 
Glantz bases his thesis on his comparative analysis of the contents of the French, British 
and American Field Regulations and of the thinking of the Soviets and Germans during the 
inter-war period. 
According to Glantz, there were also differences between the Soviets and the Germans. The 
most important of them was that the Germans tended to go no higher than the operational 
level of warfare, although they adopted combat methods that were also suited for the 
achievement of strategic success in battle in the 1930s. 
See also Bond, p. 142 and Pachter, Dan: A Day with Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, 
Bamachaneh (Israel Defence Magazine), March 1960, LH 15/5/304, part 2. 
Liddell Hart and the Soviets were also not unknown to each other. According to Pachter, the 
Soviets asked Liddell Hart to be a military adviser for the Red Army at a Disarmament 
Conference in 1932 where Liddell Hart was present. This did not happen. According to Lloyd 
George, Ivan Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador in London, was astonished in 1942 to learn 
that the British had not used Liddell Hart's expertise. 
se Simpkin, p. 37 — 38 and Tukhachevsky, M. N: 1§brannye proi§vedenyja (Selected Works), 
vol. II, Publishing House of SSSR Ministry of Defence, Moscow 1964, p. 261— 262. 
See also Glantz, David M: Soviet Operational Formation for Battle: A Perspective, Military 
Review, February 1983, p. 4. 
According to Glantz, Marshal Tukhachevsky and his close associates defined deep battle as 
follows in 1936: Simultaneous assault on enemy defences by aviation and artillery to the 
base of the defence, penetration of the tactical zone of the defence by attacking units with 
widespread use of tank forces, and the violent development of tactical success into 
operational success with the aim of the complete encirclement and destruction of the 
enemy. This also shows Tukhachevsky's inclination towards mass force. 
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the idea of breaking an opponent's lines by massing manpower and 
armament, both simultaneously in the front lines and in depth. Therefore his 
ideas owed a great deal to attrition warfare as well. 
During the Polish and French campaigns, German armoured forces 
performed well. Despite Guderian's emphasis they did not, however, become 
balanced all-arms combinations. The level of mechanisation of the Panzer 
divisions remained low. Major weaknesses were the lack of a cross-country 
performance capability for motorised infantry and other auxiliary units, the 
most important of them being artillery. Nevertheless, these shortages were not 
revealed before "Operation Barbarossa" in the Soviet Union in summer 1941. 
The swift collapse of Poland did not cause any anxiety for the Germans, 
although motorised infantry and artillery had difficulties in keeping pace with 
the tanks. The Polish Army was too slow to react to German breakthroughs, 
and the air force was able to compensate for the lack of self-propelled artillery 
with close-air-support. In France, short distances allowed adequate support by 
the air component and the dense road network enabled the movement of 
follow-on forces as well. However, the problems became apparent in the 
enormously wide steppes of the Ukraine. Due to losses, the main emphasis in 
tank production was put on main battle tanks, but this never was enough 
during the war to maintain the ability for concentrated thrusts. Mechanised 
infantry had to survive on their worn-out carriers and finally with trucks that 
could not follow the armoured spearheads. It was the same with supplies. The 
result was that the Soviets were able to isolate the spearheads before long 
and finally to destroy them one at a time.66 
1.3. Manoeuvre warfare theory 
In the early 1970s after the Yom Kippur War in the Middle East, the Americans 
set up a thorough study of the operational art. The main impetus was Israeli 
operational successes after their initial set-backs against far superior enemies 
during the 1973 War. This war raised the question of how this was possible. In 
the 1970s, the research led to the theory of manoeuvre warfare and later in the 
1980s to the American "AirLandBattle" doctrine and to its European application 
the "Follow-on-Forces-Attack" doctrine.67 Although American manoeuvre 
warfare theory is outside the period of this study, it is briefly presented here 
because the theory reflects past wars and, in addition, it is an excellent way to 
describe and analyse the basic facts behind the concepts of mobility. 
In 1974, John Boyd, a retired U.S. Air Force Colonel, noticed in his studies 
of air-to-air combat exercises that American pilots achieved a 10:1 kill-ratio 
over North Korean and Chinese opponents during the Korean War although 
66 See for example Guderian (1956), p. 152 — 154, Dyster (1988), p. 249, 514 — 515, 
Simpkin, p. 34 and Macksey, p. 155 — 158. 
67 Hardy, p. 66 and 71 — 73. 
Brigadier N. T. Bagnall, whose study The Israeli Experience has been one of the sources of 
this thesis, was one of the European military officials responsible for developing the "Follow-
on-Forces-Attack" doctrine. 
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American planes were technically inferior to the Soviet-made planes used by 
their opponents. This raised the question of why this happened. Colonel Boyd 
also later widened his studies to ground combat; i.e., to battles, campaigns 
and wars like Leuctra (in 371 B.C.), Vicksburg in the American Civil War and 
the German invasion of France in 1940. In these examples, he found that one 
side had presented the other with a sudden, unexpected change to which it 
could not adjust in a timely manner. As a result it was defeated and generally 
at a small cost. In addition, the losing side had often been physically stronger 
than the victor. This reality made Boyd consider what the common 
denominator was in all these cases and lead to the birth of his theory of 
manoeuvre warfare, also called the "Boyd theory".68 
According to Boyd, conflicts — small or large with greater or lesser forces 
involved — can be seen as time-competitive observation — orientation -
decision — action cycles. The side that is faster in this cycle, called both the 
"Boyd Cycle" and the "OODA-Loop", gains a tremendous advantage. As a 
consequence of this, Colonel Boyd also defines manoeuvre warfare as follows: 
manoeuvre means going through however many "OODA-Loops" are required 
faster than the enemy until he loses his cohesion and can't continue fighting as 
an effective, organised force. This led to the definition of the purpose of 
manoeuvre warfare as well. According to former Senator Gary Hart of the U.S. 
Armed Services Committee, the object of maneuver warfare is to destroy the 
enemy's cohesion — and the opposing commander's ability to think clearly — by 
creating surprising and dangerous situations faster than he can cope with 
them."6 
 Today, most scholars and military analysts agree with the thought that 
manoeuvre in the broadest sense of the term is the essence of conducting war 
from the operational perspective.76 
Robert Leonhard also sees manoeuvre warfare as a more philosophical 
point of view. He notes that physical movement is not a matter of a course to 
success. Therefore, manoeuvre must aim at breaking the enemy's will; a 
concept that is closely connected to Sun Tzu's thinking. In this concept, 
manoeuvre is defined purely as the movement of troops toward the objective 
without the idea of battlefield combat." Each time the commander successfully 
applies manoeuvre theory, he preserves his resources. Therefore at the 
strategic and operational levels of warfare the concept of firepower or direct 
destruction of the enemy must not, according to Leonhard, be attached to the 
definition of manoeuvre warfare. According to him, the key word in manoeuvre 
is surprise, which in the highest and purest application of the concept is to pre- 
68 Lind, p. 4 — 5. 
69 Ibid., p. 5 — 7, Leonhard, p. 51 and Dyster, p. 533. 
OODA is an abbreviation of the first letters of the word of the cycle; Observation, 
Orientation, Decision, Action. 
Lind, the author of the Maneuver Warfare Handbook, was an advisor on military affairs to 
Senator Hart in the early 1980s. This explains why the "Boyd theory" parallels Senator Hart's 
objectives in manoeuvre warfare. 
Senator Hart's quotation is made from Gary Hart's article What's Wrong with the Military? 
NYT Magazine, February 14, 1982, pp. 16 — 19. 
79 Newell, p. 79. 
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empt the enemy and disarm or neutralise him before a fight. Therefore in 
manoeuvre warfare the objectives of movements are the enemy's critical and 
vulnerable points, not the physical centre of gravity of his troops. To explain 
this, Leonhard gives an example from chess. In chess, the opponent's centre 
of gravity is the king, which is by no means the strongest piece, but its 
neutralisation ends the game. In warfare, concrete objectives of this type can 
be unprotected flanks, rear area installations (like headquarters, supply troops 
and reserves) or important geographical features that serve as a precondition 
for one's own manoeuvres (like road nets), among other things. However, the 
aim is typically not to conquer terrain or destroy the enemy, rather it is to 
paralyse him and break his will to fight. In addition, Leonhard tends to see an 
adversary's vulnerable moral and psychological characteristics (like fear of the 
dark or fear of encirclement) as objectives of manoeuvre.71  
Simpkin also sees force dichotomy as fundamental to manoeuvre warfare, 
although he and Robert Leonhard also have some restrictions with regards to 
this. In manoeuvre warfare, one of the main goals of operational battle is to 
lessen the probability of prolonged military operations and to find the 
opportunity to seize the initiative and finally destroy the integrity of the enemy's 
operational scheme. To achieve these goals, the battlefield must be extended 
in three ways: by extending the battlefield in depth to disrupt the momentum of 
enemy troops not yet engaged in the battle, by extending the time scale so that 
current actions and the attack of follow-on echelons are integrated to win the 
close-in battles as time goes on and by increasing the emphasis on the use of 
a combined arms and joint services force structure. This list, compiled by the 
American tank officer and military analyst General Donn A. Starry, widens the 
traditional force dichotomy of screening forces and attack forces. However, 
experiences from the past reveal that any attempt to overemphasise the use of 
one particular arm or part of a force has led to problems. As Leonhard notes, 
"the lack of an integrated all-arms approach in modern warfare guarantees the 
loss of the synergistic combat multiplication that occurs when we present the 
enemy with complementary efforts of armour, infantry, artillery and aviation." 
This can be extended so that the more the operation is planned to go into the 
enemy's depth, in current terms beyond the "forward lines of troops" (FLOT), 
the more important co-operation between different services and branches is. 
Thus — as Leonhard says — the manoeuvre-oriented armies of today have 
developed combined-arms organisations for deep manoeuvre.72 
Manoeuvre warfare theory also stresses the command and control system 
because the side that is faster in the decision-making process will gain a 
remarkable advantage. This benefit can be achieved in three ways. The first is 
mission tactics of which the best example is the German Auftragstaktik. The 
second is the standardisation of interfaces between different command and 
control posts. This method includes streamlining the responsibilities of fighting 
troops and support troops, but also includes the use of command post and 
staff procedures, the so called "Standing Operating Procedure" (SOP). 
71  Leonhard, p. 18 — 20 and 29 — 30 and Simpkin, p. 22. 
72 Simpkin, p. xi and 37 and Leonhard, p. 96 and 174. 
General Starry wrote the foreword in Simpkin's book. 
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However, these methods are more critical to unexpected action than mission 
tactics is. The third answer is communications technology, which until today 
has also proved to be vulnerable to the "fog of war". In addition, Lind uses the 
term "recon pull". In "recon pull" tactics, reconnaissance is used to pull the 
main force around enemy surfaces (strong points) and even more deeply into 
the enemy's vulnerable positions (gaps).73 
To sum up the theory of manoeuvre warfare, it must be said that all modern 
interpreters of manoeuvre warfare; Simpkin, Bellamy, Lind, Newell as well as 
Leonhard, advance concepts that are quite similar. As a conclusion of the 
central principles of manoeuvre warfare theory, Robert Leonhard's way of 
thinking is the most illuminating. Leonhard has listed the central principles of 
the modern interpreters of manoeuvre warfare, derived from Liddell Hart, as 
follows: 
The first is pre-emption, which means offensive action to neutralise or 
destroy the enemy before the fighting has really begun. 
The second is positional or functional dislocation. This means rendering 
the enemy's strength irrelevant. A typical dislocation-type action is 
deception aimed at covering one's own centre of gravity by dispersion and 
concentration of forces, like Epaminondas at the battle of Leuctra. 
The third is disruption. This is a concrete strike against the enemy centre 
of gravity, which in this context means his "Achilles' heel"; for example, a 
lack of depth in the defence, not the strong points of his forces. The action 
is indirect. The aim of disruption is to avoid having to physically destroy the 
entire physical structure of the enemy force with a direct strike, and instead 
to attack his vulnerable, but essential objectives to paralyse him at a small 
cost. 
- Finally, there are psychological means. Their purpose is to influence the 
enemy's mind and his will to fight. These means can be mental, but they 
also can be quite concrete like taking advantage of enemy fears like fear of 
encirclement or fear of the dark.74 
Sometimes manoeuvre at the operational level of warfare is also seen as 
the opposite of attrition. While advocates of manoeuvre warfare favour 
movement against vulnerable enemy targets as a mean to paralyse him, the 
proponents of attrition warfare prefer to destroy the physical components of his 
73 Simpkin, p. 228 — 231, 261, 267 — 268, Leonhard, p. 82, Lind, p. 19 and Gissin, p. 164. 
Simpkin calls mission tactics "directive control". 
74 Leonhard, p. 79 — 80 and 224. 
According to Leonhard, the military dimension of low intensity conflict can be viewed as a 
form of dislocation. 
See also Simpkin, p. 133 and 140 and Mearsheimer, p. 88 — 90. 
Both Simpkin and Mearsheimer also stress Liddell Hart's influence on the principles of 
manoeuvre warfare. Simpkin places the origins of Liddell Hart's principles in the Sun Tzu 
phrase ... It is not a specimen of skill ... quoted above. The principles that stress indirect 
action more than immediate military action are: deterrence meaning the inhibition of warlike 
actions without a move from peacetime dispositions; pre-emption implying the use of 
manoeuvre to prevent the outbreak of hostilities; and dislocation, which means that when 
hostilities have broken out, victory is to be achieved mainly by manoeuvre. 
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army, especially the combat formations. According to the proponents of 
manoeuvre warfare, attrition is not a strategy; on the contrary, it is irrefutable 
proof of the absence of any strategy. Attrition is generally defined as "the 
reduction of the effectiveness of a force caused by the loss of personnel or 
equipment from enemy fire." A commander who resorts to attrition rejects 
warfare as an art and admits his failure to find an alternative. He uses blood in 
lieu of brains, as Robert Leonhard notes. The distinction between these 
approaches is not, however, so clear, although both the schools of manoeuvre 
and attrition have always existed. Therefore manoeuvre has also always 
included elements of firepower in a more or less prominent role. This can be 
seen in the pragmatic operational concepts of Tukhachevsky or in the German 
Blitzkrieg doctrine where air power had a central role. Christopher Bellamy 
analyses this dilemma in his book The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare by 
saying that "maneuver without the ability to strike is illusion." To buttress this 
argument, Bellamy quotes Alfred Mahan's words "force does not exist for 
mobility but mobility for force." According to Bellamy, manoeuvre can thus be 
defined as "moving one's forces in such a way as to multiply their effectiveness 
and ability to inflict attrition." In other words, manoeuvre is used to gain an 
advantage over the enemy in the form of a better fire position, or by getting 
astride the enemy's communications lines to force him to attack.75 
Richard Simpkin goes still further. He combines the elements of both 
attrition and manoeuvre warfare together. According to Simpkin, the necessary 
factor in manoeuvre warfare is the division of forces. They should consist of 
the "ordinary force" and the "extraordinary force". This force dichotomy is also 
pivotal in the concepts of the other interpreters of manoeuvre warfare. The role 
of the "ordinary force" is to fix the enemy in place and, as Simpkin notes, 
perhaps to conduct a break-in battle to create a penetration while the job of the 
"extraordinary force" is to exploit the penetration. This point of view, where 
both forces have an active role, but also represent fire-power, narrows the 
artificial distinction between coincidentally occurring opportunities and opening 
gaps by force and finally the distinction between "direct" and "indirect 
approach". Therefore, while opportunities to unbalance the enemy and 
paralyse his operational and, perhaps, his strategic command centres and 
lines of communication are the fundamental elements behind manoeuvre 
warfare, it might be necessary to blast a hole for them in order to get forces 
into a position to do that as Liddell Hart emphasised. This has been the lesson 
of the German Blitzkrieg doctrine as well as of the Arab-Israeli wars; gaps in 
numerous operations had to be created or enlarged and secured by force, 
which is a straightforward application of the "direct approach". According to 
Simpkin, the kind of force dichotomy described above is "the proper marriage 
of maneuver and attrition theory." Operations where infantry and mechanised 
infantry have been the "ordinary forces", while the armoured formations have 
been the striking power of the "extraordinary forces" and the air force has been 
75 Bellamy, p. 15 — 16 and Leonhard, p. 76. 
Leonhard's opinions of attrition warfare are based on Dave R. Palmer's Summons of the 
Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective, Presidio Press, Novato, CA. 1978, p. 117. 
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the firepower of the "extraordinary elements" have been the most applied 
models of manoeuvre warfare.76 
76 Simpkin, p. 93 — 115, Leonhard, p. 57 and Bellamy, p. 190. 
In his book, Simpkin also analyses the advantages and disadvantages of both attrition 
warfare and manoeuvre warfare mathematically in Chapter 4. However, this is not the 
subject of this work. 
See also Holden Reid, Brian: J. F. C. Fuller's Theory of Mechanised Warfare, Journal of 
Strategic Studies, December 1978, p. 295 — 312. 
According to Holden Reid, Fuller did not see the direct and indirect approaches as separate 
concepts. The direct approach was a measure to create conditions for applying the indirect 
approach. 
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2. THE ROLE OF THE ART OF WAR IN THE ISRAELI DEFENCE FORCES 
More than different views of the words the "art of war, there has been and still 
is a difference of opinion on the role of classic military theory in Israel. Some 
scholars and soldiers, who tend to see this question in a practical manner, 
stress the importance of the officers in the young IDF in the Israeli art of war. 
The other side is the group that tends to see the influence of the theoreticians 
of the art of war as being significant to the background of the development of 
the IDF. It seems that the truth lies somewhere in between. 
According to Professor Wallach, those who could read foreign languages 
read the military theory classics already during the period of the Haganah, and 
several articles were also translated into Hebrew. However, before WW II and 
in the first years after the war, there were not so many officers who knew 
foreign languages. For those people, individual translations on the art of war 
might have been rather distant things. Practical tactical measures took first 
priority. Therefore, Professor Gelber holds that the classics of military theory 
were not usually appreciated among IDF officers during the first decades of 
Israel's independence, although such names as Sun Tzu and Clausewitz at 
the philosophical level of warfare and Jomini at the more practical level were 
known. Colonel Shaul supports this view, according to him almost all the most 
known classics were translated into Hebrew, at least partly. Nevertheless, they 
only played a small role in officer training, especially at the tactical level. Nor 
were works from past military theoreticians, according to Doctor Pa'il and 
General Simhoni, included in the officer training curricula, although many 
officers read them nevertheless!' 
Despite the fact that the classics of military theory were seen as being far 
removed in the IDF, 20th century military thinkers were accepted and their 
ideas were adopted or applied. The most known of these were Liddell Hart and 
Fuller, but since the 1950s memoirs of famous (tank) commanders like 
Guderian, Rommel, Montgomery, Zhukov and Patton were also read. Their 
popularity was obviously based on the fact that these ideas were not so much 
philosophical but practical, and in addition they tried to analyse the future of 
war. According to Pa'il, the latter consideration was the reason why the 
experiences of foreign commanders were also read. Not only did Fuller and 
Liddell Hart analyse how to win the next campaign in a future war, they both 
77 
 Interviews of Colonel (ret.), Professor Yehuda Wallach, Professor, Lieutenant Colonel 
(ret.) Yoav Gelber, Colonel (ret.), Doctor Meir Pa'il, Major General (ret.) Uri Simhoni and 
Colonel, Doctor Shai Shaul. 
According to Shaul, there are several editions of the military classics in Israel and therefore 
the dates of the first publications are difficult to determine. Nevertheless, they were mostly 
published during the 1950s. 
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According to Shai, today the interest in the art of war has increased in the IDF. According to 
Kadish, this is a consequence of the distance to the wars of the past. The proportion of 
theory tends to grow the farther one gets from the last war. According to this, the share of 
history in the IDF officer courses of today is bigger than in past decades and it is 
substantially closer to social theory than to the history of events. 
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also provided choices on surviving the war of the few against the many" with 
mobile operations. In addition, Liddell Hart's "Strategy of Indirect Approach" 
enabled one to fight without incurring major losses of one's own. According to 
Shomron, Fuller's writings also led the Israelis to consider the problems of the 
command process in mobile warfare.78 
Most Israeli scholars and military men concede Liddell Hart's influence on 
Israeli military thinking, but at the same time they limit it to the tactical and 
operational levels of warfare. One can mostly agree with this viewpoint. It is 
generally accepted that Liddell Hart's thoughts on mechanised warfare were 
typical issues for the operational level of warfare. In the Israeli context, this is 
the case for the "Strategy of Indirect Approach" as well. To the Israelis, indirect 
approach meant, according to Wallach, flexible thinking; a principle that could 
be applied on the battlefield. For example, Pa'il sees Liddell Hart's indirect 
approach as a basic item behind the pursuit of surprise. Therefore, Liddell 
Hart's thoughts became very popular in the IDF and, according to Gelber, the 
"Strategy of Indirect Approach" can be seen in the background of Israeli 
operational planning in both the 1948 and the 1956 wars. In 1967 this 
approach was almost dominant.79 
Since the Six Day War, some Israeli scholars have also emphasised 
Clausewitz's theory behind Israeli military thinking, especially at the strategic 
level of warfare. Wallach, and Shai later on, both tend to see a Clausewitzian 
influence behind the Israeli strategy of being defensive at the strategic level 
and offensive at the operational level. In addition, Shai sees Clausewitz's 
thoughts as being more behind the concept of finding gaps and weaknesses in 
enemy defences and taking advantage of them than Liddell Hart's. In theory 
the idea of Clausewitzian influence at the strategic level sounds correct, 
though there is little factual evidence that proves that Clausewitz's theory was 
read on a wide scale in the IDF before the 1967 War. However, it is known that 
officers read Soviet military literature during the early years of the IDF, 
especially the literature that dealt with the Battle of Moscow according to 
Kadish. According to Wallach, the Israelis indirectly adopted the Clausewitzian 
concept of strategic defence, which meant offensive means at the operational 
level, in this way. In addition, in 1972 a German publishing house published 
Wallach's book Kriegstheorien, which was based on his lectures at Tel Aviv 
University. Therefore, in can be expected that his students — including officers 
as well — were to some degree aware of the ideas of the classical theoreticians 
that were presented in this book. In any case, it seems in a way that on the 
78 
 Interviews of Colonel (ret.), Professor Yehuda Wallach, Major General (ret.) Uri Simhoni, 
Lieutenant General (ret.) Dan Shomron and Colonel (ret.), Doctor Meir Pa'il. 
79 
 Interviews of Professor, Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Yoav Gelber, Professor Alon Kadish, 
Colonel (ret.), Professor Yehuda Wallach and Colonel (ret.), Doctor Meir Pa'il. 
Most of the interviewees who joined senior level officer courses during the late 1950s or 
early 1960s remember that indirect approach was one of the central subjects in tactical and 
operational exercises. 
23 
whole this process is similar to the American style of interpreting the 
experiences of the Vietnam War in a Clausewitzian framework after the fact.8°  
The tradition of researching the art of war has not been very important in 
Israel. Nevertheless, the development of the foreign art of war was surveyed in 
the Training Department of the General Staff, although the human resources 
assigned to this task were not significant. Connected to this, IDF officers were 
also send abroad to study in foreign military academies from the early 1950s, 
mainly in England, the United States and in France. While in many cases the 
purpose was to study professional military matters, in the 1950s the student 
officers also adopted military thinking, especially from England. When they 
returned home, they applied these ideas as well. In the 1960s, when the Arabs 
had adopted Soviet operational principles and equipment on a larger scale, 
there was a change in a more practical direction. According to Adan, the main 
emphasis at that time was put on acquiring knowledge of the Soviet art of war. 
For this task, a team of officers, including Russian-speaking Jews, were made 
responsible for studying the Soviet way of war, according to Gelber mainly 
from the Soviet literature, and for developing concepts to cope with this 
threat.81  
Since the establishment of POUM, (Pikkud U-mateh, the Command and 
General Staff College), in 1954, Israeli officers also started conducting 
operational analyses of domestic and foreign topics. According to Bagnall, 
military instruction at the Staff College was largely patterned on the British 
system, where models were also sought. Emphasis was more on individual 
participation than on formal instruction. Initially however, according to Adan, 
staff work; i.e., how to organise things that would have an influence on the 
battle, took first priority, but as soon as the IDF got experience in these 
matters, historical analyses were also adopted. The main emphasis was on 
two topics: the armoured battles of the Western Desert in North Africa during 
WW II and the battles of Stalingrad. The latter topic served as an example of 
culmination; the change from strategic defence to operational offence. 
Nevertheless, although the studies in POUM dealt with operational issues at a 
divisional level — sometimes also at higher levels — and although some of them 
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were also based on primary sources; according to Gelber they were not 
research works from the academic point of view. Pa'il confirms this by saying 
that the aim of these analyses was to educate the student officers to learn the 
basics of the art of war. It was also understood that history doesn't repeat itself 
and therefore historical experiences were not copied. For the Israelis, history 
and military theory were not a well but a fountain", as Pa'il puts it. Analyses 
were used to produce combinations and new ideas. Instead, the role of the 
theory of the art of war has always been slight at the lower level of officer 
education; these courses have concentrated on practical items.82 
The Israeli way of analysing the art of war can also be seen in their 
manuals. Already in 1943 during WW II, those Jews who served in the British 
Middle East Headquarters in Cairo started, according to Shai, to translate the 
British manuals into Hebrew. After Israel's independence this process was 
continued. From the early 1950s, manuals were written for the squad level up 
to the General Staff, though they mostly concentrated on tactical and technical 
issues. According to Gelber, the manuals in the early 1950s were also still 
translations of the British ones — which were correspondingly based on 
German models. In some technical issues for armour, several French manuals 
were also copied. The main aim of translating the foreign texts was to get a 
solid base for military training. Already before the 1956 War, the Israelis had, 
however, started to modify the translated manuals for Israeli conditions. Just 
before the war a number of orders for the co-operation between different arms, 
air-land operations, sea-land operations and also several issues concerning 
battle techniques — such as fighting in fortified areas and fighting against anti-
tank defences — were written. However, these writings were obviously more 
orders that complemented the existing manuals than independent manuals. 
Manuals at higher levels were also written, but this process was not systematic 
and, in addition, there were disputes about the contents of the brigade level 
manuals, for example. Therefore Colonel Shaul defines these writings as being 
more concepts than manuals. For example, during the War of Independence 
IDF brigades had, according to Gelber and Kadish, their own manuais.83 
 
According to Pa'il, the operational doctrine, "Combat Doctrine", was not 
written until 1964. Although this manual was classified as "confidential", since 
then parts of it can also, according to Shaul, be seen in many other manuals. 
Tactical manuals were not revised very often as well and, according to Adan, 
this process was not systematic until the late 1970s. Major changes derived 
from developments in weaponry that later on created pressure for 
organisational modifications. For example, according to Wallach the tactical 
manuals in the 1970s were still almost the same as those that were in use in 
82 Interviews of Major General (ret.) Avraham Adan, Professor, Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) 
Yoav Gelber, Professor, Colonel (ret.) Yehuda Wallach, Lieutenant General (ret.) Dan 
Shomron, Doctor, Colonel (ret.) Meir Pa'il, Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 88, Bagnall, p. 56 and 
IDFArc., file 1/25/1954, file 5/25/1954, file 129/147/1961 and file 276/147/1961. 
Models for senior officer training were also sought from other places than England, but on 
the whole it seems that Bagnall's statement is appropriate. 
83 Interviews of Professor, Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Yoav Gelber, Colonel, Doctor Shai Shaul 
and Professor Alon Kadish, discussions with Doctor, Colonel (ret.) Hanan Shai and IDFArc., 
file 28/1529/1952 and file 129/147/1961. 
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the 1950s. The slight change in the manuals — both in substance and from a 
quantitative point of view — was a consequence of at least three things. First, 
the Israelis preferred verbal doctrine to a written one. According to Pa'il, this 
was an old Jewish tradition, verbal doctrine was more elastic and could be 
changed according to the situation. Second, the need to modernise manuals 
and concepts was avoided in the 1950s and 1960s by holding weekly 
meetings. Wallach and Adan mentioned in their interviews that at least in the 
infantry and Armoured Corps officers gathered together every Friday afternoon 
to discuss tactical issues. In these meetings, experiences, both their own and 
foreign ones, were considered. If needed, changes were made but this 
process didn't require new manuals, changes were transmitted by oral orders 
or written instructions. Third, the Israelis hesitated, according to Kadish, to 
throw away manuals that had proved to be suitable in the wars. Nevertheless, 
war experiences also provided reasons for changes in manuals, especially 
after the 1956 War when the IDF was changed from being an infantry army to 
a mechanised army and after the 1973 War when the all-tank army was 
modified to be a mechanised army.84 
As was already mentioned, most manuals dealt with tactical and technical 
issues. Nevertheless, ideas about the art of war and the principles of war were 
also included in manuals, especially above battalion level. Opinions on the 
importance of the principles of war also vary greatly in Israel. However, some 
generalisations can be made. According to the Israeli senior officers who were 
interviewed, they were aware of the principles of war and these were often 
discussed in the tactical meetings. In addition, there is agreement that several 
principles have existed and still exist in the IDF and, according to Shaul, these 
principles were also written down in the manuals. According to Shai, they were 
even initially copied from the British manuals. Pa'il stresses that some central 
principles — like maintenance of aim, surprise and concentration — were 
adopted because they formed a basis for systematic thinking. In addition, 
indirect approach is mentioned in this context, but generally this is not seen as 
a principle of war; rather it is more a manner of thinking. In addition, according 
to Adan, Gelber and Simhoni, the principles of war were often used to analyse 
past operations. The view of their importance in the planning process also 
varies. Nevertheless, it can be supposed that only the knowledge of these 
principles had left their marks on the thinking of Israeli officers without 
mentioning the fact that these principles had been used to analyse operations. 
According to all this, it seems that the IDF has not been an exception in 
84 Interviews of Professor, Colonel (ret.) Yehuda Wallach, Colonel, Doctor Shai Shaul, 
Doctor, Colonel (ret.) Meir Pa'il, Professor Alon Kadish and Major General (ret.) Avraham 
Adan. 
26 
applying the principles of war, only the emphases have varied when compared 
to other armies.85 
It seems that after the Six Day War the role of the study of the art of war in 
the IDF collapsed. Gelber tends to hold that it was the 1967 War that was the 
culmination point in the Israeli art of war, especially if this subject is examined 
from the philosophical point of view. Up to the Six Day War the Israelis had 
modified past military theories and foreign practises and manuals according to 
their own needs. After the success of the Six Day War, IDF officers began to 
imagine that they were military geniuses and instead of revising, copied their 
past experiences. As had happened in the PALMACH earlier, the Israelis 
started to believe that the IDF was a particularity unique to Middle Eastern 
conditions. Therefore, the art of war also had to be created independently. 
Although officers were still sent abroad, the operational results of these tours 
were seen as being less and less important, the trips were more prizes and a 
way of arranging personal details. This also coincides with the overall 
overconfidence in the IDF after the Six Day War. This manner of thinking led 
Israel to the verge of destruction in 1973. However, when the Israelis assessed 
the experiences of the Yom Kippur War, technological issues got priority. The 
result was that the IDF continued preparing for the last war, though the 
mistakes that were made were not as severe as those that were made before 
the Yom Kippur War. Nevertheless, from 1973 up to the 1990s, the 
introduction of new weapons technology and the possibility of lessening losses 
with these new techniques led, according to Adan, to the tendency to favour 
fire-power. This concept, which was adopted from the Americans, is generally 
dated to the resignation of the senior command generation in the IDF. 
However according to Gelber, the emphasis on firepower was not a 
consequence of this. It was more a consequence of avoiding losses of their 
own. In addition, it was thought that there was not room anymore for 
operational manoeuvre on the battlefields of the Middle East from a traditional 
point of view. Therefore, it was only in the 1990s, after the Persian Gulf War, 
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when interest in military theory steadily started to grow that it was understood 
that firepower alone is not enough to settle wars.86 
8 
 interviews of Professor, Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Yoav Gelber, Professor, Colonel (ret.) 
Yehuda Wallach and Major General (ret.) Avraham Adan. 
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28 
3. THE ORIGINS OF JEWISH DEFENCE 
The basis of the Israeli art of war was laid down at the end of the 19th century 
when the Jewish population in Palestine began to grow. An increasing number 
of immigrants, spurred mainly by the pogroms of Tsarist Russia, moved to the 
Holy Land, which was under Turkish administration, in the 1880s. This 
immigration, which was the real start of several Jewish aliyah (immigration) 
movements into Palestine in the following decades, was the seed of the later 
acts of violence between Arabs and Jews. According to Martin van Creveld, 
the total number of immigrants in the first waves amounted to some 40,000 
people, of which only half stayed in Palestine. In the background of these 
aliyahs was the international Zionist Movement (established in 1897), which 
sought a political and territorial solution to Jewish problems. The final goal of 
the movement was an independent Jewish state in Palestine. As soon as the 
Arab press published reports on the emergence of Zionism, some concern for 
the fate of Palestine as a part of the Arab world began to be articulated. In the 
beginning, however, the leaders of the Zionist movement believed that Arabs 
and Jews could live together in peace in the coming Jewish state.87 
Between 1880 and 1914, the Jewish settlement in Palestine almost 
quadrupled to approximately 90,000 people, which was about 10% of the 
entire population of the area at this time. 88 This gradually caused a steadily 
growing number of disputes between the indigenous Arab population and the 
Jewish pioneers. However, up until the end of World War I these 
disagreements did not result in bloodshed. The activities of Arab gangs 
consisted mainly of robbing Jewish property. The gangs consisted of Bedouins 
and local Arab peasants, who wanted to profit at the settlers' expense.89 
The Ottoman Turks did little to help the situation of the new Jewish 
settlements, so the Jews had to rely on hired local Arab and Circassian guards 
to defend their villages. This continued until 1904 when the second aliyah 
came to Palestine. These immigrants were also from Russia and Eastern 
Europe, and were influenced by the revolutionary movements in Russia. Above 
all, they were full of social and nationalist idealism. They built the first 
communal settlements: the kibbutzs and moshays. It is significant that these 
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groups also had some experience of defending themselves in improvised 
groups because they had protected their previous settlements in Eastern 
Europe from Russian Cossacks. Therefore, the establishment of the second 
aliyah settlements was also a turning point in securing the isolated Jewish 
villages. In 1907, these mainly Eastern European pioneers organised a small 
secret organisation called Bar-Giora. Two years later this group was expanded 
and renamed ha-Shomer (Hashomer, Watchman). Hashomer began to train 
the members of the settlements to use weapons, organised armed guards 
against banditry and were the first Jews to take the defence of their 
settlements into their own hands.9°  
Hashomer was no longer merely concerned with the defence of individuals 
and their property; rather it was interested in the defence of the Jewish 
community as a whole. Although not all the remote settlements were included 
in Hashomer, it was not a purely voluntary organisation. The members of the 
settlements were obliged to join its activities. From the very beginning, 
Hashomer emphasised quality over quantity. Its defence forces were divided 
into two elements: the active and the potential. The active element was always 
under arms and responsible for the day to day defence of the settlements. The 
potential element was to be a reserve force consisting of every able-bodied 
man. Its task was to support the active groups, but this goal was not achieved 
because of a lack of weapons. However, although the Hashomer system was 
largely defensive, the settlements also prepared to assist each other. 
Therefore, it was the seed of more organised defence organisations. This 
opinion is also shared by van Creveld. According to him, Hashomer was "the 
first to take the military road, not merely as a means to a military end, but with 
the explicit goal of shedding the supposed characteristics of the 'wandering 
Jew', and replacing him with a new, hardy, and courageous type who would 
take up arms in defence of himself, his settlement, and his country." Besides, 
Hashomer provided a source of tradition, inspiration and motivation to coming 
Israeli generations.91  
The British also influenced early Jewish military thinking; even before their 
Mandate period. During World War One, the British recruited two different 
Jewish contingents: first in 1915 the Zion Mule Corps, a supply unit that served 
in Gallipoli; and in 1917 the Jewish Legion (Gdudim) of three battalions 
recruited from Jews in England, Canada, the United States and Palestine. The 
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former unit was already disbanded in England during the war, but the latter 
participated in the June 1918 offensive against the Turks in Palestine and 
thereafter was stationed at Sarafand Camp near Jerusalem for demobilisation. 
Many future leaders of the Yishuv (the Jewish settlement in Palestine) enlisted 
in the British contingents and got a feel for military training. The most 
outstanding of them was Corporal David Ben-Gurion, who was to become the 
Prime Minister and Defence Minister of Israel during the early years of her 
independence. Although Ben-Gurion did not become, according to Gunther 
Rothenberg, a great military expert during his service in the army — as 
obviously was mostly the case with others, too — he gained a lasting respect 
for regular army procedures. Therefore, when Ben-Gurion assumed a leading 
role in the defence affairs of the Jewish Agency (the predecessor of the Israeli 
parliament, the Knesset) during the 1930s and also later when he became the 
Prime Minister and Minister of Defence of an independent Israel, his military 
experience would play a significant role." 
Three times, in 1921, in 1929 and between 1936 and 1939, the Arab threat 
materialised in the form of an overall attack on Jewish settlements and towns. 
The main Arab effort was put into a blockade of communications by guerrilla 
methods and was followed by assaults on the weaker settlements. The local 
British Colonial Administration was unable to stop the violence.93 
The first wave of Arab terrorism in Palestine began spontaneously in March 
1920 when Arab rioters attacked isolated Jewish settlements in the Upper 
Galilee. In April, these disturbances also spread to Jerusalem. Disturbances 
continued up until the end of 1921. These events were a shock to the Jewish 
community, which had voluntarily handed its armament in to the new 
authorities in late 1918 and in 1919, being convinced that the British would 
look after their security.94 
The weakness and unwillingness of the Mandate authorities to protect the 
Jews strengthened their thinking about the defence against the Arabs. The 
April 1920 riots led to the formation of a new self-defence organisation. In June 
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1920, the newly founded HISTADRUT (Histadrut Haklalit shel Haovdim 
Haivriim, the General Labour Federation) decided to allocate a fund for the 
provision of arms, to appoint a handful of permanent officers and to merge the 
local defence groups into a country-wide militia. This was to become the base 
of the Haganah (defence), the major forerunner of the Israeli Defence 
Forces.95 
The first active Haganah group was formed in 1921 and consisted of 
soldiers of the Jewish Legion battalions, which were still stationed in Sarafand 
at the time. The Haganah's main strength came from the Labour Party and 
from the exposed collective settlements in particular, where arms could be 
stored and some elementary training could be conducted. However, in its early 
phases the Haganah was not a homogenous organisation, although its ranks 
were open unlike its predecessors. The disputes were mainly over political 
issues. The first head of the Haganah was a 28-old veteran of the Jewish 
Legion named Yosef Hecht, who organised his staff according to the Soviet 
communist model of a committee of five men with two deputy members. The 
right-wing and religious Zionist groups disliked the idea of a "red" militia and 
even some left-wing settlers opposed the concept and refused to take their 
military activities seriously. In addition, the Mandate Administration began to 
restrict Jewish immigration to Palestine in the early 1920s. This placed the 
objectives of the Haganah in contradiction with those of the authorities. In 
1923, the British banned the Haganah as an illegal organisation.96 
The Haganah clandestinely sought countries that would agree to train its 
men, but without any practical results. However, they succeeded in acquiring 
money and arms from foreign supporters, mainly Jews, and arms smuggling 
into Palestine began. In any case, the Haganah remained a loose association 
of voluntary local defence groups in the early years of its existence, with the 
biggest groups in the cities of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa. In practice it had 
no central authority. However, the idea of a Jewish armed force that would 
operate at the service of the whole community was born. From a purely military 
point of view, and considering what was to come, communal life in isolated 
settlements and the informality of the Haganah formed a basis for the tactical, 
organisational and leadership principles that were later adopted by the Israeli 
Defence Forces. In the settlements among the pioneers, a spirit of defence 
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was born, which since then, according to van Creveld, has been one of the 
most important sources of motivation — en breda, no choice — in times of crisis 
up until the 1970s when the Haganah-educated soldiers retired from the army. 
The innovative defence principles were also a consequence of everyday life in 
a hostile environment with continually changing situations. These changes 
compelled Haganah members to improvise their tactics. Both of these features 
— motivation and innovation — have been typical of the IDF in the past 
decades; from privates up to the highest echelons.97 
Although the military achievements in the 1920s were not dazzling, the 
Haganah was able to reinforce its organisation and to improve its organised 
defence. Commanders, who were responsible for drawing up a defensive plan, 
were designated for each town and settlement. Under the direction of these 
men, the positions that were to be manned in case of an emergency were 
selected and men were allocated among these positions, arms and other kinds 
of equipment were stored and, if necessary, distributed. A primitive 
communication system based on whistles, flags, flashlights and messengers 
between the various positions was built up. All this happened semi-legally, 
which indicated that the British were willing to close their eyes to some of the 
Haganah's activities in order to save themselves some work.98 
Training was in the hands of former sergeants and corporals from various 
armies of World War I. However, the majority were from the British Army. 
According to van Creveld, military experience at any level above the individual 
was entirely absent, with a few exceptions. In any case, the Haganah was able 
to produce several competent leaders in the 1920s, although it can be said 
that most of them were born leaders. Besides, they already had some kind of 
military experience. This list includes Yohanan Rattner, Eliahu Golomb and 
Yitzhak Sadeh. Rattner was a professor of architecture at Haifa Technical 
Institute and a former staff officer in the Imperial Russian Army, who later 
became the Chief of Staff of the Haganah. In addition, the tactically competent 
Eliahu Golomb would also become Chief of Staff of the Haganah. Sadeh, 
correspondingly, was a visionary Russian immigrant and veteran of both the 
Imperial Russian Army and the Red Army, who in subsequent years first 
developed Jewish small-unit tactics and later became commander of the first 
armoured formation in the IDF. In the mid-1920s, Sadeh was also in charge of 
Haganah's first officer training course. Pa'il states that together Rattner and 
Sadeh formed "a complete military nature". Rattner brought knowledge of staff 
techniques and planning to the Haganah while Sadeh represented practise 
and innovation. In addition, according to Pa'il, both of these men knew at least 
German and Russian and obviously also French. They read a lot of German, 
Russian and French military theoreticians whose influence can be seen in 
Sadeh's writings, for example. Sadeh was also able to root his ideas in that 
young generation of immigrants who had already been born in Palestine. On 
97 Schiff (1974), p. 10 — 11 and van Creveld (1998), p. 22, 24 and 33. 
According to van Creveld, Jews have traditionally regarded military service as a thing to be 
evaded by every possible means. This was also one reason behind the unique military 
lifestyle that neglected manuals, but combined a spirit of great enterprise with rather lax 
discipline. 
98 
 van Creveld (1998), p. 26. 
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the whole, according to Gelber, in the 1920s the Jews read military literature 
that dealt with WW I and the years following that war when firepower and 
movement was separated.99 However, except for this officer training course, 
no common policy in the tactical principles of various settlements can be 
discerned in the 1920s. The tactics and weapon skills were mainly 
consequences of some distinguished individuals like Sadeh, but were not 
spread nation-wide in this phase. 
The second wave of Arab terrorism came in 1929. This was a turning point 
in the history of the Haganah. During these acts of violence, the Haganah 
started defence planning on a national scale for the first time. Responsibility for 
maintaining and expanding the Haganah was handed over to the Jewish 
Agency and supervision of the organisation was further vested in a civilian 
committee, the National Command, representing all the Zionist parties. Within 
this framework, the settlements were organised into a closely-knit organisation. 
Procurement of weapons from abroad accelerated and a clandestine arms 
industry began.10° 
This unity did not last long. The non-socialists didn't accept Haganah's 
power over all Jewish settlements in Palestine. The socialist parties regarded 
the Haganah as the nucleus of a future army. This can be seen in the 
document "The Foundations of Defense" (Osbiot Ha-hagana) drafted by the 
head of the Haganah, Saul Avigur, in 1934. In this outline the Haganah was, 
according to van Creveld, seen as the sole organisation responsible for Jewish 
self-defence. The document also showed a need to combat any attempt to set 
up alternative groups. In practice this draft could not be implemented. The non-
socialists were content to regard the Haganah as a mere auxiliary to the British 
army and police. The Haganah was split in 1931 as a consequence and the 
non-socialists established their own defence organisation, the Irgun Zevai 
Leumi, or the National Military Organisation, popularly known as ETZEL.101  
In 1934, politics in the Haganah were displaced by military questions. The 
defence of settlements became the major concern. By inducting all citizens 
over the age of 17, both men and women, as members of the Haganah, a fair 
basis for a common defence was laid down. The training of individuals began: 
first a six-month basic training period followed by 1 year of active service, after 
which individuals were moved into reserve units. With the aid of foreign military 
manuals — obviously mainly British — a training course of 120 hours including 
drills, minor tactics, weapons handling and the firing of some rounds was 
99 Rothenberg, p. 23, van Creveld (1998), p. 24 — 26 and interviews of Doctor, Colonel (ret.) 
Meir Pa'il and Professor, Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Yoav Gelber. 
See also Bagnall, p. 25 and Perlmutter (1978), p. 11 — 12. 
The Haganah was also called upon to deal with newly arrived immigrants from Eastern 
Europe within the objectives of HISTADRUT. Therefore, the Haganah's additional task was 
to teach immigrants Hebrew and basic information about the country. Bagnall bases his text 
on Maurice Roumani's unpublished thesis The Contribution of the Army to National 
Integration (University of London). Ever since then the IDF has continued the principle of 
educating newly arrived immigrants as well as conscripts in the early stages of their national 
service. 
100 Schiff (1974), p. 11 — 12 and Rothenberg, p. 24. 
101 
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34 
started. Furthermore, exercises were planned to reinforce co-operation 
between settlements. Therefore, several covert march-manoeuvres were also 
directed to outlying settlements. In addition, primitive staff duties were already 
organised during the first half of the 1930s under the Tel Aviv branch, which 
was the largest of the local Haganah organisations. Others followed, with or 
without guidance from the "general headquarters" — a name that might be too 
strong a term in this context. The most important detail of this reform from the 
military point of view was the establishment of an intelligence service, and a 
counter-intelligence service. This gave the Jews the opportunity to anticipate 
the actions of their enemies, and was a primary precondition for the active 
defence principle that was adopted in the latter part of the 1930s. This 
institutionalisation can be considered to have been the basis of the Israeli 
Defence Forces.102 
102 Schiff (1974), p. 13 and van Creveld, p. 34 — 35. 
The other General Staff branches were a medical department and a legal department. 
See also Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 11. 
According to various writers, all able-bodied men and women in the Kibbutzim and more 
isolated villages were in the Haganah, but its branches often existed only on paper in the 
towns. 
The term active defence should also not be confused with the corresponding term of the late 
1970s. In 1930, active (defence) can be seen as being the opposite of passive (defence). 
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4. THE ERA OF BRITISH INFLUENCE 
Between 1936 and 1939 during the third and longest Arab uprising before 
World War II, the Haganah made its most dramatic developments. The 
measures adopted were both passive and active. During the seven years 
before 1936 the countryside settlements were fortified with underground 
bunkers, barbed-wire fences were erected, fortifications were equipped with 
searchlights, and internal and external communications were improved by 
using different methods like buzzers, signal lamps and messengers. When 
hostilities broke out, none of the kibbutzs or moshays had to be evacuated. 
The active methods — which became increasingly common between 1936 and 
1939 — were based on fast raids on enemy bands, aiming at destroying them 
and getting rid of the local threat. This also necessitated a particularly strong 
emphasis on the gathering of intelligence, as one had to know for certain 
where and when to strike. According to Bagnall, three measures were taken; 
two of them largely initiated and supported by the British. One can agree with 
this with the exception that the idea of mobile operations was at least born 
already to some extent when the British started to support the Jewish 
defence.103 
4.1. Nodedet, the first step toward mobility 
In summer 1936, when the acts of violence had started, the Haganah 
established several mobile units of volunteers from the Jerusalem area called 
Ha-Nodedet (patrols or wanderers) under the command of Yitzhak Sadeh to 
track down and ambush guerrillas based in the villages around Jerusalem 
instead of waiting passively for their attacks. According to van Creveld, 
however, the idea of mobile patrols had already been in existence since the 
early 1930s, when the Nodedet met every week to practice with or without 
orders from the Tel Aviv branch such activities as patrolling, minor tactics, river 
crossings and the like. Very few sources have remained from the Nodedet, but 
it seems the idea of favouring mobile operations instead of relying on local 
defence is several years older than the third Arab uprising and is purely of 
Jewish-origin. The rather peaceful period in the early 1930s — and also the 
illegal character of the activities — might explain the fact that more evidence of 
the early activities of the Nodedet has not been preserved. However, in 
summer 1936 when the hostilities between the Jews and Arabs intensified, the 
Nodedet already operated openly, according to van Creveld. As earlier in the 
1920s, now also this all happened semi-legally, which indicated that the British 
were willing to close their eyes to some of the Haganah's activities. At this 
phase the experiment of using the Nodedet did not convince the Jewish 
leaders who, according to Luttwak and Horowitz, did not achieve a consensus 
103 Ne'eman, Yuval: The Israel Army and the Sinai Campaign, p. 2 — 3, van Creveld (1998), 
p. 38 and Bagnall, p. 25. 
According to van Creveld, the organised defence was mainly financed by semi-official taxes. 
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on the usefulness of the Nodedet in the midst of the debates on the self-
restraint policy.104 
The Nodedet finally broke the tradition of passive defence. The main reason 
for this was its commander, Yitzhak Sadeh, who was an innovative tactician 
and emphasised more active means. This can be clearly seen in Sadeh's 
words, as quoted by Amos Perlmutter in his book Military & Politics in Israel. 
Nation Building and Role Expansion:, "Don't wait for the Arab marauder. Don't 
wait to defend the kibbutz. Go after him, move on to the offensive." Already in 
autumn 1937 Haganah — still backed by the British — authorised Sadeh to form 
additional mobile forces.105 
4.2. The Jewish Settlement Police — the start of regular training 
The second measure was the establishment of the Jewish Settlement Police 
(Notrim or Gafirim) in June 1936. This decision was backed by the British. 
Jews selected from a list of "reliables" were taken into this para-military force 
which consisted of three main elements: a number of regular units called 
Special Constables, a large number of unpaid "supernumeraries" and mobile 
units. In this connection, the country was also divided into ten regional 
commands, each however, under the authority of a British officer. In addition, 
according to van Creveld, the British also sought to make use of the remaining 
Haganah forces and in time almost the entire Haganah was incorporated into 
the Jewish Settlement Police. This is why David Ben-Gurion, as well as Sykes, 
regarded the establishment of the Jewish Settlement Police as the foundation 
of the Jewish army.106 
The Special Constables were paid and equipped with small arms by the 
Mandate Government to carry out all local guard duties. They included both 
104 Bagnall, p. 25, Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 13 and van Creveld (1998), p. 35. 
According to van Creveld, the activities of the Nodedets were more widely spread than just 
around Jerusalem. Private cars and motorcycles were also included in the training and, on 
the whole, van Creveld considers the motorised units to be highly mobile by the standards of 
the day. 
105 Bagnall, p. 25, Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 13 and Perlmutter, Amos: Military & Politics in 
Israel. Nation - Building and Role Expansion, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., London 1969, p. 32. 
106 AlIon, Yigal: The Making of Israel's Army, Universe Books, New York 1970, p. 8, Bar-
Zohar, p. 88, van Creveld (1998), p. 39, Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 13 and Sykes, p. 140. 
According to Luttwak & Horowitz, the Jewish Settlement Police were built up on the lines of 
the Ulster constabulary, the model of police forces created by the British in less secure 
colonies. 
Luttwak and Horowitz hold that only the Special Constables and "supernumeraries" formed 
the Notrim. According to them, mobile units weren't included in the original Notrim. One can 
agreed with this. Reading between the lines this opinion can be found in van Creveld too. 
See also Ben-Gurion, David: Britain's Contribution to Arming Hagana, Jewish Observer and 
Middle East Review, September 20, 1963, LH 15/5/311, p. 12 — 14. 
Originally the name of the Jewish Settlement Police was the Jewish Supernumerary Police 
(Notrim), and before it was consolidated, the name was also the Jewish Settlement Defence. 
Originally the list of the "reliables" contained some 1,200 names. In autumn 1936, the 
number already stood at about 3,000 and at the end of the year it was almost 4,000. 
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British recruits and Jews and also had, in addition to their normal police duties, 
the responsibility for training the Supernumerary Police.107 
After receiving weapons training from the British regular police (in 
Palestine), the Special Constables returned to the settlements with the rank of 
Lance-Corporal. They were put in charge of training the local settlers to defend 
their own settlements as the extra "supernumerary establishment' of the 
police. The "supernumeraries" were also allowed to use the weapons of the 
mobilised units for training and emergencies. However, they were allowed only 
a few rifles. The reason for this was that the Jews were known to have other 
arms from the illegal Haganah and, on the other hand, the British did not want 
to increase the amount of Jewish armament. Instead, according to Sykes, it 
was unlikely that the Mandate Administration ever wished this Jewish police to 
be a serious counter to the rebellion. In any case, the training of the Jews 
provided them with the opportunity to illegally extend both their military skills 
and the scale of the Haganah.108  
In 1937, the Haganah ordered Sadeh — because of local and ideological 
disputes in its ranks, but also to have a more flexible concept against Arab 
terror — to form and train country-wide mobile forces from Notrim. This was the 
birth of FOSH (Plugot Sadeh, field companies). According to van Creveld, the 
Nodedet formed the skeleton of the mobile guards. Although the sources on 
this give contradictory information, it can be supposed that this was the case 
because Sadeh represented the continuation of mobile operations. According 
to van Creveld, the FOSH units totalled some 400 men in 1938; divided into six 
regionally based companies and finally into sixty squads. The Haganah 
revitalised its struggle against the Arabs. However, in April 1939 FOSH was 
disbanded as a result of the British curtailment of the Notrim, despite the fact 
that it had — along with other means — been quite successful in its operations 
and the violence had gradually faded away. However, the leaders of the 
Haganah at the time had already understood the value of mobile field units.109 
After the dissolution, the veterans of FOSH were used in two ways. A core 
of Sadeh's chosen men formed a special unit known as POUM (Plugot 
Meyuchadot, special companies) for small-scale covert police, intelligence and 
107 Sykes, Christopher: Orde Wingate, Collins St. James's Place, London 1959, p. 140. 
108 Ibid. 
In addition, Sykes also speaks of the Jewish Railway Police, which seem to have been never 
called out according to him. 
109 Perlmutter (1969), p. 32, Rothenberg, p. 26, Creveld (1998), p. 40 — 41 and Luttwak & 
Horowitz, p. 13. 
The number of FOSH members varies in different sources. Obviously the strength never 
exceeded one thousand. The explanation might be in the question of when the calculation 
was made. 
Martin van Creveld also shows another obvious reason for the dissolution of FOSH. 
Because FOSH was totally Jewish, its operations were semi-legal and therefore merely 
tolerated by the British. It might also have become too large in British eyes, posing a 
possible threat in the future. 
See also Ben-Gurion David: Britain's Contribution to Arming Hagana, p. 12 — 14. 
Ben-Gurion calls the mobile patrols of the Jewish Settlement Police Manin or Mishmarot 
Na'im. 
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counterintelligence operations. Some were also ordered to take charge of the 
illegal arms industry. The rest of the FOSH members formed the skeleton of 
the so-called HISH forces (Hel Sadeh, field corps) that were established in 
1940. Later after WW II, these permanent, but illegal HISH companies were 
expanded into battalions, which then formed the basis of the first Israeli 
brigades.11° 
Although the mobile units were operational for only a short period of time, 
their influence can be seen in the future IDF. While the officers of the Jewish 
Settlement Police were all British, many of the N.C.O.s and the rank and file 
served in a dual role as Haganah officers, especially in the mobile units. These 
officers — including Yigal AlIon (later General and Minister of Defence), and the 
future Chiefs of the General Staff Yigal Yadin and Moshe Dayan — transferred 
the training they got to thousands of Haganah members. According to David 
Ben-Gurion, there already were over 14,000 armed men and women in ten 
reorganised territorial "police" battalions during WW II. Professor Wallach also 
connects the mobile guards to the Israeli Armoured Corps. According to him, 
the mobile guards and their successors formed the basis of the Israeli 
Armoured Corps and also paved the way for Israel's future military doctrine. 
Although from a tactical point of view the mission of the mobile forces was to 
protect the convoys between isolated settlements with armed lorries, the 
measures that were taken showed the emphasis of favouring surprise and 
seeking the initiative that later on can be seen as the first central ideas behind 
the budding operational doctrine.111  
4.3. Special Night Squads — the roots of unconventional thinking 
The third measure, taken by the British, — which was to have more influence 
on the future IDF than the Jewish Settlement Police, though merely an indirect 
one — was the foundation of a special unit, the Special Night Squads (S.N.S.), 
in spring 1938 under the command of a British Intelligence Officer, Captain 
Charles Orde Wingate. Up until today the opinions on Wingate's influence on 
the IDF have been, however, rather contradictory, but it seems that his role 
110 Rothenberg, p. 31 and 45 and van Creveld (1998), p. 42 — 43. 
When FOSH was disbanded, its papers were destroyed. This was done for protection from 
the British. According to van Creveld, it was also a precaution that had a political 
background. By destroying the papers, Sadeh, who had a socialist philosophy of life contrary 
to the Haganah supreme command, kept some of his selected men under his own control. 
This all might also partly explain the lack of sources concerning the Nodedet. 
Later, some former FOSH members also formed the core of Mossad, Israel's secret service. 
111 
 Wallach, J. L: The Development of Israeli Armor Doctrine, LH 15/5/304, part 2, p. 1, 
Sykes, p. 140 and Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 13 — 14 and 17. 
See also Ben-Gurion, David: Britain's Contribution to Arming Hagana, p. 12 — 14 and Schiff 
(1974), p. 17. 
Schiff puts the total number of trained personnel in these supernumerary units as high as 
22,000 men. The difference between him and Ben-Gurion becomes obvious from the 
armament. When Schiff sums up the total number of rifles, submachine guns and machine 
guns at approximately 14,000 (8,000 of British origin in the supernumeraries and 6,000 of 
Haganah's own) this is the same number that Ben-Gurion gives. 
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behind Israeli military thinking has been greater than is usually 
acknowledged.112 
It is generally accepted that Wingate has a significant role in the IDF's 
history. Usually his influence is, nevertheless, limited to the tactical level of 
warfare. According to Gelber and Pa'il, Wingate was especially an expert in 
guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare. In addition, defence with offensive 
principles was at least locally adopted already before Wingate's arrival in 
Palestine. Therefore, it has mostly been estimated that Wingate confirmed the 
already existing methods of the Haganah and, according to Gelber and Shaul, 
also gave the Jews self-confidence. In any case, opinions that stress a more 
important role for Wingate also exist. Wallach and Shai tend to see that 
Wingate also represented military thinking above the tactical level despite the 
fact that the S.N.S. was a small force. Doctor Shai mentions that in Wingate's 
actions the levels of warfare mingled with each other because Wingate defined 
the action of his force according to the aim and not according to the size of the 
force. Therefore, it is easy to see that the S.N.S., whose aim was to prevent 
the planned strikes of Arabs beforehand, already operated at a higher level of 
military art than its sheer size gives grounds to suppose. This manner of 
thinking, i.e., the flexible use of force with regards to the task, was to become 
rather typical in the IDF up to the 1960s. Although this can not be directly 
connected to Wingate's influence, the para-military character of the early IDF 
and its predecessors was, however, evident. Besides, Shaul also stresses 
Wingate's role behind Israeli military doctrine; according to him, Wingate was 
one of the forefathers of the IDF doctrine, though indirectly via his pupils — like 
Moshe Dayan — who later manned the central posts in the IDF. This is also the 
view of Moshe Dayan's daughter Yael. After the Six Day War Yael Dayan 
describes the origins of the military thinking of her father as follows: "Wingate's 
methods perhaps were the base on which my father built his own military 
theories and practices."113 
According to Bond, Yigal Allon listed the three people who had had the 
greatest influence on the IDF at an annual conference at the Institute for 
Strategic Studies at Oxford. Their order was Wingate, Liddell Hart and Sadeh. 
Yigal Allon, as well as Yitzhak Sadeh, pictures Wingate as a military genius. 
112 Charles Orde Wingate was born on 3 March 1903 in an officers family with religious 
convictions. His education was strict, although modern and not in any way inhuman. In his 
youth he learned to love books and already became a well-read man in his early years. With 
his uncommon ideas, he was very unusual and controversial among his colleagues and 
superiors. Before coming to Palestine, he had already served in Sudan. In WW II he served 
first in Ethiopia and then in Burma. During the latter missions, he evolved his techniques of 
deep penetration behind enemy lines. He died at the rank of Major General on 24 March 
1944 when his plane crashed in a Burmese jungle. See for example Sykes (1959) and a 
newspaper clipping from the Telegraph of 1 April 1944, LH 15/4/486. 
113 Interviews of Professor, Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Yoav Gelber, Doctor, Colonel (ret.) Meir 
Pa'il, Major General (ret.) Avraham Adan, Professor Alon Kadish, Colonel, Doctor Shai 
Shaul, Professor, Colonel (ret.) Yehuda Wallach, discussions with Doctor, Colonel (ret.) 
Hanan Shai and interview of Yael Dayan, Spare, Autumn 1967, LH 15/5/315, part 2. 
Yael Dayan describes her fathers role model as follows: "Orde Wingate was another loved 
and admired friend hero of my father (the other was his mother Deborah)." 
Professor Kadish also tends to see a link between Wingate and Dayan. 
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Zeev Schiff shares this opinion; according to him "Wingate left his mark as the 
single most important influence on the military thinking of the Haganah." 
Nevertheless, however important Wingate was, he was not the only one whose 
teachings and principles can be seen in the background of Israeli military 
thinking. As Yitzhak Sadeh wrote about Wingate: "Before he came into 
Palestine we did the same things but on a lesser scale and especially with 
lesser skills." According to Wallach, Sadeh, however, respected Wingate 
because of his unconventional military thinking. Luttwak and Horowitz and 
Ne'eman also emphasise Wingate's influence behind the Haganah's 
performance, but they, too, stress that Sadeh had already applied the 
principles of active defence before Wingate. One can agree with this, 
especially, when it is a question of the tactical principles of the IDF. The 
operations of Sadeh's forces were very similar to the activities of the Special 
Night Squads. It can also be supposed that the interaction between Wingate 
and Sadeh was obvious if and because the thinking of these two men ran 
along parallel lines.114 
On the whole, Sadeh's influence has partly been overshadowed by Wingate. 
There are several reasons for this. First, Sadeh's political background was a 
factor that obviously affected his career. At least according to Pa'il, Ben-Gurion 
didn't appreciate Sadeh. Therefore Sadeh's experience was partly neglected 
because the same tactical principles that he emphasised were successfully 
tested by a professional British soldier, who was more reliable in the eyes of 
the Haganah's political leaders. Second, according to the American military 
analyst Trevor Dupuy, Sadeh's name has partly been set aside because his 
later performance as a battlefield commander was not so outstanding. During 
the Israeli War of Independence, the performance of the inadequately 
equipped and trained first Israeli armoured brigade, which was under the 
command of Sadeh, was not very good, though Sadeh was not the cause of 
the setbacks. In any case, it is true that many of the future leaders of the IDF 
fought under the command of both Wingate and Sadeh: the best known of 
them being Moshe Dayan. Because of the similarities between Nodedet and 
the S.N.S., and partly because of the scantiness of sources about Sadeh's 
forces — within the scope of military art — the role of Wingate is studied in 
greater detail in this context.115 
Captain Wingate arrived in Palestine in autumn 1936. He then made himself 
thoroughly familiar with the situation. However, Wingate was not totally 
unfamiliar with Palestine. In 1926, he had written an essay on General 
Allenby's campaign in Palestine in 1917, in which he analysed the superior 
14 Bond, p. 246 — 247, AIIon Yigal: Wingate's Heritage, Jewish Observer and Middle East 
Review, October 17, 1969, LH 15/ 4/486, s. 17 — 19, Schiff (1974), p. 17, interview of 
Professor, Colonel (ret.) Yehuda Wallach, Ne'eman, Yuval: The Israel Army and the Sinai 
Campaign, p. 2 — 3 and Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 15 — 16. 
Bond does not mention when Allon visited the Institute for Strategic Studies. It might have 
been in October 1975, at least at that time Allon was in London. 
The idea of active defence should not be confused with the 1970s term "active defence". 
115 Allon (1970), p. 9 — 10, Rothenberg, p. 26, Schiff (1974), p. 17, Dupuy, Trevor, N: Elusive 
Victory. The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947 — 1974, Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, Third 
edition, Dubuque Iowa 1992, p. 5 and interview of Doctor, Colonel (ret.) Meir Pa'il. 
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value of manoeuvre and concentrated effort when fighting on interior lines. 
Interestingly, these overall concepts — which were neither new nor Wingate's 
own ideas — have also been the leading principles in Israeli strategy and 
operational art. There is, however, no evidence of Wingate's influence on this 
issue."6 
Finally, in June 1938 Wingate submitted his report Ways of Making His 
Majesty's Forces Operate at Night with the Objective of Putting an End to the 
Terror in Northern Palestine to his superior, commander of the British forces in 
Palestine (G.O.C. Palestine), General Sir Archibald Wavell (later Field-
Marshall). Wavell, who according to Sykes was an open-minded soldier and 
neither pro-Arab nor pro-Jew, shared some characteristics with Wingate. Both 
men were progressive-minded officers and sought solutions to military 
problems indirectly and with manoeuvre so as to avoid sheer power solutions. 
In this report, Wingate stated that British counter-terrorism operations had 
been ineffective for two reasons. The first was a lack of roads, which made the 
use of mechanised troops impossible or at least delayed their effect. The 
second was that the size of the troop and air force components that were 
being used in counter-operations usually revealed the operations from the very 
beginning. To address this problem, Wingate proposed that the army should 
engage in night operations against the rebellion as a part of its regular duty."' 
After his report, Wingate was allowed to implement his thoughts. He formed 
a group of small armed bodies drawn from the loyal sections of the population 
which, in case of Arab attack, could render every homestead capable of 
defence for the short period that would elapse before a regular unit could 
arrive. The patrol force, known as the Special Night Squads, was born and 
became operational in June 1938.118 
116 Sykes (1959), p. 51 and 127. 
A force is said to be operating on interior lines when its operations diverge from a central 
point and it is therefore closer to separate enemy forces than the latter are to each other. 
Interior lines benefit a weaker force by allowing it to shift its main effort laterally more rapidly 
than the enemy. 
117 Sykes, p. 53, 109 — 110 and 136 — 137, van Creveld (1998), p. 39 and Horrocks, Sir 
Brian: Newspaper cut from The Listener, June 4, 1959, p. 977 — 979. 
Although some presumed so, Wingate was not a Jew, either wholly or in part, but he 
became a keen Zionist during the last months of 1936. However, from the first moment the 
local situation showed Wingate that he had been seriously misinformed about the Jews. 
They did not have the upper hand as was commonly assumed in Britain. 
See also Tulloch, Derek: Wingate in Peace and War. An account of the Chindit 
Commander, Tonbridge Printers Ltd., Kent 1972, p. 10. 
According to Major General Tulloch, Wingate's lifetime mission was to be a Zionist. General 
Tulloch was one of Wingate's closest friends and his deputy in Burma. 
Sir Brian reported his interview of Colonel H. E. Bredin, who was Wingate's second in 
command in the Special Night Squads, in his article. According to Colonel Bredin, most 
British officers in the 1930s were pro-Arab. 
118 Sykes, p. 138 — 141, Allon (1970), p. 8 — 9, van Creveld (1998), p. 40, Ne'eman, Yuval: 
The Israeli Army and the Sinai Campaign, p. 2 — 3 and Sugarman, Sidney: In Memory of 
Orde Wingate, 1903 - 1944. Israel's debt to a Great British Soldier, Jewish Observer and 
Middle East Review, October 17, 1969, s. 12 — 13, LH 15/4/486. 
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According to Sykes, many of the men who were trained at Ein Harod, where 
the S.N.S. headquarters was located, remembered Wingate's first words to 
them: Our purpose here is to found the Jewish army." The trainees also 
recalled that Wingate considered the Jewish members of the S.N.S. to be a 
cadre, from which the military forces of Israel would grow in due time. 
However, Wingate encountered difficulties at first. The least expected problem 
was getting the Jews to co-operate. In the very beginning the Special Night 
Squads were too small and their weapons too poor to accomplish their 
appointed task. Therefore, Wingate sought the help of the Haganah, but 
because he was a British officer he was suspect among the ranks of the 
Haganah. Finally, with the support of Dr. Chaim Weizmann, who was to 
become the first president of the State of Israel, Eliahu Golomb from the 
Haganah and Moshe Shertok from the Jewish Agency, Wingate succeeded in 
assuring the leaders of the Haganah of his sincere intentions and the work 
began.119 
When the organisation of the S.N.S. was completed, there were four S.N.S. 
posts, each with two platoons. The stations of the S.N.S. were very unlike 
British military camps. Their character was much more like the kibbutzim. 
However, Wingate underlined the importance of discipline — self-discipline 
might be the right word in this context — including respect for the adversary. 
The S.N.S. consisted both of British soldiers, five officers including Wingate 
and thirty-six volunteers, and of some 100 Jews from the Haganah and the 
Supernumerary Police. Wingate was able to form nine patrols from this force. 
Later, after the success of their operations, Wingate also decided to add a 
cavalry wing to his army because the patrols had succeeded in encircling 
manoeuvres in all their operations, but they had not often succeeded in 
pursuit. This never happened in Wingate's fairly short career in the S.N.S., but 
the idea of regional forces and operative mobile forces was to remain and was 
later applied in the force dichotomy of the IDF. The untypical para-military 
order, ostensible lack of discipline, and the unofficial custom of using first 
names was also to stay. Interestingly, it was, according to Sykes, also already 
in this phase that Wingate was thinking about a 1,000 men force behind 
enemy lines. This shows that Wingate was aware of the concept of deep 
penetration and obviously also discussed this with the Jews, though the extent 
remains unclear.12° 
119 Sykes, p. 143 — 145, 155 and 175 — 176 and Tulloch, p. 45 and 47. 
According to Tulloch, Wingate's purpose was to found a Jewish Army and his tour of duty in 
Palestine proved to be by far the most important event in his life and even in world history. 
In public, Wingate never made such an indiscreet statement but, according to Sykes, the 
squad members understood this and undertook their tasks consciously in that spirit. 
Zvi Brenner, the former head of the Haganah, also remembered Wingate's statement; 
Wingate's dream was to lead the selected men of Israel into a battle identical with Gideon's 
and his chosen men. According to Sykes, this biblical connection can be seen in different 
contexts in the S.N.S.; e.g., in where its platoons were located. 
120 Sykes, p. 149, 152, 154 and 170 — 171, Sugarman, p. 12 — 13, Allon, Yigal: Wingate's 
Heritage, p. 17 — 19, Hacohen, David: The History of a Historic Friendship, Jewish Observer 
and Middle East Review, October 17, 1969, LH 15/4/486, p. 12 — 13 and Mosley, Leonard: 
Banished - from the land he loved as the whisper spread "disloyal", The Sunday Express 
London April 24, 1955, LH 15/5/300, p. 2. 
S.N.S. squad members, including the British, wore kibbutzim uniforms. 
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Although Wingate rooted the elements of a military institution in the 
Haganah, his tactical influence is why he is remembered in the IDF. 
Nevertheless, according to Pa'il, the Jews didn't blindly copy Wingate's 
teachings; rather they more adapted and fitted them to their own mentality and 
situation. Wingate himself was responsible for training. He organised the 
training courses for the recruits of the S.N.S with his counterpart in the 
Haganah, Yaacov Dostrovski (Dori, later the first Chief of Staff/IDF). In lectures 
and long discussions Wingate presented his ideas on warfare to the squad 
members. From the very beginning, he taught the settlers that defence must 
never be passive. This reinforced the offensive ideas that were already 
adopted in Sadeh's forces, and finally confirmed the turning point from passive 
self-defence to active operations. In addition, training and operations in the 
S.N.S. were not sharply divided; indeed, squad members were trained to a 
large extent through taking part in operations. This was a habit that became a 
custom in the future IDF, as was the evaluation process of N.C.O.s and 
officers. This concept was based on the idea that command qualities would be 
revealed in field operations. Anyone lacking daring, courage and ingenuity in a 
battle or the willingness to lead his men was neither given a command 
appointment nor promoted, no matter how skilled an administrator or instructor 
he was. In the following decades Wingate's heritage was transferred to the IDF 
by his subordinates, among whom were several future Chiefs of Staff of the 
IDF and many other significant soldiers. The contents of the S.N.S.'s training 
can be seen in Appendix 3.121  
"Gideon tactics", as Colonel Ne'eman calls the tactics that Sadeh had 
applied in the Nodedet and FOSH, fitted entirely with Wingate's own thoughts 
and on the whole, according to Ne'eman, greatly improved the military 
performance of the Haganah.122 Yigal Allon, who was to become the 
commander of the WW II-era Jewish defence organisation called PALMACH, 
When Hacohen wrote this article, he was the Chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and 
Security Committee. 
Later in Burma, Wingate led his Chindits deep behind Japanese lines. This force was not a 
special force trained for special tasks but more an ordinary force trained to fight in the 
enemy's depth. 
121 
 See also Bredin: Return to Ein Harod, Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, October 
17, 1969, LH 15/4/486, p. 20 — 21, Sykes, p. 151, Bagnall, p. 37 — 38 and 57, Mosley, p. 2, 
Ne'eman, Yuval: The Israel Army and the Sinai Campaign, p. 2 — 3, Ben-Gurion David: Our 
Friend: What Wingate did for us, Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, September 27, 
1963, LH 15/5/311, p. 15 — 16 and interview of Doctor, Colonel (ret.) Meir Pa'il. 
Among Wingate's subordinates were such future IDF Generals as Yigal Yadin, Moshe 
Dayan, Haim Laskov, Yaacov Dostrovski (later Dori) and Avraham Yoffe. Yigal Allon did not 
belong to the S.N.S. He was a member of the Jewish Settlement Police (Field Forces 
Company), but took part in joint operations with the S.N.S. and the Settlement Police, 
where, according to him, Wingate's influence could also be clearly seen. See for example 
Rothenberg, p. 26, van Creveld (1998), p. 40 and Allon, Yigal: Wingate's Heritage, p. 17 -
19. 
See also Williams (1989), p. 56. 
Today, the only clear difference from the S.N.S. training principles is that there is more time 
to train conscripts because peacetime operations in border areas are performed by older 
age group units. Wingate did not have this luxury. 
122 Ne'eman, Yuval: The Israel Army and the Sinai Campaign, p. 2 — 3. 
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summarises the characteristic features of Wingate's approach to the military 
doctrine and tactics of the Haganah as follows: 
1. The personal example of the commander. This was rooted in the minds of 
the squad members in bold operations and in long and exhausting 
marches. The personal example of the commander was later known as the 
"follow-me" principle in Israel. 
2. Discipline. This must be interpreted as purposeful discipline. 
3. The idea of operations. Wingate was meticulous in preparing plans before 
operations and made sure that everyone knew and understood the 
foundation and idea of the operation. Nevertheless, he also preferred 
improvisation in accordance with the changing conditions of battle. He 
therefore gave authority to his subordinate officers and trained them to be 
leaders capable of assuming command, of making up their own minds and 
of taking their own independent decisions on a fluid battlefield. These 
principles, similar to the German Auftragstaktik, especially to that of 
operational freedom, have since been absorbed into the IDF in various 
ways. Although it can not be proved that Wingate's mission oriented tactics 
has their origins in German ideas, according to Sykes, Wingate was rather 
well aware of the German military art and in Wingate's time the German 
model of mission oriented command, which was based on their 
Sturmtruppen offensives in WW I, was the only existing one in the world.123 
4. Concentration of forces. Wingate perceived the importance of concentrating 
forces on the major objective, even under the conditions of anti-guerrilla 
fighting, while at the same time he was skilled in managing fragmented and 
scattered forces when the circumstances made it necessary. The centre of 
gravity could be reached at a place or time, and it was not necessary to put 
one's own force up against enemy strong points, actually it should be 
avoided by seeking other solutions. It is, however, unknown if Wingate also 
thought about and taught these principles for application in the larger 
context of conventional warfare. 
5. Exploitation of surprise and mobility. Both of these principles have been 
typical traits of the Israeli art of war and have been written about in the 
IDF's doctrine since the early 1950s. 
6. The mental aspects of warfare. This included both exploitation of the 
enemy's fears, like fear of the dark, and motivation of one's own forces. 
Wingate paid a lot of attention to motivation, which in his case was sought 
from the Bible, also later used by many Jewish commanders. Ever since 
then and especially since the genocide of the Jews during WW H, the basis 
of the mental motivation in the face of the enemy has been clear up to the 
Yom Kippur War (inclusive), en breda, no choice.124 
123 Sykes, p. 51 and Dyster, p. 221. 
Wingate's knowledge of the German military art is revealed in a statement that he made in a 
discussion with his colleagues in autumn 1939 after his return from Palestine. "I tell you the 
French are no good at all. The Germans will break through them as soon as they attack." 
124 AlIon (1970), p. 10 — 11 and 16 and Allon, Wingate's Heritage, p. 17 — 19. 
The mental aspects of the Israeli military art are explained in many sources. For example, 
their role in the background of the Israeli art of war can be seen in the following books: Adan 
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Martin van Creveld has also listed the central principles of Wingate's tactics. 
The interpretations of van Creveld, made more in today's terms than AlIon's, 
coincide in many ways with the principles of manoeuvre warfare. Everything 
was based on good reconnaissance and intelligence, which in turn was based 
on an intimate familiarity with the countryside, including languages. Long 
approach marches were intended to take the enemy by surprise, as was faking 
an attack at one point with a variety of tricks and attacking at another with a 
short, sharp attack delivered with maximum firepower. These latter points were 
also meant to confuse the enemy and put him off-balance. In addition, 
Wingate's preference for night action was striking. Night action was especially 
intended against the belligerent with weak firepower.' 
The fact that Wingate was more than a tactician to the Jews is also revealed 
in Yigal Allon's article Wingate's Heritage: "Soon after Wingate's leave, former 
platoon commanders of the Haganah were in charge of brigades and divisions, 
but loyal to the principles of that Wingate taught; it was a mixture of 
unconventional approach, guerrilla warfare as well as conventional warfare, 
where we dispersed and massed our forces always trying to get the initiative 
by surprise." In addition, Wingate's force dichotomy; the idea of establishing 
settlements in strategic areas, while at the same time using mobile troops to 
transfer the battle to enemy territory, fascinated the Haganah leaders. 
According to these principles, the defender would not dig in and surrender the 
initiative to the enemy; rather he would expand the battlefield by expanding 
onto the enemy's soil. In this concept, armed strongholds would provide cover 
for mobilising and employing mobile troops. The core of this idea was already 
adopted in the Haganah before independence. Since the 1950s, para-military 
settlements and territorial forces have represented strongholds and the 
operative formations of the IDF have been the mobile striking power.126 
On the whole, from a time perspective, the S.N.S. story in Palestine was 
quite short. General Sir Robert Haining, who succeeded General Wavell as 
General Officer Commanding Palestine, was biased against the S.N.S.'s 
independence. Together with the growth of British forces in Palestine and with 
Avraham: On the Banks of Suez, Arms and Armour Press, London 1980, p. 182 and 257, 
Dayan Yael: A Soldiers Diary, the Camelot Press Ltd., London 1967, p. 14 and 87 and van 
Creveld (1998), p. 124 — 125 and 151. These authors emphasise the influence of history on 
Israeli troops on the battlefield. Biblical events, as well as old battle songs from previous 
wars, have been used to reinforce the pioneering spirit of forefathers and also to encourage 
men on the eve of battle. The en breda term is used by van Creveld. 
125 Van Creveld (1998), p. 40. 
Also interview of Colonel, Doctor Shai Shaul. 
According to Shaul, the most important of the principles that were adopted from Wingate 
were offensive, initiative and unconventional means, like night fighting. 
126  Allon, Yigal: Wingate's Heritage, p. 17 — 19 and Maclean, Sir Fitzroy: The Unsolved 
Mystery, Daily Telegraph 20.4.1959, LH 15/4/486. 
AIlon's habit of calling the use of darkness the "bold man's weapon" also shows the intuitive 
manner of seeking solutions to military problems. 
The idea of covering strongholds was not new, the Romans had used retired soldiers in 
defence missions on the outskirts of the Empire while at the same time they were 
independent farmers. Later after WW II the French also established strongholds in 
Indochina, but without success because they didn't have enough mobile troops. 
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the stabilisation of the riots, the S.N.S. was dispersed in December 1938 and 
its men were transferred to a passive role in the Jewish Settlement Police, and 
to missions that had already been implemented before spring 1938. By then, 
however, the base for Israel's army was already laid down. According to 
Yohanan Rattner, Wingate's vigorous leadership, skilful training, and the fact 
that he proved that Jews were superior in courage to Arabs, gave the little 
force a sudden irresistible and dynamic unity. In addition, according to van 
Creveld, the era of the S.N.S. was one of the last times an armed force 
belonging to a developed country obtained good results in a low-intensity 
crisis. In this way, the S.N.S. gradually became, together with FOSH, what 
Wingate secretly intended, the beginnings of a Jewish army, which was also 
acknowledged by Jewish leaders in the 1970s.127 
4.4. The Liddell Hart connection 
The question of Liddell Hart's "Strategy of Indirect Approach" and deep 
penetration, and Wingate's role in all this is also interesting. It is well known 
that Wingate applied the principles of deep operational penetration with 
success both in Ethiopia and in Burma. Less is known about whether Wingate 
already understood the operational value of this approach during his S.N.S. 
career, although some hints exist, as already discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Professor Kadish, for example, doesn't confirm the connection between 
Haganah, Wingate and Liddell Hart because of the small operational area and 
small scale of the S.N.S.'s operations, though he admits that both of these 
names — Wingate and Liddell Hart — are "codes" that contain a number of 
different things.128 
According to Major General Tulloch, Wingate, as a learned man, was, 
however, well aware of the thoughts of the military theoreticians and analysts 
of his time, especially those of Liddell Hart. He also followed developments in 
the German army. In Burma, for example, Tulloch and Wingate often had 
philosophical discussions on Liddell Hart's ideas about deep penetration, and 
the question of Palestine was also touched on. While the S.N.S. can be 
described as having been a counter-guerrilla unit, which operated mostly at the 
tactical level, its methods can, nevertheless, be equated to the concept of 
127 Sykes, p. 143 — 145, 155, 185, 175 — 176, 194 and 545, Tulloch, p. 45 and 47, van 
Creveld (1998), p. 41 and Howard, Michael and Hunter, Robert: Israel and the Arab World: 
The Crisis of 1967, Ade1phi Papers N:o 41, October 1967, Quicks the Printers, Clacton-on-
Sea, England 1967, p. 2. 
British forces in Palestine consisted of 18 infantry battalions at the end of 1938. 
In early 1939, the British had a secret plan (unconnected to the Jewish army project) to 
recruit Jews from Central Europe to carry out demolition raids on oil refineries used by the 
German Army. Wingate was asked by both the British and the Jews to take command of 
these operations. Wingate refused, because he regarded himself as a soldier, not a secret 
agent. The other reason was that this kind of action would have confirmed the myth that 
Jews were untrustworthy people. However, this secret force was established later during the 
war, without Wingate, who left Palestine in late spring 1939, first for Ethiopia and later for 
Burma. 
128 Interview of Professor Alon Kadish. 
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indirect approach and today also to the principles of manoeuvre warfare that 
are linked more above the tactical level. It is also known that Wingate had 
ideas for the expansion of his force. Therefore, it is obvious that Wingate 
already discussed the subject of larger operations with larger forces with the 
Jews, and in this context the idea of deep penetration might also well have 
been raised although no strict evidence of this has been revealed, excluding 
his ideas of having that 1,000-man Jewish force behind enemy lines. In any 
case, the similarities of these cases are striking, with the exception that 
Wingate applied the principles of deep penetration on a lesser scale in 
Palestine than he did in his later years in Ethiopia and Burma, but ideologically 
the base seems to have been the same. In addition, according to Bond, Sadeh 
was also in agreement with Liddell Hart on most issues which might also 
reinforce this link.129 
After his return from Palestine, Wingate met Liddell Hart and left him his 
memorandum of S.N.S. theory and practice. In these discussions at the end of 
1938, Liddell Hart didn't wonder about Wingate's poor success in applying 
these principles. They were extraordinary in British military thinking in those 
days. In Palestine, however, according to Wallach, even before the Israeli 
Defence Forces were established, much attention was given in the Haganah to 
Liddell Hart's theory. In the Haganah, Liddell Hart's theory was seen as the 
solution to the war of the few against the many, which was also the base for 
Wingate's teachings. This reinforces the connection between, Wingate, Liddell 
Hart and the Jews.13° 
129 Major General Derek Tulloch's letter to Sir Basil Liddell Hart 24 November 1965, LH 
15/5/300 and Bond, p. 246. 
Tulloch writes in his letter to Liddell Hart: "He (Wingate) admired your theories and 
discussed them with me on occasions... and his line of deep penetrations were exactly the 
same lines of yours adopted to different weapons and terrain." 
Also interviews of Professor, Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Yoav Gelber and Professor, Colonel 
(ret.) Yehuda Wallach. 
Gelber doesn't see Wingate's influence on the background of the IDF's concept of deep 
penetration as being important because the S.N.S. didn't fight against a conventional army. 
The statement on the S.N.S.'s role is true, but it doesn't invalidate the fact that the idea of 
deep penetration might have been discussed already during Wingate's sojourn in Palestine. 
In addition, deep penetration should not only be linked to conventional warfare. Wallach, 
instead, tends to see Wingate's role as being more decisive because it didn't represent the 
typical British military thinking at that time. As a consequence, the Jews began to listen to 
Wingate. 
13° Sykes, p. 192, Liddell Hart's letter to Mr. Winston Churchill 11 November 1938, LH 
15/5/300 and Wallach, J. L: The first anniversary of Liddell Hart's death, an obituary of Sir 
Basil Liddell Hart, correspondence with Lady Liddell Hart, LH 2/22, p. 5 — 6. 
According to Sykes, Liddell Hart transmitted Wingate's memorandum to Winston Churchill, 
who had expressed interest. In the letter Liddell Hart tells Churchill that "the principles 
Wingate had used in Palestine might interest you as a soldier ... unfortunately he had not 
the possibility to enlarge this success." 
Professor Wallach mentions that Liddell Hart discovered the re-birth of Jews in Palestine 
when General Wavell wrote to him (Liddell Hart) that "here a breed of Jewish fighter is 
growing within the S.N.S.", an idea that was also expressed by Wingate in one of his first 
letters to Liddell Hart. 
Wallach's article The first anniversary of Liddell Hart's death does not have a date. It was, 
however, sent to Lady Liddell Hart in spring 1971. 
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The first documented connection between Liddell Hart and the Jews dates 
back to 1938 when a Haganah delegation, consisting of David Ben-Gurion, Dr. 
Chaim Weizmann, Eliezar Galili, Arther Lourie, Moshe Sharett and Moshe 
Shertok met Liddell Hart in London. The aim of this tour was to meet military 
experts specialising in British defence problems in Palestine. However, the 
principal idea behind the visit was to establish a Jewish army within the 
Imperial defence framework in Palestine. Liddell Hart's role in this plan was as 
an adviser, which at least shows that he was known among the Jews. In any 
case, there are no references in the documents to discussions of military 
theory. Mainly it was a question of how the Jewish forces in Palestine would be 
organised and armed. According to Brian Bond, Liddell Hart later described 
this meeting as follows: "From the time I first met the budding leaders of Israel, 
I found there a grasp of military problems and new military ideas comparable 
to that of the Germans, and in some respects surpassing theirs." However, it 
should be remembered that when Liddell Hart gave these answers, he thought 
that the Jews would form a part of the British Army in Palestine. There was no 
question of an independent Jewish state and army. Despite its positive spirit, 
the contents of the memorandum were not implemented. However, after the 
negotiations with Liddell Hart, Dr. Weizmann put forward two proposals: one 
for the establishment of an arms factory in Palestine, and another for the 
raising of an army of two hundred Palestinian Jews to form the cadre of a 
Jewish army. Although this idea had distinguished supporters in Britain, among 
them General Wavell and Commander-in-Chief Middle East, Field Marshall Sir 
Edmund Ironside, the plan was overridden. It was only at the end of WW II, in 
autumn 1944, when the first Jewish formation, the Jewish Brigade Group, was 
established.131  
4.5. PALMACH — a dual role strike force 
After 1937 the Haganah began to operate as the general staff of a large scale 
army. In July 1938, Yonahan Rattner was appointed the first Chief of Staff. 
See also Collins, John M: How Military Strategists Should Study History, Military Review, 
August 1973, p. 31 — 44. 
According to Colonel (U.S. Army) Collins, Sir Archibald Wavell was also a keen advocate of 
Liddell Hart. 
131 
 A letter from Eliezar Galili to Moshe Shertok. Attached to the memorandum The Place of 
Eretz Israel within the Imperial Defence Framework of Middle East, LH 15/5/304, part 2, p. 1 
— 6. 
Norman A. Rose found Galili's and Shertok's memorandum in the Weizmann Archives in 
Israel 1966 — 67, when he was preparing his doctoral thesis. He sent copies of the letter to 
Liddell Hart, who remembered this meeting but was not aware of the existence of this 
memorandum. The Jewish delegation evidently appreciated Liddell Hart's ideas because 
they wanted to have him as a guest in Palestine to familiarise him more with the prevailing 
conditions. This didn't occur until two decades later in 1960. 
See also Bond, p. 242 and Sykes, p. 219 — 220 and 222 — 225. 
According to Bond, the Israelis already met Liddell Hart in 1937. The participants or the 
subjects of this summit are not mentioned. 
Sykes mentions that the proposals made by Dr. Weizmann were very similar to those that 
Wingate had made to General Ironside. Therefore, it is likely that Wingate's memorandum 
had at least given direction to these proposals. 
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Under the supervision of Rattner, the Haganah organised centres for officer 
training, improved communications and organised defence within the kibbutzim 
system. It also published professional military literature. According to Wallach, 
many of Liddell Hart's articles and some of his books were also translated into 
Hebrew. Weapons procurement was started. The Haganah high command 
organised an intensive Rechesh (a clandestine weaponry purchasing 
operation) mainly with Polish support and established a small armaments 
industry, the Ta'as. Before 1939 the Haganah also created the nucleus of a 
navy and air force and most importantly, it set up a network for gathering 
intelligence and information, Shay. In addition, for the first time the Haganah 
prepared a plan to reorganise its organisation into divisions in case the British 
Army left Palestine.132 
The next step was taken in September 1939 when a Supreme General Staff 
was established in Tel Aviv. Yaakov Dori, ex co-commander of the S.N.S. and 
also a veteran of the Jewish Legion, was appointed Chief of Staff. Although 
this staff was still underground, it dealt with tasks much like any other general 
staff in a small country. It consisted of four departments: a Planning and 
Organisation Department; a Control Department; a Technical Department that 
took care of staff functions that were not specifically allocated elsewhere; and 
a Training and Instruction Department. During the War of Independence these 
departments were renamed as follows: the Operations, Manpower, 
Quartermaster and Training branches.133 
When the Arab riots faded out and the British withdrew their support of the 
Jewish Settlement Police and disbanded the S.N.S., there was no more acute 
need for actual operations excluding guard and patrol missions. This left the 
Haganah a trained reserve, which was used to enlarge the military part of the 
Haganah. In this context, youngsters from the age of 18 to 25 were trained as 
part-time soldiers in the HISH companies, which were organised for immediate 
mobilisation within a battalion framework. In addition, a youth organisation, 
GADNA (Gedudei Noar, youth battalions), was established in 1940 to 
strengthen the security consciousness of the youth and to give them basic 
military training; among other things physical training, map-reading and 
shooting were in the school curriculum. During WW II these GADNA units 
served as runners and in other auxiliary functions, but they also clandestinely 
132 Perlmutter (1969), p. 32, Sykes, p. 172 and Wallach, J. L: Obituary of Sir Basil Liddell 
Hart, p. 5 — 6. 
According to Sykes, the Haganah was commanded on a committee basis and there was no 
over-all commander at that time. However, although defence preparations were planned on 
a committee basis, the final decision was made by the Chief of Staff. 
See also Schiff (1974), p. 16 and 131 and Ben-Gurion, David: Rechesh and Ta'as - Arms for 
the Hagana, Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, September 27, 1963, p. 17 — 18. 
Shay was the predecessor of Modeyin (Military Intelligence), which was to become one of 
the three main divisions of Israel's intelligence services. The other two are Mossad (the 
Central Intelligence and Security Agency) and Shin Bet (Internal Security Service). 
The arms industry was started in the leather factory of Yaakov and Benjamin Lefkovitz. In 
1939, the Haganah had 6,000 rifles, a million rifle cartridges, 600 submachine guns, 24,000 
hand grenades and 12,000 rifle grenades. Production of the first 75 mm mortars was 
started. 
133 Dupuy (1992), p. 6 and Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 43. 
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distributed propaganda posters and gathered information on British activities 
and movements.14  
Events on the Western Front in the first years of WW II created a new 
situation in the Middle East. Palestine was threatened by Axis bases in the 
Western Desert. There were also fears of pro-German coups in neighbouring 
countries. Observant leaders of the Jewish community suddenly realised that 
Palestine could become a major campaign battleground, and might even be 
evacuated by the Allies. If this happened, the Jewish community would face 
two enemies: the Germans and the Arabs.135  
As the German-Italian threat came closer in mid-1941, the British made 
some informal arrangements with the Haganah. The National Command 
authorised the establishment of a full-time military organisation under the 
command of the Haganah, the PALMACH (Plugot Mahatz, striking or shock 
companies). However, it was controlled via its own staff and was therefore not 
fully subordinated to the Haganah supreme command. Yitzhak Sadeh was 
placed in command of the PALMACH and six companies were quickly built 
around a core of Nodedet, FOSH and S.N.S veterans. PALMACH units were 
formed and trained with British assistance in sniping, reconnaissance and 
demolition work. These units also included German and Arab speaking 
platoons. Gelber tends to see similar aims behind the establishment of the 
PALMACH as were behind the creation of the British Special Air Service (SAS) 
in North Africa. Of the eleven active PALMACH companies only two saw real 
action when the men of these units acted as scouts in the van of the British 
invasion of Syria and Lebanon in 1941.136 
As the British-Jewish co-operation ended with Rommel's defeat in North 
Africa in November 1942, the PALMACH units went underground to preserve 
their existence as the backbone of the Haganah. They continued as a 
standing, ready force of more than 2,000 trained men that in 1944 were 
consolidated into four battalions. This number also included officers who were 
trained in 1941 in a platoon commanders course at Juara. According to van 
Creveld, this course was the first in a long series of courses that produced a 
number of the future IDF Chiefs of Staff. In 1944 a naval company (Palyam) 
and an air platoon (Sherut Aviri) were also established within the PALMACH 
organisation. Palyam's primary mission was to provide inshore assistance for 
clandestine immigrant boats. The air force platoon was a liaison unit before the 
War of Independence. Once WW II had ended, some 30,000 men and women 
were in the trained reserve. When the British left Palestine in 1948, the 
134 Ibid. and Rothenberg, p. 32 and Schiff, Zeev: A History of the Israeli Army. 1874 to 
Present, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York 1985, p. 102 — 103. 
By the end of WW II, GADNA had thousands of youth and some units also took part in 
combat. 
135 Allon (1970), p. 15 — 16. 
136 
 Rothenberg, p. 28, van Creveld (1998), p. 47, Schiff (1974), p. 24 and interview of 
Professor, Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Yoav Gelber. 
See also Bagnall, p. 27, Dupuy (1992), p. 7 and Sykes, p. 222 — 223. 
Moshe Dayan was one of the scouts of a PALMACH unit that operated in Syria and 
Lebanon. 
51 
Haganah already had, although spread among different cells, the 
organisational framework of an independent army with a general staff and all 
three services. It had over 2,000 active personnel in its ranks and 
approximately 45,000 trained reserves ready for mobilisation.137 
The PALMACH companies were the first regular units of the Haganah 
where the rank and file was formed from ordinary citizens, from the boys and 
girls of the founders of kibbutzim and moshavim. In this way, PALMACH was, 
according to Luttwak and Horowitz, elitist but egalitarian within itself. It 
represented socialist values; for example, officer ranks were only functional 
and attached to tasks and not to individuals. In the egalitarian social 
atmosphere that prevailed in PALMACH, open debate was accepted as 
natural, obviously a tradition of the Jewish community since the Biblical era. 
On the other hand, the Id ISH forces controlled directly by the Haganah General 
Staff were more traditional from a military point of view. This diversity 
contained a seed of the disputes that were to be revealed during and after 
Israel's War of Independence in 1948 — 1949. PALMACH platoons were 
stationed at kibbutzim throughout the country, and were linked with adjoining 
platoons to form companies, which in turn were grouped together to form 
battalions. After the withdrawal of British financial assistance after 1942, these 
units were forced to divide their time between their military activities and 
earning their keep by working on the land.138 
Tactically, the PALMACH units continued, under Sadeh's command, the 
principles applied by the S.N.S. and Sadeh's units. PALMACH was a force of 
guerrilla infantry. Because of the inferiority of its numbers in comparison to the 
enemy and the semi-legal character of its troops, the purpose of training after 
the end of the British assistance was to teach the ability to operate in small, 
mobile, independent units. Weaknesses were compensated for by very high 
standards for individual skills, group morale and unusual tactics; therefore 
emphasis was put on inventive tactics and leadership. PALMACH emphasised 
group cohesion and combat leadership at all levels. In its training courses even 
squad leaders were trained to act independently. Great emphasis was also laid 
on night training. These needs were taken into account in training programs. 
137 Bagnall, p. 27, Dupuy (1992), p. 7 — 8, van Creveld (1998), p. 49 and 51 and The Story of 
the Defence Forces. Focus on the Guardians of Israel. Israel Today and The Jewish Times, 
June 16, 1967, LH 15/5/315, part 2, p. 5. 
See also Williams (1989), p. 250. 
According to Williams, the Palyam was established in late 1943 soon after the British 
accepted Palestinian Jews in the Royal Navy. 
138 Bagnall, p. 27. 
According to Brigadier Bagnall, the great majority of Jews fulfilled their duties to Britain; only 
a minority regarded their responsibilities towards the establishment of a Jewish National 
Home as being of a higher order. 
The para-military system of farm work and military training was adopted by the IDF after the 
War of Independence, and was known as NAHAL. 
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Command courses concentrated on reinforcing a candidate's original 
leadership skills. In addition, half of the training was carried out at night.139 
4.6. The role of the Jewish Brigade Group and veterans of WW II in the birth 
of the operational framework 
On 9 September 1944, the British War Office in London finally made a 
decision to establish an independent Jewish formation in the British Army, 
HAYIL (Hativa Yehudit Lohemet, the Jewish Brigade Group). This group was 
all that ever came of the long and devoted efforts of the Jewish and Gentile 
Zionists to raise a Jewish army to fight Nazi Germany. Up until the end of WW 
II approximately 1,500 men volunteered for this brigade, mostly from Palestine. 
This was, however, only a small part of the 28,000 men and 4,000 women who 
had volunteered for various units of the British Army earlier in the war. Some 
450 of them attained officer's rank. According to Ne'eman, this all had a strong 
effect on the shaping of the future Israeli Army. Having numerous Jews in the 
armed forces of other states — mainly in the British Army — proved to be an 
advantage to the Yishuv because this allowed the development of original 
methods and new ideas. Yigal Allon and David Ben-Gurion also mention this 
detail. According to them, individuals in the Jewish Brigade learned a wide 
range of military skills and know-how; techniques of battle-control, the 
command patterns of companies and battalions, the use of a variety of 
specialised arms, the use and care of battle equipment and co-operation with 
other arms. But above all they learned how a military unit is built up; i.e., how 
each part is established and systematically added to the whole. Thus, Ben-
Gurion viewed the Jewish Brigade as one of the most important factors in the 
impending struggle for the establishment of the Jewish state. This was the 
opinion of Yuval Ne'eman a well. According to him, the Haganah cadres got 
their formal training as well as their first acquaintance with administration and 
logistics in the British Army. When estimating the numbers of trained Jews in 
the British Army in the footnote of this paragraph, it seems to be justifiable to 
say that Jews acquired military experience in all branches of the army, in the 
139 Bagnall, p. 28, and Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 402 and Allan (1970), p. 19 — 20. 
Luttwak and Horowitz and Bagnall examine the quality of the PALMACH field-training 
program in their research works. According to Bagnall, of 332 training periods, 105 were 
conducted at night. As the syllabus included certain subjects that could only be carried out 
during the day, such as camouflage, estimating distances and taking cover from 
observation, the proportion of night to day training was in reality about 50 to 50. 
Correspondingly, Luttwak and Horowitz analyse the training schedule of the squad 
commanders' course; of 493 hours of training, 81 hours were dedicated to independent 
command and only 25 to command in the framework of a platoon. In addition, 120 hours 
were allocated to indoctrination and cultural activities. 
See also Rothenberg, p. 30. 
The course commander was Haim Bar Lev, the future IDF Chief of Staff in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s. 
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commandos, in the air force and in the navy, in addition to training, 
administration and logistics in the British Army.140 
Despite the above, the Haganah's high command also obtained experience 
in planning and executing the complex undertakings entailed by illegal 
immigration and settlement as well as co-operation with the whole community. 
However, according to Bagnall their actual military experience at this time was 
still very limited, and little experience had been obtained above the company 
level. This supposition might be quite right, when it comes to the question of 
staff work and planning. To support this opinion, Bagnall cites General Dan 
Evan. General Evan was a British-educated officer, who commanded the 
Eastern Front in Israel's War of Independence and thus had the experience 
and ability to analyse the tactical and most of all the operational skills of the 
Haganah and PALMACH. Evan regards the Haganah and PALMACH as not 
being sufficiently trained, nor suitably organised to take the field without the 
influx of British-trained officers and N.C.O.s who played a vital part in the 
establishment of the Israeli Army. According to him, the British-trained 
personnel provided almost all the expertise in such fields as armour, artillery, 
heavy support weapons, signals, engineers, tactics, modern training methods, 
staff duties and supply. With this statement, Evan supports Ne'eman's views. 
However, Evan estimated that the training of Jewish underground units up to 
the platoon level was good to excellent and therefore he goes on to say that 
the Haganah provided an indispensable and popular base, upon which the 
Army could be built.141  
14° Ben-Gurion, David: The Birth of the Jewish Brigade, Jewish Observer and Middle East 
Review, January 27, 1964, LH 15/5/311, p. 18 — 21, Bond, p. 241, van Creveld (1998), p. 49, 
Alton (1970), p. 230, Ne'eman, Yuval: This War of Our Resolution and how to Safeguard its 
Achievements, Liddell Hart's correspondence with Colonel Yuval Neeman, 18th August, 
1967, LH 2/18, p. 3 and Bar-Zohar, p. 121. 
The commander of the Jewish Brigade was a British Jew, Brigadier Benjamin. All officers 
were also Jews. 
Ben-Gurion also estimates the number of Palestinian Jews who were trained in the British 
Army. Of the total of over 30,000 men and women in the British Army during WW II, 25,734 
were from Palestine. 21,851 of them were men and 3,933 were women. They were divided 
into the various branches as follows: 4,665 in the infantry, 4,359 in transport, 3,214 in 
auxiliary units, 3,123 in engineer troops, 2,021 in the Royal Air Force, 1,146 in ordnance, 
1,009 in the Royal Navy, 659 in the artillery and 3,344 in the medical and signal corps. In 
addition there were those semi-legal troops of the Haganah in Palestine. According to van 
Creveld, 10% of the strength trained in the British Army were women. 
See also Schiff (1974) and Luttwak & Horowitz (1975), p. 24. p. 22. 
According to Luttwak and Horowitz, some 27,000 of the Yishuv's men and women served in 
British and Allied forces as volunteers. This number obviously does not include the Jewish 
Brigade. This brigade saw very little active service; nevertheless, its officers and N.C.O.s 
were trained and familiar with the technical and support tasks required for sustained warfare. 
141 Bagnall, p. 28 — 29. 
Before his arrival in Palestine, General Dan Evan served as a company commander in the 
British Army and later commanded a brigade. Bagnall's citation is from Evan's book 
Memoirs. 
See also van Creveld (1998), p. 66. 
According to van Creveld, there was probably not one person who had commanded as 
much as a battalion in action in the entire Yishuv, which the British saw as "amateurishness" 
in the organisation. 
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Yigal AlIon, an ex-member of the PALMACH, provides a slightly different 
view of the operational skills of the Haganah and PALMACH. Although he 
tends to idealise and over-emphasise the importance of PALMACH by saying 
that the PALMACH commanders retained their individual quality even when 
they worked within a larger framework, he is also right. The PALMACH 
commanders were able to combine the best features of their own tactical 
innovations with the traditional military skills absorbed mainly from the British. 
This is revealed in at least two ways. The initial fact was that the Jews would 
always be outnumbered. This inferiority in numbers had to be compensated for 
and therefore the tactics taught by Sadeh and Wingate; i.e., initiative in small 
unit operations by relying on surprise, mobility, and ingenuity in decision-
making rather than on frontal assaults and supporting fire — was encouraged. 
Second, the Jews thought that it was easier and safer to turn guerrilla units 
into a regular force than the other way around, and besides, this made the 
maintenance of PALMACH's tactical flexibility, which had already turned out to 
be effective, possible. Therefore, organisational development went from the 
bottom up; tactical and individual skills were transferred to the organisational 
and tactical principles of larger units. Much of the PALMACH tradition of 
informality, equality and innovation was also later bequeathed to the 
organisations and leadership principles of the IDF, although the British-trained 
officers held a central position in the development of the IDF after the War of 
Independence at first.142 
4.7. Towards the War of Independence 
The years 1944 through 1947 brought a struggle with the Mandate authorities, 
but they also included the large-scale military construction and organisation of 
the Haganah. Tension increased at the end of March 1944 when the British 
stopped all Jewish immigration to Palestine because of concerns for stability in 
the Middle East. ETZEL renounced its truce with the British and began making 
terrorist strikes; kidnappings, assassinations and a continual series of attacks 
against British officials, soldiers and government installations. This wave of 
violence, which almost caused a civil war between the Haganah and these 
separate groups, had already began in 1941 when a group of extremists had 
broken away from ETZEL and formed their own extremist group LEHI 
(Lohamei Herut Israel, the Fighters for the Freedom of Israel). However, in 
1945 the Haganah also joined in the actions against the British, though mainly 
with bloodless operations.143 
Yigal Allan describes the problems that the Haganah faced in its action 
against the British in his book The Making of Israel's Army. The main question 
was over what strategy was to be chosen. A full-scale, openly-declared war 
was out of the question because of the superiority and mobility of British 
142 Allon (1970), p. 19 — 20, Williams (1989), p. 300, Rothenberg, p. 30 and Weller, J: Sir 
Basil Liddell Hart's Disciples in Israel, Military Review, January 1974, p. 13 — 20. 
143 Rothenberg, p. 33 — 34 and van Creveld (1998), p. 55 — 56. 
LEHI was also known as the Stern Gang in accordance with the name of its founder, the 
scholar and poet Avraham Stern. ETZEL was lead by Menahem Begin at the time. 
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troops. The strategy of classical guerrilla warfare was also ruled out because 
most of the hills and mountains were populated by Arabs and therefore were 
not suitable for the secure base areas required in this kind of warfare. In the 
end, the Jews adopted the middle way between extreme terrorist tactics and 
limited struggle. This strategy came to be known as "constructive warfare"; it 
included illegal immigration, new settlements in prohibited areas, mass 
demonstrations and attacks mainly against military objectives or against 
targets that had military value. In addition, an important aim was to avoid 
casualties or at least reduce them to a minimum. The political objective was to 
cause problems for all the parties concerned and force them to seek a positive 
solution to the question of the Jews. However, despite the aim of avoiding 
innocent casualties, excesses were not rare, although a semi-official division 
between the Haganah, ETZEL and LEHI was established. ETZEL, which was 
not securely in the hands of the Haganah supreme command, set about killing 
British security personnel by mounting ambushes and planting bombs and 
LEHI for its part even assassinated selected individuals, including Jewish 
"traitors".144 
Up until mid-summer 1946, the Haganah, ETZEL and LEHI operated 
together. However, the explosion at the King David Hotel, headquarters of 
several civil and military organisations, in Jerusalem on 22 July was the turning 
point in the unity of the Jewish organisations. After that, the Haganah began to 
avoid armed clashes with the British, whereas ETZEL and LEHI decided to 
continue to the bitter end. Thus, violence in Palestine continued and it was 
only a question of time when the British would leave.145 
During the period after WW II and before the British withdrawal, most 
Haganah operations were quick raids because the Jewish underground 
fighters had to disappear before they lost the cover of darkness. The British 
counter-measures had the character of police actions rather than that of full-
scale military operations. However, the Haganah got experience in military 
operations, and also succeeded in rooting a consciousness of national 
144 Allon (1970), p. 23 — 25 and van Creveld (1998), p. 56. 
See also Sykes, p. 203 — 204. 
Already in May 1939, Wingate had warned the leaders of the Haganah not to jeopardise the 
goodwill of hundreds of thousands of English citizens, who felt like he did about Zionism. 
This is revealed in the following words by Wingate: "I warn you. If you ever resort to 
violence, if you kill one British soldier or one British policeman, you may so shock people in 
England." 
145 Rothenberg, p. 35 — 36 and van Creveld (1998), p. 60. 
Rothenberg also pays attention to the results of various Jewish fighting organisations. The 
conventional version of history has been dominated by the Haganah, the Mapai party, and 
the Jewish Agency, and no value has been assigned to the extremist groups ETZEL and 
LEHI. According to him, however, all of these groups complemented each other, although, 
as van Creveld puts it, it is difficult to pinpoint which organisation was most responsible for 
the British departure from Palestine. 
See also Bell, J. Bowyer: Terror out of Zion. The Violent and deadly Shock Troops of Israeli 
Independence, 1929 — 1949, St. Martin's Press, New York 1977, p. x. 
Bell concludes in the foreword of his book that "IRGUN (= ETZEL) and LEHI were 
considerably more important than common wisdom would allow." 
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responsibility in security matters in their new citizens.146 Nevertheless, this 
military experience was mainly tactical, but the ability to employ co-ordinated 
small units in action over wide areas was to be a great advantage in the War of 
Independence when they were compared to their tactically inferior adversaries. 
146 Allon (1970), p. 27 — 28. 
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5. THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 
On the eve of the War of Independence, the Haganah had about 49,000 men 
and women in its active or militia forces.147 4,000 of them were already 
mobilised in the Haganah (in HISH and PALMACH), while another 1,000 of the 
PALMACH were ready for immediate mobilisation. A force of 12,000 service 
personnel stretching from those on active duty to those who were training 
(including the already existing forces) was to be formed by early 1948. Behind 
these troops were a total of 37,000 reservists, mainly from the HIM (Hel 
Mishmar, home guard or guard corps), for immediate local security functions. 
The HIM was established together with the HISH forces in 1941. At that time 
the older men with lesser training and weapons had formed the regional 
forces. In December 1947, most of the men and women in the Haganah had, 
according to Luttwak and Horowitz, received a total of fifty days of military 
training or less. This means that the basic military skills — like shooting, small 
arms weapon training and small unit tactics within the framework of platoons 
and companies — had at least been adopted. In addition, there were more than 
2,000 volunteers (Anshei Ha'Ma' cha7, Foreign Volunteers), WW II veterans 
from the United States, France, Great Britain, Canada and South Africa. These 
volunteers, mostly Jews, helped the Haganah in training and mobilisation: 
some were pilots, some assumed command tasks as brigade commanders, 
and some performed staff officer duties.148 
Interpretations of the quality of Jewish forces vary in different sources, but 
many of them consider the Jews to be inadequately trained. This is perhaps 
not the whole truth, especially when comparing the relative strength of the 
Jews to the enemy forces. According to Trevor Dupuy, there were at most 
40,000 Arab troops committed to the liberation of Palestine from the Jews, and 
they certainly were much more poorly trained than the Jewish forces. The 
colonial rulers; the French in Syria and Lebanon, and the British, had not 
thought it necessary to train national troops for their ranks, and in 1947 these 
armies were brand-new, without military experience. Only the British-educated 
Arab Legion, consisting of about 10,000 men, can be evaluated as being 
qualitatively equal to the Jews.149 
The real disadvantage of the Jews was their armament. In the case of small 
arms, the situation was not so grave. Trevor Dupuy estimates that the Jews 
were able to arm a force of about 30,000 at the beginning of the War of 
147 In this study the Middle East War 1948 — 1949 is called "Israel's War of Independence". 
Although this might be a somewhat limited point of view, this term is accepted in this work 
because it is often used in the sources. As a result of this war, Israel became independent. 
However, up until today this event has not been recognised by all Arab states, especially 
with regards to the question of Israel's territorial borders. 
148 Dupuy (1992), p. 8 and 15 — 19 and Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 1 and 17. 
See also Katz (1996), p. 37 and Rothenberg, p. 57. 
According to Rothenberg, the number of foreign volunteers was more than 2,000 but less 
than 5,000 men, the official number is too low. To see more about the volunteers listed in 
the IDF during the War of Independence, see for example Bercuson, David J: The Secret 
Army, Stein and Day Publishers, New York 1984, 
149 Dupuy (1992), p. 8 and 15 — 19. 
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Independence, of whom between 14,000 and 20,000 had modern small arms 
and another 10,000 were equipped with a wide variety of obsolete military 
weapons or hunting guns. More serious was the lack of heavy mortars, field 
artillery, armour and combat aircraft. The Jews had only 800 light machine 
guns, 200 machine guns and a total of 800 light 2 and 3 inch mortars. On the 
other hand, the Arab forces possessed armoured cars, artillery and 
aeroplanes, among them several modern combat fighter-bombers.15° 
Excluding the armament, the total manpower ratio was somewhere around 
1:1. During the war the Jews were, however, able to double the strength of 
their manpower and also increase the amount of their armament, including 
artillery and aircraft. The Jews had some other advantages as well. They were 
in a defensive posture, knew the terrain and were fighting on interior lines. The 
Arabs also did not seriously co-operate with each other, which gave the Jews 
the opportunity to concentrate their forces according to the threat. In addition, 
the Jews had an organisation ready for battle, they had a fighting doctrine 
emphasising co-ordinated small unit action that had already been tested, they 
were better trained, they had planning and combat experience and they were 
mentally ready to fight. Even so, Israelis have been fond of the David and 
Goliath comparison up until today, which — excluding the initial ratio of 
armament — seems to have been exaggerated. Thus, Trevor Dupuy's 
statement "it was really a Jewish Goliath against Arab David" might be more 
apt.151 
 The strengths, orders of battle and losses of the Middle East War 1948 
— 1949 can be seen in Appendix 4. 
It is difficult to point out the precise day the War of Independence broke out. 
After the British announcement of their withdrawal from Palestine in late 1947, 
the violence between Jews and Arabs resurfaced in November and continued 
up until spring 1949. Therefore, the Israeli War of Independence can be 
divided in different ways. In this thesis it is divided functionally as follows: 
- The War of the Roads, a half-year period preceding 15 May 1948. During 
this period the last British forces were evacuated from Palestine. In this 
stage of the war, the Jews mainly engaged in defensive actions. 
- The second stage, the first four weeks of the War of Independence from 15 
May to 10 June. On 15 May, the neighbouring countries launched — after 
150 Ibid. 
151  Ibid, p. 19. 
See also Howard, Michael and Hunter, Robert: Israel and the Arab World, p. 2 and Katz, 
Samuel M: Fire & Steel. Israel's 7th Armored Brigade. Four Decades of Victory and Courage 
- the Story of the Most Awesome Tank Force in the World Today, Simon & Schuster, 30 
Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10020, 1996, p. 25. 
Howard and Hunter also support the myth of the Israeli David and the Arab Goliath by 
saying that the Haganah, with its spearhead of PALMACH shocktroops, was ready to fight 
the Palestine Arabs in 1948, though initially she was not prepared either in armament or in 
organisation to deal with the regular forces of Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Egypt. 
Samuel Katz compares the total population of each side and states that the Jews in 
Palestine were outnumbered 100 to 1. However, it is misleading to compare the total 
population of belligerents in a short war. The bulk of the people were neither trained nor 
armed for war. In this case efficiency is the important factor, how the Jews were able to 
mobilise such a large proportion of their manpower for war. 
59 
Israel's declaration of independence on the previous day — a full-scale 
offensive against the newly-established state. From the Jewish point of 
view, this stage saw both defensive action and the containment of Israeli 
forces. 
The third phase begins on 8 July, one day before the cessation of the first 
truce, and is known as the "Ten Days' Offensive". This phase consisted of 
Israeli tactical offensives on all three fronts, although the Egyptians initiated 
the battles. 
The final phase continued on 15 October after the second truce with Israeli 
offensives in the Galilee and on the southern front up until 10 March 1949. 
This fourth stage consisted of Israeli operational offensives.152 
Examples of Israeli operations during the War of Independence can be seen 
in Appendix 5. 
5.1. War strategies and organisational preparations 
According to Zvi Lanir, an Israeli Colonel and scholar, the War of 
Independence was characterised by a close co-ordination and, at times, full 
compatibility between political goals and military objectives. Both sets of goals 
were formulated in terms of seizing and holding territory. It seems, however, 
that a possible war had been thought through only at the tactical level, and the 
operational level, which combines national political goals and tactical 
objectives on the battlefield, was vague or unclear up to the third stage of the 
war. Therefore there is good reason to expect that, although the Haganah had 
operated in a political context, no nation-wide military doctrine existed. In this 
war the Haganah and its successor, the IDF, which was officially established at 
the end of May, had not yet adopted the goal of achieving decisive victory in 
battle. In any case, the conquest of territory became the basic political aim of 
the war, but at first this goal was to be attained through a series of battles at 
tactical level. According to Shaul, only during the first truce when the force 
numbers began to grow were the first operational plans created. After that 
some concepts of destroying the enemy, in addition to the aim of seizing 
territory, existed in the final phase of the war.153  
152 The War of Independence is divided into different phases depending on the aim of the 
researcher. Yigal Alton and Zvi Lanir, who both have studied both the political and military 
action of the Jews, do not separate the War of the Roads from the full-scale war. In addition, 
Alton divides the War of the Roads into two different sub-phases; first the era when the 
British troops still were present in Palestine and second the phase when the rest of the 
British troops were evacuated and the action of the Arabs intensified. See Alton (1970), p. 
30 — 43 and Lanir, Zvi (ed.): Israeli Security Planning in the 1980s. Its Politics and 
Economics, Praeger Publishers, New York 1984, p. 17 — 19. 
153 Lanir, p. 17 — 18 and interview of Colonel, Doctor Shai Shaul. 
Neither the Israeli war aims nor the definitions of the levels of warfare were clear. This is 
revealed in Ben-Gurion's words, as quoted by Lanir: The War of Independence was "less 
than a total victory . . . but an improvement in our military situation and a great political 
victory." The most obscure is the latter statement. Obviously it meant the independence of 
Israel, the situation in Palestine was not solved, as is well known. 
See also Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 1 and van Creveld (1998), p. 81. 
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In spring 1947 all the Jewish war plans were based on the assumption that 
the worst danger facing the Jews after the British withdrawal would be an 
uprising of the local Arabs. David Ben-Gurion, who was head of the Zionist 
Executive at the time, believed otherwise; he saw the possibility of a multi-front 
war against neighbouring Arab states as being the most probable. However, 
the Haganah was only prepared for limited conflicts, which is revealed in the 
plans that were presented to Ben-Gurion in May 1947. This plan consisted of 
two type of forces: A defence force of 15,000 men in static garrisons, nine 
battalions of 700 men each for mobile regional defence, an offensive force of 
fifteen small brigades of 2,000 men each and a strike force of six battalions 
with 4,500 men. The absence of heavy armament was striking. In addition, the 
Haganah was divided internally into contending groups that were almost 
hostile to each other. These factions were the "Haganah party' representing 
the different existing and past Haganah organisations, and the "army party' 
which consisted of British-trained soldiers. The "army party" under the 
leadership of Haim Laskov also secretly presented a plan to Ben-Gurion. That 
concept consisted of twelve large brigades, an air force, armour and artillery. 
The discrepancy between the two plans led Ben-Gurion to trust the Jewish 
Brigade veterans more.154 
When war seemed inevitable at the end of 1947, the Haganah started its 
preparations. Up until April 1948 the Haganah was commanded on a 
committee basis, but thereafter the Minister of Defence for the Jewish Agency 
dealt directly with the Chief of Staff. The Jewish Agency can be seen as the 
predecessor of the Israeli government. The General Staff was organised under 
the guidance of former members of the British armed forces. According to van 
Creveld, the Haganah adopted the Anglo-German model, which had one 
division each for operations, intelligence, personnel and supply. By doing so, 
the Haganah put much greater emphasis on operations as opposed to the 
other already existing divisions, personnel and supply. The basic idea was to 
have the head of the General Staff Division unite operations, intelligence, 
training and doctrine and act as a primus inter pares under the Chief of 
Staff.135 
Four regional headquarters (pikudims), Southern, Central, Eastern and 
Northern, were set up under the General Staff. At the very beginning the 
territorial commands were established to be responsible for territorial 
According to Luttwak & Horowitz, the Israeli Defence Forces were officially established on 
26 May 1948. According to van Creveld, they were established two days later on 28 May. 
The reason for this deviation can not be found in the sources; however, in this context the 
difference is not significant. 
154 Bar-Zohar, p. 143 — 145. 
According to the author, Ben-Gurion was very well aware of the use of military force. He 
spent a lot of time reading the works of great military theorists, military books and Haganah 
publications. 
Also interview of Professor, Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Yoav Gelber. 
According to Gelber, the British-trained Jews also represented the idea of connecting 
firepower and movement. In PALMACH the emphasis was more on movement — and in an 
unconventional way. This shows that PALMACH was, despite its rather large size, more a 
guerrilla force than a conventional army. 
155 Van Creveld (1998), p. 65. 
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operational issues. All of these commands were expected to be capable of 
independent fighting, which was an answer to the threat that one day Israel 
might have to fight some or all of its neighbours simultaneously. In the first lull 
of the War of Independence in June 1948, these headquarters were 
reconstituted as commands under the General Staff. In spring 1948 the small 
naval and air force components were also separated from PALMACH and their 
command echelons were incorporated into the General Staff as well. 
According to the Israeli officer and military analyst Netanel Lorch, the unified 
General Staff was created for three reasons: to co-ordinate every type of 
military operation closely with ground forces, to economise manpower and 
avoid duplication, and to streamline procurement and unify training methods to 
facilitate inter-service co-operation.' 6 
According to Shai, the IDF General Staff combined services, general staff 
duties, territorial commands and the channel of command to different arms. In 
Israel there, however, wasn't any General Staff Corps at different levels of the 
command echelon. The command system was constructed to be commander-
centred, where commanders concentrated on the aim and how to reach it and 
the staff on understanding the aim in the spirit of the commander's will, and on 
supporting this objective. In this concept, the aim unified the command process 
at all levels of warfare. Therefore Gelber's statement that the IDF General Staff 
became a joint staff of services already during its early years seems to be 
justified despite the fact that the ground forces command didn't exist at that 
time, but the General Staff also served as the headquarters of the ground 
forces. This system was to remain up to 1980s when a separate command for 
ground forces was established.157 
The HISH battalions were gradually called to active duty and in February 
1948 they were grouped into six brigades. During the war, the HISH troops 
were first used locally because they were largely immobile in operational terms 
in the early phases of the war. Later in the war, improvements in transportation 
equipment made it possible to also use HISH troops on a nation-wide scale. 
Three PALMACH brigades, whose politics contradicted the Haganah's 
leadership, were also integrated into the Haganah, although at this stage 
PALMACH still retained its own country-wide headquarters. PALMACH units 
spearheaded major operations on difficult fronts, but in later operations these 
brigades were also used in conjunction with other forces. In October, 
PALMACH's headquarters were folded into the IDF as well. The Home Guard 
(HIM) mainly acted as a means of passive defence in cites, but it was also 
used for reinforcements in rural areas.158 
156 Rothenberg, p. 45, Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 97 and Lorch, Netanel: Shield of Zion. The 
Israel Defense Forces, Howell Press Inc., Charlottesville, VA, 1991, p. 56 — 57 and 59. 
At the end of the 1950s the Central and Eastern Commands were combined. 
157 Interview of Professor, Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Yoav Gelber and discussions with 
Doctor, Colonel (ret.), Hanan Shai. 
According to Shai, the IDF General Staff was constructed on the Prussian model. Von 
Moltke the Elder also emphasised the operational factor on his General Staff. 
158 Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 25, Bagnall, p. 30 — 31 and van Creveld, p. 89 — 90. 
See also Rothenberg, p. 45. 
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The strategy of the Haganah during the War of the Roads was as follows: 
1. To defend every settlement as a base within Arab 
to identify them as ultimate objectives when 
launched. 
2. To avoid direct clashes with the British. 
3. To establish territorial continuity in predominantly 
as possible, between zones.159 
dominated territories and 
an offensive could be 
Jewish zones and, as far 
During the war these objectives were redefined to better cover the war aims 
of an independent state. However, despite this process they remained mainly 
military without an overall political context. 
The Arab strategy is much more difficult to perceive. This was a 
consequence of the United Nations Participation Plan on 29 November 1947. 
According to this plan, Palestine was to be divided into two independent Arab 
and Jewish states. The Arab areas, however, represented different groups of 
interests. This disagreement — in addition to the fact that the Arab forces were 
scattered and the strongest one, Iraq, rather far away — also made 
concentrated military efforts difficult. The only shared objective was to prevent 
the birth of an independent Jewish state.166 
5.2. From tactical defence to operational offensive 
The period of the War of the Roads could be described as having been mainly 
skirmishes along the road net between isolated Jewish settlements, although 
there was also sniping, bombing and occasional clashes in the cities. At the 
beginning of this period, the Haganah adopted a defensive strategy because of 
a fear of innocent victims, and the measures were also mainly passive: 
consolidation of communications between Jewish areas and occupation of 
positions blocking the most likely invasion routes. However politically sound 
this policy was, it was inadequate in preventing the ever increasing clashes in 
early spring 1948.161  
In April 1948, the Jews finally went over to the offensive and launched the 
first large brigade-scale series of operations called "Plan U. The aim of this 
plan was to protect the communication routes by occupying territory. The most 
important aim was to break the blockade of Jerusalem by seizing natural 
strong-points along the Tel Aviv — Jerusalem road. Ambushes not larger than a 
company were also used. With the co-operation of the HISH and PALMACH 
The Haganah brigades were Alexandroni, Carmeli, Etzioni, Givati, Golani and Kiryati. The 
PALMACH brigades were Yiftach, Harel and Hagenev. 
159 Allon (1970), p. 31 — 32. 
169 Dupuy (1992), p. xxiii. 
161  Rothenberg, p. 47 — 48. 
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battalions, the goals of "Plan D", secured communications between the Galilee 
and Jerusalem, were largely, although temporarily, achieved.162 
When the real war broke out in mid-May, the Israelis tried both to block their 
enemies' thrusts to the coastal plain settlements and to the Jewish parts of 
Jerusalem. On the northern front, the Israelis already engaged in small-scale 
offensives against the Lebanese, Syrian and Iraqi troops after a short 
containment period. In defensive positions, the Jews were only able to stop the 
Egyptians some ten kilometres south of Tel Aviv with great effort as was the 
case with the Arab Legion in Jerusalem in the outskirts of the Jewish districts. 
Pre-war preparation, fortifications in the settlements and the principles of 
active defence proved to be important. They were strong enough to tie up the 
enemies until the first truce came into effect. In the Galilee and on the northern 
part of the central front, where there was more room for manoeuvre, the 
Israelis already applied more mobile tactics. This was at least partly 
successful. The approach consisted of rapid indirect approach marches and 
offensives against enemy communications lines, of ambushes against columns 
and of night attacks. However, this approach was probably not due to an 
understanding of Liddell Hart's "Indirect Approach", it was merely an 
application of the guerrilla tactics that had already been used earlier in different 
types of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations in the 1930s and 1940s. One 
reason for mobile tactics was also the obvious lack of heavy armament that 
was a prerequisite for direct assaults on fortified positions. The lack of training 
in traditional conventional warfare might also have been an explanation. 
Commanders who were aware of the demands of co-ordination between 
different branches were rare. In addition, a sensitivity to manpower losses was 
behind tactical solutions. Nevertheless, all these reasons were typical motives 
for the compensation of inferiority with mobility. According to Yuval Ne'eman, 
everybody in the army during the War of Independence already knew that 
results should be achieved with minimum losses when it proved possible — 
either by indirect approach or by avoiding enemy strengths.163 
Yigal Allon gives this mixed principle of defence and offence the name 
active defence. The idea of being active was not new. The Jews knew of it as 
well. Both Sadeh and Wingate had insisted on it. Liddell Hart also pondered it. 
In his early writings on WW I, Liddell Hart wrote that "maneuver would be 
restored to the entire front by relying on the tactical manoeuvring of many 
small units. The key to victory on the battlefield could therefore be found by 
working out principles of tactics upwards from the elementary, instead of 
downwards from the complexities of large operations"; i.e., numerous tactical 
successes with small mobile units would produce a strategic success if the 
parts were well led. Although the Israelis acted like the description above, 
particularly in the early phases of the war, it would be artificial to only connect 
this type of indirect approach to Liddell Hart. According to Brian Bond, it seems 
more likely to have its origins in Wingate, though the link between Liddell Hart 
162 lbid, p. 47 — 49 and van Creveld (1998), p. 74 — 75. 
"Plan D" was also known as "Plan Daleth". The breaking of the blockade of Jerusalem was a 
part of "Plan D" known as "Nachshon". 
163 Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 64, Dupuy (1992), p. 46 — 47, 49 — 51, 54 and 57 — 59 and 
Ne'eman, Yuval: This War of Our Resolution and how to Safeguard its Achievements, p. 13. 
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and Wingate might have existed, as already discussed. Nevertheless, in future 
years the Israelis developed tactical and operational principles for their troops 
as well as their command system that were flexible enough to enable at least 
tactical independence, which should be commanded only if necessary.164 
During the first truce in June — July 1948, the Haganah was formally 
declared to be Israel's official army. The IDF used this lull effectively. Prime 
Minister Ben-Gurion held a series of meetings with his commanders. In these 
discussions the lessons learned were collected and strategy for the next stage 
was laid down. Territorial commands were put in charge of operations and 
formations were rebuild and trained. There were twelve of them, as Laskov 
had suggested, by the end of the first cease-fire, including one poorly 
equipped armoured brigade. The IRGUN and LEHI were disbanded and their 
men dispersed to other units. In addition a paramilitary unit called NAHAL 
(Noar Halutzi Lohemet, pioneer fighting youth) was created and trained to be 
the last reserve that could be sent to the front lines. According to van Creveld, 
the IDF was already a cohesive, disciplined force capable of co-ordinating 
operations on a countrywide scale in July 1948.165 One can agree with this 
evaluation, with the exception that co-ordination between different arms was 
not very good by today's terms, although the Israelis were able to control their 
forces nationally. The four-week truce was simply too short a time to teach or 
learn operational principles on a brigade scale. 
After the first cease-fire in mid-July 1948, the Israelis extended their basic 
war objectives. Because of the sparse lines of the Jewish-held territory, the 
Israelis put their main effort into the destruction of the enemy or at least into 
making him withdraw from the entire territory of Mandate Palestine. 
Operationally this "Ten Days' Offensive", which was launched simultaneously 
on all three fronts, can therefore be described as a containment operation, 
including neither distant geographical locations nor the destruction of the 
enemy. However, the Israeli ability to launch simultaneous frontal operations at 
least indicates a favourable force ratio, and an improvement in armament. 
In the second phase of the war, from the purely military point of view, the 
Israelis applied quite different tactics on different fronts. The most successful 
was the Golani Brigade's "Operation Deker in the Galilee. During this 
164 
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 Alton (1970), p. 39, Williams (1989), p. 301 — 302 and Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 36 — 38. 
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operation, where the Israelis were able to neutralise the Arab Liberation Army 
as an effective army, the IDF, feeling itself inferior in firepower, adopted a 
standard method: Take cover by day while engaging the enemy and using 
mobile operations at night. However, the main focus was on the Jerusalem 
Corridor, where the Israelis launched a three-brigade offensive called 
"Operation Dani". The purpose of this operation was to secure the corridor, but 
it was only partly successful, mainly because of the lack of co-ordination 
between the infantry and other branches. On this front, the Israelis also used 
more frontal attacks and firepower than elsewhere. However, in towns and 
villages, where resistance was relatively weak, the rapid thrusts of jeep-borne 
infantry units proved to be successful. According to van Creveld, this was 
particularly the case in Lydda, where Major Moshe Dayan's commando 
battalion "drove through the main street and reversed direction like an old-
fashioned cavalry regiment charging a line of infantry, firing wildly into houses 
on both sides and finally causing psychological shock and surrender," 
However, the Israelis suffered heavy losses against the Arab Legion in Latrun. 
This was not only a result of inexperience in co-ordinating different type of 
forces, but also a failure of intelligence. In one way this is a little bit amazing 
because two of the brigades involved were PALMACH brigades which 
continued the heritage of S.N.S. and FOSH troops that put such a heavy 
emphasis on reconnaissance. Therefore, the explanation might have been the 
inexperience in co-ordinating operational issues, as van Creveld states. On the 
southern front in the Negev, the Israelis were able to open a new corridor to 
the Negev and to block the east-west communications of the Arabs with two 
brigades in "Operation An-Far". The nascent seeds of deep penetration 
operations into enemy lines of communication can be seen in this desert 
operation, although penetrations were only applied in full in the final phase of 
the war.166 
In the final phase of the War of Independence, the main Israeli emphasis 
was on the southern front, first in the Negev and later in the Sinai. The Israelis 
had several advantages at this stage. First, the road network inside Palestine 
had been almost secured, which offered the Israelis interior lines, where they 
had a possibility to move and concentrate forces according to the threat. This 
was also done during the last phase. Besides, except for the Egyptian forces, 
the other Arabs did not pose a serious threat anymore. Second the Israelis 
were now superior in terms of the force ratio. By October 1948, the Israelis had 
almost 90,000 men and women under arms in 17 brigades, two of them 
armoured, while the Arabs could, according to van Creveld, muster only 
68,000 men. The armament of the Israelis had also greatly improved, including 
heavy weapons and an air force element.167 
166 Allon (1979), p. 37 — 38, Bar-Zohar, p. 169, Dupuy (1992), p. 75 — 78, 81 — 83 and 86 and 
van Creveld (1998), p. 84 and 87 — 88. 
167 van Creveld (1998), p. 66, 78 and 82. 
By the end of 1948, almost 200,000 people, of whom 164,000 were men, had been 
registered for service. 
See also Dupuy (1992) (1992), p. 123. 
According to Dupuy (1992), the Arab strength in October 1948 was some 55,000 men. The 
reason for this deviation remains unclear. 
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On 29 September, before the final phase, Ben-Gurion also issued an order 
to dismantle the PALMACH command. This decision was made both for purely 
military reasons to raise the professionalism in the army and also to diminish 
the political influence of the leftist Mapam party behind PALMACH. Mapam 
and PALMACH obeyed the government's orders, but remained resentful. After 
the war, Ben-Gurion's decision led to the resignations of many PALMACH 
officers. According to Michael Bar-Zohar, this was a severe blow to the quality 
of the army as well as to its operational effectiveness during the period 
following the War of Independence.168 
The final phase of the war consisted of Israeli offensives in the Negev, the 
Sinai and the Galilee. "Operation Hiram" in upper Galilee was planned to 
destroy the Arab forces and conquer the upper Galilee. The operation was 
implemented with four brigades, one of them armoured. With large pincer 
movements co-ordinated by Northern Command, the Israelis were able to trap 
the Arabs and eliminate them one at a time in a two-week offensive that drew 
to a close by the end of October. In the south, the Israelis launched two 
offensives to destroy the Egyptian forces, "Operation YoaV' in the latter part of 
October and "Operation HoreV' (also known as "Ayin") in November -
December 1948. Finally, in March, "Operation Uvda" was launched to occupy 
the southern and western Negev. The southern front operations during the 
final phase of the War of Independence were implemented in desert conditions 
with three to four brigades, including armoured and mechanised forces, under 
the command of Southern Command. Although the Israelis also had initial 
difficulties in co-ordinating this strength here, they tried to avoid these 
deficiencies with a week's training, during which a few tanks, half-tracks, jeeps, 
artillery, infantry and combat engineers all rehearsed their appointed roles, 
according to van Creveld. The operations were also examples of deep 
penetrations, where natural hazards were preferred to direct assaults; i.e., 
geographical conditions were fully exploited in thrusts on enemy lines of 
communications.' 69 
5.3. The Air Force and Navy 
The role of Israel's Navy (Sea Service) and Air Force (Air Service) in the War 
of Independence was not a decisive one. There are several reasons for this. 
First, the Haganah had not planned to have an air force, as it has not planned 
an all-out war. Second, the main threat came by land and therefore the focus 
of the efforts of the IDF was on land warfare. Third — and this was a 
consequence of the previous reason — what little resources that were available 
were first concentrated on the armament of the ground forces, and this left the 
Navy and Air Force in a secondary role. 
In November 1947, most Palyam forces were assigned to ground units or to 
the weapons procurement effort abroad. In the Haganah's and PALMACH's 
168 Bar-Zohar, p. 176 and 182 — 184. 
169 
 Dupuy (1992), p. 95 — 96, 101 — 104, 106 — 111 and 113 and van Creveld (1998), p. 96 — 
97.  
67 
thinking, the sea was important as a route for immigration and supply — but not 
as a naval theatre of operations. Nevertheless, the Israelis were aware of a 
possible threat from the sea flank; however, this scenario did not really 
materialise during the War of Independence. Thus, the purpose of the Sea 
Service was also to discourage Lebanese participation in the war, and it did in 
fact compel them to divert forces to cover their vulnerable shores. The Israelis 
applied the same tactics against the Egyptians, with similar result. The 
Egyptians did not launch any naval operations against the Israelis, although 
they tried to supply their troops in the Gaza Strip by sea. The Israelis almost 
totally blocked these efforts by patrolling the coastline of Palestine. In addition, 
the Israeli Navy harassed Egyptian land forces in the Sinai by shelling roads 
and beaches. Thus, the Israeli Navy also forced the Egyptians to disperse their 
forces on coastal defence, which helped the Israeli land forces for its part.17° 
In the Air Service, the growth in numbers was the biggest of all branches of 
the IDF.171  From the beginning of the War of the Roads, the Air Force 
extended its strength from nine civilian planes to over 200 warplanes of 
different types by the end of the war. This was a respectable achievement 
within the length of the war, although it also sowed problems and a lack of 
concentrated effort that was uneconomical for a small country. By the end of 
1948, the Israeli Air Force was in a way a miniature version of a great power's 
air force, with different planes for different missions. At the beginning of the 
war there wasn't any doctrine for the air force either. Therefore, the planes 
were used for bombing and strafing attacks in the enemy's rear areas, but not 
for co-ordinated attacks with other branches. However, the few planes already 
caused a shock effect in the ranks of the Arabs in the early stages of the war 
because the Israelis were expected to have no air force. During the second 
stage of the war in May — June 1948, the Air Service got its own missions; at 
first on its own and in the final stages of the war combined with the operations 
of land forces. The Israelis established air superiority as early as the summer 
of 1948 and then retained it for the rest of the war. In addition, as a 
premonition of the future, the Israelis already flew preventive air strikes in the 
War of Independence against Egyptian airfields and equipment in the Sinai 
with encouraging results. 72 
5.4. Operational art 
It is widely said that Israeli military leaders applied Liddell Hart's "Strategy of 
Indirect Approach" in their operations during the War of Independence. 
170 Williams (1989), p. 250 and 252 — 253 and Dupuy (1992), p. 118 — 120. 
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However, it is not wise to over-emphasise Liddell Hart's influence on the Israeli 
art of war and "take the simplistic claims of different journalists literally", as 
Brian Bond mentions.173 Nevertheless, strong similarities between Liddell 
Hart's thoughts and the Israeli applications can be seen, and some ties 
between Liddell Hart and the Israelis also existed before the war. 
Yigal Yadin, Chief of the General Staff, IDF during the War of 
Independence, wrote a strategic analysis of the war's battles after the war.174 
According to Bond, Yadin had already read Liddell Hart's books before the 
war, and he had also translated chapters of Strategy: the Indirect Approach 
into Hebrew for the benefit of his students and colleagues. Yigal AlIon, Yadin's 
colleague and deputy, for his part, learned of Liddell Hart's ideas before the 
War of Independence from these translations and from talks with the veteran 
PALMACH leader Yitzhak Sadeh. Furthermore, among Yadin's students in the 
early 1940s, when he was in charge of the planning branch of the Haganah 
secret officers' school, were future Chiefs of Staff Zvi Zur and Yitzhak Rabin. 
Therefore, according to Yadin, Rabin's brilliant analytical mind supported AlIon, 
and was already in the War of Independence — not to speak of the Six Days 
War — chiefly responsible for the planning of "Operation HoreV' and other 
operations on the southern front.175 
According to Brian Bond, Liddell Hart was a general tactical theorist and, 
most of all, an exponent of the "Strategy of Indirect Approach" at the strategic 
level to Yadin. Yadin also acknowledged that he was influenced by Liddell 
Hart's thinking in his conduct of operations in 1948 — 49. Later on, Arie 
Hashavia, a correspondent for Bamachaneh, wrote in his article on Yigal Yadin 
on 24 August 1967 that Yadin stressed more than once that his first and 
foremost mentor was Captain Liddell Hart by saying that "I have read every 
work of his, and the only original thing I did was — adapting his ideas to our 
conditions." However, this does not mean that Yadin copied Liddell Hart's 
ideas in their entirety. As Yadin himself said, he found Liddell Hart's books 
173 Bond, p. 269. 
174 Yadin was actually Chief of Operations, the second in command of the General Staff. 
Because of Chief of Staff Yaacov Don's poor health, Yadin acted as de facto Chief of Staff 
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useful in triggering his own reflections on warfare, as they were later also 
useful in the development of the organisation and doctrine of the IDF after the 
War of Independence.178 
The strategic level mentioned by Yadin must be seen in this context as 
equivalent to the operational because Yadin stressed the idea in Bond's 
interview that the further from the front the enemy lines of communication 
could be cut, the greater the long-term effects would be. This aim is a typical 
and concrete objective of the operational level. However, strategic national 
aims were reached mainly by tactical forces because operations were only 
loosely co-ordinated by territorial commands and by the General Staff. 
Therefore, valuable opportunities had also been missed, especially at the early 
stages of the war, by the poor co-ordination of different brigades in the same 
sector, and by inexperience with staff duties in operational terms. However, 
according to Yigal Allon, the Israeli Army intentionally avoided forming 
divisional echelons during the war because of the prevailing conditions in the 
Palestinian theatre, and because of the size of their own forces.177 While the 
role of the General Staff was still largely unspecified, the territorial commands 
took charge of operations, which were not closely linked to the national aims. 
In addition, the commands were largely immobile and therefore had only a 
limited ability to lead mobile operations. This all meant that while the brigades 
represented tactical formations by their size, in practise they often 
implemented operational aims independently. However, during the War of 
Independence, where the belligerent armies were relatively small and overall 
war strategies did not exist on either side, this was a sound solution. In the 
coming years this independence led both to brilliant tactical and operational 
successes, but also to failures at operational and especially at strategic; i.e., 
grand strategic, levels. 
In his article For by Wise Councel Thou Shalt Make Thy War in Israel 
Defence Force Weekly, the Bamachaneh issue, Yigal Yadin also writes that 
the planning of all the most important operations was prepared with an indirect 
strategic approach; i.e., by means of cutting off, sealing off and maximum 
exploitation of cunning to achieve surprise directed at the basic and speedy 
dislocation of the enemy's deployment.178 All these principles also represent 
176 Bond, p. 245, Bagnall, p. 196 — 197, p. 39 — 40 and Hashavia, Arie: Article-clipping about 
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the principles of manoeuvre warfare. However, it is also wrong here to assume 
that all the Israeli commanders were aware of the ideas of Liddell Hart, or 
exploited or applied his thoughts. In many cases it was obviously merely a 
question of acting instinctively according to the principles of the predecessors 
of the IDF. 
Israeli operational principles during the War of Independence are revealed 
in another article Beshviley Machshava Tzvayit (In the Paths of Military 
Thinking) written by Yadin. In this article, Yadin makes a brief summary of the 
major lessons to be learned from the War of Independence. He listed four 
major principles of warfare applied by the Israelis; surprise, fighting spirit, 
concentration and mobility, among these surprise was the most important and 
the others either secondary or means to achieve the former. When these three 
latter principles were achieved, surprise was achieved and when surprise was 
achieved, the battle was won. 79 Thus, it seems that at the tactical level the 
Israeli way of waging war rested indirectly on the teachings of Wingate, Sadeh 
and the PALMACH commanders, who had been pupils of both of these men. 
According to this, it is therefore also not surprising that traits of the indirect 
approach can clearly be seen in the operations of the War of Independence. 
On the whole, Liddell Hart has been a controversial figure in Israel. Some 
people denied his influence, but more admitted it, including many high-ranking 
commanders. For example, this official acknowledgment can be seen in 
Encyclopaedia Hebraica, which says: "Even before the Israel Defence Forces 
were created, the Haganah organisation paid great attention to Liddell Hart's 
theories. The commanders of the Haganah, and after them the commanders of 
the IDF, saw in them a solution for the war of the few against the many. It is 
therefore not surprising that several of Liddell Hart's books were translated into 
Hebrew."180 
On the whole, the Israeli army fought with varying success. There are 
several reasons for this. First was the inexperience in implementing and co- 
In his letter to Liddell Hart, Yadin mentions that Lorch was also a keen advocate of Liddell 
Hart. 
179 Allon (1979), p. 223 — 224. 
Yadin's second, quoted article Beshviley Machshava Tzvayit was an introduction to the 
collection of essays published by Ma'arachot Publishing House in July 1950. According to 
Yadin, on the whole the major lessons of the War of Independence were as follows: Morale 
of the Jewish people; the ability to totally mobilise the forces of the Jewish community; 
unified command over all forces; the contribution of settlements in defence enabling the use 
of mobile offensive forces; the tactical and leadership skills of commanders especially in the 
middle and lower echelons, but also the ability to apply these in the higher echelons 
including multi-branch operations; night-attack skills; knowledge of the terrain of the 
battlefield and finally, full utilisation of the Strategy of the Indirect Approach. Though this list 
is optimistic, it gives insights into the Israeli art of war during the War of Independence in a 
wider context. 
180 J. L. Wallach's letter to Liddell Hart 27 June 1967, LH 2/22 and Kimche, Jom: Liddell Hart 
and the Hagana. Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, August 26, 1960, LH 15/5/304, 
part 2 of 3, p. 25. 
The quoted part of Encyclopaedia Hebraica was attached in Wallach's letter. 
According to Kimche, there was probably no body of military men anywhere in the world that 
has been more influenced by Liddell Hart's flexible doctrine than the commanders of the 
Haganah and its successor, the Israeli Defence Forces. 
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ordinating combined operations, though partly this was a consequence of a 
lack of equipment. This was partly compensated for with skills in small-unit 
tactics and partly with the maintenance of aim. Second, many individuals had 
no war experience, although WW II had just ended. Third, a common language 
was a problem, especially amongst new-comers, which naturally formed a 
barrier to understanding training and orders. Finally, especially on the 
Transjordan front, the enemy — the Arab Legion — was good enough to resist 
the Israeli advance. 
In the period of the War of Independence, the revolution in the art of war 
caused by crew-served weapons and sophisticated systems replacing 
individual weapons as a decisive means of warfare had not yet reached the 
Middle East, including Israel. Mostly for this reason, Arab fire was not well co-
ordinated at the strategic and operational levels, which was a great advantage 
to the Israelis. However, at a tactical level the fire was significant, but the 
Israelis mainly succeeded in avoiding this inferiority with their idea of small 
group tactics. Major General Israel Tal, one of the developers of the Israeli 
Armoured Corps and later a minister in Israel's government, describes these 
tactics in his article Israel's Defence Doctrine in Military Review in 1978. 
According to Tal, the Israelis, who were at first unable to compete with the 
superior firepower of the Arabs, avoided expensive frontal assaults and chose 
the mobile way of "fighting on the objective" instead of "fighting to the objective 
with fire". In its basic form, this means that movements covered by darkness 
and advances along the least expected lines, where supporting firepower was 
not of decisive importance, were applied. Finally this method of fighting obliged 
the Arabs to face the Israeli soldier in close combat, which had a psychological 
effect, without speaking of the better fighting skills of the Jews.181  
Favouring small group tactics, many Israeli operations seemed scattered 
and therefore also in contradiction with the principles of war, especially with 
the aim of concentration. In reality this was not the whole truth. Because of the 
organisational structure, various units ostensibly operated independently, but 
in reality the Israelis applied the principle of "maintenance of objective", which 
compensated for the lack of fire-power.182 Principally this method of fighting 
was based on a decentralised command system, where emphasis was put not 
so much on orders on how to reach the objective, but on the overall framework 
and destination of the operation. This suited the mental outlook of Israeli 
soldiers, who were already trained to think and fight independently. This 
decentralisation of decision-making power was to form a firm base for the 
command system of mobile warfare in the coming years. 
181 
 Tal, Israel: Israel's Defence Doctrine, Background and Dynamics, Military Review March 
1978, p. 26. 
182 Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 54 — 55, 59 and 61. 
This definition is used by Luttwak and Horowitz. According to the authors, the Jews lacked a 
military tradition, which allowed plenty of scope for original methods and new ideas. With 
one exception, this can be accepted. This innovation was not adequate to compensate for 
the lack of skills in co-ordinating combined operations. 
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5.5. The seed of mechanised manoeuvre 
In the operations of the Southern Command in the final phase of the War of 
Independence, and also to a lesser degree in "Operation Hiram" in the upper 
Galilee, the tendency was to exploit already adopted tactical skills. The 
principles of war that the Israelis followed were quite similar to Fuller's and 
Liddell Hart's principles. According to Yigal Allon, nine principles of war were 
adopted. They were: Maintenance of aim, Initiative, Surprise, Concentration, 
Economy of force, Protection, Co-operation, Flexibility and Consciousness of 
purpose or cause.183 
The emphasis on taking advantage of terrain conditions and enemy 
weaknesses is a question of the balance between human and material 
resources, as Martin van Creveld puts it in his book Command in War. 
According to Creveld, this means a heavy premium on compensating factors of 
a mental nature: individual daring, maintenance of aim, improvisation and 
resourcefulness, all of which still remain key elements of the fighting doctrine 
in the IDF at every level.184 Since the War of Independence this also included 
the full use of terrain by deep penetrations into enemy lines of communications 
and command posts, and outflanking pincer operations against exposed and 
vulnerable enemy flanks. The Israelis acted best at the platoon and company 
level, but they also succeeded in concentrating their forces for larger efforts up 
until the end of the war. Frontal attacks were rare, but they were used in areas 
where no other choices were available. Nevertheless, the Israelis tried to 
defeat the enemy with mobility in both indirect and direct offensives. In these 
operations, the Israelis used mechanised units and motorised infantry in two 
different ways: light-armoured jeep-units for encirclement operations and 
mechanised units followed by infantry to breach enemy lines with rapid 
breakthroughs in populated areas.185 
The use of jeep-borne units reflected the growing tendency towards mobility. 
In the final offensive phase of the War of Independence, the need for a 
modern cavalry arm, which combines high mobility and cross-country capacity 
with a comparatively great firepower, was revealed. Especially in the Negev 
desert and in the Sinai, where there was enough room for deep operations and 
183 Allon (1970), p. 44 and correspondence between Liddell Hart and Allon, LH 2/2/61/3 and 
22. 
In the early 1950s Allon studied in London. He was also known in military circles. On 4 
November 1960, the Guardian published an article on Allon, who was then seen as the best 
Israeli commander during the War of Independence. Allon's book The Curtain of Sand was 
also published in English at this time. 
184 van Creveld, Martin: Command in War, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London, England 1985, p. 196. 
The compensating factors were heaza (individual daring), dvekut bamatara (maintenance of 
aim), iltur (improvisation) and tushia (resourcefulness). 
185 A copy of Yaacov Dori's letter to Mr. da Costa 17 June 1949, LH 15/5/304, part 2. 
See also The Story of the Defence Forces. Focus on the Guardians of Israel, Israel Today 
and The Jewish Times, June 16, 1967, p. 5, Dayan, Moshe: Story of my Life, Weidenfeld 
and Nicholson, New York 1976, p. 71 and 71 — 86 and Forty, George: Tank Commanders. 
Knights of the Modern Age, Firebird Books, Poole Dorset 1993, p. 169. 
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a decisive victory was the objective, at least on the operational level, this need 
was acute. Besides, jeep-units could also be used in pre-emptive guerrilla style 
operations to harass the enemy, which, for its part, already reflected the dual-
purpose nature of Israeli forces in the coming years. Special units had to be 
suitable for use both in conventional warfare and in counter-guerrilla 
operations.1 86 
Jeep-borne commando battalions were established in several brigades, and 
combined to fight together with motorised infantry. The tactics and 
organisations of the jeep-battalions were quite similar to that of the British 
Long Range Desert Group used in North Africa in WW II against Rommel's 
forces. There is a clear reason for this. During the War of Independence, 
operations on the Southern Front were the responsibility of Colonel Avidan 
(earlier Koch). Colonel Avidan had served in Wingate's unit, was one of the 
founders of PALMACH and during WW II had fought with a detachment of 
several other PALMACH members in Captain David Sterling's Long Range 
Desert Group in the SAS. According to Kadish, a still more important link 
between the British concept of long-range penetration and the Israelis was 
Colonel Israel Karmi, who was also a veteran of the British special troops in 
North Africa. Karmi established the first Israeli commando battalion on the 
British model and created its tactics based on the combination of fire and 
movement and encirclements where mechanised forces were to be used in 
penetrations and infantry to hold the terrain. The battalion commanders had 
nevertheless, according to Kadish, rather an important role in creating the 
tactics of their own force. In addition, according to Yaacov Dori, the attacks of 
the jeep-units also had similarities with the actions of Lawrence of Arab. The 
battles of jeep-units were to become the source of legend in Israeli military 
folklore. These forces were used in late-night, long-range raids on major 
Egyptian bivouacs, on reconnaissance missions, to protect the flanks of the 
main thrusts, and to give fire support for mechanised infantry. Most of the 
missions were implemented in accordance with the principles of indirect 
approach and were strictly similar to the principles of manoeuvre warfare as 
well. Rather than forcing or luring the enemy out of position, the aim of the 
operations was functional dislocation; to neutralise the enemy's forces or make 
his strength inappropriate.187 
186 A copy of Yaacov Dori's letter to Mr. da Costa 17th June, 1949. 
See also Katz (1996), p. 53. 
Ben-Gurion's aim was not to fully destroy the Egyptians, which is a sign that he already 
thought ahead to the time when the hostilities would end. 
187 A letter from Yuval Ne'eman to Liddell Hart 13th October, 1958, LH 2/18 and interview of 
Professor Alon Kadish. 
Colonel Avidan resigned from the Army in 1950 after disputes with Ben-Gurion. 
Israel Karmi was Prime Minister Golda Meir's military adviser during the Yom Kippur War. 
See also Katz (1996), p. 53 and 280, a copy of Yaacov Dori's letter to Mr. da Costa 17th  
June, 1949 and interview of Professor, Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Yoav Gelber. 
The most famous of the commando battalions were the Negev Brigade's 8th Battalion 
(Avraham Adan, later General and commander of the Armoured Corps foucht in this 
battalion), Moshe Dayan's 89th Battalion in the 8th (Armoured) Brigade and the 54 Battalion 
(Shu'alei Shimshon, Samson's Foxes) in the Givati Brigade. According to Katz, this latter 
battalion became the reconnaissance unit (Sayeret Shirion) of the 7th (Armoured) Brigade. 
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Martin van Creveld also sees similarities with German armoured warfare 
during WW II in the operations of jeep-units. Although Yigal Allon, the 
commander-in-chief of the Southern Command, could not be suspected of 
having studied armoured operations, his 8th Armoured Brigade commander, 
Yitzhak Sadeh, obviously had. 'Meir Pa'il confirms this, though originally 
Sadeh's ideas on armoured warfare might also have been based on the 
thinking of F. O. Miksche, whose book Blitzkrieg in addition to Foertsch's 
Kriegskunst Heute and Morgen (The Art of Modern Warfare) was at that time 
the only published book that described the Blitzkrieg concept and the use of 
mechanised forces within this framework. In the Sinai and the Negev from 
beginning to end, the operations were conducted with much improvisation 
against a background of inadequate means. Once the breakthrough had been 
achieved, an "expanding torrent" into the enemy's rear installations and lines 
of communications was formed. For example, this can be seen in the 
occupation of Beersheba, which was like a stroke of lightning, whereas the 
subsequent drive into the Sinai represented an "expanding torrent", which was, 
according to van Creveld, a brilliant, small-scale copy of the German 
breakthrough at Sedan, France in spring 1940. The encirclement of Rafah was 
also very similar to Rommel's offensive at Gazala May — June 1942, where he 
pushed his armoured spearheads between two British forces and threatened 
to surround both.188 
However, on the whole the operations of the jeep-battalions were more 
successful than the battles of the armoured units. The failures of the armoured 
formations were mostly the consequences of obsolete WW II surplus 
equipment, and of inadequate co-ordination and rigid tactics. In the early 
phases of the war, tanks were used in frontal attacks as single gun platforms 
to cover infantry, as was the case in Latrun on the central front and in Iraq 
Suedan on the southern front. However, towards the end of the war the 8th  
Armoured Brigade was already evincing clear signs of switching its tanks from 
an infantry-support role to mobile, deep-strike operations on the model of 
Guderian, Manstein, Rommel and Patton, as van Creveld puts it. 
Nevertheless, the better experiences of the jeep-battalions was to form a trend 
towards emphasising mobile infantry at the expense of armoured forces during 
the first years of the IDF. Therefore, up until the late 1950s the IDF was an 
infantry-army, although the tendency towards mobility prevailed: tanks were 
put into an infantry support role and no concrete doctrine of deploying 
armoured formations was formulated by the end of the war.189 
According to Gelber, the original commander of the Long Range Desert Group was Henry 
Cator, who was in charge of a company composed of both Jews and Arabs. When he was 
wounded, Sterling replaced him. 
188 
van Creveld (1998), p. 92 and 96 — 97 and interview of Doctor, Colonel (ret.) Meir Pa'il. 
In his interview, Pa'il also mentioned Miksche's influence behind the Israeli concept of 
armoured warfare, though he didn't exactly specify what was adopted especially from 
Miksche. This is, however, quite natural because Foertsch's and Miksche's ideas are very 
similar. 
189 Wallach: The Development of Israeli Armor Doctrine, p. 10 and van Creveld (1998), p. 
158. 
See also Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 68. 
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As a result, the Arab troops were not destroyed during the War of 
Independence. In any case, they were at least mauled and were, except for 
the Arab Legion, unable to continue the war, which had taken a more mobile 
form. In addition, during the last stages of the war Ben-Gurion and the General 
Staff were involved in disputes in which Ben-Gurion prevented the IDF from 
attaining military goals that the operational commanders — especially Yigal 
Alton, the commander of the southern front — considered to be their business. 
According to Zvi Lanir, Ben-Gurion's guiding considerations in this context 
were aimed at creating a situation that would be favourable in political 
negotiations after the war. Therefore, the Israelis should refrain from pressing 
their military power to full advantage during the fighting. In addition, there were 
disputes about who was the most dangerous enemy: Ben-Gurion viewed the 
Transjordan threat as the most hostile, while the General Staffs opinions 
pointed towards the Egyptians. Therefore Israeli political and military 
objectives diverged at the end of the war, which at least partly was due to the 
fact that the operational art consisted mainly of winning tactical battles. During 
the War of Independence tactical battles were not linked at the operational 
level to the grand strategic war aims.19° 
The other goal, seizing territory, was mainly achieved; the entire Galilee was 
cleared of enemy troops and restored to Israel, Israeli forces reached the Litani 
River on Lebanese territory, the Egyptian siege of the Negev was lifted and 
access to the Red Sea was secured. Only in the West Bank and in Jerusalem 
did the Israelis experience major set-backs. In this direction the enemy — the 
British trained Arab Legion of Transjordan — had been a tough adversary, 
although the mountainous terrain also favoured the Arab Legion more than the 
Israelis.191  
Finally, Israel's survival in the hostile environment was also a question of 
will. Though the vulnerability in depth — the sorrow of Ben-Gurion especially in 
central Israel — remained until June 1967, the War of Independence 
represented the first Jewish victory in more than two thousand years. During 
that war the ranks of the IDF, "warrior-settlers" as van Creveld calls Israeli 
soldiers, represented a new generation in the traditional Jewish pacifism. The 
new generation interpreted the term en breda, no choice, as meaning fighting, 
not submission. According to van Creveld, it was therefore no wonder that 
Israeli public opinion fell madly in love with everything military in the coming 
decades. Thus, the IDF's successes can also never be understood without 
reference to its exalted position in the public mind. After the War of 
Independence, the awareness of the threat formed the mental basis of defence 
where public opinion itself was the product of a feeling of en breda, the 
Three of the future Chiefs of Staff came out of the mechanised forces; Moshe Dayan from 
the aforementioned 89th Battalion of the 8th 
 Brigade, Haim Laskov from the mechanised 
battalion of the 7th Brigade used in the Galilee and Haim Bar Lev from the 9th Battalion of the 
Negev Brigade. 
190 Lanir, p. 19. 
191 
 Ibid, p. 40 — 41, 
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importance of which cannot be, according to van Creveld, exaggerated in 
Israeli history.192 
192 
van Creveld (1998), p. 124 — 125 and 151. 
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6. THE BIRTH OF DOCTRINE 
There was a hot-tempered period of debate over the subject of the future army 
in Israel after the War of Independence. The differences in opinion that had 
already begun before the war intensified when numerous PALMACH officers 
resigned from the newly-established Israeli Army. However, the IDF had no 
conventional military doctrine of its own in the period following 1948. According 
to Samuel Katz, strategies were based mainly on the guerrilla techniques 
applied by PALMACH, while those who had got their basic military education 
someplace else than Palestine commandeered training manuals from 
American, British and even Wehrmacht sources.193 
The army of the War of Independence had been a mixture of sabras (Jews 
born in Palestine) and immigrants. Tactically, it was also a mixture of skills 
adopted mainly from their own defence organisations and from the British 
Army. Therefore — aside from any political disagreements — there already were 
differences in tactical thinking; that of PALMACH with a tendency towards 
improvisation, and on the other hand the view of the British-trained men who 
continued to put the IDF on a regular footing.194 
An uneasy compromise was reached when David Ben-Gurion, who held the 
portfolios for Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, imposed a solution in 
favour of the suggestions of the British-trained officers. According to Bagnall, 
Ben-Gurion wished to normalise the army's somewhat haphazard chain of 
command and create a non-political military organisation. Ben-Gurion — who 
himself was somewhat familiar with the British system because of his 
background in the Jewish Legion of the British Army in WW I — understood the 
need for firm central direction. The army had to be put under the supervision of 
the ruling political leaders, without any rival organisation. According to Ben-
Gurion, the creation of the guidelines for doctrine was also the responsibility of 
politicians.195 
When speaking purely of organisational matters, all of the arrangements 
made in the IDF after the War of Independence were not so radical. During the 
war, and to a lesser degree since the late 1930s, an equivalent force structure 
had already existed. A core of permanent cadre can be seen in various 
PALMACH and Haganah groups, and in the HISH forces of the main body of 
193 Katz (1996), p. 43. 
194 Williams (1989), p. 12, Bagnall, p. 32 Kahalani, Avigdor: A Warrior's Way, S.P.I. BOOKS 
/ Shapolsky Publisher, Inc., New York 1994, p. 296. 
195 Bagnall, p. 32. 
To illuminate Ben-Gurion's thinking, Bagnall quotes the Hebrew newspaper Maariv on 25 
April 1973. In this interview, Ben-Gurion describes the early phase of the IDF as follows: 
"Until the establishment of the State, the PALMACH units were the best we had. However, 
with the establishment of the State, they were no longer the best but those which were 
formed from the ranks of the Jewish Brigade and the British Army. Anyhow, I would not 
accuse the PALMACH of trying to pursue a take-over role in the county. Evidently though, 
this had been a possibility and had not the re-organisation been forced through during a 
period when the state was fighting for its survival, it could have subsequently resulted in 
Israeli fighting Israeli, and the continuing involvement with politics within the Army." 
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the reserve. The real change happened in the rank and file of the units, 
formations and command echelons. 
The British-trained officers represented the political neutrality and military 
professionalism in being able to organise a conventional army that coincided 
with Ben-Gurion's views. However, he faced a problem; what to do with the 
leftist PALMACH veterans who still held senior positions in the army. Because 
he favoured the establishment of the supremacy of civilian authority over a 
professional military, several retirements were announced and new 
appointments made. This also nearly caused a crisis; especially when Yigal 
AlIon, the head of the Southern Command, resigned and was succeeded by 
Moshe Dayan. Many staff officers were greatly perturbed by Allon's dismissal, 
and Dayan only succeeded in getting them to stay with a lot of persuasion. In 
any case, Ben-Gurion's policy caused a considerable exodus of well-trained 
and combat-wise officers and a lot of valuable experience was lost, not to 
mention the tradition. Nevertheless, many younger ex-PALMACH members 
remained and soon afterwards the questions of operational doctrine, 
organisation and tactics replaced political indoctrination and different opinions 
in personal matters. However, in the tactical sense, the influence of PALMACH 
remained because training — and via this the favouring of innovative tactics -
was given over to junior officers, whom in many cases were kibbutz-origin 
PALMACH members. According to Pa'il, it was Dayan who was able to 
combine the advantages of both PALMACH and the British-trained officers.196 
6.1. Defence Service Law 
The first Israeli Defence Service Law was drawn up based on the concepts of 
Ben-Gurion, Yaacov Dori and Yigal Yadin, and was enacted by the Knesset in 
autumn 1949. According to Zvi Lanir, the Israeli Defence Forces were defined 
as an instrumental army; the military was, and still is, nothing but a tool that 
carries out government-approved policy, and was therefore subordinate to 
efficient national supervision. It was completely separated from the party 
system. This latter point didn't completely materialise, as can be seen in 
196 Rothenberg, p. 74 — 76, Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 69 and 74 and interview of Doctor, 
Colonel (ret.) Meir 
According to Rothenberg, over 40% of all Lieutenant Colonels and Majors in the late 1940s 
came from the PALMACH. In addition, 20 Colonels out of 45 were PALMACH veterans. 
See also Perlmutter (1969), p. 61 and interview of Colonel, Doctor Shai Shaul. 
According to Perlmutter, PALMACH officers were worried about the disappearance of the 
pioneer-egalitarian spirit in the army, which might isolate the officer corps from the entire 
society in the end. Ben-Gurion saw the political PALMACH as a threat to the democratic 
state and therefore wanted to root politics out of the army. In practice, this did not happen. 
Officers maintained their links to political parties up until the end of the 1970s. 
According to Shaul, the third thing that had an influence on the IDF in its early years were 
the foreign volunteers that had joined the War of Independence, the most important of them 
being U.S. Colonel David Marcus. According to Rothenberg, Marcus' influence was slight, 
because having been in General Eisenhower's staff he had little field experience. Therefore 
Marcus', as well as the other's, influence can be seen as being similar to the British-trained 
officers; they represented knowledge of the duties in a conventional army like knowledge of 
different arms and services, staff work and co-operation between arms. 
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footnote 203. The Defence Service Law confirmed the Israel Defence Forces 
Ordinance promulgated in May 1948, and since then it has only been changed 
in 1955 and in 1976. The Defence Service Law defined the overall system of 
the IDF, while the Military Jurisdiction Law dealt with military hierarchy, 
discipline and orders. 197 
The major problems in establishing a permanent army were the poor 
economic situation of the state and, with this in mind, the need to maintain an 
army large enough to cope with a variety of threats, and the need to reach and 
maintain qualitative superiority against Israel's adversaries. Therefore, the 
essence of the Defence Service Law intensively emphasised the exploitation 
of the entire national manpower through universal conscription of both men 
and women. This all was to be achieved with a long reserve service with wide 
annual refresher training duties, and with the utilisation of state-supported 
activities — like transportation, health care and communications — for dual 
military-civilian functions.198 
When the 120,000-man force that was under arms was partially disbanded 
in early 1949, a call for professionalism prevailed. According to Colonel 
Shimon Eshet, former Director of Defence Planning Department in the General 
Staff, there was a need for a highly professional regular fighting force of some 
25,000 men, with maximum mobility. The size of the force was, of course, 
limited by economic considerations. In a way this opinion was a reflection of 
the use of the PALMACH troops as a rapid deployment force against the most 
immediate and hostile threat in the early phases of the 1948 war. The actions 
of PALMACH units had showed how a regular élite force could cope with a 
threat — at least for a few months — and give time for a build up of a larger, 
non-professional force.199 
Examples and models in support of the solution of establishing military 
institutions were also sought from abroad. However, the Israelis clearly 
understood that whatever might be accepted as a basis for the solution, it had 
to be adopted to local demands and conditions. General Yigal Yadin, who 
became the Chief of Staff after Dori in November 1949, and Yadin's successor 
as head of Operations Branch, General Mordechai Makleff, also preferred the 
use of a 25,000-man framework to train and staff an ever-available, rapidly 
deployable citizen-army; a militia. After visiting Switzerland in 1949, Yadin and 
Makleff created a system of their own based on the assumption of a short 
warning period that, for its part, was a consequence of the small size of the 
country. In any case, unlike Israelis have generally claimed, the system that 
197 Ben Meir, Yehuda: Civil - Military Relations in Israel, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 
Tel Aviv University, Columbia University Press, New York 1995, p. 33 — 36 and Lanir, p. 51. 
The Military Jurisdiction Law was enacted in 1955. In 1976 after the Yom Kippur War and in 
the wake of the Agranat Commission's report, both the National Service Law and the Military 
Jurisdiction Law were revised, and a new law The Basic Law: The Army was enacted. 
198 Rothenberg, p. 71. 
See also van Creveld (1998), p. 115. 
According to van Creveld, regular reserve training also strengthened the cohesion of units. 
Besides, the reserve units experienced little personnel turbulence, and remained together 
for many years. 
199 Lanir, p. 5. 
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was incorporated in the Defence Service Law of 1949 was not unique, rather it 
was quite similar to models from other countries. Nor was the Israeli 
application completely similar to the Swiss system, because the Israelis had a 
bigger permanent cadre.20°  
According to the Defence Service Law, the armed forces were based on an 
active army consisting of a professional cadre of permanent officers, N.C.O.s, 
certain specialists and conscripts, a trained civilian reserve and the territorial 
defence units. In addition, the already established NAHAL organisation was 
put on a regular footing. The situation and organisation of the General Staff 
(Mate Ha'Klali), territorial and functional commands and staff branches were 
also confirmed almost entirely along already existing lines. The commanders 
of the Navy and Air Force, commanders of the territorial Commands and the 
functional Armour Command and Training Command were placed directly 
under the command of the Chief of the General Staff. In the second tier, were 
the branch chiefs; Paratroop and Infantry, Artillery, Signals, Engineers, Supply, 
Transport and Ordnance. GADNA (youth organisation) and NAHAL had their 
own commands, although practically they belonged more in the second tier. 
According to Bagnall, theoretically the members of this second tier were all on 
a par with those of the first, but in practice responsibilities and prestige 
reduced their actual status.201  The organisation of the General Staff can be 
seen in Appendix 6. 
The major exception in the organisation when compared to other armies 
was the absence of a ground forces command. According to Gunther 
Rothenberg, the explanation for this was the position of the Chief of Staff. In 
the IDF there was and still is no Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces, 
and therefore the Chief of Staff was defined as being the sole executive head 
of the entire multi-service army. Because he was always chosen from the 
ground forces, there was no need for a separate ground forces commander. 
The second-in-command was the Chief of the General Staff Branch, although 
a special post of Deputy Chief of Staff was sometimes created during war-time.202 
In all, the overall role of the Chief of Staff was not clearly defined in the 
Military Jurisdiction Law, although the law granted the Chief of Staff a wide 
variety of powers and authority in the internal matters of the army. The chain of 
200 
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command was not clear, particularly with regards to the Chief of Staffs 
position in relation to Defence Minister on the subjects of strategy, doctrine 
and armament of the army. Besides, none of the first ten Chiefs of Staff up 
until the mid-1970s could have been promoted to that post if they had been 
considered to be in opposition to the overall political direction of the 
government. According to Rothenberg, this was not dangerous because 
military interference with the political process did not exist.203 But, there 
remained a question of how on the other hand. The special position of Ben-
Gurion caused a strange situation with regards to decision-making, as he was 
both Prime Minister and Defence Minister. However, in the first two decades of 
the state during Ben-Gurion's tenure this was not a problem for the IDF and its 
doctrine because the Chief of Staff was included in the small inner circle of 
decision-makers. Nevertheless, in the decades to come this non-
institutionalised role of the Chief of Staff lessened his power, even in purely 
military terms. Later, especially during the Yom Kippur War, the weaknesses in 
the high level chain of command were revealed and changes both in the 
Defence Service Law and the Military Jurisdiction Law were made. 
The branches of the General Staff were renamed Manpower, General Staff, 
Quartermaster, with Training added in 1953 and Intelligence in 1955. The 
territorial commands were reduced to three; Northern, Central and Southern. 
These commands had a dual role. They were responsible administratively for 
all operational troops deployed in their areas, and for supervision of local 
defence units along the border. In war, the commands assumed responsibility 
for operations in their areas. The territorial commands were divided into 
districts and consisted of two main elements: a mobile element for major 
operations comprised of brigades and a static regional defence element. The 
latter consisted of the Local Defence (Merchavit) and the NAHAL Corps, 
forming district units in agricultural settlements. Their task was to control their 
own regions mainly by defensive means. These settlements, which had to 
survive any war with the primary task of defending their homes and to check or 
delay enemy advances along particular axes, were, in addition, organised into 
sub-districts containing two or three settlements. Finally, the settlements were 
supported by district units consisting of infantry battalions manned mainly by 
elderly men. 04 
203 Rothenberg, p. 74 — 75 and Ben Meir, p. 34 — 36. 
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In addition, the Air Force and Navy Commands were also unified with the 
General Staff, which afterwards controlled all branches of the defence forces. 
According to Yigal AlIon, this latter consolidation was made to achieve 
maximum co-operation, efficiency and coherence. Partly, the unification was 
made for economic reasons; the Arab-Israeli theatre of operations has been 
continental and this gave priority to the development of the branches.205 In 
addition, acting Chief of Staff Yadin did not pay much attention either to the Air 
Force or to the Navy, which at least temporarily reduced the status of both the 
Air Force and the Navy.206 
6.2. The infrastructure of national service 
The Defence Service Law created universal conscription for all 18 year-old 
males and females with some exceptions for religious groups, females and 
minorities. This system has only been slightly modified since. The men were 
called up to serve for three years, followed by reserve army duties up to the 
age of 50. Women were ordered to serve for two years and, although they 
were potentially liable for duty up to the age of 24 if unmarried, they have 
rarely been called to peacetime reserve service.207 
Training of the active forces continued almost uninterruptedly after the War 
of Independence and already in 1951 the IDF had regular brigade-scale war 
games, exercises and manoeuvres while the Air Force and Navy had their 
standby training. In 1952 the General Staff also gave instructions on reserve 
training. The basic principle was to maintain the composition of the troops in 
accordance with the conscription cycle. In rehearsals, a four-year cycle was 
chosen. During the first year, the force served in security tasks in the border 
Ministry, the Special Intelligence Section of the Police and Military Intelligence. According to 
Rothenberg, before the 1950s military intelligence relied heavily on the human element, but 
afterwards it began to receive electronic equipment, and soon eclipsed the other agencies. 
This was the reason why the fifth centre, the General Staff Intelligence Branch was created, 
for reasons of synergy. 
Merchavit was also a part of the reserve system, manned by older men (50 - 55 years) living 
in villages near the border, including women trained for military tasks. 
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areas. In the second year, commanders had 40 days training in tactical and 
staff exercises. The third year consisted of 21 days of unit exercises for 
privates only. In the fourth year, all this culminated in two-week manoeuvres. It 
seems, however, that initially, before the system had been fully established, 
the IDF also carried out reserve exercises that were not included in the four-
year cycle. For example, the IDF already tested different things like co-
operation between infantry and tanks and co-operation between operational 
forces and territorial forces in war games and several manoeuvres in August 
1952. Substantially the exercises that were held in the early 1950s were rather 
modern. The tendency to also combine small landing operations and the 
support of the air force in these manoeuvres reflect the nascent concept of 
deep penetration.2°8 
Theoretically this reserve system, established on sound foundations by the 
end of 1952, solved at least temporarily the manpower problem of the young 
IDF. In practice the truth was different. Up until the verge of the 1956 Suez 
crisis the IDF remained mainly poorly trained and equipped. There were two 
major reasons for this. First was the question of armament. The Tripartie 
Declaration announced by the western powers had limited arms sales to the 
Middle East and if arms were available, the Israelis did not have enough 
money for wider arms procurement. The second and more important reason 
was the training system. Ben-Gurion wanted to connect military, economic and 
Zionist goals together. This meant that, after basic military training, 12 months 
of the conscription had to be devoted to agricultural instruction. However, the 
idea was neither very popular among the recruits nor did the generals like it. 
Agricultural training diminished the time available for training, and thus 
reduced combat readiness, which was incompatible with the requirements of a 
modern army with sophisticated weapons. In addition, Chief of Staff Mordechai 
Makleff indirectly supported Ben-Gurion because he was a keen advocate of 
professionalism on the British model. Makleff favoured a smaller but more 
efficient force. This all lead to an overall decline in the training level of 
conscripts and reservists, although a small core of the army obviously, in 
Makleff's concept, got better training.209 
Finally in 1954 during Moshe Dayan's tenure as Chief of Staff the Israelis 
abandoned combining agricultural and military training with the exception of 
the paramilitary NAHAL. Unlike his two predecessors, Dayan was worried by 
the poor performance of his conscript army. This led to changes. Dayan 
removed most of the civilian functions in the IDF and reduced its support 
208 IDFArc., file 18/1529/1952, file 28/1529/1952, file 5/25/1954 and file 142/25/1954. 
The number codes of the forces that joined these exercises give reason to believe that they 
were called up from the reserve. 
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elements. According to Rothenberg, Dayan also revived the combat spirit of 
the War of Independence.21° One can agreed upon this. Tactically, the army 
adopted traits of the jeep-patrols of 1948 in the form of mobile infantry. In 
addition, the innovative "follow me" leadership principles were created during 
Dayan's time. In 1956, while perhaps not the best in terms of equipment, a 
mentally tough and unified reserve army was already well established. 
6.2.1. NAHAL — territorial defence 
There are three unique organisations in the Israeli army; NAHAL (Noar halutzi 
lohemet, Pioneer Fighting Youth), which is a paramilitary agricultural 
organisation, a paramilitary youth organisation called GADNA (Gdudei Noar, 
Youth Battalions) and the Women's Corps of the IDF, CHEN (Chet Nashim, 
Women's Army, it basically means loveliness). Both NAHAL and GADNA have 
their own separate functional commands in the General Staff, as mentioned 
earlier. CHEN has an inspectorate equivalent to the branches because it is an 
organisational part of the IDF. All of these special organisations have their own 
significance to the Israeli military institution, and to the military art as well. 
Therefore, a short look at these organisations is called for in this context. 
After the enactment of the Defence Service Law, the General Staff ordered 
the reorganisation of the NAHAL as a fully fledged regular unit of the IDF. In 
this formula, NAHAL was, according to Williams, separated from GADNA. 
Although this special framework was organised from GADNA, NAHAL was not 
afterwards an offshoot of the pre-military GADNA anymore. NAHAL has had its 
own role in the Israeli concept of mobile warfare. In the early 1950s Ben-
Gurion's idea was, according to Shaul, to build settlements as the first line of 
defence, though this concept had existed already before the War of 
Independence. This was the birth of NAHAL, which was created to complete 
the territorial defence in the most hostile and isolated locations. A system 
equivalent to this does not exist in other armies anymore.211  
Originally, Nahalnik's (members of NAHAL) were infantrymen with two 
primary functions. NAHAL was meant to preserve the pioneering elements and 
traditions of the settlements, including self-defence. At the beginning, the level 
of training in the NAHAL Corps was low — as was the case in the whole army. 
Therefore in the early 1950s, Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan started to modify this 
concept by stating, that "Israel needed more soldiers, not tomato farmers", and 
after 1954 less time was spent on agricultural training and more on military 
duties. Secondly, NAHAL soldiers completed the organisation of territorial 
defence and still do this, although their importance in the territorial defence has 
declined in recent years. While territorial defence was built merely on local and 
stabile systems, the members of garinim (nucleus) were settled in more active 
roles to defend and patrol border areas where there were specific security 
problems. Territorial defence, on the whole, was based on a dug-in, hedgehog- 
210 Rothenberg, p. 91. 
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like defence system of mutually supportive house-groups supported by a force 
equivalent to a company combat team. Nahalniks were doing the same thing, 
but in addition they also applied more offensive means. The overall aim was to 
get more depth to the defence of the country, to get time to mobilise and 
organise reserve forces, and to channel enemy penetrations by keeping 
defensive footholds as bases for the offensive operations of mobile forces. 
These principles also represent the force dichotomy of manoeuvre warfare; 
territorial defence including NAHAL — and of course the peace-time active 
army — formed the ordinary or holding force, while the mobilised reserve forces 
took the role of the extra-ordinary force or main attack.212 
The length of service for garinim boys and girls was equivalent to those who 
served in the IDF ranks. However, when compared to the two-years basic 
training and field practice of the general conscript service, the male soldiers of 
NAHAL spent nine months of this time on agricultural labour, excluding five 
days military service monthly. Training was divided into five stages: basic 
military training, agricultural training, history and natural history courses, 
advanced military training and operational tasks. The girls in the garinim were 
to remain in the settlements when the boys went off to perform the military part 
of their duties.213 
In its early years, the NAHAL system also caused problems for the whole 
IDF, the biggest of them was officer education. According to Louis Williams, 
the IDF had accepted a revolutionary concept in the case of NAHAL 
youngsters by agreeing not to break up peer groups. The result was that a 
large part of the good potential manpower was removed from the IDF's 
selection processes, including officer and N.C.O. selection, as well as elite 
units and specialist roles. Therefore the original training system was diversified 
and more emphasis was put on military training. Each kibbutz was required to 
supply its quota of cadets for non-commissioned officers' and officers' courses. 
In 1955 the NAHAL joined the paratroops and already before the Suez Crisis 
took part in counter-guerrilla action. In the following years the training widened 
yet more and the Nahalniks also joined the other branches, including armoured 
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units. Since the 1956 War NAHAL units have taken part in all Israeli wars, 
performing at the same level as the other IDF units. In their original defensive 
mission, the NAHAL settlements also performed well in the Six Day War in 
Northern and Central Israel, when they contained Syrian and Jordanian troops 
until operational troops were released to this front.21  
Since the 1950s the NAHAL Corps had been acting with a skeleton 
structure of battalions and companies, which had controlled and administered 
both wartime operations and peacetime security and night patrols. This loose 
framework has given more operational freedom in comparison to conventional 
military formations. A NAHAL unit could rotate its personnel between various 
settlements, while its composition and size could be rapidly adjusted without 
creating organisational and administrative problems. Since 1982 the NAHAL 
has also shared with the other troops the ongoing security duties in Northern 
Israel. In addition, as a consequence of the experiences of the 1982 war, 
NAHAL begun recruiting more personnel because the IDF needed more 
infantry units. This was the birth of the regular NAHAL Infantry Brigade that in 
1997 was transferred to the command of the Central Command.215 
6.2.2. GADNA — youth organisation 
GADNA had already been founded in 1940. After the enactment of the 
Defence Service Law, the role of GADNA was also defined. GADNA was not a 
voluntary youth organisation of national defence as in many countries. In 
Israel, most boys and girls were required to join this organisation at the age of 
fourteen. In peacetime, these youngsters were to perform military drills, 
receive rudimentary instruction in handling arms and map-reading, and tour 
Israel on camping excursions. In wartime, GADNA youngster served in 
hospitals, in post offices and helped in different logistic missions, but during 
the War of Independence some units also engaged in the Battles of Jerusalem 
and Haifa. However, the emphasis on training 
 has shifted from arms training to 
sports and physical training in recent years.2  
Although GADNA has its equivalents in other countries, its military aspect in 
Israel has in general been broader than elsewhere. Therefore it is often said -
mainly outside Israel — that this is a sign of militarism. However according to 
Zeev Schiff, the Israelis accentuate the point that, because of the special 
situation of Israel, this has been a social question. In this way, it is possible to 
both psychologically indoctrinate the youth with a security consciousness, and, 
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on a practical level, to teach them basic military skills useful in their coming 
military service.217 
6.2.3. CHEN — women's army 
The idea of establishing a Women's Corps was not new anymore at the end of 
the 1940s. Orde Wingate already drew up schemes with Ben-Gurion in 1941 
for raising a Jewish Women's Service. At the time this concept did not, 
however, bring forth results, but the idea was to remain. Nevertheless, the 
truth was that some 4,000 women served voluntarily in the British Army in 
auxiliary troops, and some even in special troops. These women formed the 
IDF women's branch in June 1948 — called the Auxiliary Corps at first. In the 
Defence Service Law, the Women's Corps was placed on a regular footing. On 
the whole, the Women's Corps was modelled on the pattern of the British 
Auxiliary Territorial Service, where women had served as drivers, clerks and in 
different missions in support echelons.218 
The main purpose of Israel's manpower planning in establishing the 
Women's Corps was to place every able-bodied man in a combat unit. 
However according to van Creveld, the decision to exclude women from 
combat units after the War of Independence was seen as a humiliation, 
especially to the women of PALMACH, ETZEL and LEHI who had also 
participated in combat missions, some of them even being captured or killed. 
Because the IDF was and still is overwhelmingly combat-oriented, women 
were not wanted in combat units. If a women was injured or killed, the blow to 
unit morale would be almost intolerable without mentioning the possibility of 
women being taken prisoner. In 1953 however, the concept of excluding 
women from combat units was abandoned, mainly to preserve the social and 
human atmosphere in line battalions. Women's presence in combat units did 
not, however, mean that the Israelis also started to train women for combat 
missions, rather they were instructors and served in support jobs. The other 
reason for women's service was the psychological aspect. Women, who had 
served in the army and became mothers, could implant a consciousness of 
defence in their children. Today only about 50% of the women who are 
available are required, which provides an opportunity to select only women 
with comparatively high academic abilities.219 
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From the very beginning women were put together with men and not into 
their own units, although the latter was planned at first. However, for basic 
training the Israelis formed two different training installations only for women. 
Since the 1970s, the tasks of women have become more varied and widened 
from auxiliary jobs to various kinds of instruction and supervisory tasks in 
different branches and military courses. Artillery was the first combat arm to 
use women instructors to train combat troops in the 1970s. Since then this 
concept has spread to the Armoured Corps as well as to other branches. 
Officers posts up to the higher ranks are also open to women today, although 
the variety of higher posts for women is quite narrow because the prerequisite 
for entering most of these jobs has been service in combat units.22°  
6.3. The birth of doctrine — synthesis of the past and the present 
After the War of Independence, the Jewish Standard newspaper published 
several articles analysing the defence problems of Israel. Two of them were 
based on interviews with Liddell Hart conducted by the correspondent Mr. da 
Costa. According to Liddell Hart, the Israeli Army would in the near future be 
involved into semi-guerrilla operations, which will stress the need of mobility. 
Only where the country would provide a real natural fortress, it will be 
practicable to plan static defence. In Israeli case this came not into question. 
Therefore plans had to concentrate on tactical agility and on mobile units." 
Mobility meant in Liddell Hart's words "improvement of armament, where Israel 
could profit much by developing technical originality and education of individual 
soldiers to act in the battlefield in the spirit of tactical instinct."221  This all clearly 
shows that Liddell Hart was very well aware of the performance of the IDF at 
that time. All of what he suggested was based on the improvement of existing 
organisation and methods, which had already proved to be practical. In 
addition, the future scenario shaped by Liddell Hart was to materialise. Up to 
this day, the Israeli army has had to prepare not only for a full-scale invasion 
by Arab countries, but also for guerrilla operations during inter-war periods. 
The two above mentioned articles were soon commented on by Chief of 
Staff Yaacov Dori, who placed great value on Liddell Hart, as mentioned 
earlier. However, instead of preserving the rather successful army of the War 
of Independence, new structures and new doctrines were to be formulated on 
the basis of rational thought. The preceding war had been a series of tactical 
22° Williams (1989), p. 245, 323, 325, 332, 335 — 336 and 339, Schiff (1985), 109 — 114, van 
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early as May 1948. 
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battles without a higher strategic framework. Battles were fought to gain what 
was to be reached. This was not the policy of an independent state. 
Nevertheless, at the tactical level there was a lot in the Army of Independence 
that could be applied. Therefore, early in 1950 General Dori appointed an 
Establishment Team under the command of Colonel (later Lieutenant General) 
Haim Laskov to produce a blueprint for the basis of the IDF's future force 
structure and fighting doctrine. The Establishment Team was expected to unify 
different principles, and provide a framework into which the standing army and 
the newly conceived reserve brigades could be integrated harmoniously.2 2` 
Israel is a classic model of a nation whose strategy — and via it doctrine -
has been dominated by geographic circumstances. In the background of the 
Israeli fighting doctrine was a scenario that was composed of potential threats. 
Israel had to be prepared for the worst; all Arabs were potential enemies, and 
especially the neighbouring Arab countries posed an imminent threat.223 In his 
book The Making of Israel's Army Yigal AlIon defined Israel's theoretical 
scenario — which can also be placed also in the early 1950s — as follows: 
The main military strength of the Arabs lay in Egypt; Israel's main geo-
strategic weakness was in the coastal plain facing Jordan, which was 
the soft under-belly of her posture. The greatest danger Israel faced was 
a co-ordinated, simultaneous surprise beginning with an attempt to 
annihilate her air force, and followed by a main effort to split the country 
into several parts by a combination of land attack and landings on the 
coast; these actions being supplemented by guerrilla attacks by 
paratroopers and irregulars, and accompanied by mass bombardments 
and air raids against the civilian population and industries as well as 
military targets." 
According to Israel Tal, these preconditions have changed only a little since 
the 1950s. Although there have been variations of the scenario, basically the 
core has remained the same up until today. According to this outlook, the 
defence planners of the early 1950s under the command of Generals Yigal 
Yadin, Mordechai Makleff and Moshe Dayan outlined the main conditional 
factors behind the Israeli military strategy. The dominant consideration 
affecting their thinking was the mission of the state of Israel. According to 
Professor Handel, the history of the Jews magnified the Israelis' sense of 
insecurity; therefore the psychological and cultural influences of Jewish history 
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— most prominently the genocide of the Jews during WW II — shaped the 
environment in which Israeli strategy was formulated.22  
In Israel, a systematic analysis of the organisation of the defence questions 
seems to have been started soon after the creation of the Establishment 
Team. From the early 1950s on, Israel developed its strategic-operational 
doctrine, which in this context can be seen as including both strategic 
prerequisites and means and operational principles. Yoav Ben-Horin and Barry 
Posen examine the development of Israeli doctrine since the 1950s quite 
thoroughly in their study Israel's Strategic Doctrine. Although the origin of the 
doctrine; i.e., when the doctrinal principles were first taken into use, is not 
clearly shown in Ben-Horin's and Posen's study, nevertheless, it outlines the 
main trends behind the development of the doctrine. Therefore, this study is 
useful for summarising the Israeli military doctrine; especially, because other 
studies dealing more or less with this subject are along the same lines as Ben-
Horin's and Posen's work. It is also important to note that doctrine is not a 
static theory behind practice. Ben-Horin and Posen have understood this and 
have therefore tried to analyse the backgrounds to different solutions in 
different times. In addition, these researchers have been able to discover 
several key principles that have remained behind Israel's doctrine since the 
1950s, although their emphases and relationships have varied.226 
Ben-Horin and Posen divide Israeli military doctrine into three levels: foreign 
policy, political-military elements and operational elements.227 The political-
military can be interpreted as "war strategic" in this connection or strategic in 
today's terms. Conditioning elements have undergone only minor changes 
since the 1950s. On the other hand, political-military means have varied 
depending on the military policy of different governments. The main principles 
of the operational doctrine were fully crystallised only after the 1956 War, but 
they have since changed only slightly. 
Conditioning factors 
The conditioning factors were already defined in the 1950s. According to Ben-
Horin and Posen they are: 
- The threat. All Arabs are potential enemies. An especially feared type of 
war has been the war of attrition. 
225 Handel, p. 542 and Tal, p. 22. 
See also le Mire, Henri: Tsahal. Histoire de l'armee d'Israel 1948 — 1986, Librairie Plon, 
Paris 1986, annex No 1. 
Up until the 1956 Suez Crisis, three men were responsible for developing doctrine. They 
were Eliyahu Ben Hur, Haim Laskov and Yitzhak Rabin. Of these men, the most significant 
to the future armoured doctrine was Laskov. Laskov was not only in charge of doctrinal 
development, he also served as Commander of the Air Force, Commander of the Armoured 
Corps, and Chief of Operations in the early 1950's. 
226 Ben-Horin & Posen, p. 1, Allon (1970), p. 64 — 65, Lanir, p. 22 — 23 and van Creveld 
(1998), p. 123. 
Strategic-operational is Martin van Creveld's term. 
227 Ben-Horin & Posen, p. v — viii. 
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- Constraints. This consists of geography, population, economic resources 
and the tendency for superpower intervention. 
- Assets and opportunities. These include a geography for acting on interior 
lines, the fractious politics of the Arabs and finally the social nature of 
Israel, which has a good enough educational base for a quality defence as 
well as experiences from the past for the mental aspect of defence.228 
These pre-conditions for the Israeli defence doctrine have not undergone 
major changes despite the peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan. 
Political-military elements 
At the strategic level, Israel's doctrine consists of the political-military 
elements. The contents of these principles have been revised several times, 
although the main issues have remained. According to Ben-Horin and Posen, 
the strategic doctrine can be defined as a central core of generally shared 
organising ideas concerning a given state's national security problems. In this 
way, the definition can be seen as a "means-ends" chain, in which military 
capabilities are connected to military outcomes, which are themselves 
connected to political outcomes. Political-military elements are not the main 
subjects of this work. A short summary must, however, be made because 
strategic elements of doctrine interact with the operational elements. As Ben-
Horin and Posen put it; political-military elements reflect and address the 
conditioning factors identified, while operational elements serve as the means 
to the political-military elements or the ends of the doctrine.229 
The political-military elements are: 
- Deterrence, 
- Casus belli, 
- Military victory (Machria, decisive victory), 
- Acceptable casualties, 
- Autonomy and dependence, 
- Defensible borders.23° 
Deterrence can be seen as a strategy that aims to dissuade possible 
adversaries from aggression in advance by the threat of punishment. 
228 Ibid, p. 4 — 12. 
See also Tal, p. 22 — 23, Allon (1970), p. 50 and 62 — 63 and Wallach (1970), p. 129 — 130. 
All these sources deal with similar issues as Ben-Horin and Posen without major differences. 
229 Ben-Horin & Posen, p. v, 1 and 3. 
When Ben-Horin and Posen conducted their study at the beginning of the 1980s, it was not 
yet possible to find a description of Israel's strategic doctrine in any comprehensive formal 
statement by the Israeli government. Therefore, this research is based on books by civil and 
military decision-makers, on Israeli practise in crises, on wars and on the force posture of 
the IDF. 
239 Ibid, p. vi — viii and Allon (1970), p. 61 — 62. 
Decisive is the most commonly used translation of the Hebrew term Machria. 
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Deterrence is usually understood as a defensive strategy, including in Israel. 
This principle, which is understood in a rather practical way in Israel and is not 
very precisely defined, has been applied in different ways in the past. Casus 
belli, in this connection a justified reason for military action, is closely linked 
with deterrence. For the Israelis, casus belli is and has been an officially 
announced theoretical limit; i.e., hostile action which would limit Israel's living 
or security conditions, and in this way gives a justified reason for open military 
action. Deterrence is, according to Shaul, also linked to the armed forces; first 
the quality of armed forces will serve as a mean that raises the threshold that 
might lead to a war and second, if deterrence don't work, armed forces will be 
needed anyway. This also coincides with Liddell Hart's views that deterrence 
means the inhibition of warlike actions without a move from peacetime 
dispositions, as already discussed in chapter 1.231  
An overall military victory, a final blow to the enemy, has been impossible to 
implement as David Ben-Gurion already noted in 1955. Therefore the next 
best objective was a decisive victory, which in Israel's doctrine can be seen in 
two ways; the first aim was to paralyse enemy forces and the second the 
conquest of territory. The former has had a relationship to deterrence, a 
crushing defeat of adversaries in offensive operations was believed to 
reinforce deterrence. The conquest of territory for its part gave depth to the 
defence in operational terms, and at the strategic level provided a bargaining 
card in negotiations on borders and peace settlements.23 
 
Israel's small population has made it very sensitive to casualties and 
therefore it has led the Israelis to seek different operational solutions than a 
long-term war of attrition. However, this has not been — as Ben-Horin and 
Posen show — uniformly straightforward. In the case of "en breda", no choice, 
Israelis have also accepted the probability of suffering relatively high losses, 
both at the operational and at the tactical level: losses that are acceptable from 
the viewpoint of the entire war. In this way, this principle is also linked to the 
military victory that has been seen as a prerequisite for deterrence. A decisive 
victory might prevent the next war or at least lengthen the peacetime, and in 
this way reduce the total losses.233 
231 
 Ben-Horin & Posen, p. 12 — 18 and interview of Colonel, Doctor Shai Shaul. 
See also Alton (1970), p. 70 — 71. 
Alton lists reasons for a casus belli. They are: an imminent threat of an enemy offensive, 
signs of preparations for a surprise enemy attack on Israeli air-bases, air attack on atomic 
and scientific institutions, extended guerrilla warfare, a Jordanian military pact with another 
Arab country and the closing of the Straits of Tiran. 
232 Handel, (1994), p. 537, Ben-Horin & Posen, p. 18 and Tal, p. 23. 
233 Ben-Horin & Posen, p. 21 — 23 and Kahalani (1994), p. 340 — 342. 
According to Kahalani, Israelis also use the phase "sticking to the target" in this context. In 
its basic form, it means commanders' difficulties in estimating whether to carry out a mission 
on the basis of the price they are willing to pay. Therefore Kahalani stresses that such 
decisions should be made by people who have the ability to think profoundly, people who 
possess a large personal library of dog-eared history books; i.e., an understanding of the 
context of policy and warfare. The final aim should be drawn so that the war ends with the 
fighting men standing at the best possible point to start political negotiations. 
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Autonomy and dependence is a consequence of the past. Israelis have 
mainly fought their wars without direct foreign aid, which — although it would 
have been available — could not have helped because of the fast tempo of 
modern wars. However as originally defined by Ben-Gurion, this has not meant 
a total materiel self-sufficiency, although it has led to a very high-level of arms 
production in Israel. Political dependence, for its part, has mainly been seen as 
a threat to strategic decision-making. In an emergency this might give the 
initiative to adversaries because of the delay it brings.234 
The emphasis on seeking defensible borders has existed in Israel since the 
early 1950s. The main question — and a very disputed one — has been; 
defensible borders without peace or, on the other hand, compromise peace 
treaties with the neighbouring Arab countries, which might weaken operational 
defence without adequate foreign guarantees. In 1955, Israel's Embassy in 
London published a leaflet with an article entitled Peace but not suicide. The 
problem of secure borders can already — and this was when the doctrine was 
still under creation — been seen in this article. The main question in this leaflet 
was how to deal with the absence of strategic depth in a hostile environment 
without maintaining a large permanent army. In the eyes of the ruling socialist 
parties, the border settlements were the key to the possession of Eretz Yisrael 
(the territory of Israel). Although the army could conquer territory, only the 
kibbuzim and moshavim had the power to liberate territory from desolation and 
convert it to Jewish land. In this concept, the border settlements formed 
artificial defence zones, which were put into practise with territorial forces that 
would both provide cover and give an early-warning to mobile forces. 
Therefore up until the early 1960s, the solution to the lack of depth was, 
according to van Creveld, mainly defensive. However, this tendency changed 
already before the Six Day War when the quantity of forces was seen as 
inadequate to control and defend the borders. In addition, heavy emphasis 
was put on first-rate intelligence. To avoid falling victim to a surprise attack and 
to prevent over-hasty pre-emptive action, a first-class intelligence service had 
to be developed and linked to the various elements of Israel's defence forces. 
The dilemma between defensible borders and peace treaties has prevailed up 
until today, although the geo-strategic situation in Southern and Central Israel 
is better today from the Israeli point of view than before the peace treaties with 
Egypt in 1979 and with Jordan in 1994.235 
234 Ben-Horin & Posen, p. 23 — 26. 
See also Lanir, p. 168. 
According to Lanir, the turning point in the search for self-efficiency in the arms industry was 
the French embargo in the early 1960s. This created a feeling that Israel must be — at least 
in critical material — self-reliant in equipping its armed forces because of the fear of being cut 
off from its foreign sources of armament. This objective has never been completely reached. 
235 Peace but not suicide, Israel Faces Danger, Embassy of Israel, The Narod Press, 
London November 1955, LH 15/5/307, p. 15, Handel, p. 537, Tal, p. 23, Allon (1970), p. 53, 
73 — 75, 88 and 99 and van Creveld (1998), p. 106 — 107. 
The leaflet Peace but not suicide is an approximate description of Israel's defence problem 
in the early 1950s. Although it was published, this leaflet can not be interpreted as an official 
doctrine although some basic elements behind the question of defence can be seen in the 
text. 
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When considering Israel's defence problems on the whole, Israel has — with 
the exception of the 1956 Sinai Campaign and the war in Lebanon in 1982, 
when the imminent threat of war did not exist in Israel — always reacted to its 
opponents' initiatives. According to Handel, it has also never really developed 
a coherent long-term strategy. Instead, the military-operational doctrine has 
been concrete because of the imminent threats; geographical vulnerability, 
fear of annihilation, political isolation and finally national survival. Therefore, 
according to him, the logic of military operations has often determined strategy. 
This contradicts the Clausewitzian principle of the primacy of policy in military 
matters, where a strategic victory can't be evaluated only in military terms 
because the results of a war will never be final without consolidated political 
agreements. A strategy where military operations determine strategy can 
clearly be seen in Israel in the past decades. The operational victories have 
been astonishing, while up until the Camp David peace treaty with Egypt the 
question of peace did not materialise at the political-military level.236  
From the early 1950s onwards, foreign policy became subservient to 
security needs. Zvi Lanir calls this strategy the "denial approach". The rule "the 
minister of defence is authorised to determine defence policy, while the job of 
the foreign minister is to explain that policy" was laid down by Ben-Gurion, and 
lasted, with several exceptions, up until the late 1980s. According to Lanir, the 
concept of denial was based on the assumption that a state has nothing to 
gain from initiating a war, and that the only pragmatic or moral justification for 
the use of force is purely defensive, to thwart an aggressive opponent's attack. 
Such a state goes to war only with the intention of exercising denial, and tries 
to finish the war when that objective is attained. While political goals dictate the 
military objectives in war in a Clausewitzian approach, the denial approach by 
its very nature embodies a clear distinction between political and military 
matters. Politically, the main efforts are devoted to preventing war. However, 
from the moment the political goals tend to fade in importance relative to the 
military aims, both are aimed at exploiting the full potential of the military in 
order to prevent the enemy from carrying out his designs and to deter him from 
future attacks. Kadish and Simhoni confirm this and continue that after the War 
of Independence a belief was born that Israel's border problems could be 
solved by military means. This has proven to be wrong, but at that time the 
younger generation of political and military leaders didn't understand that a 
military success could also be a political problem. In this way the pursuit of 
decisive victory limited their understanding of the military art as a whole, of 
which the next war, the Sinai Campaign in 1956 is a good example.237 
Yigal Allon also favoured the idea of an independent Druze state as a buffer zone between 
Israel and Syria in the 1960s. 
236 Handel, p. 570 and 572. 
237 Lanir, p. 14 — 17, Handel, p. 560 — 561, 563 and 572 and interview of Professor Alon 
Kadish. 
According to Lanir, annihilation means neutralisation in this context. 
It should be mentioned that opinions of Israel' s success in military policy have varied 
greatly, as have the views of the substance of the denial approach. 
According to Simhoni, before the late days of the Yom Kippur War, Israeli political and 
military leaders didn't understand that a war had to be settled at the political level. 
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Operational elements 
Yoav Ben-Horin and Barry Posen list the operational elements of the Israeli 
doctrine as follows: 
- 	
Offence, 
Pre-emption, 
	
Speed, 
	
Indirect approach, 
	
Exploitation of macro-competence, 
- 	 All-arms, combined-arms. z38 
According to Professor Handel, the operational elements of the doctrine 
have controlled and still control Israel's style of warfare.239 This statement can 
be accepted with some restrictions. Military strength as well as operational and 
tactical skills have mostly become, as already discussed, the solution to 
political-military problems. Israel's military competence has obviously lowered 
the barrier on the decision to go to war, which has been seen as the most 
advantageous way of solving threatening situations. Nevertheless, this manner 
of thinking has lead to a tendency to only think about war at the operational or 
tactical levels. Military decisions have determined political solutions, decisive 
victory has been more important than the political situation after the war. On 
the other hand, the tendency to use military means has in many cases been 
the only way to eliminate the threat and compensate for geographical 
inferiority, lack of manpower or economic vulnerability, which for its part 
explains the predominance of operational principles. 
Doctor Ariel Levite, an Israeli scholar who has studied the background 
behind Israeli doctrine, sees the "cult of the offensive" behind the Israeli 
offensive principles. According to this concept, military organisations 
commonly favour offensive doctrines because these better serve the 
organisational interest of the professional military. In its basic form, this means 
that military men tend to have organisations and equipment that are suitable 
for offensive because the demands on them in the offensive are higher than in 
defence. They therefore emphasise offensive operational and tactical 
principles, regardless of whether an offensive orientation is congruent with 
Instead, according to Yitzhak Rabin, Israel had never, before the 1982 war in Lebanon, 
worked on the assumption that through a decisive victory it could impose its own conditions 
for peace on the enemy or arrive at a comprehensive political solution in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. In 1982 this was however, according to Handel, Minister of Defence Ariel Sharon's 
impossible objective. Rabin's words are cited in Handel's book. 
See also Ben-Horin & Posen, p. 13 and Katz (1996), p. 287. 
The authors have defined denial as "means of successful preservation of the physical 
integrity of Israel." 
According to Katz, the IDF has been guided through its operational and day-to-day 
existence by a principle called Tohar HaWeshek (Purity of arms), which means that deadly 
force should be used only as a last resort, and that only the necessary force should be used 
in any situation. 
238 Ben-Horin & Posen, p. viii. 
239 Handel, p. 575. 
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perceived national interests or prevailing technology. This has obviously been 
the case everywhere in general. If the organisation is suitable for offensive, it 
would normally be also useful for defence. This might also have been true in 
Israel, but it only partly describes the tendency for the offensive. In Israel, 
offensive fighting principles already existed when the Establishment Team 
started its work. Therefore, a more obvious explanation for the tendency for 
the offence than the "cult of the offensive" is the operational and tactical 
heritage of the War of Independence, where active action in Israel's 
circumstances had proved to be efficient. The Establishment Team only 
confirmed the existing practice. This conclusion does not, however, exclude 
the fact that the new Jewish generation that won the War of Independence 
wanted to get rid of the traditional pacifism, which is not, in any case, a 
synonym for defence.24°  
In purely military terms, it is more likely that the lack of operational depth 
and inferiority in manpower and arms were the most significant items behind 
these offensive operational and tactical means. It was not possible to 
compensate for these deficiencies with defensive operations. Doctor Levite 
also shows a similar view by saying that "the origins of the Israeli offensive 
military doctrine are consistent with Scott Sagan's interpretation of the 
offensive orientation of the European powers prior to WW I. At those times the 
initial adoption of the offensive doctrine was the result of a rational strategic 
calculus, rather than an institutional offensive bias of the military." According to 
this view, the Israeli tendency towards the offence can be seen as being 
rational; it was a consequence of an unfavourable geopolitical environment 
and inferiority in manpower. In addition, the Israelis stress that they have had a 
defensive strategy that was carried out, in the case of being attacked or 
threatened by attack, with offensive means on the operational battlefield. 
Offensive operations made it all possible: to carry the battle to enemy soil, to 
get the initiative and to get local superiority to defeat the enemy by measures 
that didn't attack his strength. The main aims behind these principles were to 
compensate for their own inferiority, of which the most dangerous were the 
imbalance between manpower and the sustainability of a war economy in a 
prolonged war. Besides, in the offensive it was possible to achieve a decisive 
victory, which would have shortened the war for its part. The chosen principles 
also coincide with the principles of manoeuvre warfare, especially with 
dislocation and disruption. 41  
240 Levite, Ariel: Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine, IDF Journal 20/1990, p. 11 
and van Creveld (1998), p. 98 and 124. 
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 Ben-Horin & Posen, p. 29 — 33, Levite, p. 11, Leonhard, p. 79 — 80, Tal, p. 24 — 25 and 
interviews of Colonel, Doctor Shai Shaul, Major General Avraham Adan and Lieutenant 
General Dan Shomron. 
Scott Sagan's statement quoted by Levite origins to International Security, 1986. 
According to Shaul, the lack of operational depth was the most important thing behind the 
Israeli offensive orientation. Adan supports this. Territorial vulnerability forced the Israelis to 
favour transferring battles to enemy soil. 
Shomron also stresses the aim of avoiding a long war of attrition in the tendency towards 
offence. Adan also agrees with this and links it to the term "decisive victory" as well. 
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Pre-emption is understood in Israel, as Yigal Alton says, as a pre-emptive 
counter-offensive or anticipatory counter-attack, though more offensive 
definitions have also been available, as can be seen in Israel Tal's text, which 
defines pre-emption as the principle of delivering the first blow. According to 
Zeev Schiff, it was, however, Yigal Alton who developed the theory of pre-
emptive attack, and justified it politically and morally. In general, the main 
purpose for pre-emption is to defeat or neutralise the enemy before the fight 
has begun. In Israel the aim has been to compensate for the disadvantageous 
force ratio. This also has a close link to the offence, because the secondary 
aims of pre-emption are to carry the battle to the enemy's territory and to seize 
the initiative. However, it has been difficult to define and separate pre-emption 
and preventive strikes from each other in the past. According to Ben-Horin and 
Posen, pre-emption is a reaction to imminent threat while prevention happens 
when signs of hostilities are revealed. Yigal Alton calls both pre-emption and 
prevention by the name anticipatory counter-attack and defines them as Israeli 
operational initiatives taken against concentrations of enemy forces. 
Furthermore he links this definition to the concept of casus belli. This means 
that casus belli has been applied at a time when the enemy has been 
mustering his forces for an attack but before than he has had time to actually 
start his offensive. In the leaflet Peace but not suicide published by Israel's 
London Embassy in 1955 there is, however, no word on the policy of pre-
emption and on the principle of transferring battles to enemy soil. This is a sign 
that Israel had obviously not yet fully adopted these principles in the early 
1950s. In addition, the principle of pre-emption has not been a matter of 
course in Israel, rather it has been the end of deliberate considerations. In 
every 	 case, the fear of foreign reaction also had been to be taken into 
account.22  
Speed has been essential especially because of the threat of superpower 
intervention, which could prevent the Israelis from reaching their war 
242 Schiff, Zeev: October Earthquake. Yom Kippur 1973, University Publishing Projects Ltd., 
Tel Aviv 1974, p. 41, Ben-Horin & Posen, p. 34 — 37 and Peace but not suicide, Embassy of 
Israel, p. 15. See also Alton (1970), p. 73 — 75 and Wallach (1970), p. 129 — 130. 
Alton does not separate the words anticipatory and counter-attack, to him the distinction was 
a purely verbal one. Israel's strategy was defensive and therefore the anticipatory counter-
attack was defensive action at the strategic level. Prevention was also offensive at the 
strategic level and therefore wasn't included in the Israeli vocabulary. The aim of an 
anticipatory counter-attack was first and foremost to achieve air superiority to react to the 
imminent threat and via this to prevent further aggression. However, Alton agrees that it is 
difficult to distinguish the pure mustering of force without the aim to attack from, on the other 
hand, an imminent threat. 
Wallach follows the same lines as Alton. Basically Israel's strategy was defensive, but in the 
cases of the 1956 Suez Crisis and the Six Day War, the policy was changed because of the 
threat and pre-emption became the first priority. 
According to Ben-Horin and Posen, Israel's action in the 1956 Suez crisis was a typical 
preventive offensive, reaction to the rise of a threat, while in 1967 the Israelis reacted to the 
imminent threat with pre-emption. 
In the article Peace but not suicide there is a phrase "We have never initiated war against 
any one and we never will. We do not covet a single inch of foreign soil as we will not permit 
anyone to deprive us of a single inch of our territory." Aside from the fact that this illustrates 
an unfinished doctrine, it also reveals the early tendency towards the concept of the denial 
approach, with the use of force as necessary. 
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objectives. The second reason for rapid operations has been the intention of 
avoiding long-term exhausting battle that would be unfavourable for Israel, 
which has always been inferior in manpower and war potential. Besides, 
dependence on reservists determined the doctrine; wars had to be finished 
quickly to avoid or at least minimise the economic paralysis caused by total 
mobilisation. This short war concept was, according to Adan, one of the main 
reasons for the future infrastructure of the IDF; the need to end wars quickly 
modified the IDF's force structure to emphasise mobile means like the use of 
armour and an air force.243 In addition, this last point also became, after the 
1956 War, a means for the Israelis to increase the qualitative gap between the 
IDF and the Arab armies. The aim was to use technological, tactical and 
operational — including leadership skills — superiority to compensate for the 
lack of manpower and operational depth. 
The idea of the indirect approach can be seen in the background of the 
Israeli art of war both at the mental and at the practical level. According to 
Ben-Horin and Posen and Wallach, the thoughts of Liddell Hart were rooted in 
the Israeli art of war by Yigal Yadin and Haim Laskov, from whom Liddell 
Hart's ideas have spread into the officer training programs of the IDF by way of 
other senior officers. Wallach, who is a contemporary of Yadin and Laskov, 
said in an interview in May 2000 that for the Israelis Liddell Hart's thoughts 
were a model of flexible thinking. Although the Israelis well understood that the 
concept of the indirect approach was not a new invention, Liddell Hart's way of 
analysing modern mechanised warfare in the framework of past operational 
lessons fascinated the Israelis. According to Adan, indirect approach itself was 
the art of war; for the Israelis it has meant since the War of Independence the 
ability to find and take advantage of the possibilities on the battlefield. Even in 
the 1980s, articles detailing Israel's application of the indirect approach have 
been quite common in military journals in Israel and elsewhere. The indirect 
approach was well-suited to Israeli innovative military thinking. The mental 
aspect can be seen at the strategic or political-military levels; how to wage a 
war to achieve a decisive victory without wasting one's own forces 
unnecessarily. In the operational and tactical fields, the indirect approach has 
been quite practical; to use the least expected and least defended lines with 
deep pincer-movements, according to the concept of the "expanding 
torrent".244 
Exploitation of macro-competence can, according to Ben-Horin and Posen, 
be defined as the ability of an Israeli soldier to act independently, including in 
an operational framework. The Israelis have emphasised qualitative factors to 
compensate for their inferiority in hardware in their planning and doctrine, and 
they have favoured maintenance of the initiative, pre-emption, motivation and 
fighting spirit. This all can be seen as a consequence of the experiences of the 
243 Ben-Horin & Posen, p. 37 — 39, Handel, p. 545 and interview of Major General Avraham 
Adan. 
244 Bond, p. 238, Ben-Horin & Posen, p. 39 — 42, Handel, p. 545, interviews of Colonel (ret.), 
Professor Yehuda Wallach and Major General Avraham Adan and Wallach, The first 
anniversary of Liddell Hart's death, p. 5 — 6. 
Wallach's article The first anniversary of Liddell Hart's death, which was sent to Lady Liddell 
Hart in spring 1971, was obviously published in Armoured Corps Quarterly in spring 1971. 
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Haganah and PALMACH, in other words the use of learned and already tested 
tactical and operational skills.245 
The value of co-operation between branches has been known in Israel since 
the War of Independence. The emphasis on carrying battles quickly onto 
enemy territory was the central principle in the construction of combat 
formations. However, the economic framework put restrictions on the 
appropriate balance of arms and branches. This led the Israelis to give priority 
to armoured formations and their air force at the expense of other branches 
despite different opinions in the General Staff. Tanks and combat aircraft best 
represented the principles of the operational doctrine, the most important of 
them being pre-emption, offence and speed. In the 1960s, the Israelis adopted 
a lightning war or Blitzkrieg-type fighting doctrine, where tanks and air power 
bore the brunt of the assault while other branches were integrated into the 
armoured formations in supportive roles. This was to cause problems in years 
to come, especially when battles were fought in the enemy's depth. Only after 
the Yom Kippur War did the synergistic combat multiplication became partly 
true in the modified Israeli brigades and divisions.246 
Today, the IDF doctrine can be seen; for example, on the Internet home 
pages of the IDF. A comparative analysis of today's doctrine and that 
presented by Ben-Horin and Posen reveals that the central principles have not 
undergone major changes in the past decades. In addition, analysis shows 
that Ben-Horin and Posen have succeeded quite well in outlining the main 
elements of the doctrine. In the present doctrine, the conditioning factors are 
combined together with the political-military elements and are defined as basic 
points. The operational elements of today also are defined in parallel with past 
elements, although their contents have widened. In addition, the Israelis 
emphasise the defensive character of their strategy today as they already did 
in the 1960s, although it is still carried out by offensive tactics, including on the 
operational level. In the 1990s the defensive component consists of a small 
standing army with an early warning capability, a regular air force and navy 
and an efficient mobilisation and transportation system. The offensive part of 
the operational doctrine includes maintenance of the ability to, move over to the 
counter-attack, which is achieved by a co-ordinated multi-arms force that is 
able to transfer the battles rapidly to enemy territory. All this is to be attained 
with the qualitative capabilities of both men and armament. As a conclusion, 
the only visible addition to the previous doctrine is anti-terrorist warfare, which 
is today seen as responding to a substantial threat. On the other hand, it is 
astonishing that counter-insurgency is not mentioned in the new doctrine, 
although elements of revolutionary warfare have formed a certain type of 
threat to the Israelis since the territorial occupations of the Six Day War. 24' The 
current IDF doctrine can be seen in Appendix 7. 
245 Ben-Horin & Posen, p. 42 — 43 and Handel, p. 549. 
246 Ben-Horin & Posen, p. 43 — 45, House, p. 177 and Tal, p. 36. 
247 http://www.icitil/English/Doctrine/doctrine.htm, 13.7.1999. 
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6.4. Organisational and operational changes 
Organisational development was started simultaneously with doctrinal 
development. Prevailing General Staff thinking in the early 1950s was that the 
spearhead had to be infantry; however, there was a clear preference for 
paratroops. Armour was first kept as a support echelon for infantry.248 In a way 
this was quite natural. Many Israeli commanders and staff officers were British-
trained, and the British did not have significant traditions in the use of 
independent armoured formations. Germany was defeated in WW II despite 
her capabilities in armoured warfare, and as usual, the tactics of victorious 
states prevailed. This was also the case in Israel for a while. Tanks were not 
seen as having a central place on the battlefield although Russian armoured 
formations did well against the Germans on the Eastern Front. In addition, the 
Israelis themselves did not have very good experiences with their use of tanks 
during their War of Independence, although the problems were mainly caused 
by poor equipment, not by the lack of tactical skills. On the whole, however, 
Gelber tends to see the British influence as the major factor behind the 
development of the IDF up to the Six Day War (inclusive), after which came 
the U.S. influence.249 It should, nevertheless, be remembered that since the 
1950s the German practises of WW II have been behind the British military art 
in many ways. 
The first task of the planning group was to design a new combat formation 
for ground forces. Two models were considered. The first was whether the 
Israelis should have divisions divided into brigades, or only brigades, letting 
the already established territorial commands play — in addition to their territorial 
responsibility — both the corps and divisional roles. The second model included 
both independent brigades and a number of divisions. The result was the self-
contained infantry brigade that became the primary force of the IDF. Gideon 
Avidor has defined the primary force as "that formation level that was capable 
of carrying out the majority of tasks on the battlefield independently and for a 
defined period of time, usually a few day." According to Luttwak and Horowitz, 
there were two major reasons for this decision. First, brigade headquarters had 
become the focus of tactical planning during the War of Independence, 
although service and support units were only assigned to brigades temporarily. 
The second reason came from doctrinal needs; the basic tactical formation 
had to be capable of swift offensive in depth. In this context it should, however, 
be mentioned, that the Establishment Team report criticised the task that was 
given to the team as being partly unclear, especially on the question of how to 
organise the command structure above the brigade level. This issue was to 
cause the Israelis operational problems in the coming years.25° 
 
248 Williams (1989), p. 178. 
249 Interview of Professor, Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Yoav Gelber. 
250 Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 89 — 90, IDFArc., file 381/900/1950 and Avidor, Gideon: From 
Brigade to Division, Military Review, October 1978, p. 65 — 66 and 68 — 69. 
Gideon Avidor was a Colonel in the IDF in 1978. 
See also Love, Kenneth: Suez. The Twice Fought War, Lowe & Brydone Ltd, London 1969, 
p. 492 and Dupuy (1992), p. 147. 
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Inside the brigades, a triangular structure was chosen, which was more or 
less standard internationally. Each brigade was organised into three rifle 
battalions, a jeep-mounted scout company, headquarters and support units. In 
addition, every brigade also had additional combat elements; a heavy mortar 
battalion and sometimes field artillery and anti-tank gun units, but not in a fixed 
form. The brigades were not totally self-contained for sustained combat in the 
enemy rear because of the small size of their additional units — especially 
artillery. However, this was not decisive in either the 1956 War or the Six Day 
War because of the character of the battles. After the initial clashes, the need 
for artillery in mobile movements against the enemy's dispersed efforts in 
depth was slight. With the occasional additional units, newly created brigades 
were capable of either operating independently or joining in larger 
formations.251  
The minimal role of artillery was caused by several reasons. Although the 
Artillery Corps had been established during the War of Independence, there 
was no tradition of the use of artillery in the Haganah. Therefore, artillery 
officers faced problems when trying to make necessary changes. In the early 
1950s, inter-branch exercises showed that armoured and paratroop echelons 
were full of impatient and fast moving men. They did not need artillery in the 
mobile infantry tactics — surprise and night attacks — favoured by the General 
Staff or later in the lightning war doctrine, and were unwilling to understand 
that moving artillery and preparing to fire was a time-consuming process. 
Finally, there was the quantity and quality of the guns; they were 
miscellaneous, towed and few, only some 150 pieces. Therefore, after the 
breakthrough battles artillery was left behind because the guns were 
unsuitable for mobile operations especially in pathless terrain. In addition, a 
large number of artillery weapons in the brigades were replaced by mortars, 
but because they were mainly heavy, they were also tied to the roads. At the 
battalion level, there were no artillery or mortars and therefore immediate fire 
support was impossible.252 
According to Kenneth Love, there were 30 to 35 brigades organised before the 1956 War, 
each with a permanent staff as well as a permanent supply clerk for each battalion. 
According to Dupuy, 18 of them were mobile in 1956. 
251  IDFArc., file 65/346/1957, Rothenberg, p. 86, Dayan, Moshe: Diary of the Sinai 
Campaign, Cox & Wyman Ltd., London 1966, p. 220 — 221 and Yuval Ne'eman's letter 
Office of the Military, Naval & Air Attaché 90-4/667 to Liddell Hart, 1st March, 1960, LH2/18, 
p. 2 — 3. 
Compositions of the brigades varied, though the main type was a triangular structure. 
Besides, additional units attached to brigades were different because of the tasks allotted to 
them, but the lack of armament and equipment was also one central reason. 
The self-contained brigade was not unique. For example, the Finns used brigade formations 
during WW II (the Winter War and the Continuation War in Finland) in areas where flexibility 
was needed. 
252 Dupuy (1992), p. 212, le Mire, p. 108, Gawrych, George W: Key to Sinai: The Battles for 
Abu Agheila in the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars, Research Survey No. 7, Combat 
Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1990, p. 24 and Fall, Bernard, B: The Two 
Sides of the Sinai Campaign, Military Review 4/July 1957, p. 11. 
According to le Mire, only one battery attached to 27th Mechanised Brigade was self-
propelled (105 mm). The organisations of auxiliary units in other brigades also varied. For 
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According to Williams, the Artillery Corps' combat doctrine was originally 
based on British and French principles, but they gradually gave away to an 
Israeli approach. Emphasis was placed on self-propulsion and updated 
techniques that would enable the artillery to provide constant, accurate and 
rapid support for armoured and infantry formations. This aim was not achieved 
before the 1956 War. The artillery was mainly used within the frameworks of 
other units and therefore concentrated fire was not available in the 1956 
War.253  
Antiaircraft and antitank missions were combined together at brigade level 
with a mixed unit of antitank and antiaircraft guns.254 This shows the slight 
importance attached to these branches. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the 
planning group endeavoured to find balanced multi-branches combinations, 
but priorities in arms procurement prevented this. Besides the Air Force was 
seen as being capable of coping with the aerial threat, and in the offence tanks 
and infantry with recoilless guns were seen as being able to block the enemy's 
armoured forces. 
Above the brigade level, the Israelis created a new operational command, 
the Ugdah, while territorial commands maintained their operational and 
administrative tasks in the principal theatre. The Ugdahs were tested for the 
first time in the manoeuvres in the early 1950s. The term Ugdah has generally 
been translated as division — the size of an Ugdah was equivalent to a division 
— but having organisational flexibility, as well as functionally, it was nearer to a 
Corps command. Whereas the division was a large multi-branch formation that 
was a fixed organisation, according to Wallach, the Ugdah represented a 
combat team; an operational super-formation command, to which forces and 
means were allotted in accordance with its mission. The composition of these 
combat groupings varied from two to five brigades, in accordance with the 
particular task allotted to them, and the way the battle developed. Extra 
strength in reconnaissance, armour, infantry, artillery and engineer troops was 
added or subtracted without destroying any organic framework and without 
imposing a stop for re-grouping. This organisational solution was seen as 
providing the IDF organisational flexibility which for its part reflected the 
operational flexibility. Nevertheless, in the 1956 War the Ugdahs were still in 
test-use but their headquarters were made more or less permanent to improve 
the readiness of the IDF during the peace-time.255 
example, the 7th Armoured Brigade had both artillery and mortar battalions while the 37th  
Mechanised Brigade had none. 
253 Williams (1989), p. 237. 
254 Gawrych (1990), p. 24. 
255 Wallach, J. L: Voice of Israel, translation of a broadcast delivered on 15th July 1967, LH 
15/5/304, part 2, p. 3, Liddell Hart, B. H: Strategy of a War, Encounter, February 1968, LH 
15/5/304, part 2, p. 17, Allon (1970), p. 52 and IDFArc., file 65/346/1957. 
See also IDFArc., file 142/25/1954, file 26/130/1958 and interviews of Professor, Colonel 
(ret.) Yehuda Wallach and Colonel, Doctor Shai Shaul. 
The Ugdah was tested at least in August 1952 in a multi-brigade manoeuvre and in May 
1956 in a command and communication exercise where new field manuals were also tested. 
In addition, at the same time the Armoured Corps had its manoeuvres in the Negev. 
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Most brigades were infantry brigades. In the wake of the 1956 Suez Crisis, 
Israel had 18 mobile field force brigades of which three were armoured, one 
paratroop and the rest infantry brigades. The fighting doctrine also rested on 
the use of infantry, albeit, in a mobile manner. According to Shaul, the 
traditional infantry was reserved for special areas like Jerusalem. The 
emphasis on mobile operations and the tendency to transfer the battles to 
enemy territory began, according to Kadish, during Moshe Dayan's tenure as 
Chief of Staff, which started in 1953. However, although Dayan favoured 
mobile operations, he was basically an infantry man to whom a tank was a fire 
support weapon. Therefore mobility and initiative was to be achieved with War 
of Independence-type motorised battalions equipped with jeeps and half-
tracks. According to Luttwak and Horowitz, the tactics were defined as being 
offensive in spirit, planning and organisation, even when the task was 
defensive. Because the borders were so long in relation to the size of the 
forces available to defend them, a linear defence was impractical. Therefore 
the brigades were not to hold their ground passively but, served as a base to 
mount counter-attacks supported by the Air Force and paratroopers. In this 
concept Kadish sees a link between Dayan and Wingate. They both 
emphasised the same things; offensive spirit, mobile defence, the transfer of 
the battles to enemy territory, night fighting etc.256 Nevertheless, most brigades 
had no battlefield mobility because they were dependent on civilian cars, but 
this was not so important because of the small size of the area of operations. 
6.5. The birth of the Armoured Corps 
Infantry brigades did not provide a solution to the doctrinal aims of speed and 
surprise. This was obviously not completely understood in the General Staff, 
as Michael I. Handel puts it: "During the 1950s Israel's military doctrine lacked 
the synchronisation, for the infantry oriented IDF did not appreciate the 
potential of armoured warfare." According to Yuval Ne'eman, battalion and 
company assaults, and sometimes even brigade offensives, were generally 
based on deep penetration tactics and attacks from the flanks and rear. 
Smaller units, of a platoon or less, were often sent deep behind the enemy 
position with the aim of starting the attack inside the enemy's deployments. In 
this way, the general infantry doctrine looked like commando tactics. 
Theoretically this all coincided completely with Liddell Hart's ideas on 
manoeuvre with small units, although the Israelis mostly did not have the 
ability to concentrate forces quickly because of a lack of mobility. In addition, 
the failures of the tank battalions in the War of Independence were still fresh in 
In an interview, Wallach compared Ugdahs to Lego-bricks that could be put together as 
desired. 
According to Colonel Shaul, Ugdahs were also used in the 1956 War in the sense that they 
were tested. 
256 Dupuy (1992), p. 147, Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 91 and interviews of Colonel, Doctor Shai 
Shaul and Professor Alon Kadish. 
The planning group also presented a defensive doctrine, which was obviously linked to the 
settlement defence, as earlier discussed. However, this solution was never, according to 
Luttwak and Horowitz, put to the test. 
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many minds. Therefore, the General Staff favoured the idea of creating mobile 
infantry forces more than tank units. Nevertheless, not all staff officers and 
commanders shared this view. According to Williams, soon after the War of 
Independence the 7th Brigade commander Colonel Yitzhak Pundak — originally 
an infantry man but after WW ll a graduate of the French Army's Armour 
School — argued to his superiors, that "the tank was an offensive weapon of 
war, not a rusty piece of metal on hand for holding actions." For him offence 
was the key to military victory and the tank, even in small numbers and with 
limited crews, was an all-powerful tool of war.257 
Under the command of Colonel Pundak, tanks started to operate at a 
battalion level with combined combat teams of tank and mechanised infantry 
battalions. At the very beginning, tank warfare manuals were, according to 
Williams, purchased from open sources and staff war colleges in the United 
States, Great Britain and France. Senior armour officers in the IDF were forced 
to study them, write full-length Hebrew-language evaluations and then 
distribute them among the troops. There is no evidence of Russian influence or 
the use of Russian manuals at this time.258 
Another supporter of the tank — and a very important factor in future IDF 
armour doctrine — was Colonel Laskov, who was known to have been in 
agreement with Liddell Hart's theories. Liddell Hart's influence on Israeli 
armoured doctrine will be discussed more in chapter 8, which is concerned 
with the era from the late 1950s to the early 1960s, when the IDF armoured 
doctrine was really created. Laskov also maintained that the tank was an 
offensive tool, which solved all its tactical problems by attacking in columns 
with independent missions. In Laskov's concept, armoured formations were 
spearheads of the ground forces acting to penetrate deep into the enemy's 
rear without trying to secure their flanks or supply lines by scattering their 
forces to hold ground. Exhausting frontal attacks, as well as tank-to-tank 
battles were to be avoided, while the anti-tank mission was given to the anti-
tank artillery. Adan confirms this. According to him, before the 1956 War the 
main aim of the armoured forces was to find gaps in the enemy's lines and 
strike against his vulnerable targets like command posts and artillery. Only 
during the 1960s, when the IDF finally deployed its first well-equipped tank 
units and enough strength to concentrate tanks, did the enemy's armour 
257 Williams (1989), p. 44 — 45 and 179, Ne'eman, Yuval: This War of Our Resolution, p. 16 
and The Story of the Defence Forces. Focus on the Guardians of Israel, p. 5 and Handel, p. 
550. 
There is no strict evidence of the influence of French armour doctrine on the Israeli art of 
war. However, the similarities of the armoured doctrine created by Liddell Hart, Guderian, de 
Gaulle and Miksche to Pundak's applications are striking. 
See also Michael Ben-Gal's letter to Liddell Hart 5th January, 1955, LH 2/5/64/6 and Liddell 
Hart's letter to Michael Ben-Gal 31st December, 1954, LH 2/5/64/5. 
It is likely that Colonel Pundak knew Liddell Hart personally. From 11 January to 7 February 
1955 Colonel Pundak — the Director of Armour — visited British armoured forces (BAOR) and 
Israel's military attaché tried to arrange an appointment for Pundak to meet Liddell Hart. It 
can not be determined from the correspondence whether this summit was held. 
258 Williams (1989), p. 44 — 45 and 179. 
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became the primary target of the tanks, but then also, not in frontal battles if 
avoidable.259 
Speed and surprise were favoured in Laskov's concept at the expense of 
shock effect which reflected the influence of the indirect approach and the 
search for mobility. The planning group drew up a list of the priorities in the 
conduct of armoured warfare. It went as follows: speed, surprise, 
manoeuvrability, concentration of forces and shock effect. The purchase of 
fast, though thinly armoured, French-built AMX-13 tanks before the 1956 War 
coincided with this doctrine; they provided mobility and speed but were not the 
type of tanks that lead an armoured spearhead, they merely represented 
vehicles that could support a lightning strike.26°  
One immediate recommendation of the Establishment Team was the 
creation of an Armoured Corps. This reflects Laskov's influence behind the 
decision but his concepts didn't materialise until the end of 1953. According to 
Wallach, after the War of Independence there were four possible solutions for 
creating an armoured corps. The first proposal was to attach one armoured 
battalion to the organisation of a chosen infantry brigade in each territorial 
command. This concept can be seen as a continuation of the use of 
commando battalions during the War of Independence. The second idea was 
to form a supporting brigade in each territorial command, including one 
armoured battalion and artillery and anti-tank units. The third choice was to 
create a country-wide armoured brigade which would have provided tank 
detachments for the commands according to the need. The fourth proposal 
was to establish independent armoured battalions for each territorial 
command. The Chief of Operations, Brigadier Yigal Yadin's proposal to 
establish one regular reinforced armoured brigade as a country-wide armour 
reserve won, though the idea of a reserve never materialised. The decision 
was justified with the demand that in possible future wars the IDF should have 
at least one armoured brigade in every primary effort and it might not be 
entirely out of the question that they might be compelled to perform two 
primary efforts simultaneously.261 
259 Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 91 - 92, Williams (1989), p. 180, a letter from Haim Laskov to 
Liddell Hart 12th April, 1959, LH 2/13 and interview of Major General Avraham Adan. 
In his letter to Liddell Hart, Laskov lets Liddell Hart know that he has been an advocate of 
Liddell Hart's ideas, which was also well known in the IDF. 
According to Luttwak & Horowitz, the planning group was not wrong in seeing that armour 
could best be used to fight an independent battle (without slow-moving infantry) of deep 
penetration in the enemy rear. If "without slow-moving infantry' can be interpreted as 
meaning without mechanised infantry, the intention went against the ideas of combined-
arms. This trend was to be reinforced in the 1960s. 
260 Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 91 — 92 and Katz (1996), p. 44. 
261  Williams (1989), p. 178 and 185 and Wallach: The development of Israeli Armor Doctrine, 
p. 10 — 12. 
See also IDFArc., file 6/13/1957. 
In summer 1955, the Armoured Corps trained, anyway, to transfer armoured forces from 
one front to another. Nevertheless, these forces were battalion combat teams of the 27th  
and 37th Armoured Brigades, not the whole brigades. The time limit when the transfer was to 
be carried out was 24 to 48 hours. 
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Already at the end of 1949, the organisation and equipment of the reinforced 
armoured brigade were published. However, material problems had a heavy 
impact on the intellectual ones, especially on the formulation of an armour 
fighting doctrine. According to Colonel Wallach, the operative plans of the 
early 1950s considered the principal mission of armour to be the stopping of 
an enemy invasion in the south of the country. The tank advocates estimated 
that since the Arab force build-up in the coming years would be largely based 
on modern tanks, the next full-scale confrontation between Israel and its Arab 
neighbours would be a tank war in the Sinai and Negev.262 This all shows the 
fact that the tank was already seen among the armour officers as the best 
weapon against another tank. Quantitatively inferior to possible enemies, 
armour could not, however, be used defensively in attrition warfare dominated 
by fire exchange or solely in frontal attacks. Therefore, the emphasis on the 
use of armour in the south of the country shows that tanks were best put to 
use in accordance with the newly-created doctrine of the IDF in an area where 
there was space for mobile and deep flanking operations. 
Armoured tactics were developed in exercises that Luttwak and Horowitz 
describe as a time-consuming effort of "trial and error". In these trials, tanks 
drove over, under and through every kind of obstacle to find out what they 
could do. Luttwak and Horowitz stress the Israeli originality in their tactical 
ideas. For lower echelons, this can be seen as having been true. In operational 
issues, the Israelis applied, however, foreign concepts in many ways and the 
IDF manuals in the early 1950s were, according to Gelber and Shai, mostly 
copies of British ones that were, furthermore, based on German WW II-era 
manuals. Nevertheless, according to Gelber, already in the 1956 War the 
Israelis also had improved versions of the foreign manuals and this work was 
continued after the war in the late 1950s and in the 1960s.263 
In 1950 the IDF's tactical tank doctrine was presented for the first time in a 
Senior Officers' Course exercise. This doctrine was a combination of the 
British application of "aimed fire" and the "suppressive moving fire" 
emphasised by the Germans and also by the Soviets later during WW II. 
According to Luttwak and Horowitz, "aimed fire" means that as soon as infantry 
comes into contact with the enemy, it will dismount from its trucks or armoured 
carriers to take up positions from which it can fire accurately. "Suppressive 
fire", for its part, means that accurate small arms fire is of little use on the 
modern battlefield because the enemy can rarely be seen. Therefore, forces 
should be trained to advance without pause, firing on the move whenever 
possible, and while automatic fire from moving vehicles could be too 
inaccurate to do much real damage, it can, however, achieve a breakthrough 
262 Wallach: The development of Israeli Armor Doctrine, p. 12 and IDFArc., file 
381/900/1950. 
263 u  
L ttwak & Horowitz, p. 92 — 94 and 128, interview of Professor, Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) 
Yoav Gelber and discussions with Doctor, Colonel (ret.) Hanan Shai. 
See also IDFArc., file 5/25/1954. 
There were also copied tactical manuals. In June 1952, for example, a manual on long-
range penetration was introduced. It was based on the experiences of foreign armies during 
WW II. Although this was a company-level manual, its principal idea was operational deep 
penetration. 
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by pinning down the defenders so that their fire becomes ineffective. In 
Laskov's concept, fire and movement were one; the maximum number of 
bullets were to be fired at the enemy in the shortest possible time in order to 
destroy him. Therefore speed was also needed.264 What the real difference 
with the German armour doctrine was is difficult to say. However, Laskov 
obviously emphasised accurate suppressive fire — in other words shooting but 
also other individual skills, which in itself can be seen as a reflection of the 
doctrinal aim of macro-competence — skills that could be achieved with 
intensive training and with high-quality armament. These concepts later 
became the basis of all ground forces in the IDF, not only of the Armoured 
Corps. 
Despite the fact that the ability to undertake mobile operations was seen as 
one of the most important subjects in developing the IDF, in the early 1950s 
the tendency to emphasise the role of infantry over that of tanks still 
dominated. Although armoured forces carried out their own war games and 
exercises after 1951, where the tasks of armour varied from frontal attack to 
break-through and pursuit, in larger manoeuvres tanks were dispersed to 
infantry battalions in a fire-support role. This manner of thinking can also be 
seen in the first manuals where the main task of the tanks was to support 
infantry by creating points of penetration for mobile infantry, and to also give 
reconnaissance support. In the armoured forces, this manner of thinking was 
seen as being old-fashioned.265 
As a result of the activity of Israeli tank officers, the role of armour as an 
independent formation was, however, tested in full-scale, two-sided war games 
held in the Negev, first in 1952 and again in 1953. In 1952 the armoured party 
succeeded in outflanking the defending party and disrupted the opponent's 
communications almost without a fight by using unoccupied areas. According 
to Adan, the German influence behind the Israeli concept of deploying tanks 
can already be seen at this time. The deep penetration of armour was 
Lieutenant Colonel Uri Ben-Ari's brainchild. Before and during the 1956 War 
he was commander of the 7th Armoured Brigade and was known for his 
interest in German armoured warfare during WW II. In the first exercise, the 
penetration was a shock to the infantry-based manoeuvre, and the armoured 
party was ruled out of action. In 1953, this was repeated and this time without 
interruption, but there were not yet any remarkable signs of a better 
appreciation of tanks. Nevertheless, in the armoured forces armour's principal 
mission was already formulated already in this phase as deep penetration into 
enemy territory. This also coincides with General Shomron's views of the 
German influence. According to him, the Israelis learned that war is an act 
against an enemy's psyche from the Germans; i.e., deep penetration against 
264 Wallach: The development of Israeli Armor Doctrine, p. 12 — 13, Rothenberg, p. 87 and 
99 and Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 92 — 94 and 128. 
It should also be mentioned that, because of the traditions of Haganah and PALMACH, the 
IDF was already movement-oriented. However, according to Rothenberg there was also 
resistance to the armour doctrine because the rigid discipline, conformity, and technology 
required for armoured warfare ran counter to the socialist-egalitarian ideals of Israeli society. 
265 IDFArc., file 16/1529/1952, file 28/1529/1952 and file 197/488/1955. 
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the enemy's vulnerable rear targets was a key to success.266 This manner of 
thinking can also be linked to Liddell Hart's "Strategy of Indirect Approach" and 
today to the principle of dislocation in manoeuvre warfare theory. 
Despite the disputes over the role of tanks, in mid-December 1953 the Chief 
of the General Staff ordered the formation of the Armoured Corps and the 
abolition of the office of the Chief Armour Officer. In this arrangement the 
already existing armoured brigade headquarters were disbanded and their 
functions were entrusted to the new command. This also revealed different 
opinions in the ranks of the tank officers. The French-trained tank officers 
represented ideas about two wartime brigade combat team headquarters, 
which in peacetime would conduct and control battalion combat teams' 
exercises. These battalion combat teams would be directly under the 
command of the Armoured Corps and would only be transferred to the 
command of brigade combat teams for operations. The other school favoured 
the massing of tanks, organic armoured brigades of fixed composition, headed 
by a regular headquarters. The final solution was a compromise. The mission 
of the Armoured Corps Command was defined as being dual-purpose; first an 
inspectorate responsible for the training, doctrines and technical matters of 
armoured units, and second a wartime headquarters for armoured reserve 
brigades. According to Shai, this solution had similarities to the German 
system in the 1930s, when the amount of armour was still small.267 In addition, 
the establishment of the Armoured Corps as one of the four functional 
commands — although it did not show any concrete distinguishable role for 
armour in comparison to the other branches at the time — was a sign of what 
was to come; the growing role of the armoured forces. One should remember 
that none of the other branches in the mid-1950s had any special role in the 
force structure of the IDF at the time. The branches were in the second tier 
under the Commands in the General Staff. 
Up until the 1956 Suez Crisis, there was no common agreement on how 
tanks should be used in battle. According to Luttwak and Horowitz, there were 
three major opinions. The first was the mobile infantry school dominated by the 
General Staff and supported by Chiefs of Staff Yigal Yadin and later also 
Moshe Dayan. They both were influenced by the experience of motorised units 
in the War of Independence. In this concept, tanks were to support the 
advance of the motorised and mechanised infantry. The second was the 
manoeuvre school to whom tanks, used in battalion combat teams in 
independent striking missions, represented a cavalry-style exploitation force to 
be used for indirect approach behind the enemy front after an infantry 
breakthrough. The third school — emphasised by most tank officers including 
266 Wallach: The development of Israeli Armor Doctrine, p. 12 — 14, Rothenberg, p. 100 -
102, Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 130, interview of Major General Avraham Adan and IDFArc., file 
18/1529/1952, file 31/79/1954 and file 77/433/1956. 
Ben-Ari was generally known in Israel as "Israel's Rommel". 
Also interview of Professor Alon Kadish. 
According to Kadish, people like Guderian, Manstein and Rommel were behind Ben-Ari's 
concepts. 
267 Wallach: The development of Israeli Armor Doctrine, p. 16 — 17, Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 
128, discussions with Doctor, Colonel (ret.) Hanan Shai and IDFArc., file 77/433/1956. 
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Laskov — favoured the German-style fighting doctrine based on armoured 
spearheads. According to Laskov, tanks were not used effectively enough in 
combined operations with infantry. Therefore, armoured brigades had to be 
composed of self-sufficient combat teams of tanks, mechanised infantry and 
additional units to fan out in deep narrow thrusts and cut the enemy into 
isolated pockets and finally destroy him. In addition, for the armoured school, 
tanks already represented at this time weapons against other tanks, leading to 
a decision in battle. However grinding tank-to-tank battles were to be avoided 
so that the advance of the armoured spearheads would not be slowed. In 
addition according to Wallach, in the early 1950s there was also a defensive 
doctrine for armour; in the defence tanks were supposed to render assistance 
in local counter attacks, exploit these counter-attacks for the destruction of the 
adversary's deployment and protect exposed flanks. However, this doctrine 
was soon abandoned.268 
Doctrinal disputes also influenced organisational matters. At first, when the 
role of armour was seen as supporting infantry, armoured detachments were -
excluding some mechanised and signal units — relieved of additional forces. 
Nevertheless, the manoeuvres of armoured forces revealed the need for 
infantry support and in addition armoured engineer units and self-propelled 
artillery were also mentioned because tanks alone without mechanised units 
were seen as being too vulnerable to enemy's counter-action. At this time, 
after the creation of the Armoured Corps, there were also discussions on the 
use of mechanised infantry, whether it was to be used alongside the tanks in 
combined combat teams that were bigger than battalions but smaller than 
brigades or in independent tasks. As a derivative of these discussions, 
additional units of mechanised infantry, artillery — some of them even self-
propelled — and engineer troops were attached to mechanised and armoured 
brigades before the 1956 War and armoured forces were also obliged to learn 
and train to co-operate with the other arms.269 
Before the 1956 War, the organisations of the armoured and mechanised 
brigades — which logically were the same thing because they both consisted of 
268 Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 131 — 132, Wallach: The development of Israeli Armor Doctrine, p. 
15 — 16 and IDFArc., file 937/1034/1965. 
Occasionally the disputes were so heated that armoured officers didn't even appear for the 
negotiations that were arranged to think about the roles of infantry and armoured forces and 
their co-operation. 
See also IDFArc., file 3/59/1958. 
Mobile defence for tanks was revitalised during the Yom Kippur War. This principle was 
adopted because of the needs of the situation — to compensate for the initial inferiority in 
strength — and was therefore not a reflection of the defensive principles of the tanks of 
1950s. In March 1955 as well, the Operations Branch of the IDF General Staff outlined 
defensive plans for all Israeli fronts. These plans — which did not take form — also included 
an element of mobile anti-tank defence that stressed the importance of surprise and 
initiative. It might be an exaggeration to see ties between these two facts, especially since 
tanks were not usually included in the antitank defence. It can, however, be said that the 
idea of operationally using tanks defensively, though tactically offensively, has not been 
totally unknown to the Israelis. 
269 Wallach: The development of Israeli Armor Doctrine, p. 12 — 14, Rothenberg, p. 100 -
102, Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 130, IDFArc., file 77/433/1956, file 43/160/1959, file 
266/746/1959 and file 125/516/1970. 
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almost an equal number of tanks — varied, however, greatly. Nevertheless, with 
the organisational changes these three existing brigades reached a rather 
balanced combination of different arms, though it is obvious that the 
development was also a consequence of the number of different weapons and 
vehicles and the lack of tanks and not only a consequence of the calculated 
thought to build combined arms brigades. This can be seen in the 
organisations of the brigades. These organisational changes made the 
armoured formations capable — at least in theory — of independent operational 
missions. In this context, the tasks of mechanised infantry were defined as 
follows in 1954: reconnaissance, protection of flanks, deception and also 
limited raids.27°  
On the eve of the 1956 Sinai Campaign, there was a reshuffle in the 
Armoured Corps Command staff. In a conference held on 1 September -
known as Sabbath and later Great Sabbath — Prime and Defence Minister 
David Ben-Gurion met his commanders. The conference was especially 
devoted to the doctrine of armour deployment. There were two different 
opinions. Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan favoured the idea of mixed combat 
teams of infantry, armour and artillery, where infantry had the key position. To 
Dayan tanks were heavy, cumbersome and vulnerable weapons, having only a 
secondary role in support of mechanised or motorised infantry after the initial 
breakthrough through the enemy's lines. The main burden was laid on infantry 
and on light mobile elements, which would speed forwards on half-tracks. Tank 
officers under the command of Haim Laskov, for their part, regarded armour as 
a decisive weapon in ground combat, and therefore tank units should not be 
split up in support missions for infantry formations but be used in concentrated 
effort with the classic principles of armoured warfare. The pace of actions 
should be the pace of the armour advance, not of infantry marching, since 
every compromise in the speed of the action would allow the enemy to recover 
270 Dayan (1966), 220 — 221, Gawrych (1990), p. 24 — 25 and Farris, p. 29 
Before the 1956 War, the armoured and mechanised brigades were constructed in non-fixed 
form. The 7th Armoured Brigade consisted of two tank battalions, one mechanised infantry 
battalion, one motorised infantry battalion and additional units of artillery and mortar 
battalions and a reconnaissance company. The 27th Mechanised Brigade consisted of four 
tank companies, one mechanised battalion, one motorised battalion, and additional units 
including a self-propelled artillery unit. The 37th Mechanised Brigade consisted of one tank 
battalion, one separate tank company, one mechanised battalion, one motorised battalion 
and additional units. 
See also IDFArc., file 8/804/1984. 
Before the 1956 War — and also during the war itself — the 27th Mechanised Brigade, for 
example, was organised in combat teams consisting of one company of tanks, one company 
of armoured infantry, one self-propelled battery, a reconnaissance unit and a squadron of 
engineers. Although this organisation shows a rather balanced combination of different 
arms, with that number of tanks it would not have been even possible to create armoured 
spearheads. 
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and would postpone the moment of the final decision. At this phase the idea of 
an armoured division was also brought up, but this did not materialise.271  
After the negotiations, Ben-Gurion reached a conclusion in the spirit of 
Laskov and added that the Israelis would favour the two British military 
theorists — Liddell Hart and Fuller in armour fighting methods. This shows that 
both Liddell Hart and Fuller were familiar to Israeli officers, and also to several 
politicians at the time. Though the range of the adoption of Liddell Hart's and 
Fuller's thoughts is not known, historical evidence shows the links between 
Ben-Gurion's conclusion and these British military theorists. A Hebrew version 
of Liddell Hart's Strategy: The Indirect Approach already existed in 1956 
before the Sinai Campaign. In addition, Liddell Hart had sent a copy of Fuller's 
book Lectures on F.S.R. III with his (Liddell Hart's) notes to Lieutenant Colonel 
G. Rivlin, who in the early 1950s was sub-editor of the Israeli newspaper 
Ma'arachot. It is not known how much this had been used as a "manuscript" in 
the training of tank officers. Nevertheless, after Ben-Gurion's decision the 
Israelis returned without compromises to the pattern of organic brigades with 
permanent sub-units. In the doctrine, it was decided to deploy armour 
effectively and with maximum mobility in the largest possible concentrations., 
The principal mission was defined as the destruction of enemy forces, not the 
seizing of territory.272 
The concept of massed tanks fit with the Israeli doctrine. In the ranks of tank 
officers, armour was already seen as a means to paralyse enemy forces with 
swift penetrations in depth against vulnerable targets. This also included 
seizing geographical objectives — for instance vital road junctions — although 
this aim was not in itself a decisive one to tank formations, nor in the doctrine 
of the IDF. The principal aim of this action was to get space for continuous 
operations to destroy or paralyse enemy forces. Therefore — and for the first 
271  Oren, Mordechai: An interview of David Ben-Gurion, Al Hamishmar 8 April 1969, LH 
15/5/304, part 2, Wallach: The development of Israeli Armor Doctrine, p. 17 — 18 and 
I DFArc. , file 937/1034/1965 and 35/727/1957. 
See also Liddell Hart's letter to Laskov 2 May 1969, LH 2/13 and Laskov's letter to Liddell 
Hart 11 May 1969, LH 2/13. 
Mordechai Oren sent the article about Ben-Gurion's interview to Liddell Hart, who after that 
became interested in how Laskov had used his theories and therefore wrote a letter to 
Laskov to ask about it. Laskov answered, although he didn't reveal anything detailed. 
Laskov only stated that the Israelis learned a lot about Liddell Hart's thoughts and applied 
them in their own conditions. 
272 Liddell Hart's letter to Michael Ben-Gal 17 March 1955, LH 2/5/64/12 and Ben-Gal's letter 
to Liddell Hart 7 June 1956, LH 2/5/64/18. 
The sub-editor of Ma'arachot, Lieutenant Colonel G. Rivlin, visited Liddell Hart in the early 
1950s and had seen Liddell Hart's personal archive. One of the files — Fuller's book Lectures 
on F.S.R. III with Liddell Hart's notes — was of extra value to Colonel Rivlin. Later Liddell 
Hart sent a copy of this to Rivlin, not to be published but for his own use. Colonel Ben-Gal 
sent Liddell Hart, attached to his letter (7 June 1956), the Hebrew translation of Strategy: 
The Indirect Approach made by Lieutenant Colonel Elhanan Oren. The covering letter 
stated: "May I add that I am delighted to see this important work of yours in Hebrew". 
See also IDFArc., 3/59/1958. 
In March 1956 the General Staff gave orders on how to break open enemy fortifications. The 
main principle was to seek gaps in enemy lines while pushing through with force was 
secondary. This principle is similar to Liddell Hart's concept of "expanding torrent". 
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time in the IDF — tanks with both fire-power and ability to move under fire were 
regarded as a tool to destroy an adversary's forces, including reserves and 
armoured formations. This corresponded to the aim for decisive victory. 
However, because of a lack of quantity, armour was not to be used in 
exhausting frontal attacks against enemy masses, but according to the 
principles of manoeuvre warfare; with the concept of the indirect approach by 
keeping pace and concentrating forces against the enemy's weaknesses. 
The result of the disputes concerning the role of armour was that Dayan -
who favoured the idea of swift penetrations into the enemy's rear but didn't 
trust the technically unreliable tanks — and the General Staff opted for a blend 
of the mobile infantry and manoeuvre school thoughts. This was the main 
concept before the Suez Crisis. However inside the Armoured Corps, the 
opinion that armour was capable of spearheading an assault in an 
independent role was already adopted, and this was to have a decisive role in 
the coming war in the Sinai. This is also revealed in the tasks set for the 
mechanised infantry; they were to follow tanks where infantry was needed but 
the main concept was to use mechanised units to get a bridgehead for the 
break-through and then secure the gap for the penetration of the tanks.273 This 
manner of thinking can be thought of as having been the seed that led, after 
the 1956 War, to the operational concept called the "Conveyor-belt" principle. 
This question is discussed in greater detail in chapter 8. 
6.6. Paratroopers — special force/elite force 
Parachute or airborne forces are today seen as one of the main elements of 
manoeuvre warfare, and as a fixed part of the deep battle concept. The Israelis 
are not an exception to this. However, the paratroopers have had more roles in 
Israel than similar troops in other countries. Paratroopers have not only been 
used in airborne operations — as a matter of fact these tasks have been the 
minority — but also in special missions like anti-guerrilla operations and to 
compensate for the lack of infantry. 
When Israel purchased its WW II surplus Sherman tanks in the early 1950s, 
they were neither new nor in a good state of repair. This, together with 
disputes about the fighting doctrine was a reason for the General Staff not to 
hurry to accept the Establishment Team's concept of armour. Lack of trust in 
tanks reinforced the General Staff's belief that the paratroopers must be the 
spearhead of the army, not the tanks.274 
On the modern battlefield, parachute landings are a means to swiftly engage 
one's own forces, to prevent the freedom of action of enemy forces and in this 
way to get the initiative, prevent the use of the enemy's weapon systems and 
in general protect the movement of one's own forces. This idea, which 
reflected the inclination towards the indirect approach that in today's terms can 
be interpreted as the principle of dislocation in manoeuvre warfare, coincided 
with the fresh Israeli doctrine. The emphasis on developing parachute troops 
273 IDFArc., file 36/566/1955. 
274 Williams (1989), p. 179. 
113 
was also quite natural from the viewpoint of the heritage of the PALMACH, 
which had emphasised unconventional warfare more than conventional 
warfare. According to Kadish therefore, the initial creation of the paratroop 
force was, however, more out of romance than the result of a deliberate 
consideration that was based on a need for these kinds of troops in 
conventional warfare, although such plans existed. In addition, during the early 
1950s' atmosphere of guerrilla infiltration the paratroopers were mostly used in 
counter-guerrilla tasks. Once the coming of the 1956 War became evident, the 
belief in having paratroop spearheads was to already surface in the initial 
planning of the 1956 Sinai Campaign. There were too few paratroopers to 
have a decisive role in the conventional warfare despite the fact that they had 
much more battlefield experience than the other IDF troops at that time.27° 
The first paratroop battalion was already established in 1948 from expert 
parachutists who were trained by the British during WW II, and from Haganah 
men who had received their jump training in Czechoslovakia. The training was 
implemented with principles adopted from the British. The main emphasis after 
the jump course was put on discipline and drilling without major battlefield 
exercises. Therefore, the training level of the paratroopers remained low and 
their equipment was poor, which also was, nevertheless, the case in the entire 
IDF at the time.276 
The development of the parachute troops was originally a consequence of 
Palestinian guerrilla infiltration and of the counter-means adopted to respond 
to this threat. In the early 1950s, the infiltration gradually intensified and 
became more brutal. The retaliation attacks of the IDF were mostly ineffective, 
conscripts at that time were incapable of fighting in this type of warfare. 
According to van Creveld, the Israelis responded to this threat on three levels. 
The first was to establish new settlements on the border to deprive the 
infiltrators of freedom of movement. However, the net of settlements was too 
sparse to prevent infiltration. The second measure was the establishment of 
the lightly armed 5,000 man Border Police or Frontier Guard (Mishmar 
Hagvul), which, having too many tasks, was ineffective.277 
Finally, the IDF began in 1949 to mount raids across the border into Jordan 
and the Sinai desert to seek revenge for past incidents and to deter future 
ones. Two separate units were established, a scout force, Unit 300, from 
volunteers to operate against Bedouin gangs, and an S.N.S.-type 
reconnaissance force, Unit 30, formed from conscripts for long-range patrols. 
Both of these units were rather short-lived experiments of the Southern 
275 Holcomb, James F. - Turbiville, Graham H: Soviet Desant Forces. Part 2: Broadening the 
Desant Concept. International Defense Review, vol. 21 n:o 10/1988b, p. 1262, interview of 
Professor Alon Kadish and Williams (1989), p. 179. 
276 Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 108 — 109 and 111 — 112 and Brown, Ashley: Israeli Paras, Orbis 
Publishing, London 1986, p. 14. 
Because of the many accidents in training caused by weak equipment, even the continued 
existence of the paratroopers was reconsidered according to Brown. 
277 Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 105 — 106, van Creveld (1998), p. 129 — 130 and Sharon, Ariel 
with Chanoff, David: The Warrior. The Autobiography of Ariel Sharon, Macdonald & Co 
Publishers Ltd, London 1989, p. 80. 
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Command. However, they left a seed, which later begun to develop and form a 
basis for territorial reconnaissance units.278 
In August 1953, the Israelis adopted more active means to cope with the 
infiltration, which had become more brutal. With references to Colonel Michael 
Shacham, commander of the Jerusalem Brigade, Chief of Staff General 
Makleff established a special unit called Unit 101 under the command of Major 
Ariel Sharon (later Major General and Minister in the Israeli government). Unit 
101 consisted of some 40 picked veterans of the War of Independence. This 
unit — in many ways also quite similar to Wingate's S.N.S. — was also in 
existence for only a short time. In any case, it was more important than the 
previous units because it formed a basis for the present Israeli paratroopers. In 
addition, the means that were used in counter-guerrilla operations were to 
show the direction for Israeli counter-guerrilla activities up to the latter part of 
the 1980s.279 
When Moshe Dayan was promoted to Chief of Staff at the end of 1953, he 
wanted to combine the best qualities of the paratroopers and Unit 101 and 
established the 202nd Paratroop Battalion. The amalgamation begun in 
January 1954, but was not without difficulties. The main problem was to merge 
these two very different groups of men into a cohesive combat unit. While Unit 
101 veterans preferred their own individual fighting style, operating as a loose 
bands of warriors with no distinctions between officers and men, many of the 
paratroopers objected to the loss of professionalism that they tend to see in 
Unit 101. However, mutual confidence was achieved via hard training in the 
first missions. Therefore, the creation of the paratroopers shows a process that 
278 
van Creveld (1998), p. 129 — 130, Katz, Samuel, M: Follow Me! A History of Israel's 
Military Elite, Arms & Armour Press Ltd., London 1989, p. 34 — 35 and 60 — 63. 
Unit 30 was the brainchild of Moshe Dayan, who had a lot of experience in this type of 
action, both in the S.N.S. and in his commando battalion. A small interesting detail is that 
this force carried Finnish Suomi M/1931 9 mm submachine-guns. 
Territorial reconnaissance units were established as follows: Sayeret Shaked (Almond) was-
already established within the Southern Command in 1949 and was made permanent in 
1957, Sayeret Egoz (Walnut) within the Northern Command in 1955 and Sayeret Haruv 
(Carob) within the Central Command in 1966. 
279 Sharon, p. 80 and 84 — 85. 
See also Sykes, p. 263 and Katz (1989), p. 33 
When Orde Wingate established his special unit in Ethiopia, the unit was officially named 
Unit 101. However, Wingate didn't like this anonymous name and renamed it Gideon Force. 
The deep penetration tactics of this unit were equivalent to the tactics of the Special Night 
Squads. Besides, the aim was to lead picked men into battle like the biblical Gideon had 
done. Coincidence or not — both Makleff and Dayan were former S.N.S. men — there are 
certain similarities to the S.N.S. 
According to Katz, the number 101 refers to the U.S. 101st Airborne Division. Major Yehuda 
Harari, the commander of the original paratroop battalion (Yechidat Hatzanhanim), 
envisaged, according to Katz, the creation of IDF paratroopers on the U.S. models of the 
82"d and 101st Airborne divisions. In any case, Unit 101 was established before 
reorganisation of the paratroopers began. 
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went on in the IDF on the whole, when the characteristics of the British and 
PALMACH-trained personnel were combined.280 
The training of the paratroop battalion was like a copy of the training 
activities of the S.N.S. General Sharon speaks at length of this evolution in his 
book Warrior. Some points are worthy of a more detailed examination. The first 
is the thorough planning process before operations and the principle of post-
action reporting. In a way the former deviated from the fighting principles of the 
ground forces because their tasks on the fluid battlefield could not be defined 
precisely and therefore flexibility in implementing the task took first priority. 
Second is the battle technique. Sharon replaced the old "fire and movement" 
tactics learned from the British where each team provided fire support for the 
others when troops were advancing towards the enemy lines by stages. The 
new tactics — like the operational doctrine of the IDF on the whole — also 
shows certain similarities to indirect means. It was based on Sharon's 
experiences with the fears of the Arabs; fear of the dark and a fear of hand-to-
hand combat. To take advantage of these weaknesses, the paratroopers 
trained to avoid fire-fights until they were in touch with the enemy. They were 
taught to demoralise the enemy and play on his fears by moving close to the 
enemy in silence. Once they reached the trench line, the men were to form 
small assault groups and, without pausing to clear the fire-trenches, they were 
to jump into the communication trenches, running and shooting all the way to 
the centre and out again. The essence of Sharon's tactics, described by 
Luttwak and Horowitz, was the shock effect of relentless movement — partly 
from the rear — and surprise to confuse the enemy and break down his 
resistance. Nevertheless, the paratrooper assault method also included some 
weaknesses; the most important of them was the possibility of being 
ambushed before the action had begun. The second was a vulnerability to 
enemy counter-attacks during the actual assault. After studying several 
ambush cases, the paratroopers concluded that the most effective response to 
this type of threat was to attack immediately. Therefore, the paratroopers were 
trained to act reflexively in danger. 281  
Because of the mainly positive performance of the paratroopers in their 
counter-guerrilla operations, Chief of Staff Dayan wanted to incorporate the 
paratrooper model into the regular army. According to Luttwak and Horowitz, 
Dayan wanted to raise the training level of the army with training that stressed 
combat skills rather than parade-ground drills, and to increase toughness,-  
280 Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 108 — 109 and 111, Ne'eman, Yuval: This War of Our Resolution, 
p. 3 and Rothenberg, p. 93. 
See also Sharon, p. 94. 
Sharon describes the training process in detail, but does not assign any special value to the 
principles adopted from the paratroopers. 
281  Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 113 — 114 and Sharon, p. 95 — 96 and 98 — 99. 
See also Rothenberg (1979), p. 93. 
According to Rothenberg, artillery support was usually dropped because of the fear of 
civilian casualties. 
The paratroopers were also prisoners of their fighting doctrine. This was revealed; for 
example, in Mitla Pass in the 1956 War, when the paratroopers raided Egyptian positions 
without proper intelligence, which caused a rather high number of casualties. See for 
example Sharon, p. 148. 
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courage and self-confidence in the combat leaders. Therefore, he also wanted 
a maximum of "teeth" units with an absolute minimum of "tail" — and in all those 
matters the paratroopers provided an exemplary model. Up until the Suez 
Crisis, many of these plans were absorbed in the IDF, including the 
commanders' nose heavy "follow me" leadership principles and the evacuation 
of all "killed in action", both of which were important to fighting spirit. According 
to Dayan, before the Suez Crisis Israeli officers were already well-trained, 
young and in good shape, and they were daring and rapidly made decisions.282 
1955 and 1956 were years of guerrilla raids and retaliation. After a raid 
against a guerrilla base in the village of Kibbiya in Jordan, the Israelis begun to 
concentrate their reprisal raids against military camps, police fortresses and 
outposts not only in Jordan, but also in Egypt and Syria. This change was a 
consequence of the high rate of civilian casualties in the Kibbiya operation. 
Meanwhile the size of the operations increased and diversified to combined 
arms operations. In this way the paratroopers also became more familiar with 
the co-operation of arms other than infantry and armoured units. The first real 
combined arms operation was Alei Zait (Olive Leaves) against the Syrians east 
of Lake Tiberias on the night of 11/12 December 1955. This force was 
composed of all services and commanded by Sharon. It was based on 
carefully detailed planning. Nevertheless, the operational principles also fell 
into a pattern. The turning point was an attack against a Jordanian police 
fortress near the border town of Kalkilya on the night of 10 October 1956. This 
operation revealed the shortcomings of the night reprisal raids; the enemies 
had become familiar with Israeli tactics and were already able to anticipate 
Israeli moves. The benefits were slight comparing to the price, in Kalkilya's 
case the casualty toll was especially high. After the 1956 War, the Israelis then 
gradually — with some exceptions — returned to emphasising well-trained 
special troops in their counter-guerrilla missions, because guerrillas generally 
used towns and villages as their bases, shielding themselves behind the 
civilian population. Thus, the use of mass and firepower was not possible. Nor 
were the combined arms principles adopted by the other units and formations 
of the IDF to any great degree.283 
282 Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 117, Dayan (1966), p. 40, Sharon, p. 92 and Ne'eman, Yuval: This 
War of Our Resolution and how to Safeguard it's Achievements, p. 14. 
Sharon states that already in the early stages of Unit 101 he thought that his unit might be 
an example for the rest of the army. Whether this had any connection to Dayan's ideas 
remains unclear. At the very beginning, after the establishment of Unit 101 Dayan didn't 
favour its role — maybe because of its elitist status and maybe also because of its initial 
failures in operations — but he changed his mind after getting the post of Chief of Staff. 
283 
 Sharon, p. 98 and 136 — 137, Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 139 - 140 and Rothenberg, p. 94. 
For Sharon the failure at Kalkilya was also a learning experience. Ever since then no 
common scheme can be seen in Sharon's operations, they all have been very unique. 
However, the overall tactical principles of the paratroopers proved to be sound and were 
also applied later by Sharon. 
In his book Warrior, Sharon criticised the role of Dayan and the General Staff in the Kalkilya 
operation. Sharon had also planned a blocking force to contain the Jordanian counter-
attack, but Dayan did not accept it, although he was not very well acquainted with the 
battlefield situation. By doing so, Dayan restricted Sharon's operational planning, which was 
against the delegated command principle. This process was quite similar to the so-called 
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The tactics developed by Sharon was strikingly similar to the principles of 
manoeuvre warfare. This shows that effective counter-guerrilla means — like 
guerrilla tactics — can also be based on the use of an opponent's weaknesses. 
First of all Sharon favoured offensive action to maintain initiative and 
momentum, by surprise if possible. The traits of psychological warfare and 
indirect strategy — inherited and revived from PALMACH and the veterans of 
the War of Independence — to benefit from the enemy's weaknesses were also 
central. In addition, more than before, the operations were based on precise 
intelligence data to favour the least expected lines. The latter point was also 
linked to operational planning when Dayan formed special scouting 
detachments to collect topographic intelligence material, and by 1956 the 
Israelis knew, according to Luttwak and Horowitz, Sinai better than the 
Egyptians.284  
On the whole, the first years of the paratrooper battalion in the early 1950s 
were full of action, but at the same time these activities had very little to do 
with conventional warfare and with the common concepts of the use of 
paratroopers as a spearhead for an army. This was also the case with reserve 
paratroop forces. They were trained to seal the borders in peace-time low 
intensity conflict operations as well. However, unlike most units in the other 
branches — the paratroopers already had fighting experience when the 1956 
War broke out. In theory, this gave the Israelis a possibility to use the 
paratroopers as a spearhead in a conventional offensive, just as the General 
Staff has planned in the beginning of the 1950s. In practise, nevertheless, the 
paratroopers did not have experience in large multi-battalion landing 
operations in conventional warfare. The Air Force also did not have the ability 
to transport and replenish such a large landing force. In addition, until the 1956 
War, the 202"I Paratroop Battalion did not have the status of an independent 
contingent. It lacked auxiliary units, intelligence troops and support forces. It 
was expanded to a brigade just a short time before the war.285 
The era of retaliation attacks also modified the future Israeli strategy. Raids 
against Arab objectives decreased the activities of the Palestinian guerrillas 
and their supporters and the operations were therefore seen as successful in 
Israel. According to Zeev Schiff, the foundation of retaliation attacks was built 
on the fear barrier. The philosophy of this was based on two assumptions: 
"Reversed Optional Control principle" during the Yom Kippur War, where higher echelons 
supervised operations without a proper picture of the situation. 
See also Dayan (1966), p. 10 and 52 and Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov: Israel, the Superpowers 
and the War in the Middle East, Praeger Publishers, New York 1987, p. 28 and 35. 
According to Dayan, the restrictions on the Kalkilya operation were made because of a fear 
of escalation. The British and Iraqis threatened to intervene on the battlefield if large-scale 
operations were continued. Besides, negotiations with the French over the situation in the 
Sinai were already in progress, and there were no reason to make the British angry because 
they were also involved in the Suez Crisis. 
284 Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 118. 
285 Sharon, p. 124, interview of Professor Alon Kadish and IDFArc., file 103/798/1960. 
For example, the inexperience in brigade-size operations caused some logistical confusion 
during the 1956 War. Some equipment that was needed was absent — one reason for this 
was the hurriedly delivered material that was purchased just before the war — and some of 
what was not needed, was delivered. 
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First, the Arabs only understood and respected the language of force. Second, 
if the Arabs used violence against Israel, ordinary punishment was insufficient. 
A double or triple price had to be exacted. Only then would Arabs be 
compelled to reconsider the desirability of actions against Israel and its 
citizens. This can be seen as one of the thoughts that lead gradually to the 
deterrence strategy in the latter part of the 1950s and in the 1960s, to the 
denial approach; first within a low intensity conflict and later within the whole 
IDF and in the context of an all-out war. Moshe Dayan was one of the fathers 
of this philosophy. Dayan's emphasis can be seen in his words: "It is not in our 
hands to guarantee each water line against sabotage, each tree against 
uprooting. It is not in our hands to prevent the murder of workers in the fields 
and families in their sleep. But it is in our hands to fix a high price for our blood, 
so high that the Arab community and the Arab military forces will not be willing 
to pay it." It was also accepted that retaliation perhaps retarded the peace 
process, but security came before peace. According to Lanir, a war avoided 
was a war prevented. The enemy had therefore to be deterred, and the best 
deterrence was decisive victory in battle. Total victory in the war would deter 
the enemy from starting a new war in the future.286 
6.7. The Air Force and Navy 
During the first part of the 1950s, the Israeli Navy came into being. 
Operationally its importance was still seen as being minor, which was a 
consequence of the nature of the imminent naval threat; it was slight. 
According to the short war concept, a sea embargo was not very harmful. 
Therefore, Israeli naval units were realistically tailored for their tactical mission 
of protecting the Israeli coastline, and with the growth of the force — two British 
Z-class destroyers, twelve torpedo boats, and several small frigates and patrol 
ships, coastal escorts and a few landing craft — the Navy was seen as being 
able to cope with the threat to the coastal areas. However, the Navy was to 
apply the same doctrinal principles as the other services; active offensive 
tactics and often at night.287 
286 Sharon, p. 96, 120 and 136 — 137, Lanir, p. 24 and Schiff, October Earthquake, p. 75 -
76. 
Sharon shared Dayan's views. According to him, the objective of the retaliation attacks was 
to create in the Arabs a psychology of defeat, to beat them every time and to beat them so 
decisively that they would develop the conviction they could never win, to destroy their will to 
fight"...."With Kalkilya it became crystal clear that no deterrence operation, no matter how 
large or successful, would achieve the goal of stopping terrorism. If we wanted the Arab 
governments to face their responsibility, another route had to be found." The question was 
did this mean an all-out war or the use of diplomacy, which at the time was almost out of the 
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See also van Creveld (1998), p. 130. 
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The case of the Air Force was different. Up until the 1956 War, the Air Force 
was to become a remarkable force within the IDF, although not without 
disputes. During his tenure as Chief of Staff, Yigal Yadin continued to reduce 
the importance of the IAF. This lead to the resignation of the first Air Force 
Commander, Major General Aharon Remez, who favoured a more 
independent role for the IAF. At the end of 1950, Major General Shlomoh 
Shamir was nominated to be commander-in-chief of the Air Force to turn the 
IAF headquarters into part of the General Staff to be — no longer an 
autonomous command — but a support service for the ground forces. Because 
of his ill health, the work remained unfinished and, according to Cohen, his 
only real accomplishment was the transfer of IAF headquarters from scattered 
offices in Jaffa to Ramie, near Tel Aviv, where it became a military command 
post.288  
In August 1951, Major General Shamir was replaced by Major General Haim 
Laskov, who was expected to complete the integration of the IAF into the 
General Staff. Laskov, who had been in charge of the doctrinal Establishment 
Team, can be seen as the builder of the IAF's organisation. He shared 
General Remez' views on the need for air power independent of ground 
considerations. Laskov was a visionary soldier who already had suggested 
mobile armoured units supported by air power. He also had a vision of what 
the Air Force should be in the future. During his two-year period in the Air 
Force, he supervised a thorough analysis of the role of air power in Israeli 
strategy, and developed the beginnings of a tactical doctrine with his deputy 
and successor Colonel (later Major General) Dan Tolkowsky.289 
In April 1952, Chief of Staff Yadin gave an order to guide the development 
of the Air Force. This order shows that some mutual understanding between 
the General Staff and the Air Force was reached. The tasks of the IAF were 
defined as follows: 1) Defence of Israel's airspace, 2) Destroying the enemy air 
force, 3) Hitting the military force of the enemy in combination with ground and 
naval actions and 4) Support tasks, including close-air-support. At this time -
when the IAF still had WW II surplus long-range bombers — the strategic tasks 
of bombing enemy infrastructure and war potential were also considered.29°  
According to the General Staff's order, in the doctrinal framework the 
objectives of the development of the Air Force were easily defined. Dan 
Tolkowsky held a central position. Under his leadership, according to Luttwak 
and Horowitz, the IAF acquired many of the distinctive features that still remain 
with it today. However, it was not until the tenure of Ezer Weizman, who 
succeeded Tolkowsky in 1958, that the Air Force achieved the form that 
Tolkowsky emphasised. According to Cohen, Tolkowsky's aim was to create a 
force that could neutralise the air forces of the enemy at the instant of any 
hostile action. Israel's lack of strategic depth necessitated constant readiness 
and a fast response with a regular force that did not depend on reserves. 
288 Cohen, p. 4 and 68 — 69 and Williams (1989), p. 94. 
Remez was a former RAF pilot while Shamir was an infantryman who had reached the rank 
of Major in the British Army during WW II. 
289 Rothenberg, p. 78, Williams (1989), p. 97 and Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 122 — 123. 
290 IDFArc., file 120/626/1957. 
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Because of this fact, Tolkowsky gave the fight for air superiority against enemy 
air power top priority and only after that came tactical strikes and 
reconnaissance in support of land and naval operations. Egypt was then seen 
as the main enemy, and the ever prevailing quantitative inferiority was to be 
dealt with by attaining aerial supremacy by destroying the Egyptian Air Force 
on the ground at the beginning of a war.291  
However, there were different opinions on how the enemy air force was best 
destroyed; whether in aerial combat or in attacks on enemy airfields. Finally for 
economic reasons, multi-purpose aircraft, which could be used for attack, but 
also for defence, were seen as the best choice for implementing this aim. 
Tolkowsky also realised that the strength of an air force depended on the 
number of serviceable aircraft available at any time, rather than on the total 
number of aircraft in the inventory. This was the foundation for building a 
ground system that later was to be able to keep the number of operational 
planes very high and the turn-around times very low. During Weizman's time 
as commander-in-chief, this system was implemented. Every possible 
mechanical and psychological technique was used to improve the work of the 
ground crews so as to reduce the time required for maintenance between 
sorties. This also shows that Israel had already in 1956 thought through the 
practical matters of a pre-emptive strike. In addition, the concept of a pre-
emptive strike against enemy airfields was in accordance with the doctrinal 
principle of transferring the battle to enemy territory. In the General Staff 
before the 1956 Sinai Campaign, however, the IAF was seen as being too 
small to carry out this mission, though theoretically it might well have been 
possible. In addition, Laskov and Tolkowsky planned aerial control networks in 
order to track enemy aircraft so that real-time changes in the on-going 
missions of IAF planes could be made.292 
Finally, Laskov and Tolkowsky created a three-year plan according to the 
missions that the General Staff had them given. The tasks of the IAF were 
defined as follows: 1) Defence of the nation's skies, 2) The disabling of the 
Arab air forces and 3) Transport and attack support for the ground and sea 
forces. These tasks and priorities were in accordance with the operational 
doctrine, as well as with most of the tasks given by the General Staff, but not 
with the role of the Air Force in the General Staff. When the Air Force, like the 
Navy and Armoured Corps, had gained the status of a Command in the 
General Staff, the aim had been to form a joint operational command echelon. 
The new tasks of the IAF also had, however, strategic and tactical dimensions 
that increased the role of the Air Force. This was not monitored closely by the 
291 
 Cohen, p. 61, 72 and 81 — 82, Williams (1989), p. 94, Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 122 — 123 
and Rothenberg, p. 103. 
Major General Ezer Weizman, a former fighter pilot in the RAF during WW II and later 
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292 Cohen, p. 81 — 82. 
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General Staff which was to cause disputes that remained unresolved until the 
latter part of the 1950s when Major General Weizman became the 
commander-in-chief of the Air Force.293 
Despite the financial disputes between the General Staff and the IAF 
headquarters, the IAF was converted from a propeller to a jet air force during 
the first years of the 1950s. In June 1953, the first jet fighter, a British-made 
Meteor, landed in Israel, though the squadron was not operational until 1955. 
The growth and quality of Arab air power, however, accelerated the 
procurement policy. In early 1954, the IDF intelligence network estimated that 
Arab air power would include 360 fighter aircraft, one-third of them jets. This 
potential threat made mutual understanding in procurement programs 
possible, and planning to produce a response to the tangible threat was 
started. This process partly bore fruit already before the 1956 War, when 
France agreed to sell Israel Mystere IV aeroplanes. In addition to their 
intercept capabilities, these planes could serve as bombers as well. In the 
wake of the Suez Crisis, the IAF had some 150 combat aircraft of which, 
however, only three squadrons — 70 planes — were jets.294 
Alongside the training of pilots and ground crews for the new jets, the IAF 
was developing the means, tactics and intelligence to meet the new threats. 
The goal of the squadrons was — as was earlier already planned — to fly the 
greatest number of sorties with the smallest number of aircraft, which was 
based on the efficiency of the ground crews and installations. Target priorities 
were set as enemy aircraft first, then airfield runways and installations. The 
classification of targets became possible when a photographic wing was 
established in late 1953.295 
The result of the development process of the IAF in the early 1950s was that 
the IAF commanders had adopted a policy of a pre-emptive air strike. When 
intelligence became able to produce accurate target data, the IAF staff 
developed operation order "Slope". This plan was connected to a broader plan 
for the opening of the Strait of Tiran, where the IAF's role was to be ready to 
attack the Egyptian airfields to assure air superiority and an umbrella for itself 
and the ground forces, as well as to prevent the bombing of cities in Israel. In 
the event of war, every flightworthy aircraft — with a few exceptions to protect 
Israeli airspace — would be assigned to simultaneous surprise attacks on 
Egyptian airfields to destroy aircraft, runways and ground installations. 
293 Ibid., p. 70 — 72, Williams (1989), p. 97 and IDFArc., file 126/632/1956 and file 
118/697/1958. 
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Therefore, from early 1956 the IAF was also involved in a methodical series of 
technical exercises in dummy raids on IAF bases.296 
Co-ordination between the IAF staff and the General Staff was not on fixed 
lines. This was revealed when the Israelis started their planning process for a 
possible war. The Israelis had two plans for the war in the Sinai, "Kaddesh 1" 
for a war in the Sinai and "Kaddesh 2" for a multi-front war. In both cases, the 
task of the IAF would have been a pre-emptive air strike. This mission of the 
IAF was well known in the General Staff, too well, one might say. Completely 
devoted to the initial air strike, the IAF had not put much emphasis on the other 
two missions of the Air Force; the defence of the nation's skies and ground 
support for ground forces. In the updated "Kaddesh" plan, however, the IAF 
was only given defensive and ground support tasks; close support of the 
ground forces, interdiction strikes against enemy reserves and rear targets and 
battlefield air cover and transportation missions.297 The main emphasis was 
put on the goal of destroying the enemy on his way to the battlefield. The pre-
emptive air strike was to be implemented only if the Egyptians were the first to 
escalate by attacking targets in Israel proper. 98 
According to Cohen, the change in the role of the IAF left the Air Force only 
three days to accomplish its preparations for the new missions. Many pilots 
completely lacked experience in providing ground support. Dog-fights and 
ground-target attacks were trained for hastily, but anxiety and frustration was 
avoided because the pilots didn't know the extent of operation "Kaddesh". Air 
Force officers with their own communications were also to be assigned to all 
echelons from battalions upwards, while ground forces liaison officers were 
attached to the squadrons. However, exercises drew attention to the failings in 
the system — some of which were related, according to Williams, to the ever-
present "fog of war". In addition, the number and quality of the missions 
requested and the inadequate technical and tactical skills of the air operation 
controllers were not in balance. Even today close air support missions without 
298 Cohen, p. 94 and 100 and Williams (1989), p. 103. 
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real-time communications makes these missions very difficult to implement. 
Therefore, Tolkowsky stressed the role of interdiction, where the Air Force's 
freedom of action in the enemy's depth would be greater. On the basis of this 
line, the Air Force headquarters devoted itself to independent interdiction 
missions against enemy forces behind the battlefield; to disrupt the flow of 
reinforcements and supply intelligence on forthcoming intentions. This course 
of action, which shows that the joint chain of command in the IDF General 
Staff was still evolving, had striking similarities to those of Rommel's Africa 
Corps and Montgomery's 8th Army in WW II, where air components had 
independent roles. Therefore, in the 1956 Suez Crisis it is not possible to 
speak of planned lightning warfare composed of armoured spearheads 
supported by an air force component.299 
In conclusion, while the IDF General Staff and Israeli political leaders -
mainly Prime and Defence Minister Ben-Gurion — didn't share the view of the 
Air Force's capabilities of attaining air superiority, it is even doubtful that the 
IAF really would have had the potential to launch an all-out initiative air strike 
on the Egyptian air fields with so few jet planes. Partly the awareness of the 
Franco-British alliance in the coming war might have had an influence on this 
decision, because the role of the allied air force component was to acquire air 
superiority. In any case, combining these things together, the supreme 
command's hesitation was obviously the final reason for halting the primary 
plans of the Air Force at this time. Despite the Sevres agreement, the Israelis 
did not fully trust their allies, especially the British. The possibility of fighting the 
war alone was still there. Therefore, risks in the use of force — including the 
use of the Air Force — had to be reduced to a minimum.3°°  
299  Cohen, p. 104 — 105, Williams (1989), p. 103 — 104 and Cooling, Benjamin, Franklin: 
Close Air Support, Office of Air Force History, U.S.A.F, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Microfilm copy, Washington D.C. 1990, p. 492. 
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beffi to demand both Egyptian and Israeli withdrawal from the Suez Canal zone. Egypt was 
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6.8. Planning and exercises 
In 1955, the Planning Branch of the IDF General Staff evaluated Israel's future 
scenarios. In this document, signed by Colonel Yuval Ne'eman, three 
possibilities were seen; the first was an Egyptian attack, second came a Third 
World War in which Israel would also be involved and third was a pre-emptive 
strike of another Arab country in a range of some 500 kilometres from Israel. 
This all meant that Israel had to take a risk because preparations for all 
scenarios were not possible. As a consequence of this, Egypt was seen as the 
most probable threat. The main aim was to split the Egyptian efforts and break 
their spirit. The principle of transferring battle to enemy soil can also be seen. 
Territorial defence was responsible for the defence of the settlements and 
border villages, for delaying the enemy and for keeping several important 
areas as a base for a counter offensive. However, the counter-offensive was 
the major effort. Six brigades, including three armoured, were to break through 
the Egyptian lines in the central and northern Sinai. The armoured formations, 
which were to be kept in reserve at first, were to use the success in the 
Egyptian rear. In all this, special importance was put on indirect fighting and 
mobile operations, which both are stressed several times in the document. In 
addition, the tasks of the Air Force were defined; first defence of the skies and 
after that support of the ground forces.301  
The evaluation of the Planning Branch also contains the idea that the IDF had 
to be able to implement seven to eight division-level operations, but because 
such echelons did not exist, the aim was to be achieved with a similar number 
of brigades.302 This shows that the role of the Ugdahs, which were also 
mentioned in this document as a command echelon between brigades and the 
territorial commands, was not thoroughly considered. While in theory Ugdahs 
were operational echelons, their main function was limited to transmitting 
orders from the General Staff to the brigades. In addition, in a way, the role of 
the territorial commands also shows the incompleteness of the IDF's command 
structure. Although the commands were responsible for their territories, 
including from the operational point of view, in practise their role was limited to 
the allocation of reserves. Operations were to be supervised by the General 
Staff. 
According to Rothenberg, IDF doctrine already contained the idea of an initial air strike, but 
only when assured of major-power support. In the 1956 War, this support was available, but 
the principle was not applied. This also shows the Israelis' lack of trust in their allies. 
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According to Doctor Shai, despite rather intensive development, the IDF 
was not in harmony before the 1956 War. There were several reasons for this. 
First, early 1956 had been a period of low intensity conflict operations. Rather 
few forces were, however, committed to counter-guerrilla action and although 
manoeuvres were held, commanders grew separated from the reality of war. 
Instead, they concentrated on garrison routines; training and planning. 
Second, according to this the commanders seldom had the possibility of 
practising their leadership skills and making decisions that later on formed the 
basis for the work of their staffs. Although the leadership process during a 
battle is difficult to train for in peacetime, and Shai also admits this, 
management was not trained for enough before the 1956 War. Therefore, if 
there was not a proper balance in the IDF between the physical command 
structure and the tasks of the formations, the commanders and their staffs did 
not have sufficient practise in understanding and supporting each other.3°3 
303 Discussions with Doctor, Colonel (ret.) Hanan Shai. 
See also Dayan (1966), p. 40. 
The training process during Dayan's tenure as Chief of Staff also lead to command 
changes; incapable officers were transferred to other posts before the 1956 War, which was 
an unpleasant but very necessary job according to Dayan. 
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7. THE 1956 SINAI CAMPAIGN 
The 1956 Sinai Campaign was an exceptional war from the Israeli point of 
view because many of the opening moves in the political arena were secretly 
planned with the British and the French in Sevres in France just before the 
operation on 22 — 24 October.3°4 On the whole, the situation that developed in 
the Suez Canal was seen in Israel as providing an opportunity to solve the 
stalemate in the political negotiations. The crisis enabled a stop in the sea 
embargo in the Suez Canal and in the Red Sea, as well as an attempt to crush 
the Fedayeen guerrilla bases in the Sinai. Yigal Allon and Robert Jackson both 
also write about Israeli confidence in contriving the war itself. According to 
Allon, the Israelis would — because of the intolerable situation in the Sinai -
have initiated the war anyway even in the absence of a favourable situation. 
According to Jackson, Moshe Dayan left the impression in the negotiations 
with the French that Israel was able to quickly cope with the enemy even 
without allies.3°5 
In the 1956 Sinai Campaign, Israel fought its first modern war, though by 
today's standards the war was relatively primitive from an equipment and 
operational point of view. In addition, Israel's military doctrine was not yet in 
balance with the quality of its forces in the early 1950s. The infantry-oriented 
IDF did not fully appreciate the potential of armoured warfare, although the 
Israelis already began to understand the value of mobility on the battlefield 
during the war. Therefore, according to van Creveld despite Israeli operational 
victory, some Israeli formations performed well, some less so and some too 
much less so.3°6 At the strategic level, the war was a disappointment to the 
Israelis; despite the decisive victory on the battlefield, the IDF was compelled 
to withdraw from the occupied areas in the political arena. This inability to 
benefit from territorial conquest combined with military success led to a 
growing trust in a strategy of deterrence and the denial approach after the war. 
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7.1. Deployments and plans 
The Egyptian forces in the Sinai were not in a position to withstand a 
determined Israeli attack. Strung out over the vast desert, the bulk of their 
forces were bottled up in the northernmost corner of the peninsula, formed up 
very close to the Israeli border. The Egyptians had not implemented the 
suggestions of their German advisers. They had proposed that Egypt's main 
defence line should be sited in the depths of the Sinai on the hills that run 
north to south in the Bir Gifgafa area controlling the major east-west axes and 
the important Mitla and Giddi passes. Nevertheless, based on a thorough 
study of all avenues of approach, the Egyptian defences were designed to 
block the roads, and the fortifications were good. In addition, the deployment 
obviously reflected Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's will. According 
to Rothenberg, he wanted the main positions and bases as close as possible 
to the Israeli frontier to serve as a springboard for a future offensive and to 
defend the Fedayeen camps in the Gaza Strip.307 
The Egyptian deployment was very vulnerable and practically invited 
encirclement. Indeed, the Egyptian disposition in the Sinai favoured Israeli 
deep penetration tactics. This is clearly revealed in Moshe Dayan's analysis of 
the Egyptian preparations in the Sinai as cited by Brigadier Bagnall. According 
to Dayan, the Egyptians had exaggerated the defensive power of defended 
localities by making a false analogy with Europe. This analogy supported a 
belief that it was possible to block and prevent the movement of sizable forces 
into the Sinai by holding key salients. However, the insufficient manpower and 
weapons in the positions in the Negev and the northern half of the Sinai were 
quite easily bypassed. Nevertheless, the defence might also have been a 
success if the Egyptians had been prepared to use mobile reserves. This was 
not the case. The Egyptians were unable to conduct mobile warfare.3°8 
At the strategic level, the Israeli war aim was, according to Zvi Lanir, to 
exploit the opportunity to expand its borders. With this objective in mind, Prime 
and Defence Minister David Ben-Gurion modified the goals of the IDF. They 
were as follows: 
1) The destruction of the forces that were continuously attempting to subdue 
the Israelis. 
2) The liberation of that part of Israel's homeland that was occupied by the 
invader. 
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3) Insuring freedom of shipping in the Straits of Elath (Eilat) and in the Suez 
Canal. 
In addition, Moshe Dayan, the Chief of Staff of the IDF, had the objective of 
capturing as much Egyptian equipment as possible, but not to kill enemy 
soldiers; i.e., to destroy the war potential of the Egyptian army.3°9 
After the opening moves in the operational plan — the parachute drop in the 
Mitla Pass and the set-piece commitments on the border line — Israel's aim 
was to break through the enemy lines under the cover of darkness in the 
northern and central Sinai along two roads with two Ugdahs. In phase two in 
the first light, depending on the success of the night attack, armoured brigades 
would break deep into enemy lines while infantry formations would deploy in 
defence in the central Sinai. In the plan, the Suez Canal is also mentioned as a 
possible final aim of the penetration. In addition, one brigade was reserved to 
conquer the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula and one brigade to seize the 
Gaza Strip.31°  
The force ratio favoured the Israelis, although not by much. After the 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal, the threat of British and French invasion of 
the Egyptian homeland had forced the Egyptians to reduce their troops in the 
Sinai to half of their normal strength. This resulted in the defensive 
deployments being rather thinly manned. Besides, the Israelis could also 
include something of the role of the Anglo—French invasion in their 
calculations. On the whole, the Egyptian forces in the Sinai consisted of two 
infantry divisions with three brigades each, one armoured division and some 
other units including territorial forces in Gaza and in Sharm-el-Sheikh. The 
infantry divisions were stationed in the Central Sinai in the Abu Ageila area 
and in the Gaza Strip and the armoured division was initially on the western 
side of the Suez Canal. According to van Creveld, the Egyptian forces in the 
Sinai totalled some 30,000 men. The Israelis committed some 45,000 combat 
troops divided into 10 brigades of which six were infantry, three armoured or 
mechanised and one was a paratroop brigade. The armour strength, some 500 
tanks, was quite similar on both sides, although almost half of the Egyptian 
tanks were, as already mentioned, in reserve on the western side of the Suez 
Canal. There were 255 combat aircraft on the Egyptian side and some 150 on 
the Israeli side. About half the aircraft on both sides were jets. The overall 
deployments of the Egyptian forces were rather well known, as can be seen in 
the British intelligence documents. It is obvious that this information was also 
3°9 Lanir, p. 20, Love, p. 642. 
See also Dayan (1966), p. 32 and 38 — 39, O'Ballance (1959), p. 7 and Luttwak & Horowitz, 
p.142. 
310 IDFArc., file 35/804/1984, Dayan (1966), p. 39 and 96 and Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 146 
See also IDFArc., file 42/464/1957 and file 138/172/1959. 
In 1955 the Southern Command held a manoeuvre called "Elephant'. This exercise included 
a plan to conquer the Sinai, or at least the northern part of the peninsula. In addition, in 
spring 1956 at least the 27th Mechanised Brigade tested its plans in a manoeuvre where the 
aim was an operational offensive. The troops of this one-sided exercise consisted, in 
addition to the troops of the brigade itself, of paratroopers and of the men of the Air Force 
who were to provide close air support. 
129 
in Israeli hands after the Sevres negotiations. The strengths, orders of battle 
and losses of the Sinai Campaign can be seen in Appendix 8.311  
7.2. Different operational solutions 
Gunther Rothenberg divides the Sinai Campaign into three phases: a division 
also used in this work. They are: 
- The opening phase of 29 — 30 October when Israeli paratroopers were 
dropped on the eastern end of the Mitla Pass deep in the Sinai while 
divisional task forces crossed the border to engage the main lines of 
defence of the Egyptians. 
The breakthrough phase of 31 October to 1 November in the main Egyptian 
lines of defence in the Central and Northern Sinai, in the Mitla Pass and in 
the Gaza area. 
- The exploitation on 2 — 5 November when the Israelis advanced to the 
Suez Canal and conquered the Southern Sinai. 
A map of Israeli moves in "Operation Kaddesh" can be seen in Appendix 9.312 
Because of the secret Sevres agreement with the British and the French, 
the Israelis were not able to launch an offensive according to their own 
doctrine. This made both pre-emptive air-strikes as well as concentrated 
commitments of ground forces in the initial phases of the war impossible. 
Besides, according to Tal and Wallach, the principle of delivering the first blow 
was only adopted after the 1956 War. Kenneth Love also links this idea to air 
superiority. The IDF General Staff, including Dayan, clearly understood the 
need for air superiority in order to be successful in desert warfare with infantry 
forces. However, the General Staff did not share the IAF's confidence in its 
ability to eliminate Egyptian air-power on the ground — to the disappointment of 
the Israeli airmen according to Cohen — so the air-strikes against Egyptian Air 
3" Dupuy (1992), p. 146 — 147 and 212 — 213, van Creveld (1998), p. 142 and 148 and HQ 
2 (BR) Corps ISUM No 4, 20 September, 1956 and HQ 2 (BR) Corps ISUM No 6, 10 
October, 1956, Public Record Office, file WO 288/51/7803. 
See also HQ 2 (BR) Corps situation report 31 October, 1956, Public Record Office file WO 
288/51/ 7803. 
This report shows that the Israelis also transmitted their reports to the British supreme staff 
in "Operation Musketeer". 
Dupuy states that the Egyptians committed some 50,000 men in the war. It is possible that 
this is the strength of the forces before deductions or that he has also counted all the 
reserve forces that the Egyptian used in the Sinai during the war. 
According to Dupuy, the Israelis mobilised all of their mobile field force's 18 brigades, of 
which 12 were assigned to the Southern Command. Only 10 were used, so in this view two 
brigades were left somewhere in reserve. In addition, six brigades were held in reserve, 
ready to deal with hostile moves from Syria and Jordan. 
312 Rothenberg, p. 107. 
See also Barker, A. J: Suez: The Seven Day War, Faber and Faber Ltd, London 1964, p. 75 
— 77 and Love, p. 489 — 491. 
The war can also be seen as being divided into different phases within the context of 
operational directions and from the point of view of the belligerent parties as well. 
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Force targets were not carried out. The Israeli Air Force was kept back to 
support the ground forces. In addition, according to Love it might well have 
been possible that Dayan, guessing of the Anglo-French air operation to come, 
calculated Israeli moves based on this, as already discussed. In any case, the 
advantage of surprise, an important element in manoeuvre warfare, was left 
unused and troops were committed with set-piece tactics.313 
The imbalance between the Israeli strategic plan and the operational 
implementation was also to cause problems for the Israeli supreme command. 
Operational commanders, who didn't know the political context of the war and 
were trained to act independently according to the battlefield situation, made 
moves that were against the strategic plan. In addition, the imbalance between 
the plan and its implementation was a consequence of Dayan's command 
style, which was to move on the battlefield. This meant that he was also often 
out of reach of any communications just when his decision was needed. In a 
way, however, Dayan's overall principle that "the enemy will be given no time 
to reorganise after the assault and there will be no pause in fighting" 
compensated for this deficiency. According to this concept, the supreme 
command organised its forces to be as independent as possible. Thus, 
Ugdahs were deployed against the Egyptians to achieve their separate 
objectives in their own sectors independently. This meant, nevertheless, at the 
same time the loss of the possibility of concentrating forces. In any case, some 
kind of centre of gravity in the Israeli effort can be seen on the east-west axis 
of the Central and Northern Sinai.314 
In the Central Sinai, the Israeli 38th Ugdah consisted of two infantry brigades 
(4th and 10th) and two armoured brigades (7th Armoured and 37th Mechanised). 
The overly independent mission orientation caused gaps in the co-ordination of 
movements. The task force failed to reach its initial objective and committed 
the 7th Armoured Brigade prematurely, though successfully, in battle, although 
Dayan had reserved this decision for himself. According to Luttwak and 
Horowitz, the early failures were partly also consequences of the deficiencies 
in officers' combat spirit as well as a lack of elementary tactical skills in the 10th  
Infantry and 37th Mechanised Brigades. They also maintain that it was partly 
because of Dayan's eagerness to strengthen the "teeth" units at the expense 
of the support units. The term "teeth" means units that are intended for direct 
combat missions while "tail" units in the rear echelons support combat units. In 
313 Love, p. 487 — 489, Kwallek, Jeffrey A: OPDEC: The Operational Commander's Key to 
Surprise and Victory, Naval War College, Newport RI, June 1994, p. 16, Cohen, p. 102 -
103, Tal, p. 27 and Wallach (1970), p. 129 — 130. 
See also Rothenberg, p. 106 — 107. 
According to Rothenberg, the intense pressure expected both from the United States and 
the Soviet Union prohibited Ben-Gurion and Dayan from opening the campaign with a 
classic strike against the Egyptian Air Force on the ground. It also prevented the deployment 
of armour in concentrated attacks in the beginning of the war until Anglo-French operations 
would have begun. 
Bar-Zohar mentions that Ben-Gurion had to restrain Dayan's demands for a pre-emptive war 
against Egypt. This does not mean a pre-emptive air-strike. Bar-Zohar describes the 
situation when Egypt had closed the Strait of Tiran, but when the secret negotiations with 
the British and French had yet not begun. 
314 Dayan (1966), p. 39 and 96, Love, p. 546 and Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 146. 
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Israel's case, the "teeth" were 50 percent of the force, which was a 
consequence of streamlined administration and short supply lines while, 
according to Kenneth Love, most armies at the time were 20 percent "teeth" 
and 80 percent "tail". As a result, the campaign in the Central Sinai was 
marked by frequent breakdowns in communications and logistics, and not all 
were caused by poor equipment. Nevertheless, according to van Creveld the 
use of the 7th Armoured Brigade changed the character of the campaign from 
an advance by motorised infantry into a highly effective, if technically primitive, 
Blitzkrieg based on tanks. What had originally been planned as an auxiliary 
thrust was suddenly turned into the main thrust, but the Israelis proved to be 
flexible enough to recognise what was happening and change their plans. 
Therefore, the 7th Brigade's subsequent operations can be compared to Liddell 
Hart's principle of the "expanding torrent". While the infantry attack forced the 
Egyptians to concentrate on the front line situation, the tanks found their way 
into the enemy's rear with "recon-pull" tactics. Together with the overall 
Egyptian withdrawal, this finally led to the exploitation phase that ended on the 
Suez Canal.315 
In the Northern Sinai on the Rafah - El Arish axis, the 77th Ugdah, which 
consisted of two infantry brigades (1st and 11th) and one mechanised brigade (27ths ,  ) carried out a more or less balanced and continuous combined arms 
operation. With the help of aerial reconnaissance, the Israelis on the northern 
axis — unlike the Central Sinai — were quite well aware of Egyptian 
deployments and had, in addition, more time to prepare for their operation, 
which was supposed to start on 1 November. However, the possibility of 
operational surprise was not realistic because hostilities had already begun. 
Therefore, the Israelis based their plan on a combined arms operation. In this 
case, the encircling infantry was to break through the enemy's defensive lines 
to the road network in the less defended rear area. In the second phase, the 
tanks were to finish the envelopment. The plan had similarities to Fuller's "Plan 
315 Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 157, van Creveld (1985), p. 197, van Creveld (1998), p. 144, Katz 
(1996), 52 and Dayan (1966), p. 96. 
The "tail" units also included artillery. 
See also Love, p. 492, 507 and 518, Gawrych (1990), p. 36 — 37 and IDFArc., file 
35/727/1957. 
In the war plans of the Israelis, there was a 24 hour break between the opening move of the 
paratroopers and the ground offensive. Because of the premature commitment of the 38th  
Ugdah's forces, Dayan was obliged to move the planned schedule of the second phase of 
the war up 24 hours. 
Dayan criticised the early commitment of the Southern Command troops. However, in his 
memoirs he basically says that he was wrong, as he himself also says in his book Diary of 
the Sinai Campaign. The quote is as follows: "Better to be engaged in restraining the noble 
stallion than in prodding the reluctant mule." Commanders just acted like they had learned 
and were expected to behave. 
According to Gawrych, Dayan was the only one of the military men who knew the political 
context. Therefore, he had reserved the use of the 7th Armoured Brigade for himself to 
release the paratroopers from Mitla, if something went wrong. 
On the 9 September 1956, the Armoured Corps gave an order concerning the operational 
principles of armoured formations during a possible war. According to this, tanks were to be 
used to break through enemy lines of communications in at least battalion-size combinations 
to prevent the use of enemy reserves. This order might also have had an influence on the 
behaviour of the armoured commanders. 
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1919", where medium tanks advanced on the flanks of the infantry to the 
objective, excluding the fact that the Israelis did not have heavy tanks in 
support of the infantry. The overall plan was also finally carried out this way, 
although the infantry had great difficulties in their sector. Some detachments 
lost their way to the objective, there was a danger of friendly fire, and some 
units got stuck in the minefields and had to dismount under artillery fire. 
However, the commitment of the armoured forces turned the situation in 
Israel's favour. The tanks succeeded in breaking through the Egyptian lines, 
which finally lead, together with the Egyptian withdrawal order, to fast 
manoeuvre spearheaded by tanks and assisted by IAF interdiction on this part 
of the front as well.316 
 
The independent brigades were all used in different types of tasks. The 
202nd Paratroop Brigade had a dual mission in the war. In the opening phase, 
the battalion that was dropped on the Mitla Pass created an immediate threat 
to the Suez Canal area and in this way fulfilled Israel's commitments in the 
Anglo-French agreement. Therefore, this operation was not a typical part of 
deep penetration in manoeuvre warfare, although — in operational terms — this 
Israeli movement drew Egyptian reserves and attention away from the front to 
cope with this threat. Thus, it can be seen as having been an effort to 
unbalance and dislocate the Egyptians. The paratroop operation in Mitla 
confused the Egyptians and delayed their countermeasures. When their 
counter-operations finally began, the armoured reserves were then 
continuously on the road, away from the places where they would have been 
needed. Simultaneously, the main bulk of the paratroop brigade fought its way 
through rather thin Egyptian defence lines in the south central part of the Sinai 
to link up with and reinforce the Mitla battalion. According to Yuval Ne'eman, 
this encirclement created an Israeli held southern flank from which all the 
operations in the Sinai could fan out northwards. In reality this was only partly 
implemented. The 202nd Paratroop Brigade was stuck in exhausting battles at 
Mitla Pass but, nevertheless, the operation created a firm base for the capture 
of the Southern Sinai by the 9th Infantry Brigade. The paratroopers were used 
as a spearhead only in the final phase of the war; the brigade was taken into 
the General Staff's reserve for use in mobile operations. However at the time 
the situation had changed and the need for mobile operations was not acute 
316 Marshall, p. 146 — 147 and 225 and Pietilainen, Kari: Panssarisodankaynnin teoreetikot ja 
toteuttajat 
	 israelilaisessa 
	 sotataidossa, 	 Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulun 
	 diplomity6 
(Theoreticians and Practicers of Armoured Warfare in the Israeli Military Art, a study work of 
General Staff Officer Course, National Defence College Finland), Helsinki August 1998, p. 
51. 
In this direction, the Egyptians also put up a stiff resistance. According to Marshall, half of 
the Israeli tanks were hit, although they were not all destroyed. 
See also O'Ballance (1959), p. 139. 
According to O'Ballance, the advantage of surprise was lost when the combat engineers, 
who were sent to clear and mark lanes in the Egyptian minefields a day before the 
operation, were discovered. 
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anymore, although two airlifted airborne battalions of the brigade assisted in 
the capture of the Southern Sinai.317 
Gaza was considered to be a difficult objective in the initial phase of the war, 
taking too much time and too many troops. It was therefore only encircled and 
left until later according to the idea of the least expected. Later, when its 
communication lines were cut off, Gaza was expected to drop like a ripe fruit. 
This worked well. The plan, which reversed the logical order of objectives in 
line with the "least expected", deceived the Egyptians about the scope and 
direction of the Israeli offensive. The force ratio, the Israeli 11th Infantry 
Brigade and in the final phase the 12th Infantry Brigade against two Egyptian 
and Palestinian brigades, was approximately 1:1. However, the enemy's forces 
were almost immobile and therefore the Israelis chose mobile tactics 
equivalent to the paratroopers at Mitla; they drove swiftly through the Egyptian 
lines with a task force of armoured personnel carriers while mopping up what 
was left with the infantry. In the Gaza area this approach was quite successful, 
the defensive lines were bypassed and the pace was only slowed in the most 
thickly populated areas, where the resistance was quite heavy, while infantry 
was moved to spearhead the assault. Within two days and with the help of 
officials of the United Nations, the Egyptians and Palestinians surrendered. 18 
The best example of the indirect approach, and the preference for terrain, 
can be seen in the operations of the 9th Infantry Brigade. This brigade crossed 
the mountainous and pathless desert of the southern half of the Sinai 
Peninsula, which was still almost unknown at the time, and conquered the 
southern tip of the peninsula, almost by itself. The commander of the brigade 
was Colonel Avraham Yoffe, an ex-member of Wingate's S.N.S. Liddell Hart 
also commented on Yoffe's operation in The Jewish Chronicle by citing his 
own book Strategy. According to him, "the great captains will take the most 
hazardous indirect approach over deserts or mountains or swamps (which may 
here be interpreted as soft sand) in preference to accepting the risk of 
frustration inherent in the direct approach, for all conditions are more 
317 Ne'eman, Yuval: This War of Our Resolution and how to Safeguard it's Achievements, p. 
13, Rothenberg, p. 106 — 107 and O'Ballance (1959), p. 91. 
See also Dayan (1966), p. 91, and Sharon, p. 144. 
Colonel Sharon was accused of incurring excessive casualties in the paratroop brigade 
when it became stuck in bloody fighting in the Mitla Pass. Sharon has two explanations for 
his action. The first was that the location of the initial drop zone was wrong because the IAF 
failed to transmit intelligence data to the paratroopers. The losses were also partly a 
consequence of the paratroopers' tactics; they were trained to act offensively. Sharon's 
command style was also criticised. He was not with the ambushed spearhead. There was no 
question of a lack of courage, Sharon's achievements during the counter-guerrilla raids in 
the early 1950s had proved that. According to Sharon, he placed himself so that he was not 
in charge of the expeditionary force aimed at pushing through the pass, but with the main 
body of the brigade to cope with the primary threat, the expected offence of the Egyptian 
reserves. An equivalent situation developed later in the Yom Kippur War. Lt. Col Avigdor 
Kahalani, commander of the 77th Armoured Battalion in the Golan Heights, also decided to 
stay with the main bulk of his battalion despite the uncertainty of the fate of his spearhead. 
He was not critisised for that, though the casualties were also minor. See Kahalani, Avigdor: 
The Heights of Courage. A tank leader's war on the Golan, Greenwood Press, London 1984, 
p. 173. 
313 Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 146, Dayan (1966), p. 162 — 163 and Love, p. 546. 
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calculable, all obstacles more surmountable than those of the human 
resistance."319 The carefully planned, equipped and supplied operation of the 
9th Brigade surprised the Egyptians almost completely. The brigade had only 
one major battle with the Egyptians. This was in the destination area at Sharm-
eI-Sheikh. While the initial breakthrough tactics on the move, as at Mitla and 
Gaza, were not an immediate success, an encirclement together with the 
paratroopers forced the Egyptians to surrender on the third day after the 
beginning of the operation. The operations of the 9th Brigade were supported 
by aerial reconnaissance and sea transport. Thus, this operation can be seen 
as having been a joint operation, although a rather primitive one. The co-
ordination of aerial and naval elements was chiefly done at the General Staff 
level.329 
7.3. The Air Force and Navy 
For the Israeli Air Force, the Suez Campaign was a disappointment in a way. 
Over the years before the war the IAF had developed its operation order 
"Slope" to get air superiority by destroying the Egyptian Air Force on the 
ground. This blueprint was shelved during the planning process of "Kaddesh", 
mainly because the General Staff did not believe in the IAF's ability to execute 
it. According to Eliezer Cohen, Ben-Gurion's role in this was decisive. He was 
still haunted by nightmares of the bombings of WW II and therefore feared 
Egyptian air power. Ben-Gurion also expected that while the IAF supported the 
Israeli offensive in the Sinai they alone would not be capable of protecting 
Israel's cities from destruction. Therefore, the French promised in the planning 
process to provide the necessary air defence, and in the days before the 
offensive two French fighter squadrons were shifted to Israel. In addition, 
French cargo planes transported material before and during "Operation 
319 The Jewish Chronicle, November 16, 1956. Israel's Sinai Campaign. Capt. Liddell Hart's 
Views by a special correspondent, LH 15/5/304, part 2, p. 17. 
320 A letter from Avraham Yoffe to Liddell Hart, December 8th, 1968, LH 2/24, a letter from 
Avraham Yoffe to Liddell Hart, March 3, 1969, LH 2/24. 
In his correspondence with Liddell Hart, General Yoffe revealed that he had known Liddell 
Hart "through his books for so many years". In February 1969 they also met each other. 
See also Marshall, p. 201 — 202 and 209 — 210, Dayan (1966), p. 192 — 194, O'Ballance 
(1959), p. 157 and 175 and Heiman, Leo, Israeli Army's Strategical and Tactical Doctrine, 
An Cosantoir, January 1965, LH 15/5/307, p. 49. 
Originally, the 9th Brigade had one day to carry out its mission. According to Marshall, even 
Colonel Yoffe gasped for breath after hearing the mission and its timetable. However, Yoffe 
was able to implement his operation with detailed planning and careful organisation of his 
independent sub-units. The operation took three days and two nights, of which one day was 
spent waiting for the beginning of the Anglo-French operation and one night was spent 
waiting after the initial failures in the Sharm-el-Sheikh area. 
According to Leo Heiman, Yoffe's application of the "Strategy of Indirect Approach" was later 
called the "Impossible Approach Concept" in the 1960s. 
135 
Kaddesh".321 However, the Israeli supreme command's lack of confidence in 
the Air Force was obviously only one part of the explanation for why the pre-
emptive air strike was not made. The second and more important reason was 
the political concept of the war. The Anglo-French invasion of the Suez Canal 
area would not have been possible if Israel had launched an all-out war 
against Egypt. Besides, the doctrinal principle of pre-emption was truly 
developed only after the war. 
The IAF flew some 1,900 sorties during the war. This number wasn't divided 
evenly over the seven days of the war. In the first phase, the Air Force was 
restricted by the order to avoid air-to-ground action until the British and French 
had dealt with the Egyptian airfields. Once this order was amended, the IAF 
was committed to aerial battles and ground support. The role of the Anglo-
French air invasion eased the task of the IAF. By nightfall on 2 November, the 
Egyptian Air Force had, according to Jackson, been eliminated as a fighting 
force, including the 11-28 bombers that had posed a threat to Israel's heartland. 
The British estimates of the performance of the Egyptian army at the end of 
November 1956 also confirm this. The Egyptian Air Force had been rendered 
virtually ineffective. This translated into air superiority for the Israelis in the final 
days of the war and the possibility of providing aerial support for the ground 
forces. This achievement was not lost on the Israelis; the need for air 
superiority in the conduct of ground operations in mobile warfare influenced 
the list of priorities for future IAF procurement.322 
In the dog-fights, the Israelis were superior to their counterparts. Robert 
Jackson estimates that the Egyptians had great difficulties in mastering the 
321  Cohen, p. 101 — 103, Jackson, p. 39, 41 — 42 and 46 — 47, Williams (1989), p. 104 — 105 
and van Creveld (1998), p.141. 
The unmanned Israeli Mystere IVs were also flown by French pilots. However, according to 
Williams, General Tolkowsky, the commander-in-chief of the Air Force, conceded that the 
presence of the French might also have been an advantage; it would have helped the 
Israelis to concentrate on destroying the Egyptian Air Force on the ground. In any case, this 
latter vision did not come true. 
See also Dupuy (1992), p. 212 and Love, p. 493. 
The estimates of the strengths of the Israeli and Egyptian Air Forces vary greatly depending 
on the number of delivered and operational planes. It seems that when operational fighter 
planes are counted, the force ratio was near 1:1 when the French support of the Israelis is 
included. 
322 Williams (1989), p. 106, Jackson, p. 75, Cohen, p. 147, Bagnall, p. 33 — 34 and HQ 2 
(BR) Corps, 24 November, 1956, Public Record Office, file WO 288/51/7803. 
Cohen underestimates the role of the British and French. According to him, "Operation 
Musketeer (code name of the Anglo-French invasion) served as an example of failure; it 
taught any pilot who idolised such experienced and well-equipped air forces as those of 
France and Great Britain that a lack of planning, professionalism, and dedication meant 
certain doom." However, this analysis is not fair. The importance of the Anglo-French air 
operation to Israeli air superiority is indisputable. 
See also O'Ballance (1959), p. 141. 
According to the author, Israeli planes flew eight sorties/plane/day. This number is obviously 
too large on average. However, in the hottest phase of the war, combat aircraft might have 
flown more than five sorties/day. The actual numbers are not so important; what is important 
is the efficacy of the IAF ground system. It was at a very high level already in this campaign. 
This at least doubled or tripled the strength of the IAF when calculating its effect on its 
objectives. 
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Russian-built jets and therefore fewer than 200 pilots, out of a total of 500, 
were capable of flying the jets. Besides, the Egyptian tactics, when comparing 
to the Israelis', were obsolete. The Egyptians flew in methodical and tight 12-
plane WW II-style formations. These were clumsy tactics against the smaller 
and quicker formations of Israeli Mysteres. As with their ground forces, the 
Israelis based their actions more on delegated and individual decision-making. 
According to Doctor Raanan Gissin, this small formation combat, similar to the 
British Air Force during WW II, put a high premium on flexibility, surprise, and 
high levels of trust in the judgment of operational combat commanders. The 
only severe restriction in the flight missions was the range of the IAF planes; 
they could stay in the area of operations for only a short time.323 
Around 500 of the Israeli sorties were attacks on ground targets. Interdiction 
eased the fighting in the central areas of the battlefield; in Abu Ageila and 
Rafah the Air Force prevented the commitment of the Egyptian reserves to 
battle. In addition, the transport support of the ground troops was particularly 
decisive in the battles for Sharm-el-Sheikh and Mitla. However, in direct 
support the Israelis had problems. Forward air controllers were rare, which 
was a consequence of the priority of the tasks of the IAF. Ground support was 
seen as a secondary mission before the war. The IAF's flight control network, 
which was meant to guarantee flexibility and maximum use of force, was also 
still in its infancy. Long-range radar systems didn't exist yet and 
communication systems were inadequate. Tactical air reconnaissance 
supporting the armoured penetrations was also seen to have been too slight. 
All the factors listed above resulted in repeated breakdowns in the passage of 
information between the air and ground forces and caused casualties from 
friendly fire in several areas, including Abu Ageila and Rafah. In addition, after 
the war it was estimated that the equipment of the air force and the task of 
supporting ground forces were not in balance. Despite the purchase of new 
aircraft, there were only a limited number of planes that were suited for ground 
support. Therefore, the support could only be used in one direction at a time. 
This led to a demand to optimise the use of the existing planes.324 
During the 1956 War, Israeli sea operations were of little significance. This 
was first of all a consequence of the Anglo-French naval dominance both in 
the Mediterranean and in the Red Sea. The Anglo-French fleet — including 
several aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean — fully occupied the Egyptians in 
coping with this threat. Therefore, only two Israeli naval operations are worth 
mentioning. The first was the capture of the Egyptian destroyer Ibrahim. The 
crew of this vessel surrendered to the Israelis on 30 October after Israeli 
fighter-bombers had damaged its steering. The second was the sea transport 
323 Jackson, p. 80 and 98, Cohen, p. 121 and Gissin, p 128. 
See also Dupuy (1992), p. 212. 
The aircraft losses of the Israelis vary between 12 and 15. All of them were lost to ground 
fire. 
324 Cohen, p. 147 — 148, Dayan (1966), p. 103 and 132 — 133, van Creveld (1998), p. 150, 
IDFArc., file 137/776/1959, IDFArc., file 125/516/1970 and file 130/516/1970. 
The casualties from friendly fire were partly due to the use of captured enemy vehicles that 
were not equipped with Israeli identification marks. 
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of supplies with a detachment of landing craft in the Gulf of Akaba to the 9th  
Infantry Brigade deep in the Sinai.325 
7.4. Assessment of the operational art 
According to Rothenberg, much of the Israeli style of warfare was patterned on 
Liddell Hart's principles. The initial surprise was sought by silent mobilisation 
and with troop deployments against the Jordanian border. The tendency to 
avoid frontal battles if possible, the choice of the least expected lines of 
advance and the use of darkness dominated. Soon after the war, Liddell Hart 
commented on the Sinai Campaign in The Jewish Chronicle. According to him, 
"the Israeli campaign has been a masterpiece of strategic art ... It is one of the 
best examples of the "Strategy of Indirect Approach" in modern times or in all 
history. It applied the method of threatening alternative objectives and by the 
distraction of the enemy's mind and forces, created in the move towards the 
Suez Canal in the south, both concealed and eased the way for the 
concentrated stroke against the enemy rear ... It is evident that the tactical 
execution matched the conception — fulfilling and combining most brilliantly the 
dual principles of speed and surprise that are fundamental to the success in 
war" 26 
True, the traits of the "Strategy of Indirect Approach" can be seen in the 
Israeli art of war in this war. However, one must keep in mind that most of the 
things that influenced the result of the war — advantages and shortcomings on 
both sides — were not yet known at the time. Therefore, it is natural that this 
short, victorious war strengthened Liddell Hart's belief in his own ideas. 
Nevertheless, it is obvious that Liddell Hart's ideas were applied at least to 
some extent, because he had so many direct or indirect connections to the 
Israelis before this war. Doctor Israel Beer confirms this in an article in Haaretz 
on 25 March 1960 in the context of Liddell Hart's visit to Israel by saying that 
"The Israeli army not only fought in accordance with many tactical ideas of 
Liddell Hart, but their higher defence policy has always been inspired by a 
sense for the practical, by the refusal of over-ambitious and advantageous 
schemes, and finally by deep regard for the fundamental, political and social 
aims of warfare, all of which Liddell Hart has always regarded as the hallmarks 
of positive strategy. The Hebrew way of warfare grew, one might say, out of a 
thousand years old tradition and its lessons, and on the other hand, it is the 
result of the hard and concrete facts. Precisely, because of this a whole 
325 Dupuy (1992), p. 209 — 211 and Jackson, p. 60. 
326 Israel's Sinai Campaign, The Jewish Chronicle, November 16, 1956, p.17 and Wallach, J. 
L: Obituary of Sir Basil Liddell Hart, LH 2/22, p. 6. 
See also van Creveld (1998), p. 142. 
However according to van Creveld, the masquerade of silent mobilisation was dropped on 
26 October, three days before the beginning of the Mitla airdrop, and a public call-up went 
out by way of radio and newspaper; the Israeli people, believing themselves in imminent 
danger, responded enthusiastically. 
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generation of Haganah and IDF commanders was attracted to them and 
received their military education by Liddell Hart's works." 327 
Evaluations of the Egyptian performance also led to Moshe Dayan's so-
called "collapse theory", which can be linked to the indirect approach. 
Theoretically Dayan's theory also fit the principles of manoeuvre warfare, 
especially the principle of dislocation. The "collapse theory" was based on the 
assumption that a strategy of exploiting high mobility in order to appear in the 
enemy's rear and cut his lines of communications would bring about his defeat. 
In any case, the principles mentioned above were also included in the issues 
that Dayan had stressed in his estimate on how the IDF should prepare for a 
possible future war even before the threat of war became real in summer 
1956. In this assessment, the spirit of mobility and reconnaissance take a 
central place; Dayan emphasised the importance of time which would make 
swift offensive operations necessary, the ability to carry out encirclements and 
the skill of night-fighting. Therefore it seems that, from the tactical point of 
view, Dayan's aims can also be linked with his own experiences in Wingate's 
S.N.S. and on the southern front during the War of Independence.328 
However in his book Sinai Victory, an American officer and military analyst, 
S. L. A. Marshall, shows that the Israelis had also created concrete tactical 
fighting principles in addition to their strategic and operational doctrine. 
Brigadier Marshall, who was known to have been a keen advocate of Fuller, 
also tends to see Fuller's principles of war as being loosely behind this list. 
True, there are similarities, although the principles of war have generally been 
very similar all over the world, only the emphases have varied. In any case, the 
more striking thing was the Israeli use of armoured forces according to the 
principle of the "expanding torrent", which can be derived more from Liddell 
Hart than Fuller, as already discussed. According to Marshall, the Israelis also 
won the Sinai Campaign with extended daring. This opinion is quite apt, but it 
can be interpreted in many ways. Nevertheless, everything was based on 
individuals; on their skills and especially on the motivation that resulted in the 
development of an offensive spirit among the troops. General Uri Simhoni 
confirms this. During the Sinai Campaign he was a young Lieutenant in the 
paratrooper battalion that was dropped in the Mitla Pass. According to him, at 
that time — and this also was the case during the Six Day War in 1967 — IDF 
soldiers relied completely on themselves. On the whole, it can be estimated 
that the Israeli success during the war was a combination of adopted concepts 
and principles applied to individual skills, imaginative command principles, and 
327 Beer, Israel: Liddell Hart in Tel Aviv, 25.3.1960, a copy of a Haaretz' article written one 
day before Liddell Hart's lecture in Z.O.A. House in Tel Aviv, LH 15/5/304, part 2. 
328 
 IDFArc., file 35/727/1957 and file 4/59/1958, Lanir, p. 21, Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 142, 
Harris, J. P. - Toase, F. H. (ed.): Armoured Warfare, B. T. Batsford Ltd., London 1990, p. 
164 — 165 and Messenger, Charles: The Art of Blitzkrieg, Ian Allan Ltd., London 1976, p. 
228. 
See also Barker (1964), p. 84 — 85. 
According to Barker, the Egyptian divisions in the Sinai were the cream of Nasser's army, 
especially the 3rd Division which fought stubbornly in the Central Sinai until the withdrawal 
order came. This seems to be at least partly true. The 3rd Division fought very well before the 
withdrawal order. 
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daring operational solutions. In addition, the role of the Anglo-French invasion, 
luck and Egyptian failures also made the swift conquest of the Sinai 
possible.329 The Israeli tactical fighting principles can be seen in Appendix 10. 
7.4.1. In pursuit of flexible command 
The centre of gravity of the Israeli effort was in the Central and Northern Sinai, 
although one can not speak of a very concentrated effort. Dayan's plan did not 
attempt to co-ordinate the advance of different Ugdahs in order to concentrate 
them on a single objective. They were brigades, reinforced with additional 
troops, that implemented the operational tasks but in many cases with tactical 
means. In addition, those brigades that were not included in the Ugdahs also 
had independent tasks and sectors. Thus, the operational independence of 
Israeli formations was striking. This is clearly revealed in Yitzhak Rabin's 
words as cited by Luttwak and Horowitz: The brigades were given a set of 
initial guidelines which defined only objectives, targets and time-tables, 
demarcation lines between different units and the general method of 
conducting the battle." This was based on the supposition that there would be 
a lot of breaks in communications. Thus, the long-term concept of operations 
was a prerequisite to success in mobile operations. This was also possible 
because the commanders had already adopted the principle of maintenance of 
aim. Nevertheless, although the brigades generally performed well, it was not 
a question of success in the initial battles. The command style of the 
formations was short-sighted, though intuitive, and less attention was paid to 
more long-time operational planning or to co-operation between branches, 
services and other formations. The result of the operational independence of 
the brigades was that the possibility of concentrating formations was lost. 
Troops were engaged in one continuous battle which lasted until their 
objectives were reached or the cease-fire stopped their movements. In 
addition, the reserves were organic, and included in these task forces and 
brigades. No additional reserves were available for the use of the Southern 
Front on short notice.33°  
Dayan's command principles excluded himself, the General Staff — and 
more or less the Southern Command as well — from the chain of command and 
co-ordination of operations. Therefore, the Southern Command acted like the 
General Staff didn't exist, and to a lesser degree the task forces and brigades 
also acted in the same way with regards to their superiors. Not having to follow 
329 Marshall, p. 17 — 20 and 22 — 23, interview of Major General (ret.) Uri Simhoni. 
See also Fall, p. 3. 
Fall noted only half a year after the war that better communications — better than the enemy 
had in any case — logistical flexibility, and air cover in the later stages of the war were the 
dominant factors that made mobile operations possible. The listed item are central in mobile 
warfare. At least the Israelis seem to have understood the importance of these things to 
some extent. Fall nevertheless fails to see that without the emphasis on finding gaps in 
enemy lines mobile operations would not have been possible with such small forces. 
330 Rothenberg, p. 140, O'Ballance (1959), p. 80 — 81, Love, p. 546, Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 
144, 146 and 161 — 163, van Creveld (1998), p. 158 and 196 — 197. 
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detailed plans prepared in advance or being subject to a continuous flow of 
orders from above, the brigade commanders and their staffs were free to make 
their own tactical decisions. The role that was left to the higher headquarters at 
every level was to co-ordinate the moves of different formations. In the 1956 
War, this latter aim was not yet achieved. The lack of proper signals 
equipment was the main reason but also organisational and principal facts can 
be seen behind this. After all, the independence of the formations solved the 
problem of co-ordination, although there was no co-ordination at all in many 
cases at the Ugdah level because decision-making was delegated to brigades 
operating in their own sectors. Therefore no real provision was made to 
concentrate the efforts of the formations, especially during the battles against 
the Egyptian main defence line in the Central Sinai. In practice the role of the 
higher headquarters was limited to making sure that the units in the field 
adhered to their objectives, targets and timetables. In addition, because 
Ugdahs and brigades implemented operational tasks rather intuitively, 
sometimes the results were different — and also greater — than originally 
intended; for example, the drive up to the Suez Canal.331  
The Israelis were also lucky with regards to the "fog of war. Mobilisation 
was left until the last days preceding the war and it caused transportation 
problems. There were deficiencies in equipment and organisation, logistical 
support worked near its absolute limit and communication problems were 
sometimes serious — although maybe not decisive because of the 
independence of the formations. The brigade organisations were not balanced 
enough for modern warfare, although this deficiency was not fully revealed in 
this short war. The Egyptian withdrawal order also greatly helped the Israelis, 
especially in the Central Sinai. In addition, the need for Israeli naval operations 
was — as already mentioned — minimal, which let the Israelis concentrate their 
efforts on operations in the Sinai. 
Combined arms operations were only in their infancy, partly because of the 
lack of equipment and partly because of inexperience in using the support of 
different branches. In organisations, the Israelis have favoured organic 
support, as was the case with reserves. Sappers were attached to battalions 
mainly for mine-clearance, other engineering tasks were seen as being 
secondary in mobile warfare. This worked well enough in this war. Anti-tank 
missions were delegated to the artillery. Its shortcomings were not revealed. 
The Egyptian armoured forces were mostly dug-in, and the minor use of 
mobile armoured reserves was successfully prevented by the Israeli Air Force 
and armoured units. However, because of the experience gained in the war, 
331  Ibid. 
See also Gawrych (1990), p. 52 and 58. 
According to Gawrych, one reason for the initial failures in the Central Sinai (Kusseima — 
Umm Katef — Abu Ageila) was Dayan's command style. Because he was away from the 
General Headquarters most of the time, he was not really able to co-ordinate operations in 
the whole theatre. Nevertheless, Dayan did not delegate his power of decision to the 
General Staff. Instead, he interfered in his subordinates' command processes without a 
clear picture of the situation. 
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the anti-tank function, which had already included wire-guided missiles, was 
transferred after the war from the artillery to the infantry.332 
Logistic support was also a risk factor. Understanding this, the Israeli 
brigades were built to survive independently without any extraordinary help 
from higher echelons. In addition, the IDF had adopted a principle of not 
waiting for supply trains. Principally, this concept of self-sufficiency supported 
the idea of mobile warfare. As already discussed, Dayan's favourite act was to 
increase the "teeth" at the expense of the "tail"; however, this meant 
deficiencies both in personnel and in plans. Without overall logistical plans and 
with civilian vehicles delivering material to the front lines, and with more or less 
decent traffic discipline, breakdowns in supply lines were not exceptional 
events. In several cases there were also problems in finding stocks that were 
laid down in advance or supply trains that were pushing material ahead. 
Nevertheless, the Israelis succeeded in avoiding major problems in this short 
war waged on interior lines.333 
The most important of the principal and organisational deficiencies was the 
role of the field artillery. The need for artillery support, especially behind the 
forward lines of troops was not understood in Israel. However, in this case, the 
Egyptian resistance in depth, namely their anti-tank defence, was not decisive, 
and therefore the need for Israeli artillery was seen as being slight. Besides, in 
many cases an artillery barrage was seen as being against the principle of 
surprise; for example, in the case of the paratroopers. On the whole, according 
to Williams the Sinai Campaign was a sad experience for the artillerymen. 
Infantry commanders were only dimly aware of what artillery could do for them. 
This was especially the case in the armoured brigades. In the initial 
breakthrough battles artillery was used against enemy fortifications but not in a 
concentrated effort and not at all in the enemy's depth. In addition, according 
to Yuval Ne'eman, the Israeli tendency of attacking at night did not favour the 
use of artillery. In the Sinai Campaign — as in the War of Independence — 80% 
of infantry attacks were carried out at night. However, he does mention that 
artillery was also used at night, wherever possible. Thus, the neglect of artillery 
was partly also a consequence of a lack of proper equipment and partly of the 
success of the armoured formations and the Air Force, which was seen as 
compensating for the need for mobile artillery. The result was that although the 
Artillery Corps began to integrate a divisional artillery concept after the war, the 
underestimation of artillery continued up until the mid-1970s, when the 
332 Williams (1989), p. 237. 
See also Handel, p. 568. 
According to Handel, the Israelis had a poor overall understanding of modern weapons 
technology in the early 1950s. 
333 Schiff (1974), p. 83, Marshall, S. L. A: Sinai Victory, William Morrow and Company, New 
York 1958, p. 148, 155 — 156 and 186, Dayan (1966), p. 22 — 23 and IDFArc., file 
125/516/1970. 
See also IDFArc., file 266/746/1959. 
Since the 1956 War, the overall logistical principle of the IDF has been to push material 
ahead. In 1953 the General Staff gave instructions on logistical support. In offence the most 
important factor was fuel resupply and in defence fuel and ammunition supply. Despite the 
fact that material was pushed ahead, the IDF had some sort of rear services at all levels. 
Obviously this principle also enabled the echelons of supply, the "tail", to be lightened. 
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experiences of the Yom Kippur War finally led the Israelis to develop their 
artillery within the combined arms concept.3i4 
7.4.2. The role of armour begins to rise 
Dayan's hypothesis on the Egyptian collapse didn't fully form until the Egyptian 
withdrawal after the beginning of the Anglo-French bombardment. The second 
aim, the destruction or capture of the enemy's equipment was also only half 
carried out. Although Dayan trusted the ability of the light formations to break 
into the enemy's depth, the Israeli force structure was not adequate for the 
second aim. In addition, it is also obvious that the policy of staying on a 
defensive posture before the beginning of the Anglo-French operation deprived 
the IDF of even the possibility of surprising the Egyptians and breaking though 
their lines of communication, whatever the force structure would have been. 
According to van Creveld, the (operational) system (adopted by the Israelis) 
might have been well adapted for seizing fleeting opportunities in armoured 
operations conducted against a mobile opponent, except that no such 
operations took place." This statement is quite apt, though two facts behind 
this viewpoint must be understood. First, even the possibility of mobile tank 
battles was almost absent because the Egyptians had dug-in almost all their 
tanks in the defence lines and the reserves never did reach the battlefield in 
mass. Second, the armoured Ugdah demanded by Laskov was not 
established; rather armoured and mechanised brigades were attached to 
existing Ugdahs. The tanks were left in reserve in these Ugdahs and were 
initially in a secondary role, though the tank formations mostly maintained their 
integrity and sub-units were not split up to support infantry forces. According to 
Colonel Ben-Ari, this meant the loss of "shock power", i.e., mobile infantry did 
not have the battlefield mobility and firepower to destroy the withdrawing 
Egyptians that tanks would have had. Therefore, according to Kadish, in the 
1956 War the armoured breakthroughs were derivatives of the initiatives of 
local commanders, not a result of a generally accepted concept.335 
On the whole, it can be said that up until the 1956 War — and mostly in that 
war as well — Israeli operational mobility was based more on movement than 
on firepower. The role of the tanks was to use the success in pursuits.336 This 
334 Williams (1989), p. 236 — 237, Ne'eman, Yuval: This War of Our Resolution and how to 
Safeguard its Achievements, p. 15 — 16 and IDFArc., file 130/516/1970. 
However, Williams mentions that initial efforts to deploy divisional artillery already appeared 
in the 1956 War. 
See also IDFArc., 125/516/1970. 
It mentions that in several cases the artillery fire-controllers didn't even have a means of 
communicating. 
335 
van Creveld (1985), p. 149 and 196 — 197, IDFArc., file 125/516/1970 and file 
13018/1034/1965 and interview of Professor Alon Kadish. 
336 IDFArc., file 43/160/1959. 
The light AMX tanks used by the 27th Brigade on the northern axis were not suitable for 
breakthrough battles in properly defended areas. The other two brigades that had tanks 
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was a derivative of the pre-war thoughts of the mobile infantry school and the 
manoeuvre school. Therefore — and because of the policy that prevented the 
early use of breakthroughs — the view of the IDF tank officers on the 
concentrated effort of tanks bore only partial fruit in the war. Nevertheless, 
during the war after the failures of the infantry to breach the Egyptian lines 
armoured formations were committed to battle. In these operations the pre-war 
thinking of the Armoured Corps can be prominently seen. The most important 
was the principle of using tanks in a concentrated effort. In other words, 
although the armoured Ugdah was not established, at brigade level tanks were 
not split up to support infantry, but were mostly used in independent tasks 
where the potential of tanks to push through to enemy lines of communications 
was revealed. In addition, indirect means were dominant. Tanks were not used 
to push through enemy lines with force but more with a mixture of speed and 
encirclement. In this way, the operations resembled the tank manoeuvres in 
the early 1950s, which furthermore had strict similarities to the concept of the 
"expanding torrent". This reflected the tendency to avoid unnecessary losses in 
battles of attrition although it is obvious that the lack of modern tanks that 
would have had more battlefield durability and the lack of numbers that would 
have enabled a concentrated effort and "shock effect" also influenced this 
issue. As a result of all this, because of the positive experience of the use of 
tanks, the ideas of the mobile infantry school were gradually abandoned after 
the war, and the manoeuvre school and independent armour school formed 
the basis of the armour doctrine in the years to come. 
Israel's ability to annihilate enemy forces was a new development. Despite 
the fact that the Egyptian army was not totally destroyed, its fighting capability 
and especially morale was, according to British intelligence estimates, severely 
hampered in the battles in the Sinai (and in Port Said). This coincides with the 
transformation that had occurred in the IDF from 1949 to 1956. According to 
Zvi Lanir, this was a change from light infantry to a boldly used, although rather 
primitive, operational structure in which armour and air power were the key 
components. It seems, nevertheless, that Lanir gives too optimistic a picture of 
the performance of the Israeli armour-air force component. Although they were 
quite successful in the war, the Armoured Corps especially would obviously 
have been too small and inadequately equipped to fight against a stubborn 
defence. In addition, the IAF was, in a way, in the shadow of the allied air 
forces and on the whole the allied operation also eased the task of the IDF. 
Therefore, it is better to say that the IDF had made the change from guerrilla 
and infantry tactics to mobile operational concepts between the War of 
Independence and the 1956 Sinai Campaign. At this phase the role of armour 
and air power was, however, only growing, though constantly.337 Nevertheless, 
were mainly composed of Shermans that were, although not new, also suitable for tank-to-
tank battles. 
337 G (OPS.), HQ 2 (Br.) Corps, 24 November, 1956, Public Record Office, file WO 
288/51/7803 and Lanir, p. 21 — 22. 
See also Young, Peter: The Israeli Campaign 1967, William Kimber and Co. Limited, 
London 1967, p. 183 — 184, Fall, p. 12 and Barker, p. 83. 
All these authors compare Israeli armoured warfare to tank warfare classics in the previous 
wars. Similarities can be found. According to Barker and Young, the overall idea of the 
Israeli "Operation Kaddesh" was like General WaveII's first Western Desert campaign in 
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in the coming years tanks supported by the air force combined the basis of 
Israeli military art. The emphasis on a short war and a decisive victory was to 
show the way for the development of both the operational doctrine and the 
organisations. 
North Africa against the Italians in 1940. Wavell — like the Israelis — used the indirect 
approach with vertical envelopment (encirclement) with good results. The controlled risk in 
the supply principles was also equivalent. The difference was that Wavell was distinctly 
inferior to the Italians, the Israelis were not. Second, Young and Fall compare the Israeli 
operational art of armoured forces to the German Blitzkrieg doctrine. However, the 
similarities were not so clear in this war because of the underdevelopment of the Israeli 
armoured warfare concept at that time. In the Six Day War, the situation was different. As 
Young notes the similarities were striking in the latter case. 
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8. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LIGHTNING WARFARE DOCTRINE 
8.1. Conclusions and re-thinking the previous war 
At the political-strategic level, the Israelis learned two things from the Suez 
Campaign. First, a military victory was not a guarantee of political success. 
Second, if a military operation was planned, it had to be supported or at least 
mentally accepted by a superpower. Otherwise, there would be no guarantee 
of keeping the war's gains. Up until the 1956 War, Israel's war aims were 
related to the question of national survival and to the protection of the armistice 
borders. After the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, the existing strategic 
concept that Israel had no positive war aims changed; after that the only aim 
was the preservation of the regional status quo.338 
Israel's political goals in war also shifted. The political context emphasised 
that military power had to be strengthened to face the threat. Security had 
replaced peace as the first priority. During the period between the 1956 War 
and the Six Day War in 1967, the Israelis developed a strategic doctrine that 
was based on the deterrence power of the IDF. This deterrence would serve in 
the future as a constraint, in other words denial was, according to this concept, 
achieved in two ways: building the IDF both quantitatively and qualitatively so 
that it was strong enough to deter enemies and if this was not enough, getting 
a decisive victory on the battlefield. Thus, since Moshe Dayan's tenure as 
Chief of Staff the military operational meant, in the denial concept in 
conventional warfare, the annihilation of the enemy. However, that did not 
mean the total destruction of the enemy, rather it meant the neutralisation of 
his military power which would then raise the IDF's deterrence power. 
Nevertheless, the conquest of terrain also had its part in this doctrine. This is 
revealed in Moshe Dayan's words "security before peace". In practice this 
manner of thinking meant the conquest of terrain to reduce the vulnerability of 
Israel's operational depth.339 
338 Lanir, p. 16 and 21 — 22, Bar-Siman-Tov, p. 83 and Tal, p. 34. 
See also Handel, p. 563 and van Creveld (1998), p. 166. 
Handel states that despite the powerful influence of the IDF on every facet of Israeli life, 
Israel has remained a solidly Western-style democracy. The military has rarely interfered in 
the domestic political arena (however, in 1967 Prime Minister Eshkol was pressured to 
launch the war). Instead, more often it has been civilian leaders who have deviated from 
democratic procedures (for example, the Lavon affair). 
According to van Creveld, there was a consensus among the Israeli public after the 1956 
War on the objectives of the state and its military instrument: to ensure survival at all costs. 
339 Lanir, p. 14 — 15 and Johnson, Paul: Profile: General Moshe Dayan. Israel's Coriolanus, 
New Statesman 29 August, 1969, LH 15/5/315, part 1, p. 270 and 272. 
See also an article on the political disputes concerning Israeli borders in the mid 1960s, the 
Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, March 13, 1964, LH 2/2/61/37, p. 8 and a letter 
from Yigal Allon to Liddell Hart, 11 October, 1967, LH 2/2/61/42. 
Moshe Dayan's aim of annihilating the enemy is revealed in an article of the Jewish 
Observer and Middle East Review. In spring 1964, there were political disputes in Israel over 
the conquest of terrain during the War of Independence. According to Ben-Gurion, Israel 
would have achieved more favourable borders if Dayan, instead of Yigal Allon, had already 
been in charge of operations during the War of Independence. However, according to this 
article Ben-Gurion had specifically refused Allon the opportunity of destroying the Egyptians 
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The strategy of the denial approach also influenced the operational 
concepts. However, the existing doctrine was already quite suitable for the 
prevailing situation. Besides, it even reinforced the political approach of denial. 
The military doctrine that had developed in the IDF before the 1956 War 
already quite unequivocally answered the question of how wars should be 
engaged in militarily. Therefore, the emphasis in development in the IDF was 
put on introducing new technology and weapons. Technical skills and training 
standards were continually raised, the air arm was developed and molded into 
an élite force, the intelligence services were extended, new techniques for 
deception were developed and mobilisation procedures were reviewed and 
refined.34° 
The only remarkable doctrinal change was to reinterpret the definition of 
pre-emption. The concept of decisive victory was linked to the doctrinal 
principle of pre-emption. Nevertheless, a self-evident fact the pre-emption 
became not although a principle to deliver the first blow whenever a 
threatening situation reveals was adopted. Even so, the maximum exploitation 
of military power for the attainment of decisive victory was compatible with the 
widespread belief that the Arabs would win a political victory if war ended in 
anything less than total military triumph for Israel. In addition, according to 
Handel the volatility of Israeli pre-emptive or interceptive strategies, offensive 
at both the tactical and operational levels, also made them more likely than 
others to trigger unplanned confrontations, to escalate and to even go to 
war.341 
8.2. The rise of the Armoured Corps 
This strategic framework put strict demands on the operational principles as 
well as on the organisation of the IDF. The conquest of terrain was not only a 
matter of strategic security, it was also a precondition for operational freedom 
of action in mobile warfare. As Brigadier Amit, Dayan's chief of operations, 
said of the need for terrain: "There was no possibility of manoeuvring forces 
over large areas as well as there was no question of temporarily giving ground 
to an advancing enemy in order to recapture it later."34 
 In other words, the 
to get a better position in the post-war peace negotiations. Therefore, the core of the dispute 
might have been different views of the doctrine: Dayan's offensive and Allon's defensive. 
Alton was known for his settlement policy; to establish settlements in the border areas to 
protect the rest of the country, though this does not explain the entire concept. Before the 
Six Day War, Yigal Alton was one of the people who were responsible for creating the 
strategy and doctrine of the 1967 War. 
340 Bagnall, p. 35, Zamir, p. 11 and Heiman, Leo: War in the Middle East, p. 62. 
According to Zamir, the reserve was organised territorially, so that in peacetime a unit's 
equipment was stored in the same areas where the men of the unit lived and worked. 
Usually mobilisation orders were distributed from brigade down to sections by messenger. 
Call-ups were also distributed by written orders and radio messages. 
341  Lanir, p. 22 — 23, Tal, p. 27 and Handel, p. 538. 
Handel's statement came true in June 1967. 
342 Amit (1963), p. 37. 
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conquest of terrain, already made or achieved during the operation, gave not 
only depth to the defence but also possibilities and space for Israeli deep 
penetrations. 
In his article Israel's Defense Doctrine. Backgrounds and Dynamics, 
General Israel Tal describes the preconditions of the Israeli operational 
doctrine. The foundation was the struggle of the few against the many. 
According to Tal, classic military doctrine, as is usually acknowledged, requires 
a quantitative ratio of forces of 3 to 1 in favour of the attacker. However, these 
classic military principles were correct only at the tactical and operational level 
and not always at the strategic level. In Palestine, the ratio of force to space 
(territory and length of borders) also had to be taken into account because the 
defenders forces had to be dispersed and spread out over three fronts, 
whereas the attacker could concentrate his main effort and apply the centre of 
gravity doctrine. Therefore, in the light of the saturation of space by enemy 
forces, it was, according to Tal, the defender who had to enjoy quantitative 
superiority at the national-strategic level. However, because Israel could not 
permit itself this luxury, this led the Israelis to a simple conclusion; the few had 
to adopt the principle of delivering the first blow and conduct an offensive 
rather than a defensive war. Without offensive operations, it would also have 
been almost impossible to reach the doctrinal aim of decisive victory. Besides, 
defensive war would have been exhausting and against the short war concept. 
Nevertheless, defence was not totally out of the question. General Tal notes 
that if offensive means were to prove impractical, then the alternative, the least 
of all possible evils, would be a flexible defence aiming to destroy the enemy's 
forces even at the expense of a loss of territory. In a way it seems, however, 
that Tal's article — although it analyses Israel's problem of being inferior in 
manpower — tries to make excuses for offensive doctrine. Up to the Sinai 
Campaign, for example, interior lines were seen as a particular advantage for 
the Israelis; a possibility of compensating for the problem of quantity.343 
After the Sinai Campaign, a committee headed by Dayan's second in 
command and successor as Chief of Staff, General Laskov, was established to 
collect and study the lessons of the campaign. The most important recognition 
was that the IDF's main striking force would have to consist of armoured 
brigades in the future, though there were also still opinions that armour was 
not solely the property of tank commanders. Armour was seen as suitable for 
all Israeli conditions, although this was not, according to Shaul, the only 
possible choice. However, the quantity and quality of the enemies determined 
the decision. Tanks were seen as providing the flexibility that was needed 
while infantry was seen as too defensive against the enemies' mass. Thus, the 
outcome of the war, especially considering the performance of the armoured 
and air forces, was to accelerate the development of these branches, and 
343 Tal, p. 35 — 37. 
Saturation in space means that the force strength fills the battlefield with forces and, by 
doing so, prevents manoeuvring. 
See also Ne'eman, Yuval: This War of Our Resolution and how to Safeguard its 
Achievements, p. 12. 
According to Ne'eman, during the 1960s the operational theatre in the Middle East favoured 
the Israeli offensive doctrine; the armies on both sides were relatively small, and there was 
ample room for manoeuvre. 
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orders to develop the tactics of the armoured forces according to the 
experiences of the past war were given. In addition, tactical and operational 
lessons were drawn in particular from the battles at Abu Ageila. The lessons 
drawn pointed first and foremost to the need for enhancing the IDF's 
manoeuvrability and firepower yet again in order to achieve rapid and decisive 
victory in future conflicts.344 
The most important person involved in the evolution of Israeli fighting 
doctrine between the 1956 and 1967 wars was General Haim Laskov. 
According to Luttwak and Horowitz, Laskov's ideas on organisation, doctrine 
and methods of command in mobile warfare were published in Israeli military 
journals and "formed the most comprehensive statement of Israeli military 
doctrine". In addition according to Brian Bond, Laskov shared "a firm belief in 
the value of the indirect approach as a guide to strategic thought" with Yigal 
Yadin and Yigal Allon, but he also played a vital role in introducing Liddell 
Hart's ideas on mechanised warfare to Israeli commanders.345 
Liddell Hart's influence on Laskov's thinking can be seen in the 
correspondence between Laskov and Liddell Hart. Some three months after 
the Six Day War, General Laskov wrote to Liddell Hart as follows: "I think that 
one of the lessons amongst others that gave effect to armour is the one you 
mention in your The Tanks, volume two in your conclusion chapter. I made 
quite a drive to get people to read these books and discuss them, whatever 
344 Lanir, p. 20 — 22, van Creveld (1985), p. 198, Cohen, p. 148, interview of Colonel, Doctor 
Shai Shau and IDFArc., file 35/727/1957, file 937/1034/1965 and file 13018/1034/1965. 
See also Handel, p. 568, Dupuy (1992), p. 258, Asher, Jerry with Hammel, Eric: Duel for the 
Golan. The 100-hour battle that saved Israel, William Morrow and Company Inc, New York 
1987, p. 177 and IDFArc., file 31/684/1962. 
Handel mentions that one of the major sources of the IDF's military strength in the 1960s 
was learning lessons. 
According to Dupuy, before the withdrawal the Central Sinai was thoroughly surveyed, 
mapped and photographed. In addition the Israeli Command and General Staff College 
conducted a detailed staff analysis of the battle of Abu Agheila every year after the 1956 
War. 
According to Ashel and Hammel, Moshe Bar Kochba's (Brigadier during the Yom Kippur 
War) battle at the Ruafa Dam in particular was studied for many hours by every Armour 
School cadet. 
One of the divergent opinions on the future role of tanks was represented by the 11th 
Infantry Brigade which estimated that APCs and tanks would have accelerated its fighting 
ability if they only had existed. Another experience was that the brigade did not know how to 
fight in populated areas, which was also obviously the case for all the other brigades, 
excluding the paratroopers. Therefore it was highly suspicious whether the principle of 
massing tanks would also have been the right solution for fighting in all types of 
environment. 
345 Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 172 and Bond, p. 254. 
See also van Creveld (1998), p. 164. 
According to van Creveld, Laskov was the most professional and most educated Chief of 
Staff that the IDF had ever possessed. 
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you can say by way of critique — we are good disciples."346 Several central 
principles of the successful use of armour in the past can be seen in the cited 
chapter. Most of the examples are from German tank warfare in WW II, as can 
be seen in the following list: 
1. Flexibility in operational technique, which means a capability for cross-
country movement in concentrated formations. 
2. Connected to the previous point, an ability to engage and disengage tank 
formations swiftly from area to another. The holding of large tank formations 
in reserve is not flexibility. 
3. Time-saving command methods including operational independence and 
advanced radio-telephony control. 
4. The German Blitzkrieg techniques which, according to its developer 
General Heinz Guderian, were mobility, velocity and indirect approach on 
the enemy's rear areas. With a tactical combination of tanks and aircraft, 
the stroke in time and direction could be implemented unexpectedly and 
furthermore the exploitation of a tactical breakthrough leads to deep 
strategic penetration. Tactically, this breakthrough is a torrent-like process 
that seeks the enemy's weak points. Finally, variability of the thrust-points 
will paralyse and disperse enemy countermeasures and provide 
opportunities to maintain the initiative and tempo. 
5. Defensive combination of tanks and anti-tank guns to lure the enemy into 
traps.347 
The result of the examination of the Sinai Campaign was that Israel made a 
shift from the era of individual weaponry to the era of the crew-served weapons 
of modern warfare, as General Tal wrote in his article. In addition, a general 
tightening of control was also required to secure better co-ordination and 
prevent further misadventures between the air and ground forces and between 
the ground forces themselves in rapidly changing situations on the modern 
battlefield. However according to Shai, the rise of the Armoured Corps meant 
the loss of harmony between the arms. The day of motorised infantry fighting 
independently was largely over, which was more or less the case with 
paratroopers in airborne operations as well.348  
346 A letter from Laskov to Liddell Hart 12 April 1959, LH 2/13 and a letter from Laskov to 
Liddell Hart, 20 September 1967, LH 2/13. 
In the letter, Laskov tells Liddell Hart that he had studied and still studied Liddell Hart's 
books The Tanks. Laskov had got these books (two volumes) from Liddell Hart. They were, 
according to Laskov, an aspiration to any student of war and weapons". 
347  Liddell Hart, B. H: The Tanks, volume two 1939 - 1945, Cassell and Company Ltd., 
London 1959. The pages of the book mentioned in Laskov's letter are 452 — 454. 
See also Tiberi, p. 65 — 66. Tiberi's list of the fundamental principles of German armoured 
warfare are almost the same as Liddell Hart's list above. 
348 Tal, p. 27, discussions with Doctor, Colonel (ret.) Hanan Shai and interview of Doctor, 
Colonel (ret.) Meir Pa'il. 
According to Shai, during Laskov's tenure as Chief of Staff the Training and Doctrine 
Department of the General Staff became tank-dominated and the balance between arms 
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8.3. From thoughts to practise; an application of the German lightning 
warfare concept 
8.3.1. The birth of the "Constant Flow" doctrine 
It is justifiable to say that the Israeli concept of armoured warfare came into 
existence with a blend of principles adopted from abroad — mainly from the 
Germans. Since then they have been applied on their own terms. The same is 
true with General Laskov, as Brian Bond notes, "evidence of Liddell Hart's 
influence is indirect". One is also justified in saying that the principles listed in 
The Tanks and applied by General Laskov are not just Liddell Hart's invention, 
although they also contain his ideas on combined arms warfare and indirect 
approach. Nevertheless, whatever the origins of modern tank warfare; they are 
not so significant in this context. Instead, it is important that the Israelis read 
Liddell Harts texts and adopted an armoured warfare doctrine that was quite 
similar to the Germans from them.349 
However according to Bond, Laskov admired Liddell Hart's ability to express 
tactical ideas in simple language suitable for instructing troops. He also 
thought that Liddell Hart had expressed the importance of continuous 
movement in battle better than any other theorist. Nevertheless, the old ideas 
of manoeuvre, as updated to reflect 20th century military technology by Liddell 
Hart, coincided with Laskov's thoughts. They were also well matched to 
Israel's environment and doctrine. Therefore, one can agree with Bond when 
he says it seems reasonable to associate Liddell Hart's name with Laskov's 
doctrine." In addition, some people also tend to see Montgomery's influence in 
the background of the Israeli art of war; including Liddell Hart who said the 
Israelis had carefully read his indirect approach as well as experiences of both 
the German and Montgomery's armoured warfare, and then applied them with 
heart" in an article in Israel Today and the Jewish Times. However, it is difficult 
to show which particular principles of the Israeli military art have their origins in 
Montgomery and which in the Germans. The joint and independent operational 
command in a front or a theatre — including the services — is often only 
connected to Rommel, but it can also be connected to Montgomery. In 
was only achieved in the 1980s when the ground forces command was established. 
According to Pa'il, Laskov was a tank addict. 
349 Bond, p. 246 and 260. 
See also a letter from J. L. Wallach to Liddell Hart, 29 November 1967, LH 2/22 and a letter 
from David Kessler to Liddell Hart, 14 May, 1969, LH 15/5/304, part 2. 
In his letter to Liddell Hart, the editor of The Jewish Chronicle, David Kessler, tells of an 
interview with David Ben-Gurion that was conducted by a student named Mordechai Oren. 
One of the questions presented to Ben-Gurion was a question about the Blitzkrieg doctrine. 
Oren was interested in the Soviet Union's statement that the Israelis had adopted their 
doctrine of the Six Day War from Nazi Germany. According to Ben-Gurion, the Blitzkrieg 
doctrine was a technique, not a strategy for aggression against another country. It was used 
because it was a technique of modern warfare, no matter where it was from. When Oren 
continued We learned from the British and the Germans, so ZAHAL (= IDF) learned from 
Liddell Hart and Fuller?" Ben-Gurion answered "True, very much so". However, some Israeli 
scholars have considered the comparison of Israeli armoured doctrine to German Blitzkrieg 
doctrine strange and have preferred the term "lightning war. For example, Wallach says 
that the word Blitzkrieg always arises uneasy associations with Hitlerism". Nevertheless, the 
source of this association is mainly emotional; the meanings of the words are the same. 
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addition, Rommel is known to have stressed delegated decision-making, but 
Montgomery also stressed this from the mid-1920s. Only the tendency towards 
deep armoured penetrations seems to be more German than British (or 
anybody else).35°  
At the end of the 1950s, the results of the re-evaluation process of the 
fighting doctrine started to bear fruit. The ideas of the mobile infantry school 
were abandoned and the thoughts of the manoeuvre school and the armour 
school formed the basis of the armoured warfare doctrine. The revised 
doctrine was based on an offence of the armoured forces, supported by the air 
force and with intelligence suited to this purpose. Above all, the doctrine 
underlined pre-emption at the strategic level; a decisive breakthrough aimed at 
deep penetration and long-range pincer-movements at the operational level; 
and sudden strikes, raids and surprise action at the tactical level. These 
guidelines also necessitated changes in the IDF's operational principles, in 
command processes and in organisation.351  
Since the late 1950s, during Haim Laskov's tenure as Chief of Staff, when 
the aim to favour mobile operations was still growing, the Israelis adopted a 
new operational concept. According to this, troops constantly on the move 
would be safe while solid fortifications would be in danger. This led to a 
situation where the IDF, at least partly, abandoned the idea of trench warfare 
and static defence, including fortification preparations. The only exception to 
this concept was the territorial defence system that had already been 
developed after the War of Independence. As a matter of fact, the Israelis 
even built new agricultural settlements according to Yuval Ne'eman. However, 
these fortifications also served mobile operations. Settlements formed, as they 
had done earlier, a firm base for offensives and new settlements provided a 
better defensive position to contain enemy penetrations.352 
Heiman calls the new operational concept by the name of the "Doctrine of 
Constant-Flow Action". According to him, it was a synthesis of the ideas of 
350 Bond, p. 59 and 260, Hamilton, p. 174, 322, 459 and 461, Young, p. 60 — 61, Rippe, 
Stephen T: Leadership, Firepower and Maneuver: The British and Germans, Military Review, 
October 1985, p. 33 — 34, Fascinating Files of Liddell Hart, Israel Today and the Jewish 
Times, September 1, 1967, LH 15/5/315, part 2, p. 6 — 7 and Rees-Mogg, William: The faith 
and the army, The Times 17.2.1970, LH15/5/315, part 1. 
351  It may be a coincidence but at this time, in the beginning of 1960, Liddell Hart visited 
Israel and gave lectures at POUM (Pikkud U-mateh, the Command and Staff College). 
See a letter from Liddell Hart to Yuval Ne'eman (at that time Israel's Military Attaché in 
London) 7th December 1959, LH 2/18. 
The letter that Liddell Hart sent to Colonel Ne'eman contained the topics of Liddell Hart's 
planned lectures for the senior rank officers and student officers in Poum. These topics are 
interesting: The Future of Armour, The Future of Infantry, Organization of Forces for 
Rapidity and Flexibility of Command and Manoeuvre, Attack and Defence - their 
Comparative Power, The NATO Defence Problem in Europe, How Military Ideas have 
Shaped the Course of World History, The Possibilities and Problems of Limited War, The 
Dangers of Dogmatic Doctrine - as Illustrated by the Course of French Military Ideas before 
WW I and again before WW II and The Elements and Characteristics of Military Genius. 
352 Heiman, Leo: Israeli Army's Strategical and Tactical Doctrine, An Cosantoir, January 
1965, LH 15/5/307, p. 47 and Ne'eman, Yuval: This War of Our Resolution and how to 
Safeguard its Achievements, p. 11 — 12. 
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Generals Haim Laskov, Yitzhak Rabin and Avraham Yoffe. In Heiman's 
manner of thinking, this doctrine consisted of all activities behind the planning 
and implementation of Israeli operational doctrine while Rothenberg and 
Luttwak and Horowitz limit the concept of "Constant Flow" to only logistical 
principles in mobile warfare. According to them, "Constant Flow" was meant to 
push logistic support in mobile warfare to the forward lines in a constant 
stream without waiting for specific requisitions. In any case, it seems that the 
concept of mobility was not limited only to practical matters but can also be 
found behind the mental mobility at a planning level as well as behind the 
principles that pursued operational and tactical mobility. Therefore, although 
Heiman's definition of the "Doctrine of Constant-Flow Action" was not an 
officially proclaimed doctrine, the name can justifiably be used to describe the 
IDF operational doctrine that was developed in the late 1950s/early 1960s.353 
The basic pillars of the "Doctrine of Constant-Flow Action" were very similar 
to the German Blitzkrieg doctrine. According to Leo Heiman, they were defined 
as follows: 
Unconventional and unorthodox thinking, planning, and execution. Much 
more important than movement per se was mobility of the mind, which 
above all meant thinking several moves ahead of the enemy according to 
the situation. According to the Israelis, calculated planning could not be 
extended further than the deployment of troops and the general guidelines 
of logistical support.354 Planning was necessary, but the development of a 
353 Heiman (1965), p. 47 and 49 — 50, Rothenberg, p. 120, Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 175 and le 
Mire, appendix n:o 1. 
This study defines the "Doctrine of Constant-Flow Action" as the entity behind the pursuit of 
operational mobility since the late 1950s. In addition, by naming the doctrine according to its 
substance it is easier to handle the large number of different things connected to it. The 
"Doctrine of Constant-Flow Action" should not be confused with the more limited logistical 
concept of "Constant Flow". 
Laskov was appointed to the position of Chief of Staff after Dayan in 1958. Before that he 
served both as Chief of the Armoured Corps and as Chief of Operations. Yitzhak Rabin was 
responsible for the development of the doctrine up to 1958 and was later appointed to the 
post of the Chief of Staff in 1963. General Avraham Yoffe was responsible for the 
development of the doctrine at the end of the 1950s. 
According to Luttwak and Horowitz, it was the head of the Logistics Branch of the General 
Staff, Brigadier Matityahu Paled, who introduced and modified the American "Constant Flow" 
system of logistics to the IDF. 
354 See also Kahalani (1994), p. 409 — 411. 
Kahalani states that the slogan "every plan is a basis for changes" has usually been 
incorrectly understood. The common conception is that the Israelis don't use planning in 
their operations and therefore changes to operational orders are quite common. According 
to Kahalani, planning has been included in the Israeli command process and becomes more 
important the higher decisions are made. In this concept, changes should have been 
avoided, but if changes are required, the existing plan is the common foundation for these 
changes. The already existing and understood guidelines provide the subordinates with a 
base to understand the changes and their effect on the future. Without enough planned 
guidelines, troops would loose time due to the changes. As a matter of fact, in some cases 
changes have been very rare; for example, during the Six Day War, where Kahalani served 
as a company commander. Kahalani reveals that he understood the tasks and the goals of 
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situation could not be foreseen. When battles began, responsibility for 
operations was delegated to independent task forces. Therefore, general 
guidelines would be enough to provide direction for the decisions of the 
lower echelons. Heiman calls this "fluid mobility where the attacking force 
must resemble a flood of elusive quicksilver. Columns of varying sizes and 
constantly changing component units will by-pass the enemy and move on 
without being dragged into a prolonged battle." In addition, indirect action 
was stressed; i.e., flanking attacks, infiltration and attacks from the rear. 
This manner of thinking can be interpreted as being parallel to the contents 
of the "Strategy of Indirect Approach" and the concept of the "expanding 
torrent". In addition this parallels manoeuvre warfare theory, in which the 
planning process only starts after the use of success and in the pursuit 
phase; otherwise battles of attrition were to be avoided355. 
Follow the line of two alternatives to deceive the enemy's top command 
about what the real strategic-operational aims of the attacking forces are. 
This had already been central in Israeli doctrine in the Sinai Campaign and 
according to this the emphasis on surprising the enemy with deception was 
further strengthened. 
- Prepare two or more alternative sets of plans so that if something goes 
wrong or the offensive slows down, the attacking force could be switched 
over to the alternative track without any delays or confusion. 
- Moral blows (confusion, chaos, a stunned state of mind) were considered to 
be just as important as physical blows on the battlefield. On the other hand, 
territorial conquests were not considered important objectives or worthwhile 
gains. According to this principle, it was assumed that the only worthwhile 
gain to be pursued was the ultimate disintegration and disruption of enemy 
armed forces, which could be achieved by physical and/or moral damage 
inflicted upon the enemy army.356 
Unconventional and unorthodox thinking, planning and execution were the 
most important principles of the "Constant Flow" and the "red thread" to Rabin, 
who later was responsible for planning the Six Day War. This can be seen as 
being derived from Wingate and PALMACH. According to Yuval Ne'eman, 
Rabin and his staff continued and developed the organisational doctrines 
received from Yadin, and combined them together with the principles of 
Dayan. Yadin, Dayan and Rabin had all been Wingate's subordinates, and 
Wingate was especially known to have been a keen advocate of surprise and 
unorthodox planning. Brian Bond confirms this. In addition, Rabin himself 
mentioned Liddell Hart's name in this context. According to Rabin, Liddell 
Hart's doctrine of the indirect approach coincided with Israel's choice of 
methods, and had helped in providing the Israelis with a theoretical justification 
his superiors and during that war he was informed only by virtue of the briefings and orders 
given him before the war. 
365 Leonhard, p. 112. 
356 Heiman (1965), p. 49 — 50. 
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and elaboration of their strategy, which was designed to overcome her 
inferiority to her enemies.357 
Rabin emphasised the mobility of the mind, the ability to think several 
moves ahead of the enemy, react instantaneously, and take risks along the 
way. His basic principle was surprise, which was, however, reached by plans 
that struck the very root of established military concepts, theories and thinking. 
This strengthens Bond's view that the origins of Rabin's thinking lie more with 
Wingate than Liddell Hart. According to Rabin, operations that were successful 
in the past must not be tried again. This was also one of the principal reasons 
why Israeli generals were rotated at regular short intervals to maintain fresh 
operational minds at the top. In addition, this manner of thinking has 
similarities with Clausewitz's thinking. According to Clausewitz, "today armies 
are so much alike in weapons, training, and equipment, that there is little 
difference in such matters between the best and worst of them... Even the 
senior generals — divisional and corps commanders — have, as far as their 
efficacy is concerned pretty much the same views and methods. The only 
remaining factor that can produce marked superiority, aside from familiarity 
with war, consists of the talents of the commander-in-chief."358 
Interestingly, General Tal also wrote about the question above in 1978 when 
he analysed the IDF's past, and in many ways in lines that paralleled 
Clausewitz. According to him, purely from the materiel point of view, a regular 
army would always be superior to a militia army because, in theory, mobility 
was a function of the quality of the equipment. In the early 1960s, this was still 
mainly beyond Israel's economic and demographic resources. This seeming 
deficiency could, however according to Tal, be compensated for by the 
advantages of militia; the most important of them being the mental elements of 
motivation, initiative, daring, flexible thinking and improvisation. Despite the 
similarities, Tal's writing can not, however, be directly linked to Clausewitz. In 
the article, his name or influence is not mentioned. Instead, Doctor Shai tends 
to see Clausewitzian influence behind the Israeli military art during the 1960s. 
According to him, this can be seen in ingenious thinking that emphasised the 
mental aspects of the leadership process. In other words, the talents of the 
commanders, and flexible command, consisted of management, cognitive 
issues and principles that supported the command process.359 Although Shai 
doesn't stress the technical improvement of the IDF, it can be said that during 
the late 1950s and early 1960s the IDF invested in both the qualitative issues 
357 Ne'eman, Yuval: This War of Our Resolution and how to Safeguard its Achievements, p. 
6 and Bond, p. 248. 
In the early 1950s, Rabin studied at the British Staff College in Camberley. His connection to 
Liddell Hart originated from this. 
358 Ibid., Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 175 and Howard & Paret, p. 282. 
See also Lind, p. 7 — 8. 
Ideologically, German General Herman Balck favoured similar operational lines as Rabin. 
Lind names Balck as one of the most successful practitioners of manoeuvre warfare, 
according to whom there can be no fixed schemes in operations, situations are not identical, 
never do the same thing twice. 
359 Tal, p. 37 and discussions with Doctor, Colonel (ret.) Hanan Shai. 
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Prussian General Staff, which also forms a link to the German command 
system. 
There are also still other links to the Germans. Doctor Shai mentioned that 
several German Jews, the most important of them being originally an Austrian 
Jew — Fritsch Eisenstadt — interpreted German tactics for Jews in the first 
Haganah officer course in the late 1940s. Already at this time some ideas of 
the German Auftragstaktik were presented to Haganah and PALMACH. Later 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s the chapters of Liddell Hart's The Tanks that 
Laskov introduced to Israeli officers also dealt with the German command 
system. It is highly likely that these issues were discussed in those circles that 
developed the "Constant Flow" doctrine. In addition Ariel Sharon, who studied 
in 1957 — 1958 at the British Staff College in Camberley, wrote a research 
work entitled Command Interference in Tactical Battlefield Decisions: British 
and German Approaches that dealt with methods of command on the 
battlefield. However, the degree of Sharon's influence on the "Optional 
Control" principle in its early existence remains unclear, but later on Sharon 
was the Head of the Training Department for a short time before and for a 
longer time after the Six Day War and obviously rooted his ideas at least in his 
subordinates' thinking. Another interesting detail is that Liddell Hart helped 
Sharon find the sources for his essay, and in this way could have influenced 
Sharon at least indirectly. Therefore, Pa'il's statement that Israeli "Optional 
Control" was a derivative of the German Auftragstaktik complemented with 
British asymmetry seems to be justified.361  
In the "Optional Control" concept and in Auftragstaktik, the principal idea 
was delegation of decision-making; commanders would not lead their troops in 
battle with strict orders from a higher echelon, but with the overall operational 
scheme of their superiors. In addition, the Israelis based their chain of 
361  Interviews of Colonel, Doctor Shai Shaul and Doctor, Colonel (ret.) Meir Pa'il, discussions 
with Doctor, Colonel (ret.) Hanan Shai, Sharon, p. 160 — 161 and Ariel Sharon's 
correspondence with Liddell Hart in 1958; letters from Ariel Sharon to Liddell Hart 16 
September, 29 September and 15 October, 1958, LH 2/21, letters from Liddell Hart to Ariel 
Sharon 20 September, 10 October and 13 October, 1958, LH 2/21. 
Fritsch Eisenstadt also served in the Wehrmacht and the Jewish Brigade. He mostly had an 
effect on infantry tactics. The era of Jews who had served in the Wehrmacht was, however, 
rather short in the IDF as was obviously their influence. 
When Liddell Hart and Sharon met, Liddell Hart suggested that Sharon read Guderian's and 
Manstein's Memoirs and the Rommel Papers in addition to his books The Other Side of the 
Hill and The Tanks. According to Liddell Hart, "direct control", the concept of the commander 
being in the centre of the battle, was a prime cause in Rommel's success. Sharon, for his 
part, mentions that Liddell Hart's unconventional thinking has affected a lot of the IDF, and 
that he was also strongly in favour of Liddell Hart's ideas. 
In addition to Sharon, other Israeli senior officers — including Dayan, Laskov and Rabin -
also studied in Camberley. 
Pa'il also mentioned that quite generally the Israelis tend to see that during the past two 
centuries the German army has been the best armed force. Although Pa'il agreed about the 
performance of the Germans, in his opinion the British have been still better because they 
have been able to learn and adapt themselves according to the challenges of the battlefield. 
Also interview of Lieutenant General (ret.) Dan Shomron. 
General Shomron tends to also see Fuller's thoughts on the command process in mobile 
warfare as being behind Israeli applications. A link between "Optional Control" and the 
German Auftragstaktik can also be seen here. 
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information on accurate reporting, which, regardless of whether it was good or 
bad news, made it possible to evaluate critical factors of the battle realistically. 
Tactical and operational reconnaissance also held a central place; with "recon-
pull" tactics it was possible to find possibilities for taking advantage of an 
enemy's weaknesses. This manner of thinking was seen as being absolutely 
necessary in the always changing situations in mobile warfare. It was also 
seen as the only way of maintaining initiative and tempo.362 
To accelerate the decision-making process, Israeli task-force and unit 
commanders were only given general directives and expected to carry out their 
assigned missions by using their own judgment and initiative. The 
subordinates were trained to act according to the will of the commander, 
according to the "spirit" of the commander or according to the aim, and not 
only according to the task. Doctor Shai explained that this meant that 
subordinates in the IDF could, contrary to the German system, also change 
their task if the situation required it and if this change still fulfilled the 
commanders will or aim. According to Simpkin, nevertheless, the German 
subordinate commanders were also free to modify the task set for them. Thus, 
the real difference between Auftragstaktik and "Optional Control" seems to be 
rather slight. In any case, in the Israeli concept a force got its task, which could 
be a determined area of operations or direction or a concrete thing like 
capturing, for example, a certain ridge line that would form a part of the aim to 
destroy the enemy's reserves. The "recon pull" principle held a central place. 
The actions of the sub-units took shape according to an understanding of the 
aim and the situation on the battlefield. Subsequently one's own role in this 
entity was carried out independently, by understanding the spirit of the aim or 
the commander's will. In this context, the subordinate could change his original 
task if some other course of action better fulfilled the aim. In 1960, General 
Rabin summed this up by saying that "commanders and headquarters of 
armoured forces must be able to gather intelligence, process it, prepare 
orders, and issue them while on the move." With this aim, commanders were 
given daily, even hourly, objectives to attain; but only the objective or aim was 
important, how they would achieve it was their own business. Nevertheless, in 
this process superiors also had a possibility of exercising their optional control 
— that means passing over their closest subordinates to give additional orders 
straight to sub-units if it was necessary for the aim — but the unit commanders 
were still expected to act independently. In this latter case, the subordinates 
were, anyhow, responsible for reporting back continuously, but they did not 
have to wait for orders before making their command decisions — as in the 
classic two-way system. In addition, this type of command system didn't 
362 Sternberg, Charles A: The Arab-Israeli Six Day War of 1967: Essential Elements of 
Operational Art, Naval War College, Newport RI June 1995, p. 11. 
Sternberg quotes Colonel Gary D. Payton's (USAF) article in the Airpower Journal in Winter 
1993 in his study. Payton calls Israeli truthful reporting "intellectual honesty". This means 
that the commander can not be left uncertain about what is an estimate and what is an 
opinion. Therefore, the task had to be approached honestly with an open dialogue. This will 
ensure that the correct decisions are made. During the early days of the Yom Kippur War 
this system didn't work. 
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overcrowd the command posts and staffs; rather they maintained their 
mobility.363 
Although not a new way of thinking for Israeli commanders, the "Optional 
Control" process put demands on them. In the officers' selection process, 
emphasis was put more on intuitive thinking than on the technical skills of a 
super-soldier. According to van Creveld, commanders were trained in a 
manner to make them as little dependent on their superiors as possible in 
deciding how to act. Officers were taught that neat battle plans would 
invariably break down, the enemy would behave unpredictably and their own 
forces would never fight quite as planned. Therefore instead of trying to 
overcome confusion by regrouping after each breakdown, Israeli commanders 
were trained to keep their forces fighting and moving in the right direction. This 
all further strengthened the offensive spirit of the Israeli officer corps; the 
principle when in doubt — attack" was adopted as a solution to communication 
gaps and moments of uncertainty.364 
According to Leonhard, the critical problem with Auftragstaktik, and "recon 
pull" in particular, is that the ability to do it well is an unnatural one. The control 
of the uncertainty could, however, be tightened with training and managerial 
arrangements, and this was exactly what the Israelis did in the early 1960s. 
During 1962 — 1963 Colonel Meir Pa'il wrote a philosophical field manual that 
can be translated as "Combat Doctrine". This book — which was classified as 
"confidential" or "restricted" — was introduced in 1964 and was the only IDF 
manual that dealt with doctrinal issues up to the 1990s. According to Pa'il, this 
manual can be classified as treating both the tactical and operational levels of 
warfare. It also contained a historical framework of Pa'il's interpretations of 
such classics as; for example, Jomini, Clausewitz, Fuller, Liddell Hart and 
Miksche. The text was written to be as eternal as possible" because the 
problem of all manuals and doctrines was to see into the future, and therefore 
his own experiences in the past played a central role in "Combat Doctrine". On 
the whole, this manual, in a way, confirmed the thinking behind the "Constant 
Flow" doctrine.365 
The basic idea of "Combat Doctrine" was to teach Israeli officers to 
understand their superiors aim. Important in this context was the development 
363 Rothenberg, p. 120, Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 162 — 163 and 172 — 173, Heiman (1965), 
van Creveld (1985), p. 199, Gissin, p. 325 — 327, discussions with Doctor, Colonel (ret.) 
Henan Shai and Simpkin, p. 232. 
364 Van Creveld (1985), p. 199 and Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 175. 
The slogan when in doubt — attack" was used by the later Chief of Staff Lieutenant General 
Mordechai Gur. 
According to Luttwak and Horowitz, detailed tactical plans might have, however, been made 
but they were not binding. 
See also Zamir, p. 11. 
According to Zamir, the Israelis continuously tested their fighting doctrine in exercises; first 
minor tactics to ensure that sub-units could carry out their role and then battalion or brigade 
training. In addition, they also had skeleton exercises for officers and N.C.O.s. 
365 Leonhard, p. 116 and interview of Doctor, Colonel (ret.) Meir Pa'il. 
When Pa'il wrote the manual, he was the Head of the Doctrine Department in the General 
Staff, IDF. 
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of the ability to analyse an enemy's course of action and then one's own 
situation in the framework of aim, terrain, weather, and the problem of 
time/space in movement. Several principles of war — like maintenance of aim, 
surprise, concentration and security — were also introduced because they 
formed a base for systematic thinking, as was already discussed in the second 
chapter. Even so, the learning of a long list of the principles of war was seen 
as making officers "close-minded". Instead, because it was obvious that 
decisions did not get carried out as planned, open-mindedness was 
emphasised and subordinates were supposed to take the initiative 
independently. Pa'il calls this appreciation of the situation a combination of 
good planning and improvisation which, according to him, was the central 
secret of Israeli operational art. The second secret was indirect approach, 
which was, according to Pa'il, one of the main factors behind surprise. This 
was also written into "Combat Doctrine" and in this way links unconventional 
thinking to the operational principles of the IDF. In addition, the importance of 
reconnaissance at all levels in the context of independent decision-making was 
stressed in this manual because it enabled continuous movement.366 
"Combat Doctrine" was also a base for several other manuals that were 
published before the Six Day War. One of them was, according to Adan, the 
first theoretical manual of the Armoured Corps, which was also introduced in 
1964. This manual dealt with such issues as how armoured forces should be 
used in offence, defence, breakthrough battles; daytime, at night and in 
different geographical conditions. Until this time, the manuals of the armoured 
forces had been orders that dealt with technical issues about tanks and their 
battle techniques. In addition, according to Adan, at this time other manuals 
were also written in the Training Department of the General Staff, IDF, 
including for infantry.367 
On the whole, it seems that the IDF was able to find some clarity in the "fog 
of war" already during the early 1960s. The Israeli concept of a command and 
control system also seems to have been strikingly similar to the manoeuvre 
warfare theory that was, however, created only a decade later. While 
manoeuvre warfare theory stresses mission tactics, standardised interfaces 
between different command and control posts — including streamlining the 
responsibilities of fighting troops and support troops, the use of command post 
and staff procedures, and communications technology to be faster in the 
decision-making process — the Israelis invented all these already before the 
Six Day War. 
8.4. Discussions of organisations 
Organisations were also revised after the Sinai Campaign. The General Staff 
was organised somewhat like the Supreme Headquarters of Allied European 
Forces (SHAEF) during WW II. According to Shai, this was a consequence of 
General Rabin's studies at the British Staff College in Camberley. The purpose 
366 Interview of Doctor, Colonel (ret.) Meir Pa'il. 
367 Interviews of Major General (ret.) Avraham Adan and Colonel, Doctor Shai Shaul. 
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was to have a joint supreme command with three territorial theatre commands, 
with the air force and the navy as subordinates. According to Yuval Ne'eman, 
the difference from SHAEF was that the air force and navy functioned with a 
sort of split-personality: They were commands but, since they had more 
independence than the other branches, they were also part of the General 
Staff as "Super Special Staff bodies in the American sense", as Ne'eman 
notes. In the late 1950s and in the 1960s, when the authority questions were 
solved, this duality wasn't, however, a problem anymore. Territorial commands 
below the General Staff level were designed to be able to be in charge of three 
to six divisions. In addition, the functionality of the chain of command was 
tested in the great manoeuvres of 1960, directed by the Chief of the General 
Staff Division, Yitzhak Rabin, and thereafter tests were continued in annual 
exercises.368 
At the operational-tactical level, the Israelis were still considering three 
organisational choices at the end of the 1950s: Whether they should have 
divisions divided into brigades; only brigades with the three territorial 
commands playing the role of both the corps and division levels in addition to 
their area responsibilities; and both independent brigades and a number of 
divisions. The solution that was chosen was a modified Ugdah. The decision 
was based on three facts. The first was the growth of the mobilised strength; 
this necessitated a better functioning tactical-operational headquarters 
between the will of the Chief of Staff and the brigades. The second was the 
need to guarantee the concentration of power and the need for continuity. This 
was obviously a consequence of the difficulties with mass forces in the Sinai 
Campaign. The third fact was the need for flexibility. Therefore, some auxiliary 
units were transformed from brigade level to divisional level to relieve brigades 
of maintenance responsibilities and to enforce the primacy of the combat 
mission. Seemingly this decreased the status of brigades, which were still 
seen as the primary force. In practise, nevertheless, various combat tools 
could be integrated into the assault echelons at every level in accordance with 
their task. This, for its part, shows that ideologically the changes were rather 
slight and at this time the brigades — although they were kept as tactical 
formations — were still also able to implement operational tasks. On the whole, 
it can, however, be estimated that the organisational changes that were made 
improved at least the co-operation inside the Ugdahs and as a consequence of 
this also the possibilities of concentrating forces.369 
According to Yuval Ne'eman, the Israeli Ugdah looked somewhat like corps 
headquarters used to look in WW II. True, it had certain similarities, especially 
to the German divisions and corps, although Israeli organisations contained 
368 Zamir, p. 2 — 3, van Creveld (1998), p. 169 — 170 and discussions with Doctor, Colonel 
(ret.) Hanan Shai. 
The British had rather a lot of experience with joint staff procedures from WW II. 
After his return, Rabin was placed in the post of Chief of Operations. 
369 A letter from Yuval Ne'eman to Liddell Hart, Office of the Military, Naval & Air Attache 90-
4/667, 1 March 1960, LH 2/18, p. 2 — 3, Avidor, p. 65 — 66 and 68 — 69, Luttwak & Horowitz, 
p. 176 and Gawrych (1990), p. 69 — 70. 
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fewer men and were less fixed. In addition, the foundation behind the 
emphasis on flexible organisations was the same. Flexibility was needed to 
achieve operational freedom in an unorthodox manner. Nevertheless, there 
already were conversations whether a division should also be more organic in 
order to achieve good routine and co-operation in the early 1960s in Israel. 
Already after the Sinai Campaign, it was suggested that three permanent 
armoured Ugdahs be created; one for each territorial command. The tasks of 
the Ugdahs were defined according to the experiences of the Sinai Campaign 
that furthermore were connected to the experiences of armoured warfare 
elsewhere. According to this, the armoured formations would form an 
independent striking power that would be able to breakthrough, follow the 
successes and cut the enemy lines of communications. The term "fist ability", 
which before the Six Day War was beginning to describe the role of the 
armoured forces in the IDF, also appears in this context for the first time. At 
this phase the proposal was not, however, implemented but, in any case, the 
emphasis on more fixed combinations can already be seen in the early 1960s 
when the Armoured Command formed the nucleus of a divisional command. It 
was the only regular command of this type at the time.37° 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Ugdah, with its auxiliary units, formed 
a framework for two or more different types of brigades (infantry, parachute, 
mechanised and armoured). The emphasis on armoured Ugdahs, however, 
also prevailed in the early 1960s. Those Ugdahs that were committed to the 
Six Day War were quite generally called armoured divisions despite the fact 
that some of them consisted more of other types of brigades than armoured 
ones. However according to Pa'il, on the whole the amount of infantry on foot 
that would have been needed in terrain that was pathless and impassable for 
vehicles was in decline and in some Ugdahs was totally absent. Brigades were 
still organised in a triangular style, though support echelons were often 
transferred to the divisional level. However, brigades could also be reinforced 
370 A letter from Yuval Ne'eman to Liddell Hart 1 March 1960, p. 2 — 3, Avidor (1978), p. 68, 
Zamir, Meir: The Structure of the Israeli Army (1968), p. 10, IFDArc., file 35/727/1957 and 
file 937/1034/1965. 
The proposed organisation of the armoured Ugdah was as follows: an armoured 
reconnaissance battalion, three light and medium armoured battalions, an assault battalion, 
two mechanised battalions, two motorised battalions, an artillery and anti-tank regiment, an 
engineer regiment, a signals battalion, a quartermaster battalion and several auxiliary units. 
Despite this seemingly heavy organisation, this suggestion was seen as being more flexible 
than the Ugdahs of the Sinai Campaign. Instead, the headquarters staff, which was divided 
between the main and rear headquarters, was rather thinly manned, especially the main 
which consisted of a commander, operations officer, tactical staff for reconnaissance and 
commanders of different arms. It was estimated that the IDF could establish three Ugdahs of 
this type; the first from the 7th Armoured Brigade and from the 4th, 8th,  10th or 12th infantry  
Brigade, the second from the 27th Mechanised Brigade and 1St Infantry Brigade and the third 
from the 37th Mechanised Brigade and from the 2"  or 9th Infantry Brigade. 
The idea of constructing the armoured division from separate battalions that, later, could 
form brigades reflects the American concept at that time. On the whole, the organisation of 
the armoured Ugdah had strict similarities to the concept that Guderian presented in his 
book Achtung — Panzer! in 1937. 
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with additional combat and support troops, as had been the case before the 
1956 War.371  
8.5. The Armoured Corps in charge of the development of ground forces 
Beginning in 1956, there was a great increase in the armoured forces, which 
were seen as providing the most effective means of implementing the doctrine. 
This put the Director of Armour on an equal footing with the commander-in-
chief, ground forces: an echelon that did not exist in Israel at the time. The 
Director of Armour was to co-ordinate and supervise the joint tactical training 
of armoured, infantry, artillery, engineer and logistics units. According to 
Gunther Rothenberg, the three commanding officers of the Armoured Corps 
between the Sinai Campaign and the Six Day War, Generals Haim Bar Lev, 
David Elazar and Israel Tal shared the belief that armour could win the war 
alone. Each of these three men made their own different contributions to the 
armoured doctrine: Bar Lev developed the organisation necessary to deploy 
massive tank formations, Elazar devised new doctrine and acquired the much 
needed new equipment and Tal perfected the doctrine and raised maintenance 
and gunnery standards.372 
During the Sinai Campaign, Israeli armour doctrine relied on manoeuvre 
above all: tanks should not be used in direct assault. In the mid-1960s this was 
reversed. According to Gunther Rothenberg, the application of the Soviet 
fighting doctrine that Israel's enemies were supposed to apply was behind this 
development. According to the Soviet "Shield and Sword" doctrine, defensive 
lines blocking the major axes of advance formed the "shield" and the offensive 
element of armour in depth was the "sword". Therefore the Israelis presumed 
that enemy defences could no longer be bypassed without major clashes with 
the enemy. After considerable study by the committee headed by Colonel 
Avraham Adan, the Armoured Corps revised its tactical and operational 
methods. The shock effect came first, while speed was not seen as being so 
important anymore. Emphasis was put on massive daylight assaults on a 
brigade or even divisional scale. Nevertheless, even then the shock effect — in 
Luttwak's and Horowitz's words massed tanks operating as a mailed fist — was 
not planned to be used only in frontal attacks. A mailed fist meant striking deep 
into enemy territory with massive concentrations of armour and throwing them 
371 
 Gawrych (1990), p. 69 and a letter from Liddell Hart to Brigadier Zamir (Israel's Defence 
Attaché in London) 6 October 1967, LH 2/25, a letter from Brigadier Zamir to Liddell Hart 24 
October 1967, LH 2/25, IDFArc., file 35/727/1957 and interview of Doctor, Colonel (ret.) Meir 
Pa'il. 
An Israeli infantry brigade consisted of three infantry battalions and a regiment (battalion) of 
heavy mortars. An armoured brigade consisted of two tank battalions and one battalion of 
mechanised infantry. 
See also Dupuy (1992), p. 338. 
Dupuy, among others, calls the Ugdahs of the Six Day War armoured divisions. As a matter 
of fact, most of them can be seen as having been armoured divisions, but not all. For 
example, Brigadier Ariel Sharon's Ugdah consisted of three brigades and auxiliary units; of 
the brigades only one was armoured. 
372 Zamir, p. 10, Rothenberg, p. 121 and Bagnall, p. 195. 
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off balance, or out-manoeuvre as Pa'il puts this, rather than advancing along a 
wide front and establishing firm lines of communications. This concept was 
quite similar to the German concept in WW II and very near to the concept of 
the "expanding torrent" as well. The tendency to apply indirect approach 
methods; exploitation of psychological shock, maximum mobility and the 
simultaneous disruption of the enemy defences at many points were also 
maintained, but the main objective of the tanks became the enemy's tanks.373 
The new fighting doctrine also required changes in operational principles, in 
the battle techniques of the tank crews and in equipment. Battlefield mobility 
was redefined as the ability to move on the battlefield in the face of hostile fire. 
A central reason for this was the improvement of both the quantity and quality 
of tanks. However according to Luttwak & Horowitz, most Israeli officers were 
attracted at the time by the fast-tank concepts current in Europe. In any case, 
General Tal preferred the slower but more heavily armoured Centurion tanks 
over lighter and more mobile vehicles. Although some of Tal's ideas ran 
contrary to the conventional wisdom of armour officers in Israel and abroad, 
Tal's view led to the purchase of the quite slow but strong Centurions, which 
were able to manoeuvre in the presence of enemy fire. Like the British 
compromise in favour of battlefield mobility for heavier tanks at the expense of 
speed, the Israelis also preferred the tank more for its protection and 
operational range than its speed.374 
The second change was in the skills of the tank crews. This was a result of 
an exchange of tank gunfire on the Syrian border in 1964. In this fire-fight, 
which lasted almost a whole day, the Israelis were unable to destroy any 
Syrian tanks. According to Samuel Katz, this was a consequence of the 
philosophy of Israeli armoured warfare; reaching the target had been half the 
battle and while this was learned, the art of gunnery had been overlooked. 
General Tal ordered a stop to "macho" style "hit-or-miss" techniques, and a 
373 Rothenberg, p. 123, Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 91 — 92, van Creveld (1998), p. 160 and 
interview of Doctor, Colonel (ret.) Meir Pa'il. 
See also Churchill, Randolph and Winston: The Six Day War, Sunday Telegraph, July 9, 
1967, LH 15/5/315, part 2, p. 7. 
According to the Churchills, it was Yitzhak Rabin (Chief of Staff during the Six Day War) who 
used the phrase "mailed fist'. 
374 Rothenberg, p. 121 and 124 — 125, Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 190 — 191 and Bond, p. 254. 
Before the 1956 War, the tanks were to follow on transporters and their crews in buses. 
According to an interview of General Laskov by Brian Bond, battle speed had been equated 
directly with vehicle speed. 
See also Bagnall, p. 203 — 205 and Farris, Karl: Growth and Change in the Israeli Defence 
Forces Through Six Wars. U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pasadena 1987, p. 38 
— 39. 
According to Bagnall, the Israelis thought that a tank with an extended range is equal to 1.5 
or 2 tanks of a lesser capacity. In addition, they placed a special premium on tanks (like the 
Centurion) that had 20 tons more armour steel than the Soviet-made T-54's and T-55s. 
According to Bagnall, the Israelis also considered some sophisticated Western tanks to be 
too complex and unreliable for the battlefield environment. This opinion was later changed 
when the Merkava tank was built, though technical reliability had also improved by then. 
According to Farris, the IDF had some 250 Centurions, 200 M-48 Pattons, 200 modified 
Shermans and 150 AMX tanks before the Six Day War. 
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greater emphasis was put on effectively using the optimum range of long-
range tank guns. According to Katz, this led to the era of Tzalaf, the sniper, 
which meant training tank gunners to able to score long-range kills at up to 
2,000 metres. In addition, the crew members were trained to perform each 
others' jobs so that they could form a cohesive team and, if needed, take each 
other's place.375 
The third and most important change was made in the operational 
principles. The base for evolving a new combat technique for armoured, 
mechanised and infantry units was to conduct armoured battles as a 
continuous operation; sustained for up to three days within the "Constant Flow" 
doctrine. Nevertheless, when standards were set for armoured performance, 
the question of how long armoured units could move and fight without a break 
arose. In solving this problem, the Israelis had the benefit of experience with 
the use of independent brigades in the Sinai Campaign. The principle that was 
adopted was known as the "Conveyor-belt".376 
The "Conveyor-belt" placed primary emphasis on the tank forces; they acted 
like a "mailed fist" whose task was to open a breach in the enemy defences. 
Mechanised infantry forces were to follow in their wake to widen the 
breakthrough points by clearing enemy gun lines and trenches and by keeping 
the breach open for the first-echelon supply columns, whose task would be to 
extricate and repair fighting vehicles, and for the medical evacuation groups. 
The infantry on foot, with trucks or civilian buses, made up the third wave. Its 
task was to continue the mopping-up so that the mechanised infantry would be 
released to follow the spearhead of tanks, while securing the advance axis for 
the second-echelon supply columns such as the engineers, artillery, rear 
headquarters elements and service units.377 
The operational independence of the armoured spearheads was achieved 
with formations that were designed to be independent for 72 hours without 
supplies. Each column was accompanied by mobile maintenance units 
composed of both recovery and evacuation vehicles that continually pushed 
fuel, ammunition and other supplies up to the forward lines or back without 
waiting for requests. However, General Tal's favouring of main battle tanks led 
to an underestimation of the combined arms principle, according to which the 
role of support elements — infantry and other support forces like artillery -
would become more important as the thrusts went deeper into enemy territory. 
General Tal believed that heavy armour, with effective air cover, could fight on 
its own in Israeli conditions. In any case, the aim in this concept was to have 
mechanised infantry fight on the move. According to Pa'il, originally the 
375 Katz (1996), p. 66 — 68 and van Creveld (1998), p. 161. 
376 Wallach, J. L: The Israeli Armoured Corps in the Six Day War, Armor May - June/1968, p. 
43. 
See also Avidor, p. 70. 
According to Avidor, one way to pursue flexibility in Israel was to standardise repetitive 
functions like combat techniques. This would reduce the operational time between the issue 
of an order and its execution. The "Conveyor-belt" can be seen in this light. 
377 Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 292 and 295 and Dyster, p. 463 — 464. 
Support forces, like artillery and road construction units would move along the same axis of 
the mechanised infantry, sometimes just behind them and sometimes later with the second-
echelon supply columns. 
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mechanised infantry was also to find gaps in enemy lines. In addition, the 
mechanised forces had the demand of being able to fight dismounted. 
However, the reality was different. It was seen that the obsolescent half-tracks 
and the few self-propelled artillery units did not have enough cross-country 
mobility or protection to follow the armoured spearheads; not to speak of 
independent missions, which left the mechanised forces mainly with secondary 
mopping-up missions. This imbalance between arms was not revealed in the 
Six Day War because of the complete air superiority and the deficiencies of the 
enemy troops — especially in anti-tank defence — in depth.378 
The "Conveyor-belt" system had certain similarities to General Fuller's "Plan 
1919" concept and to his revised ideas for armoured warfare in the 1930s. It 
gave primacy to tanks and downgraded infantry and artillery. According to 
Fuller's concept, the attack would begin with tanks penetrating through the 
enemy front to destroy the enemy headquarters units some twenty miles in the 
rear. After this, infantry and artillery would hit the enemy front and when a gap 
opened up, a pursuing force of tanks accompanied by truck-borne infantry 
would exploit the opportunity. The "Conveyor-belt" principle also has strict 
similarities with the German Blitzkrieg concept. A chart of Fuller's "Plan 1919" 
can be seen in Appendix 11, and a picture of the "Conveyor-belt" principle is in 
Appendix 12.379 
378 Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 175 and 187, Rothenberg, p. 124 — 125 and 463 — 464 and 
interview of Doctor, Colonel (ret.) Meir Pa'il. 
According to the authors, the supply depots of the territorial commands would send forward 
as many supplies as the divisional logistics units could cope with, while divisional supply 
units would form smaller convoys to push forward to the brigades. When a fighting unit 
paused during the advance, it would be reached by a supply convoy ready to replenish it. 
The only limit in the flow of supplies was seen in the storage and vehicle capacity of the 
logistics units. 
379 Macksey: Tank Warfare. A History of Tanks in Battle, Rubert Hart-Davis, London 1971, p. 
31 — 33, Fuller, J. F. C: Armoured Warfare. An Annotated Edition of Lectures on F. S. R. III 
(Operations Between Mechanised Forces), Eyre and Spottiswoode, London 1943, p. 9, 18, 
25 — 27 and 29 and Fuller, J. F. C: Armoured Warfare. An Annotated Edition of Lectures on 
F. S. R. III (Operations Between Mechanised Forces), Greenwood Press, Westport 
Connecticut 1983, p. 124 — 127. This edition is a copy of the original one published in 1932. 
In the 1943 published edition, Fuller added his notes on WW II. 
See also Dyster, p. 128 — 130. 
According to Dyster, Fuller downgraded the role of infantry and artillery. The task of infantry 
was to aid the advance of tanks in certain circumstances; in mountainous and heavily 
wooded terrain and to protect vital supply and communication services. Fuller did not assign 
any special value to heavy artillery after the initial assault, because this element was difficult 
to move, and before WW II he did not place any special value on air power in the 
operational context. However, Fuller also envisioned lorries full of infantry, towed across 
rough areas by tanks equipped for the job, as well as artillery towed by tractors to keep up 
with the pace of the attack already in his "Plan 1919". After WW II, Fuller also put great 
value on air power operating in co-operation with tanks, which is revealed in his words we 
may see tanks and air planes forming one force and infantry a completely separate force." 
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8.6. Changes in the Air Force and Navy 
8.6.1. Preparations for pre-emption 
General Ezer Weizman succeeded General Tolkowsky as the Commander-in-
Chief of the Air Force. During this time the IAF achieved, according to Bagnall, 
a high standard of operational capability under an army dominated General 
Staff. This statement must be understood with the knowledge that the role of 
the IAF within the General Staff was more independent than that of the other 
branches. Already in 1962, Weizman outlined the IAF's future doctrine along 
the lines that Tolkowsky had already preferred before the 1956 War. Now also 
Weizman's great idea was to destroy the enemy's air power on his airfields, 
the proper place to defend Israel is in the skies over Cairo." Once the skies 
were open, the Israeli Air Force was to devote itself to its second task, 
supporting the ground forces. According to Cohen, Weizman had originally 
adopted the concept of hitting an enemy's airfields from a Czech officer in his 
first Messerschmitt course during the War of Independence. This officer had 
advised the Israelis to overcome the Egyptian Air Force in this way. At first 
Weizman, however, more favoured defending Israel's skies over Israeli held 
territory than over enemy skies, as already discussed.38°  
The missions of the IAF in the early 1960s — and also during the Six Day 
War — were both defensive and offensive; to shield the mobilisation and 
interdict the flow of enemy forces on the main axis, and to be a striking force. 
In the IAF this was interpreted as being implemented primarily with a pre-
emptive air strike, a principle already adopted before the Suez Campaign, but 
not used. The IAF thoroughly analysed its own and its enemy's strengths and 
weaknesses in their two previous wars. According to this analysis, the IAF's 
senior officers determined that air superiority and ground support were just the 
means that the Israelis most needed to achieve victory. This led to the 
selection of specific aircraft, weapons and tactics.381  
With fewer tactical aircraft than its enemies had and with certain limits in 
defence allocations, the emphasis in the development of the IAF was put on 
the purchase of just one aircraft type; on multipurpose fighter-bombers. 
According to Dennis Sager, Israel sought a way to paralyse its enemies by 
exploiting the offensive strengths of air-power: ubiquity, speed, range, potency 
and flexibility. In the meantime, the Israelis tried to minimise their inherent 
38° Bagnall, p. 214 — 215, Jones, Ronald D: Israeli Air Superiority in the 1967 Arab-Israeli 
War: An Analysis of Operational Art, Naval War College, Newport RI June 1996, p. 8, 
Rothenberg, p. 127 and Cohen, p. 151 and 168 — 169. 
The quotation is in Rothenberg's book. 
According to Cohen, Weizman pretended that he did not understand why the commanders 
of the Armoured Corps yearned for more sophisticated tanks if several squadrons could 
destroy the enemy armoured corps while they were still on their way to the battlefield. This 
shows that Weizman — despite being a keen fighter pilot — also understood the air force's 
role in supporting ground forces, though mainly through battlefield interdiction. 
381 Jones, p. 13, Ne'eman, Yuval: This War of Our Resolution and how to Safeguard its 
Achievements, p. 12 and Young, p. 45. 
Despite the plane sales and the limited amount of joint — mainly technical — research with 
the French, the development of the IAF was its own business. 
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offensive weaknesses; the most important of them was their technology. 
During the early 1960s, the IAF was in a period of transition. Orders had been 
placed for Mirage Vs and A-4 Skyhawks with new missile technology, but 
deliveries did not arrive before the Six Day War. Nevertheless, these 
deficiencies were not crucial because the IAF favoured acting through a pre-
emptive attack in which they could select the priorities, time, place and 
weaponry to achieve their operational objectives.382 
The Israeli approach was a weapon optimisation based on the already 
existing Mirage ///'s and Super Mysteres, on high quality pilot training and on 
an effective ground system. Maximum offensive firepower for the destruction of 
runways and aircraft relied, for its part, on a bomb designed specially for 
destroying runways at high speed and low altitude, and on 30-mm guns 
incorporated in existing planes to replace the original rockets.383 
The pilot training programme put a heavy emphasis on the skills of 
individual pilots. The new programme — which was in use up until 1990 — was 
formed during Weizman's tenure, though it was codified after the Six Day War. 
The basic principles behind the training were combat readiness, realism in 
training and innovative tactics. These ideas were not far away from the 
philosophy of the ground forces. Combat readiness meant daily training 
exercises in operational squadrons, realism meant that exercises were carried 
out with planes fully loaded as if it was the "real thing" and innovative tactics 
meant delegating authority to squadrons to make decisions with regard to 
tactics and training, but also in fitness and combat readiness. Gunnery had top 
priority. Although fighter pilots were taught missile tactics, their training 
stressed classic dog-fighting and strafing ground targets at slow speeds and at 
close range. In addition, the pilots learned to approach their targets slowly and 
carefully for accurate delivery, paying no attention to fire from the ground. The 
standard formation was a pair of fighters acting in tandem. This emphasised 
the innovative tactics that gave the pilots a lot of freedom to take decisions 
382 Sager, Dennis F: In Search for Leverage: David versus Goliath in 1967, Naval War 
College, Newport RI June 1997, p. and 7 — 8, Rothenberg, p. 136 and Jones, p. 13. 
The Mirage Vs never arrived in Israel because of a change of direction in French sales 
policy. 
See also Churchill, Randolph and Winston: The Six Day War, Sunday Telegraph July 9, 
1967, p. 7. 
Ezer Weizman, who was Chief of Operations during the Six Day War, explained the Israeli 
air war doctrine before the war as follows: "Bombers are expensive animals and had little 
application to Israel's defence problems. We need an Air Force capable to destroy any 
enemy force that might be sent to Israel and which can give support to ground forces." This 
meant high performance multi-purpose aircraft. 
383 Sager, p. 4 and van Creveld (1998), p. 162. 
According to van Creveld, the runway-busting bomb was named Durendal after Roland's 
sword. A parachute slowed it down and a rocket engine drove it deep into the runway. 
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 combat. The programme of the Flight Course can be seen in Appendix 
1  
The importance of the ground crews was not left unnoticed. Effectively 
arranged, they made it possible to increase the number of sorties in a given 
time period; a very valuable trait for a country with quite a small number of 
planes. This fact was already understood in Israel before the 1956 War, but it 
really became apparent during the Six Day War. During the early 1960s, the 
IAF put top priority on the maintenance of the maximum number of serviceable 
operational aircraft at any given time; there was to be a 90 percent rate of 
combat-ready serviceable aircraft. The ground crew handling of planes was 
practised and adjusted, time and again. By doing this, the time to refuel, rearm 
and prepare a plane for take-off between two missions was reduced to 7 — 10 
minutes. This all meant that the number of sorties per aircraft was increased in 
individual cases to even eight per day as compared to a sortie or two per day 
in the Arab air forces. With only a little bit more than 200 fighter-bombers, the 
Israelis could expand the practical strength of their air force to be equivalent to 
a much larger air force.385 
In the early 1960s, the Operations Branch commander, Rafi Har-Lev, and 
the top helicopter navigator, Rafi Sivron, began the first discussion at the IAF 
headquarters of a new and broad plan for the early neutralisation of all Arab air 
bases. In 1963 the plan was named "Operation Moked" and it was connected 
to systematic air intelligence started in the same year. Since then it has been 
repeatedly updated as intelligence information has dictated. According to 
Cohen, "Operation Mokecf was devised on a model similar to that of the 
German "Operation Barbarossa" in June 1941 when the Luftwaffe eradicated 
much of the Soviet Air Force before it could even take-off. In addition, the IAF 
headquarters was transferred in 1966 from Ramie to IDF headquarters in Tel 
Aviv to streamline the command process and enable the centralised use of the 
air force component. This made the birth of the joint command system a 
concrete fact.3 6 
384 Gissin, p. 399 - 400 and 402 — 403, Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 197 and 199 — 200 and 
Cohen, p. 154 and 156 — 158. 
In 1990, the structure of the Flight Course was changed to face the challenges of the 
twenty-first century. 
According to Luttwak & Horowitz, the IAF was unique among modern air forces in not 
accepting the fashionable missile theory of air combat. This choice was based on the 
assumption that even supersonic fighters would not engage each other at supersonic 
speeds. Therefore, most air duels would still have been dog-fights fought at short ranges. 
This supposition proved to be right during the Six Day War. 
See also Rubinstein, Murray — Goldman, Richard: The Israeli Air Force Story, Billing and 
Sons Limited, London 1979, p. 66 — 67. 
The principle of fighting in tandem formation during a war is similar to Luftwaffe practice 
during WW II. 
388 
 Gissin, p. 396 — 397, Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 228 — 229 and Williams (1989), p. 108. 
According to Gissin, the other air forces achieved only a 50 — 60 percent rate of serviceable 
aircraft. 
388 Cohen, p. 183 and 193 — 195. 
See also Nordeen, Lon: Fighters over Israel. The Story of the Israeli Air Force from the War 
of independence to the Bekaa Valley, Orion Books, New York 1990, p. 71. 
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General Mordechai Hod brought the plans for "Mokedn up to date when he 
succeeded General Weizman in the post of Commander-in-Chief, Air Force. 
During Hod's tenure the principle of weapon optimisation intensified. Pilot 
training against simulated airfields in the Negev desert was started to reduce 
the chance for error and continued until this complex operation became 
routine. The payload loss due to operational errors was reduced by improving 
target intelligence; the enemy was kept under continuous surveillance to 
ensure that the right aircraft would be sent with the right weapon-load over the 
selected target. Because of the need for maximum bomb loads to be carried 
by a maximum number of aircraft in every wave, a greater degree of autonomy 
was given to each air base in controlling the activities of its squadrons.387 
Pilots also occasionally trained in air combat in their operational missions 
against Arab planes, mainly in Israel's airspace. However, battle experience 
was rare, and therefore the Chief of Staff already proposed in 1961 that the 
Israelis abandon the traditional methods of restraint. Permission to cross 
borders in pursuit was then given by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol. In addition, 
pilots were also trained systematically against a captured Syrian MiG-21 from 
1966 onwards. This aircraft was rotated between squadrons to get experience 
of the character of the plane and train pilots for operations against the plane, 
which formed the backbone of the interceptors in the airforces of Israel's 
enemies. In addition, operational deception was started to saturate Arab air-
warning systems; routinely every day the Israelis launched large numbers of 
aircraft in the morning over the Mediterranean, then they disappeared and 
returned to Israel at low-level below Arab radar.388 
8.6.2. The birth of the helicopter squadron 
The 1956 Sinai Campaign revealed some deficiencies in the IDF's air transport 
system. Cargo planes could, of course, transfer troops and material according 
to need but mostly in one direction. In most cases, rescue and evacuation 
operations far behind enemy lines were not possible with Dakota and Noratlas 
transports. This convinced the Israelis of the need for helicopters. However 
according to Cohen, the role of helicopters in the IDF was not clear at first and 
different opinions on their use existed. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion had already 
wanted helicopters to maintain contact with the blockaded Jerusalem before 
the establishment of the state. Since then Chiefs of Staff had envisioned the 
Nordeen translates "Moked' as "Focus", 
387 Rothenberg, p. 136, Sager, p. 12 — 13, Cohen, p. 195 and Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 197. 
Obviously the simulated air attacks were already started before Hod became C-in-C, IAF. 
Before this assignment, General Hod was responsible for operations in the IAF. 
See also Churchill, Randolph and Winston: The Six Day War, Sunday Telegraph, July 9, 
1967, p. 7. 
After the Six Day War, Ezer Weizman denied the existence of a detailed plan by saying that 
The plans are like bricks. They can be used one by one to build a structure as the situation 
develops. We don't go in for preconceived and therefore, inflexible master plans." Within the 
ground forces this was partly true at a tactical level, but not within the IAF. The air operation 
was based on thorough planning and training. 
388 Cohen, p. 160 and 181 and Jones, p. 11. 
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use of helicopters according to their own interests; Yigal Yadin planned to use 
helicopters for rapid deployment of infantry battalions, Moshe Dayan saw them 
landing commando units deep in enemy territory as an alternative to the 
airdrop, and Haim Laskov — a tank advocate — felt that they would aid in the 
destruction of tanks.389 
After several years of evaluation, the Israelis decided to purchase a force of 
vertical-lift aircraft. According to this decision, the Sikorsky S-55s came into 
service; in air and sea rescue, coastal patrol and airborne ambulance missions 
in late 1956. However, Israeli helicopter pilots were more interested in the 
helicopters role in fighting missions and requested permission to examine the 
French helicopter activities against the National Liberation Front in Algeria. 
After this research, the Israeli Ministry of Defence decided to purchase five 
Sikorsky S-58 helicopters, which could carry ten men with their gear. In 
addition, an inter-branch team was established to develop combat theories.390  
In the IAF, helicopters were still considered transport aircraft and fighting 
missions were seen as a fantasy. However, their primary function as pilot 
rescue craft was a reason to keep them in the IAF, though this did not improve 
their status. There was also a proposal to take the helicopters from the IAF 
and place them in the hands of the ground forces. However, realism and 
several advantages in training and support systems, as well as economy of 
forces and the principle of simplicity in the command system, were also 
reasons to keep helicopters in the IAF. With such a small number of 
helicopters, control on a centralised basis was seen as the best solution. In 
addition, according to Cohen, Weizman's appreciation of helicopters was 
limited, although he thought that an airdrop was the quickest and most efficient 
method for landing an infantry brigade on enemy territory. It is obvious that 
Weizman thought chiefly of fixed-wing aircraft for airdrop missions.391  
The helicopter squadron, the Inverted Sword Squadron, was established in 
January 1958 under the command of Uri Yarom. In the original plan it was to 
be a wing, but because all the money had been spent on fighter-bombers, the 
IAF was left with poor helicopters despite great plans for the transport network. 
The squadron became operational in 1962 when it got an additional 24 
Sikorsky S-58s from West Germany. Combat missions started soon after this 
in co-operation with the Intelligence Branch's special troops. Data on these 
operations is quite sparse, but according to Cohen, the commander of a 
commando unit, Avraham Arnan, was able to assure both field units and the 
389 Cohen, p. 163. 
39° Nordeen, Lon: Fighters Over Israel, Orion Books, New York 1990, p. 59 and Cohen, p. 
164. 
According to Cohen, two Sikorskys had already been purchased before the Sinai Campaign, 
but without any doctrine they were used as flying taxis. 
Eliezer "Cheetah" Cohen himself had trained as a helicopter pilot after the 1956 War and 
later became commander of an Israeli helicopter squadron, the Inverted Sword Squadron. 
Also interview of Doctor, Colonel (ret.) Meir Pa'il. 
Pa'il was one of the early supporters behind the idea of using helicopters in combat tasks. In 
his thinking, helicopters represented the potential to manoeuvre and indirect approach. 
391 
 Cohen, p. 151, 164 — 165 and 168 — 169 and Marshall, Thomas J: Israeli Helicopter 
Forces: Organization and Tactics, Military Review, July 1972, p. 95. 
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Central Command of the utility of helicopters in missions of this type. 
According to Rubinstein and Goldman, the tactics applied in these anti-
guerrilla operations were adopted from the American helicopter tactics in 
Vietnam.392  
In 1966 Israel purchased 12 large Super Frelon helicopters and formed a 
new squadron from them. Nine of them entered service by the 1967 War. 
These helicopters were each able to carry 30 soldiers with their gear. This 
finally was a turning point in the underestimation of helicopters. Training with 
paratroopers was started, air-lift exercises were conducted and techniques of 
evading enemy interceptors were practised.393 This all meant that with two 
squadrons of helicopters, constituting about 10 percent of the IAF, the Israelis 
were — in theory — able to transfer a force equivalent to fighting elements of 
almost two battalions at a time everywhere within the range of the helicopters. 
However full of potential this was, the use of the air element in mobile warfare 
was not understood before the Six Day War. Plans for major airborne 
operations together with armoured spearheads and Air Force ground support 
were not produced. 
8.6.3. The Navy — unrealised plans 
The Navy's role in the early 1960s was modest. However, two different types 
of threat were foreseen. The first was a sea-embargo, which was not a 
decisive threat. The General Staff was thinking in terms of a short war, in 
which the Navy — a small force suitable mainly for coastal operations — would 
have no influence on the outcome. The other was the threat that the Arab 
navies could cause to Israeli civilian settlements and to ground operations in 
wartime. The second threat was a real one, but a response did not materialise 
in the late 1950s in the form of arms procurement. According to Williams, the 
Navy came "a low third in the order of procurement priorities." 94 
In the years following the 1956 War, the Arab Navies — first and foremost 
Egypt — were reorganised and modernised, largely along Soviet lines. The 
392 Ibid, p. 164 and 166, Rubinstein & Goldman, p. 85 and Nordeen, p. 59. 
The commando unit was obviously the anti-guerrilla unit of the General Staff, Sayeret 
Mat'kal or its predecessor. 
393 Cohen, p. 167, Nordeen, p. 59 — 60, Marshall, Thomas J. (1972), p. 94 and 96 — 98 and 
Rubinstein & Goldman, p. 86. 
According to Marshall, the helicopter squadrons also trained with the captured MiG-21 to get 
a look at the capabilities of their opponent, and also with their own jets. A formation, which 
could be expanded to several equivalent groups, consisted of three choppers; leader in the 
centre. They flew abreast at about 100 m intervals, having in this way enough room to 
manoeuvre without endangering the formation. When a helicopter was attacked by a fighter, 
the chopper was to turn toward the attacker and climb. When the range closed, the 
helicopter was autorotated, manoeuvring from side to side. This kept it under the enemy's 
line of attack and forced the continual lowering of the attackers nose giving him only a short 
time to lock-on. 
394 Ne'eman, Yuval: This War of Our Resolution and how to Safeguard its Achievements, p. 
12 and Williams (1989), p. 254 — 255. 
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major changes were an increasing emphasis on submarines and the 
introduction of missile boats. However according to Dupuy, the Arabs were not 
ready for immediate action in the wake of the Six Day War, although a number 
of contingency plans were in existence.395 
 
This arms race awaked anxiety in Israel's Navy. Before the 1967 War the 
Navy was still a small-scale copy of a great power navy; consisting of old 
destroyers, several submarines and motor torpedo boats. This force was 
poorly suited for Israeli needs and doctrine because it could provide no 
significant striking power. Finally late in 1962 with the promise of available 
funding, this imbalance led to a development program, which according to 
Luttwak and Horowitz was a "concept for an organic navy, a naval force of 
missile boats and small submarines that could be integrated in the operations 
of the rest of the Army."396 
The background of the development process was similar to that of the Air 
Force. Louis Williams describes this process in his book The Israel Defense 
Forces. Because of a lack of money for purchasing a large quantity of different 
types of vessels, the Navy needed multi-purpose boats capable of offensive 
action, able to defend themselves against a variety of threats and appropriate 
for patrol duties. This description coincided with the picture of a fast-moving, 
small-crew platform of different weapons systems. The problem was that this 
concept did not exist anywhere at the time. Therefore, the Navy wrote up its 
own specifications; commissioning sophisticated major warships according to 
its own concepts for the first time instead of acquiring them from other navies. 
Work on transforming the ideas into reality was started in conjunction with 
West German shipbuilders. However, because of political pressure from the 
Arab League, the Israelis had to transfer the programme to a shipyard in 
Cherbourg, France.397 
None of the new missile boats had been delivered by May 1967, although 
the threats had materialised. Therefore, the Israeli Navy had to compensate for 
its inferiority with changes in its operational plans. The Israeli Navy adopted 
the principle of operating in two defensive perimeters. Destroyers and 
submarines were to intercept and defeat hostile forces before they approached 
Israel's coastal waters, while patrol and motor-torpedo boats were to form an 
inshore patrol. In addition naval commandos, a unit called Flotilla 13, were to 
395 Dupuy (1992), p. 327. 
396 Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 394 — 395. 
See also Lorch, p. 61. 
Submarines were not purchased. However, no one doubted that the Navy also needed 
submarines, but considering the enormous costs of a submarine programme, it was not 
accorded top priority. Nevertheless, Germany agreed to finance the IDF's submarine 
programme in the 1990s, which was, according to Lorch, one of the most positive and 
lasting effects of the Gulf War. 
397 Williams (1989), p. 261 — 262 and Dupuy (1992), p. 327 — 328. 
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act offensively in forward defence by attacking enemy craft in their home 
ports.398 
On the whole, when discussing the development of Israeli doctrine and 
organisation after the 1956 Sinai Campaign, the Israelis were able to balance 
the needs of doctrine and the performance of troops in the Armoured Corps 
and the Air Force. This also shows the main direction of the views behind the 
operational thinking, although these ideas were not unanimous. Within other 
branches of the ground forces and in the Navy, the primacy of the tank-air 
force component resulted in small allocations. This left them without new 
equipment, and in the case of infantry and artillery in particular, downgraded 
their status and finally reduced their level of training. However, in the Six Day 
War and its aftermath these deficiencies were not yet revealed. 
398 Rothenberg, p. 164, Dupuy (1992), p. 328 and Katz, Samuel M: Flotilla 13: Israel's Naval 
Commandos. United States Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1993, p. 119. 
According to Katz, Flotilla 13 was known also as Kommando Yami. Its model was the Italian 
Naval Assault Teams of WW II. 
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9. THE SIX DAY WAR; A LIGHTNING WAR 
Handel's statement about the volatility of pre-emptive strategy to trigger 
unplanned confrontation came true in the Middle East in 1967. In May 1967 
the territorial crisis between Israel and her neighbours escalated into a 
demonstration of force and finally Israel applied her strategy of denial 
approach and implemented a pre-emptive strike. It can be said that the overall 
strategy failed because the deterrence power of the IDF was inadequate to 
prevent the war. Nevertheless, with no room to manoeuvre the Israelis could 
not afford to let the Arabs get the first blow in.399 
From the view point of the IDF General Staff, the Six Day War can be 
divided into four main phases: the fight for aerial supremacy and the wars on 
the Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian fronts. Air strikes against enemy air 
defences were started on 5 June at 7:45 AM. In practise, this phase was 
already over by the late afternoon of the same day. After getting almost total 
aerial supremacy, the Israeli Air Force concentrated on ground support. 
Ground operations on the Egyptian front in the Sinai were launched 
simultaneously with the first air strikes and continued for four days up to 8 
June. This phase ended in the destruction of the Egyptian Army in the Sinai 
and in the conquest of the Sinai Peninsula. On the Jordanian front in 
Jerusalem and in the northern West Bank, the battles also burst into flames on 
5 June, lasting up to 7 June. During this phase, Israeli troops conquered all of 
Jerusalem and occupied the West Bank. The final phase consists of the 
conquest of the Golan Heights on 9 — 10 June. In addition, there were naval 
engagements both in the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea. Naval 
operations did not play a central role during this war as well. Maps of the major 
Israeli operations during the Six Day War can be seen in Appendix 14. 
Trevor Dupuy states that President Nasser of Egypt found himself drawn 
into the commitment of major forces against his better judgment. This seems 
obvious and can be expanded to Israel's other neighbours as well. This all also 
reflects the lack of Arab war strategy at that time. Military objectives, plans and 
the readiness of forces were not in balance. This shows that despite the 
growth of forces and the closing of the Straits of Tiran the Arabs probably had 
no intentions of launching an imminent attack.4m  
399 Handel, p. 538 and Bagnall, p. 198. 
See also Tal, p. 27. 
According to Tal, the Israelis delivered the first blow because of the circumstances and as a 
result of a specific plan, not because the theory of the first blow had become axiomatic in 
the IDF's doctrine. 
400 Dupuy (1992), p. 235. 
See also Wallach J. L: The Israeli Armoured Corps in the Six-Day-War — June 1967, LH 
2/22, p. 1 and IDF Air Force Intelligence Paper, June 1967, LH 15/5/304, part 3. 
According to Wallach, it was obvious that on 26 May 1967 a full state of alert had been 
declared in Egypt and at least from that particular date a full-scale offensive against Israel 
was being considered. Wallach based his statement on the captured Egyptian Eastern Air 
Command's documents in EI-Arish. According to this interpretation, the Egyptian intention 
was to wipe out the Israeli Air Force in the first action and then to cut off Eilat and the 
southern Negev from the remainder of Israel. The Syrian intention was to launch a two-
pronged offensive quite similar to the one in 1948/49, one via Nazareth and the other one 
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According to Zvi Lanir, the Israeli military also went to war without operative 
political aims; that is, without strategic war objectives to guide it. However, 
Dennis Sager states that there was a loose military strategic objective, to 
reduce the military threat from the neighbouring Arab countries and regain 
access to the Straits of Tiran for Israeli shipping. This sounds reasonable. At 
the operational level, the aim of transferring the battle to enemy territory was 
also already properly adopted. The Operations Branch of the General Staff 
had prepared two plans for the possible war. The first one, "Atzmon", was 
limited in scope. It entailed the occupation of the Gaza Strip and its southern 
flank near El-Arish until Egypt agreed to open the Straits of Tiran. The second 
plan, "Kardom", was broader and its objective was to capture the mountain 
chain in the eastern Sinai up to Jebel Libni. Neither of them was implemented. 
Moshe Dayan, who succeeded Levi Eshkol as Prime Minister, expanded the 
area to be captured so that it also included Sharm-el-Sheikh. However 
according to Dayan, the Suez Canal was not the original objective. Therefore, 
the operational success determined the extent of Israel's achievements in the 
end, as Moshe Dayan noted: The army simply presented me with a fait 
accompli." After the war, this all still caused continuing political stalemate in the 
peace process of the Middle East.401  
At the operational level the Six Day War was, however, a great success for 
the Israelis. Based on past wars, Israeli leaders believed that if they were able 
to neutralise the strongest military power in the region — the Egyptian Army -
the rest of the Arab alliance would also fall. Therefore according to Chief of 
Staff Yitzhak Rabin, the Israeli operational idea was as follows: 
- First and foremost attain control of the skies by means of a sudden and 
massive attack to destroy the enemy's air power. 
- Transfer the war to the enemy's territory and defeat the enemy's forces as 
quickly as humanly possible. 
south of the Sea of Galilee, both axes finally aiming to converge on Haifa. The mission of 
Jordan was obviously to seize the Israeli part of Jerusalem, to split Israel in two between 
Tulkarm and the Mediterranean Sea and to paralyse Israeli airfields within artillery range. 
Nothing, however, shows that there was a decision to implement these plans. 
401  Lanir, p. 26 — 28, Sager, p. 6, Wallach, J. L: The Israeli Armoured Corps in the 
Six-Day-War - June 1967, LH 2/22, p. 5 — 6 and van Creveld (1998), p. 210 — 211. 
See also King Hussein: My War with Israel - 2, Sunday Telegraph, September 22, 1968, LH 
15/5/315, part 2, p. 7. 
Lanir has quoted Dayan's words from Moshe Gilboa's book Shesh Shanim-Shisha Yamim. 
According to Lanir, the denial strategy connected to the military goal of decisive victory was 
quite successful; it not only thwarled the enemy's designs, but also paved the shortest road 
to peace. This did not come true although the Israeli government declared itself willing to 
withdraw from the occupied territories in return for a peace agreement during the first few 
months after the war. 
According to King Hussein, the Six Day War brought Jordan and Egypt closer. A separate 
peace agreement with Israel was impossible and the question had to be solved multi-
laterally. 
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- Destroy the Egyptian Army (the main objective) and conquer the Sinai 
through three axes of advance.402  
On the other fronts, the strategic objectives of the war were to secure the 
West Bank and attack and exploit the Golan Heights, though how this was to 
be done was obviously not precisely planned. With the Jordanians, the Israelis 
were content to maintain a defensive posture and avoid any provocation that 
might bring Jordan closer to Egypt, and the Israelis doubted the Syrians would 
enter the war at all. Therefore, except for the Sinai front, the operational 
objectives were not planned in detail before the operation, as was also the 
case with the tactical objectives on all three fronts.403  
According to Peter Young, the Israeli plans fulfilled the classic concept for a 
major battle; collision of the advanced troops; struggle to obtain air superiority 
and exhaustion of the enemy's reserves; a decisive great attack or counter-
attack; and finally the exploitation of success once the enemy's lines had 
broken. The same was true with the air operations in a limited war context. 
Peter Young divides the air operations into three phases; the destruction of the 
enemy's air potential — preferably on the ground; interdiction and the 
destruction of the enemy's power to supply his armies; and offensive air 
support of the ground forces. At the planning level this can be thought of as 
having been as Young described. However, in the execution at operational and 
tactical levels, the aim of favouring unconventional thinking, indirect approach 
and manoeuvre prevailed. The Israelis were not locked into a particular 
scheme, with the exception of deception, which turned out as planned when 
the Israelis tried to give the Egyptians the impression that they were repeating 
operational plans equivalent to the plans in the 1956 War.404 Strengths, orders 
of battle and the losses of the Six Day War can be seen in Appendix 15. 
402 Rabin, Yitzhak: The Rabin Memoirs. Boston-Toronto, Little, Brown and Company 1979, p. 
101 — 102, Sternberg, pi 45 and Sager, pi 6. 
See also Lanir, p. 26, Ne'eman, Yuval: This War of Our Resolution and how to Safeguard 
its Achievements (1967), p. 7 and a postcard from Yuval Ne'eman to Liddell Hart in the end 
of 1967 (date missing), LH 2/18. 
According to Lanir, Rabin's formulation of the order did not differ from the new formulation 
made by Dayan. According to Ne'eman, Rabin was the one who made the plan because he 
was responsible for operating the military machine. However, Dayan, who also played a role 
in defence and war policy, made the decision to implement the plan. 
4°3 Sager, p. 6, Smithers, Jimmy D: The Israeli Defense Forces Operational Syncronization 
during the Six Day War of 1967, Naval War College, Newport RI February 1997, p. 3 and 9, 
Liddell Hart, B. H: Strategy of a War (1968), p. 19 and van Creveld (1998), p. 182. 
404 Young, p. 85 and 102. 
See also Weller Jac: The Breakthrough at Rafa, June 1967, Army Quarterly and Defense 
Journal, July 1968, pi 176. 
Weller states that dummy tanks were used in the southern part of the Sinai to give the 
illusion of a divisional sized force instead of the brigade that was really there to mislead the 
Egyptians into supposing that the Israelis were concentrating their troops for an 
encirclement of Umm Katef - Abu Ageila as had happened in the 1956 War. 
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9.1. Fight for air superiority 
The Israeli pre-emptive strike was a well thought-out plan made by the General 
Staff, which operated in the Six Day War for the first time as a joint supreme 
command of the armed forces. Israel had reason to fear a Pearl Harbour-type 
attack. Her airforce was concentrated on only four main airfields, and had it 
been destroyed, it would have meant a threat to the whole civilian population. 
However, it is obvious that the threat of an overall Arab attack was not 
imminent despite the massive force concentration on Israeli borders. 
In the weeks prior to the 5 June, "Plan Moked" was updated according to the 
current intelligence information. The Syrians were expected to react slowly, not 
until the first wave had been completed and therefore almost the entire IAF 
was sent to destroy the Egyptian Air Force. Only 12 planes were left to cover 
inner Israel. Offensive air operations against Jordan and Syria were to be 
initiated only after these forces attacked Israel. Meanwhile three Ugdahs 
started their movement west along the three central roads of the Sinai.4°5 
The attack on the Egyptian Air Force was a classic example of indirect 
attack on the Arab centre of gravity. Behind this thinking many scholars and 
researchers tend to see a Clausewitzian influence. True, the Israeli plan had 
certain similarities to Clausewitz's concepts, which stressed the direct 
destruction of the enemy's armed forces by attacking its centre of gravity. To 
avoid a war of attrition and shatter Arab morale, the Israelis attempted to 
concentrate the maximum amount of airpower very quickly against the 
enemy's critical vulnerability. By doing that the Israelis were able to gain air 
superiority and subsequently use air power against enemy armour, artillery, 
fortifications and troop concentrations. Besides, the surprise and speed made 
it possible to maintain operational momentum and dictate the tempo of the 
operation. This gave the Israelis freedom of movement in operational 
manoeuvre. In order to concentrate against one enemy at a time, it was 
planned to engage Jordanian, Syrian and Iraqi forces selectively.406 
General Hod, Commander-in-Chief of the IAF, divided "Operation Moked" 
into three phases: establish air superiority, destroy aircraft and destroy 
runways. With the help of the Israeli intelligence organisation A'man, which 
specialised in signal intelligence, the IAF knew exactly where every Egyptian 
combat aircraft was located. In addition, IAF pilots had been continuously 
provided with updated photos and other information on their assigned targets. 
Of this thoroughness, General Hod said at a press conference given after the 
war in Tel Aviv in June 1967: For 16 years we lived with the plan, we slept 
with the plan, we ate with the plan. Constantly we perfected it." To implement 
405 Cohen, p. 196, Tal, p. 27, Ne'eman: This War of Our Resolution, p. 6 and R.A.Ci Centre 
Bulletin No 4, Dec 1968, The Arab/Israeli War compiled by Tactical School, RAC Centre, 
Digest of RAC Centre Study Day - 29 Feb 68, LH 15/5/315, part 2, p. 17. 
406 Jones, p. 8, Sager, p. 9 — 10, discussions with Doctor, Colonel (ret.) Hanan Shai, Cohen, 
pi 184 and Howard and Paret, p. 258, 595 — 596, 618 — 619. 
According to Cohen, the decision to launch the attack several hours after dawn was made 
fourteen months before the war when Weizman had stated that the Egyptian Air Force 
should be destroyed between breakfast and lunch when the peak of morning activities had 
already decreased. 
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the plan, each aircraft had a specific mission to destroy a specific target. 
Runways and aircraft, MiG-21 fighters and Tu-16 bombers, had first priority. 
Air defence radar sites were authorised targets of opportunity. The IAF also 
first avoided attacking early warning and air defence assets because it allowed 
them to concentrate their efforts on achieving the main objective of destroying 
the airstrips and planes. However, prior to and during the attacks, C-47 
transports dispensed chaff along the Israeli/Egyptian frontier, and other 
electronic countermeasures were also used to disrupt Egyptian radar and radio 
communications, and also to deny electronic intelligence to the many other 
forces monitoring the Middle East. Finally, to saturate Egyptian defences, 
attacks were implemented with almost incessant waves, which continued also 
throughout the first night supported by illumination by flares.4°7 
Egypt was not the only target of the air operations, Syrian, Jordanian and 
Iraqi airfields were also attacked; the total number being 25 bases. The latter 
were in retaliation for the bombing of Israeli targets and were commenced 
later, as planned, after noon. The IAF made almost 500 sorties during the first 
three hours. The IAF's operational objective, air superiority over the Sinai, was 
achieved in six hours and by the end of the first day more than one thousand 
sorties had been made. This created the paralysis that also led to a swift 
victory on land. By the end of the war, IAF fighter-bombers had, according to 
Williams, flown 3,280 sorties — close to three per pilot for each day. A total of 
450 — 500 Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian and Iraqi aircraft had been destroyed, a 
little less than 400 of these in IAF strafing attacks on the ground and 60 in 
aerial combat. The price to the IAF was 69 aircraft hit, of which 49 were total 
losses.4°8 
407 Sager, p. 7 and 11 — 13, Nordeen, p. 68 and 71 and Smithers, p. 7 and 28. 
A'man and Mossad had infiltrated Egypt's military, political and social establishments. In 
addition A'man's signal intelligence efforts provided information on the disposition and 
intentions of Egyptian forces. 
Smithers describes the air operation in detail. Phase one consisted of four sequential waves 
of 40 aircraft, where each wave consisted of ten flights of four aircraft attacking each of the 
ten airfields for a total of 160 aircraft. Attacks against each target consisted of one bombing 
run against the runway, and two or three strafing passes against the parked aircraft; all in a 
very shorl time — ten minutes. After a ten to twenty minute pause, this sequence was 
repeated again for phase two targets. According to Sager, 94 percent of the Egyptian 
aircraft on the airfields were destroyed with 30mm guns. The results were amazing, though 
interpretations of methods used in this success varies. 
See also Dupuy (1992), p. 246 and Churchill, Randolph S. and Winston S: The Six Day 
War, Heinemann, London 1967, pi 81, Churchill, Randolph S. and Winston S: The Six Day 
War — 4, Sunday Telegraph July 16, 1967, LH 15/5/315, part 2, p. 7. 
According to Dupuy. the Israelis also used guided bombs similar to the American Bullpup to 
destroy the parked aircraft. 
According to the Churchills, 23 Egyptian radar stations (16 of them in the Sinai) were put out 
of action by the IAF, but not until the evening of the 5 June. 
The use of electronic countermeasures is also revealed in the newspaper article of the 
Churchills where the King Hussein of Jordan says that "funny things happened to our 
radars." 
408 Dupuy (1992), p. 247, Sager, p. 9 and Williams (1989), p. 112 — 113. 
See also Cohen, pi 253 and Cordesman & Wagner, p. 18. 
According to Cohen, the IAF flew 3,250 sorties during the War. 46 aircraft were lost in 
attacks on ground targets and only three in aerial combat. Cordesman and Wagner use 
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The IAF umbrella, i.e. air supremacy, during the war was incontrovertible 
largely, according to Cohen, due to the flight-control network that had been 
developed since the 1956 War. This network proved its flexibility and 
advanced management of the bombing runs of "Operation Moked". It also 
allowed the Israelis to employ the principle of manoeuvre by quickly re-
targeting formations from planned targets to new ones of greater importance 
when required or according to the battlefield damage reports. This all made 
short turn-around times possible and in practice multiplied the effect of the IAF 
on its targets.4" 
At the General Staff, the control of air power was centralised. According to 
Smithers, the IAF headquarters functioned as an operational wartime theatre 
command, in addition to its peacetime roles, having authority to direct the 
theatre air power. However, after getting air superiority, control and allocation 
of all ground support missions were implemented by an air operation office and 
forward air control units within each command. At wing level, an equivalent 
emphasis on flexibility, like the ground forces had in their "Optional Control" 
principles, can also be seen. Raanan Gissin describes this in his dissertation 
by saying that the IDF/IAF Command, Control and Communication doctrine 
(C3) was an "institutionalised form of command bypassing". The principles that 
were already in use during the Six Day War can be described as follows: On 
the ground all formations and squadrons were under the direct command of 
the base or wing commanders, who also participated in tactical and 
operational planning. Once formations were airborne, they would come under 
the direct control of the commander of the air force or his designated deputies 
within the Commands. This principle shortened the chain of command 
necessary both in air operations and in ground battles. Nevertheless, base or 
wing commanders also maintained individual decision-making power, 
especially in aerial battles. Therefore, in many cases they also personally lead 
their formations in the air both in the Six Day War and in the Yom Kippur War 
of 1973; often ignoring the prohibition of the General Staff. This, of course, did 
not change the flexibility in air control, it only personalised the command of the 
squadrons in the air, though this course of action could have endangered 
commanders' missions at the base.'" 
Already during the first day of fighting, the IAF achieved the operational 
objective of air superiority which allowed it to start interdiction and ground 
more generous statistics. The more precise numbers that are shown in this study are 
included in Cordesman's and Wagner's range. 
409 Cohen, p. 242 and Sager, p. 11. 
See also Churchill & Churchill (1967), p. 82, Smithers, p. 17 and Springer, Rita A: Operation 
Moked and the Principles of War, Naval War College, Newport RI May 1997, p. 6. 
Before the war, the IAF had adopted a principle where pilots provided battle damage 
assessments of their mission during each sortie debriefing. Returning pilots described their 
maintenance problems to the appropriate experts who were waiting for them after the flights 
to fix the aircraft with the right tools and parts, including armament. According to Springer, 
this combat maintenance procedure is also in use today in the United States Air Force. 
The Churchills describe the timetable of the IAF flights as follows: on the average 22 
minutes flight to the target, 7 min over the target, return to base 20 min, ground turn-around 
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410 Smithers, p. 16 — 17, van Creveld (1985), p. 159 and Gissin, p. 384 — 386. 
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support. Fighter/ground operations were exploited on all three fronts. On the 
Sinai front, the IAF battered the retreating Egyptian forces, especially in the 
Mitla Pass area. On the West Bank, the IAF succeeded in blocking many of 
the narrow roads through the Jordanian hills and was also used in Jerusalem 
to support the defenders before the arrival of the reinforcements. On the 
Golan, aerial bombardment was used to soften up the strong Syrian positions 
on the heights overlooking the Jordan Valley. However, the average daily 
number of sorties by the IAF dropped from the numbers of the first fighting day 
to a quarter that number in the following days. According to Cohen, the 
explanation for this is not due to the losses; rather it was a consequence of the 
fact that only a few of the ground force's commanders requested the IAF's 
support. Therefore, the pilots complained that the full air support of the ground 
forces had not been used until the second day of the war. The ground forces 
also failed to feed the air force early intelligence information about their next 
targets, and so, instead of receiving close and organised support, they had 
received only partial assistance. In addition, Cohen stresses that the ground 
troops commanders had not had great expectations for the IAF prior to the 
war. Ground support had been a second priority task. Therefore it had been 
neither trained for nor was there a solid organisation for co-operation at 
formation level.411  
In a way, there were also similar low expectations for the use of helicopters 
in fighting missions. Therefore, despite the fact that the Israelis had more than 
three brigades of trained parachute troops and were able to heli-lift a force 
equivalent to two battalions simultaneously, airborne operations were quite 
rare. In the Sinai, a heliborne parachute battalion was used in a classic 
manner to disperse Egyptian efforts and eliminate their artillery in the Abu-
Ageila — Umm Katef area. Sharm-el-Sheikh was also captured by heli-lifted 
paratroopers, though without fighting. On the Golan Heights, heliborne troops 
were used on a number of occasions in the highland area to seize key terrain 
ahead of the advance, but in only in small combinations. During the Six Day 
War it was not unusual to assign choppers to an operation for a period of 
several days. Nevertheless, the overall command of helicopter units stayed 
within the Air Force.412 
9.2. Operations in the Sinai 
9.2.1. Egyptian deployments 
Egyptian forces in the Sinai totalled about 130,000 men and some 1,000 tanks 
organised into five infantry (one mechanised and one PLA division in Gaza) 
and two armoured divisions (one a divisional task force). The initial Egyptian 
"Plan Kahle was based on mobile defence aimed at luring the Israelis deep 
into the Sinai and then launching a series of counterattacks. Only screening 
forces were deployed in the border area. The first defensive line consisted of 
411 
 R.A.C. Centre Bulletin No 4, pi 18, Sager, p. 7 and Cohen, pi 238 and 252. 
412 Dupuy (1992), p. 338, R.A.C. Centre Bulletin No 4, p. 27 and Marshall (1972), p. 95. 
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two infantry divisions in a well-defensible ridge belt 20 — 40 km from the 
border. This force group was backed by the second defence line some 20 km 
from the first. The operational reserve, consisting of the armoured divisions, 
was deployed between and behind these lines.413 
According to Samuel Katz, the Egyptians had invested a lot of effort in 
transforming the Northwest of the Sinai into a large, fortified military set-up to 
protect itself and to serve as a base for an attack on Israel. However, during 
the demonstration of force in May 1967 the Egyptians made several changes 
that left little of the original plan intact. The result was that a much larger force 
of the Egyptian Army than was initially planned was deployed very close to 
Israeli border. This left the Egyptians vulnerable to Israeli breakthroughs. In 
addition, most of the planners of Kahir had shifted out of the General Staff. 
Therefore, even the possibility of fixing the plan was out of the question. As a 
result, the Egyptians moved into the Sinai without having their military 
objectives and operational idea in balance.414 
Despite these changes, the Egyptian defensive fortifications were based on 
the Soviet "Shield and Sword" principle. The defensive "Shield" blocking the 
major axes of enemy advance consisted of troops in fortified positions of three 
long channels, one after the other combined together with positions for heavy 
machine guns, antitank canons, and tanks in well-hidden trenches. In addition, 
the front entrenchments were protected with minefields. Behind these lines 
was the "Sword", the armour concentrations. However, although the Egyptians 
knew where to keep their tanks and how to stage a counter-attack, their 
reserves were either dug-in or too far away to be committed for a counter-
attack at the right time. This gave the Israelis the possibility of penetrating into 
the Egyptian operational depth. On the whole, this concept was a result of the 
expectation that defensive lines could no longer be bypassed and major 
clashes with enemy armour were unavoidable. However, Soviet doctrines were 
copied without a major attempt to adapt them for the different circumstances of 
the Sinai. With a limited number of troops in the expanses of the Sinai, the 
defensive lines were not continuous. Therefore, each "Shield" was stretched 
out to the point where its flanks were covered by neighbouring forces or by 
impassable terrain. This gave the enemy the possibility of deciding the battle 
by concentrating its forces and breaking through the lines. In a flanking attack 
against a trench, even from the front, there was only a small force facing the 
attacking power. This was a possibility for the Israelis, who knew the Egyptian 
deployments quite well. In addition according to Israeli Sinai commanders, the 
413 Dupuy (1992), pi 240 — 241, Gawrych (1990), p. 77 — 78 and Menzel, Sewall: Zahal 
Blitzkrieg. The Sinai Campaign of 1967 Exemplified Modern Warfare, Armor 6/1986, p. 27. 
414 Gawrych (1990), p. 77 — 78, Katz (1996), pi 74 and Crow, Scott D: Six Days in 
1967...Operational Art in the Sinai, Naval War College, Newporl RI February 1996, p. 5. 
According to Crow, success in an operation depends on an operational idea that must 
portray the broad vision of what the operational commander intends to do and how he 
intends to do it. This did not come true with the Egyptians and can also be interpreted as a 
sign of their intentions not to launch an imminent attack. 
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trenches were not constructed very well, obviously because of the changes in 
"Kahir.415  
However, the most severe restrictions the Egyptians had were in offensive 
capabilities both at the tactical and the operational levels. According to Leo 
Heiman, the Egyptians and Syrians also applied the Soviet model in armoured 
tactics. This meant acting at divisional level, which was dependent on efficient 
communications and command principles. Lacking these, the Arab divisions 
moved only in columns, which are usually understood as operational 
formations advancing along their tactical axis in an organised pattern; capable 
of battle on the move, but straight ahead and only on a limited scale to their 
flanks. This made the columns vulnerable to ambushes. These tactics also 
preferred to deploy for action in a linear formation before meeting the enemy, 
while only the leading column could engage the enemy in the case of a head-
on clash. These patterned and centralised operational principles were 
inadequate for mobile warfare against the Israelis acting in a 360-degree battle 
with a decentralised command system. In addition, the Arabs used to dig in 
tanks which deprived them of their main advantage, mobility. This also 
coincided with the state of mind of the Egyptian commanders and troops within 
the fortified positions. The Egyptians only considered the passive element. The 
Egyptian commanders were statically minded and also lacked the will or 
capacity to use the considerable armoured resources at their disposal in an 
offensive manner as was also the case at the lower tactical level. According to 
Bagnall, the Egyptians had not mastered the art of mobile warfare at any 
level.416  
9.2.2. Ugdah Tal — a mailed fist 
Jimmy Smithers shows the Israeli operational objectives in the Sinai in his 
study The Israeli Defense Forces Operational Syncronization during the Six 
Day War of 1967. General Yitzhak Rabin, the Israeli Chief of Staff, devised a 
plan with three phases for the Sinai ground operations. The major objective of 
phase one was to release the two northern roads into the Sinai by neutralising 
the Egyptian defences in the Rafah — El-Arish and Umm Katef — Abu Ageila 
areas. Once this was accomplished, phase two would consist of three divisions 
enveloping the Egyptian centre of gravity in the central Sinai and blocking the 
415 Rothenberg, p. 123, Luttwak and Horowitz, p. 234 — 235. Katz (1996), p. 75 and What 
Happened to the Soviet doctrine?, Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, June 23, 1967, 
LH 15/5/315, part 2, p. 9. 
In the newspaper article, Israeli commanders in Sinai, Gavish, Tal, Sharon and Yoffe, were 
interviewedi 
See also Simpkin, p. 51. 
Simpkin calls the "Shield and Sword" the "Hammer and Anvil". The principle is the same; 
"Anvil" consisting of defensive forces (though in today's terms this force should also be 
mechanised) and "Hammer", a mobile tank force. According to Simpkin, the "Anvil" can also 
be an "Anvil of Fire"; an area which is not occupied by forces but is defended with firepoweri 
The Egyptians did not use the "Anvil of Fire". 
415 Heiman (1968), p. 15 — 16, Bagnall, p. 190 and 192 — 193 and R.A.C. Centre Bulletin No 
4, p. 18. 
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Egyptian escape routes in the mountain defiles east of the Suez Canal. The 
operational COG of the Egyptian ground force consisted of Egypt's "Sword" 
forces, the 4th and Shazly's Armoured Divisions, and the 3rd Infantry Division, 
which was in reserve in the Jebel Libni — Bir Hassna region. The final aim was 
to destroy the trapped Egyptian forces. According to Jac Weller, this plan 
relied heavily on two principles also taught by Liddell Hart: deep penetration 
and indirect approach. One can largely agree with this. However, nothing could 
be accomplished by taking desert territory; the enemy land forces had to be 
defeated. Therefore, in the Israeli plan, deep penetrations were to disorganise 
the enemy and make possible the type of fluid warfare that the Israelis were 
used to applying. In addition, the Southern Command commander Major 
General Yeshayahu Gavish's solution of pushing fast tank detachments as 
rapidly as possible in depth to set up road blocks astride the routes leading out 
of Sinai can be seen as an example of positional dislocation. With this move, 
the Israelis were able to shift their operational offensive to tactical defence. 
Besides, this revealed the Israeli aim of taking advantage of Egyptian 
weaknesses; to force them into movement.417 
The Israelis committed three Ugdahs and two independent brigades in 
Sinai. This totalled some 70,000 men and 750 tanks, which means that the 
Israelis were remarkably inferior to the Egyptians in pure numbers and greatly 
inferior if compared to the classic force ratio of 3:1; thought to be needed in the 
offence. The Israeli ground offensive begun 15 minutes after the first air attack. 
According to van Creveld, of the four days that the campaign in the Sinai 
lasted, only the first, the breakthrough phase, was planned in any detail; the 
rest was pure improvisation including the role of the Air Force in ground 
support. Therefore, the overall plan made by General Gavish had a lot of 
similarities to the Sinai Campaign in 1956. In 1967 the Israelis also had three 
main axes of movement and two independent brigade sized arrays. In addition, 
all these formations were made as independent as possible and had their own 
axes of advance. Combined operations by forces larger than one division were 
not used, except the commitment of Ugdah Yoffe through Ugdah Tal. This 
simplicity proved to be effective again in the always changing situations on the 
mobile battlefield. Therefore, the task of the Southern Command consisted 
mainly of assigning axes of advance among its three divisions, laying down 
boundaries, and allocating air sorties and reserves — which the Southern 
Command in practice did not have because reserves were internal in Ugdahs. 
417 Long, Charles B: Analysis of the Six Day War, June 1967, ACSC/EDCC, Maxwell 
Alabama, April 1984, p. 9, Sinai Front. The Six Day War Description of Combats by 
Commanders, I.D.F. Spokesman's Office, July 1967, description of O.C. Southern 
Command Brigadier Gavish, p. 2, Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 249 and Weller (1968), pi 176. 
See also Smithers, p. 3 and 9. 
Smithers speaks of tactical objectives. However. they can be seen as being more 
operational than tactical; the objectives were directed against the Egyptian defence plan, not 
so much at winning tactical battles. 
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However, five brigades of the forces of the Ugdahs were ear-marked for later 
use by the Southern Command.418 
In the opening phase, the Israelis gave the Egyptians the illusion of having 
their centre of gravity on the southern part of the front. A brigade with 
additional dummy tanks served as a feint division ready for an offensive. This 
gave the Israelis two advantages. First, it made it possible to avoid directly 
confronting the Egyptian strengths in their dug-in positions. Second, this 
dislocation enabled the Israelis to concentrate their forces for the initial 
breakthrough in the central and northern parts of the Sinai, where the road 
network was a precondition for further operations. Penetration of the Egyptian 
lines and attack from unexpected directions made the type of manoeuvre that 
the Israelis excelled at possible. By concentrating their divisions, by 
manoeuvre and by a skilful selection of objectives the Israeli commanders 
succeeded in building up a local superiority.41  
The operations of the Ugdahs were very dissimilar. They fought in different 
conditions and were therefore organised according to the mission. Despite 
these preconditions, all the operations were implemented in the spirit of 
mobility. Brigadier Israel Tal's Ugdah best represented the Israeli armoured 
warfare developed in the years before the war. Tal massed his forces against 
the Egyptian defences. Although it was a frontal attack, Tal had very little 
choice because an almost continuous belt of fortifications faced his forces. 
According to Rothenberg, Tal, who had received instructions from Chief of 
Staff Rabin to achieve a decision at the earliest possible moment, was also 
aware that much depended on the initial victory, which would establish the 
psychological and moral climate. According to this concept, the timing of the 
ground offensive was changed as late as the last night before the beginning of 
the operation. Pa'il states that initially the Israelis had planned two aerial blows 
before the start of the ground offensive. On the last night, he suggested to 
Rabin that the ground offensive should be synchronised with the aerial 
offensive to take advantage of the morale blow. This change was made, Tal's 
offensive was moved five to six hours earlier. This deviation from the original 
plan gave the Israelis the possibility of freeing the paratroop brigade that was 
attached to Tal's Ugdah for use by the Central Command in the Jerusalem 
area already during the first day of fighting. This later freed another paratroop 
brigade for use in the Central Sinai in Brigadier Sharon's Ugdah. Nevertheless, 
it may be argued, as Rothenberg notes, that Tal's decision to attack at a strong 
point in itself constituted an element of surprise as wel1.42°  
418 
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Smithers also mentions that the Sinai ground operation was improvised from phase two, 
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However in General Tal's concept, for armour to penetrate deeply, it had 
first to penetrate. In Tal's division, the tank battalions acted as a "mailed fist", 
whose task was to open a breach in the enemy defences; mechanised infantry 
forces followed in their wake to widen the breakthrough points by clearing 
enemy gun lines and trenches. Therefore van Creveld's or Major General 
Adan's opinion that there was nothing particularly indirect in Tal's thrust into 
the northern Sinai is justified. However, according to Weller, Tal and his 
superiors pondered the problem of how best to take Rafah without assaulting it 
directly. The solution was to attack Rafah by way of the Palestine troops in 
Khan Yunis. These troops were seen as being weaker than the Egyptians in 
morale, guns and fortifications and were in addition almost out of artillery 
support. Therefore, General Tal massed his tank brigades for an all-tank 
breakthrough on the thin border defences manned by the Palestinian Division, 
outfought an Egyptian tank battalion at Khan Yunis and moved south to the 
Rafah junction without pausing to regroup. Mechanised infantry was left behind 
in reserve. In the meantime, the parachute brigade attached to Tal's Ugdah 
made a wide sweep to the south, then attacked northwards over supposedly 
impassable sand dunes, again achieving tactical surprise. In this light, the 
initial phase of Tal's division can be seen as having been indirect — as Jac 
Weller notes in his article The Breakthrough at Rafah.421 
However after the initial battle, the Egyptians were able to put up stiff 
resistance between Rafah and El-Arish. Therefore the Israelis, acting 
according to their "Conveyor-belt" principle, reacted to the difficulties. 
According to Paul Dyster, Tal's Ugdah provides the best example of the 
"Conveyor-belt" system being put into practice. However, Dyster doesn't 
criticise its weaknesses like Samuel Katz, who says that after the initial 
breakthrough Tal's armoured brigades almost lost their momentum because 
the forces committed to the breakthrough could not be relieved for the pursuit. 
The belt did not stretch far enough and plenty of mistakes were made, 
especially in combined arms principles when forces got lost or stuck in the 
sand. In addition, the artillery was only adequate in the initial phase of the 
battles, and it usually was unable to follow the armoured spearheads. 
Nevertheless, as an example of a determined pursuit of aim with acceptable 
casualties, the Israelis were able to force open the critical Jiradi defile, which 
was a prerequisite for further operations. As a matter of fact, this was a critical 
sector in the whole enemy defence plan; the breakthrough at Jiradi caused the 
collapse of the Egyptian planned defence.422 
On the second morning (6 June), Tal's Ugdah was divided in two to pursue 
the retreating Egyptians along the coastal road to the Suez Canal and to link 
up with Brigadier Yoffe's forces, thus building a pocket and trapping almost all 
the Egyptian forces defending the northeastern Sinai. According to Brigadier 
Tal, this manoeuvre was carried out according to the principles of the best 
classical tank warfare tradition — German ones, one might say. Tank 
421  Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 239, 292 and 295, Weller (1968), p. 177 — 179 and 183, Williams 
(1989), p. 189 — 190, van Creveld (1998), p. 196 and interview of Major General Avraham 
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formations drove deep into enemy lines without paying attention to their 
unprotected flanks to upset the enemy's equilibrium and attack him from 
behind and inside. This movement gave the Israelis a tactical advantage of 
countering the moving Egyptians with sniping methods by tanks at ranges up 
to 3,000 metres; principles that proved, according to Katz, to be a lifesaver.423 
Only the pursuit phase aimed at blocking the withdrawal of Egyptian forces 
in the Sinai defiles was not a complete success. Although small Israeli units 
were able to drive straight through the retreating Egyptians to reach the 
passes ahead of them, they were not powerful enough to stop all Egyptian 
forces. The encirclement by the main Israeli forces from the south also came 
about too late. The pincer was delayed and at least part of the Egyptian 4th  
Armoured Division succeeded in escaping despite the pressure of the Israeli 
Air Force.424 
9.2.3. Ugdah Sharon — a combined arms offensive 
The attack of Brigadier Ariel Sharon's Ugdah was quite unconventional in the 
Israeli armoured warfare context of the 1960s. Sharon's Ugdah was an all-
arms one; it consisted of a tank brigade, an infantry brigade, a heliborne 
paratroop brigade and, for the Israelis, a large concentration of artillery. 
According to Pa'il, Sharon's operation was already planned in the General 
Staff before the war and was based on experiences and study of the 1956 War 
in the same area. Already after the 1956 War, the paratroopers had done a 
survey and found that tracked movement was also possible in certain areas in 
Abu Ageila. From then through the 1960s, the battle of Abu Ageila was 
included in the curricula of officer courses, although obviously not as a 
systematic historical case study — as Gawrych notes — but as a contemporary 
tactical exercise. This confirms the non-stereotyped manner of thinking of the 
Israeli commanders.425  
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The breakthrough phase was started on the first night without air support, 
which was not available, but with artillery support. The initial operation can be 
divided into six phases as follows: 
Phase One: Concentrated artillery bombardment of Egyptian defensive 
positions. 
- Phase Two: Penetration of reconnaissance groups to cut off Egyptian 
positions from the rear to prevent reinforcement. 
- Phase Three: Tank attack on the rear of the enemy position. 
- Phase Four: Destruction of Egyptian artillery in Abu Ageila from the north 
by paratroopers landed behind the enemy lines by helicopter. 
- Phase Five: Infantry assault on the northern Egyptian flank to clear the front 
line trenches and permit engineers to make lanes through the minefields 
- Phase Six: Breakthrough of tanks into the main fortified position. 
In addition, a reduced infantry brigade was used to deceive the Egyptians in 
the south. This breakthrough phase was carried out almost as planned and 
represents both a dislocation of enemy forces and a concentration of forces 
from a temporal point of view. The attack was an operation of several 
seemingly rather separate thrusts where the concentration was reached with 
simultaneous effect on the enemy .426 One illustration of Sharon's operation 
can be seen in Appendix 16. 
The planning of the operation was very detailed and all the commanders 
were included in this process as Sharon had done in the operations of his 
paratroopers against Palestinian guerrillas during the 1950s. According to 
Sharon, the plan was a combination of close combat, night-fighting, surprise, 
attack from the rear, attack on a narrow front, meticulous planning and the 
concept of the "tahboulah", the relationship between headquarters and field 
command. In addition, a two-week training period where operational aspects 
were perfected with a sand table and battle techniques to overcome the 
Egyptian trench system were practised before the operation. All this aimed at 
using their own strengths of mobility and an ability to fight at night, and at 
taking advantage of enemy weaknesses; most of all their exposed defensive 
lines and their inability to conduct mobile warfare. In this planning process, 
preparations and unconventional thinking, Bagnall tends to see traits of 
Wingate's teaching and PALMACH applications. In addition, Adan tends to see 
the indirect approach behind the operation. One can agree with both 
statements, if it is remembered that indirect approach for the Israelis was 
426 Young, p. 107 and R.A.C. Centre Bulletin No 4, p. 19. 
See also Sinai Front. The Six Day War Description of Combats by Commanders, description 
of Brigadier Sharon, p. 8, Bond, p. 264. 
According to Brigadier Sharon, the Israelis did not attack according to a book; the operation 
was neither a typical armoured offensive and nor was it therefore also expected by the 
Egyptians. Speed, momentum and the example of the officers were the most important 
factors in this success. 
Brian Bond confirms this. According to him, Sharon drew lessons from his own experience. 
Every staff officer had to be committed to the success of the plan, and in the battle stay 
forward to be able to intervene in the battle if needed. This overall principle is very similar to 
the German Auftragstaktik, which as already discussed might well have been a principle 
adopted from the British and applied by Sharon. 
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above all a way of achieving surprise by unconventional thinking. However in 
terms of operational thinking, Sharon's battle rather resembled modern joint 
operations in a deep battle area. Nevertheless, this can also be linked to the 
indirect approach because the aim of deep battle was and is to cause not only 
physical, but also a mental blow to the enemy which later was expected to 
shorten the battle and finally the war as well.427  
Although inferior in manpower, the Israelis were able to get local superiority 
by manoeuvre. After the infantry flanking operation into the Egyptian trenches 
in Abu Ageila, Sharon's armoured units exploited the success and rushed 
forward to encounter the enemy tanks and to play havoc in the enemy rear. 
The main aim was to push the retreating Egyptians into the roadblocks in the 
Sinai defiles. However according to van Creveld, inactivity overtook Sharon's 
forces, either because of exhaustion or because they received no orders from 
headquarters. The task of Sharon's Ugdah, a wide sweep from the south to the 
Mitla Pass, as well as the commitment of Brigadier Yoffe's Ugdah through 
Sharon's forces could also have been an explanation for the momentary lost of 
momentum. Whatever the reason for the delays, the result was that the 
southern Egyptian armoured task force, Force Shazly, was able to slip away 
before the Israeli pincers shut in the Mitla area.428 
The use of heliborne paratroopers in Sharon's plan also represented the 
tendency to surprise the enemy with mobility and render his critical strength 
irrelevant. In the Sinai, the Israelis carried out two landing operations; a heli-lift 
of a paratroop brigade to destroy the Egyptian artillery in Abu Ageila and the 
conquest of Sharm-el-Sheikh. Only the former can be seen as having been a 
real combat task. Egyptian artillery played a critical role in Abu Ageila; it was 
the skeleton of the Egyptian defence and a threat to Israeli movement. If the 
artillery was destroyed, it would become the weak point of the Egyptian 
defence. The Israelis decided to destroy this concentration with a swift 
manoeuvre, a penetration of mobile forces into the Egyptian tactical depth, -
not with their artillery, which might have not only been a waste of effort 
because of a lack of results, but also time consuming and therefore out of 
question. Therefore, a helicopter squadron was attached to Sharon's Ugdah 
and the pilots were connected to the planning process. According to Eliezer 
Cohen — who at the time was the commander of the squadron that took part in 
427 Sharon, p. 181, 187 — 191, Gawrych (1990), pi 91, Dayan, Yael (1967), p. 14 — 15, Long, 
p. 42, van Creveld (1998), p. 197, Bagnall, p. 200 and interview of Major General Avraham 
Adan. 
428 Wallach: The Israeli Armoured Corps in the Six-Day-War, p. 3, Smithers, pi 14 and van 
Creveld (1998), p. 187. 
See also Dayan, Yael (1967), pi 70, 78 and 80 and Sharon, p. 184 — 187. 
According to Yael Dayan, Sharon pressured his superiors to continue the pursuit of the 
Egyptians immediately after the breakthrough in Abu Ageila. This concept of not giving the 
initiative to the Egyptians or of giving them time to recover can also be seen in Sharon's text. 
However, Yael Dayan mentions that after 60 hour of battles (2 days) the Israelis stopped to 
rest on the evening of 7 June and during the next night the enemy was able to withdraw 
without major battles. 
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the battles in Abu Ageila — this operation was the foundation of joint airborne 
operations.429  
9.2.4. Ugdah Yoffe — an example of the indirect approach 
The third Israeli main thrust in the Sinai was the most exceptional in terms of 
conventional warfare, although not phenomenal in the Israeli context. Between 
General Tal's and General Sharon's forces, the Israelis committed their third 
force, General Avraham Yoffe's Ugdah, to battles through terrain that the 
Egyptians had regarded as impassable. The Egyptians had therefore left this 
area without fortifications and troops. In addition, Yoffe's troops were 
committed through the forces of both Tal's and Sharon's Ugdahs, which can 
be seen as a risky operation because of a fear of total confusion. General 
Yoffe's Ugdah was, as was General Tal's, an armoured task force and applied 
the "Conveyor-belt" principles though in a different, more indirect way than 
General Tal. On the whole, Yoffe's operations can be seen as a continuation of 
his 1956 actions through the pathless Sinai to Sharm-el-Sheikh. 
General Yoffe's operation is a good example of the use of the "expanding 
torrent" principle. Liddell Hart also mentioned this in his article for Encounter in 
1968. He said that the Israeli plan and operations combined the strategic 
offensive with the tactical defensive, which meant getting around the back of 
the Egyptians in the Sinai after the opening penetrations, blocking their lines of 
retreat and forcing them to attack when trying to escape. General Adan also 
sees traits of the indirect approach behind this operation. On the other hand, 
Peter Young compares Yoffe's breakthrough to the British offensive against 
the Italians in North Africa in 1940 where two British divisions were able to take 
five Italian divisions from the rear and cut their lines of communication. This 
statement seems to have a foundation as well. According to Brian Bond, 
General Yoffe had told him that the most important influence on his (Yoffe's) 
decision was his experience of similar treks with the British 8th Army in WW II 
in North Africa. In the Six Day War, Yoffe's operation was also based on good 
intelligence information and had similarities to Yigal Yadin's operations on the 
same front during the War of Independence. When Yoffe's armour outflanked 
the Egyptians in the El-Arish — Khan Yunis area, his tanks took a route that 
had been reconnoitered by the Israelis ten years earlier. The objective was to 
penetrate the enemy's vulnerabilities; to interpose themselves between the two 
main Egyptian fortified areas to the north and south. In his battle description, 
Yoffe says that the purpose of his operation was to arrive at the rear of the 
enemy defensive positions and to try to do two things there; stop 
reinforcements from getting to the main defence and try to catch anybody who 
was trying to run away.43° 
429 Sharon, p. 189 — 190, Leonhard, 173 and Cohen, p. 230 and 244. 
439 Sinai Front. The Six Day War Description of Combats by Commanders, description of 
Brigadier Yoffe, p. 1, Wallach: The Israeli Armoured Corps in the Six-Day-War, p. 4, R.A.C. 
Centre Bulletin No 4. p. 18, van Creveld (1998), p. 185, interview of Major General Avraham 
Adan and Young, p. 65 — 66 and 69. 
Adan was Yoffe's deputy during the Six Day War. 
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After the penetration, Yoffe's Ugdah raced towards the Suez Canal to block 
the enemy escape routes; paying no heed either to logistic considerations or to 
the fact that this relatively small force was crossing an area still actually 
controlled by large enemy forces. This manner of fighting also caused logistical 
problems. Because no routes were in Yoffe's sector, it had been left without 
any artillery and the second echelon supply also encountered difficulties. 
Therefore, some units had to fight continuously up to the end of the operation 
and were saved from being totally out of supply because of the passivity of the 
Egyptians, by last time reinforcements and by the air-drop of supplies.43 
 
9.3. Operations in the West Bank 
On the central battlefront, the Israelis were not prepared for offensive 
operations because Jordan was not expected to be a primary threat. 
Therefore, no divisional task forces were mobilised on this front. When the 
hostilities began, the Israelis had to improvise an ad hoc strategy at the 
moment Jordan joined the United Arab Republic-led military alliance and 
attacked Jerusalem and the Tel Aviv coastal strip. Originally three infantry 
brigades, one permanently stationed in Jerusalem, one mechanised brigade 
and one paratroop brigade transferred from the Northern Command as soon 
as the situation in the Sinai was clear were put under the command of OC 
Central Command Brigadier Uzi Narkiss. He faced nine Jordanian brigades 
with some 55,000 men.432 
See also Liddell Hart, Bi H: Strategy of a War, Encounter, February 1968, LH 15/5/304, part 
2, p. 17 — 19 and Bond, p. 262 — 264 and a letter from Adrian Wilson to Liddell Harl July 6th, 
1967, LH 15/5/304, parl 2. 
Young tends to see more German influence; descending from Frederick the Great via 
Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Clausewitz to Manstein, Rommel and Guderian, behind the 
military thinking of educated Israeli soldiers than Liddell Hart. Obviously the influence came 
from both directions, as already discussed. 
Liddell Hart saw his theories coming true in General Yoffe's operation. This can be seen in 
the following Liddell Hart: "It fulfilled an axiom I had deduced in my earliest book on the 
history of strategy, and often made since, that: "Natural hazards, however formidable, are 
inherently less dangerous and less uncertain than fighting hazards. All conditions are more 
calculable, all obstacles more surmountable, than those of human resistance. IN SUM, THE 
PLAN was a superb application of the Strategy of Indirect Approach, and its corollary of 
choosing the line of least expectation', to throw the opponent of balance." 
General, Sir Richard O'Connor was in charge of a British division in Africa in 1940. His 
connection to Liddell Hart remains unknown. However, as was already discussed, the later 
supreme commander of British forces against the Germans in the Western Desert was 
General Montgomery. He was known to have thoughts that paralleled Liddell Harl's in many 
cases. 
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432 Heiman (1967), pi 63, Dupuy (1992), pi 284 and 338 and Nordeen, p. 75 — 76. 
General Narkiss, who already during the War of Independence had fought in Jerusalem, 
knew the operational area and the Jordanian defence system very well. 
See also Wallach: The Israeli Armoured Corps in the Six-Day-War, p. 1. 
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When the Jordanians opened hostilities, the Israelis quickly reallocated 
Brigadier Elad Peled's armoured Ugdah, originally ear-marked for other tasks 
in the Northern Command. This balanced the force ratio at approximately 1:1. 
However, within only a matter of hours the Israelis were able to conduct a 
series of operations which ultimately achieved objectives previously 
considered to be impossibly ambitious, especially the regaining of the 
possession of Jerusalem. Operationally the battles in the West Bank can be 
divided into three: the capture of Jerusalem, operations in the northern West 
Bank and the conquest of the southern West Bank.433 
Some scholars familiar with the subject tend to also see traits of indirect 
approach in the Israeli West Bank operations. At the strategic level, the Israeli 
ad hoc plan was based on the expectation that Jerusalem and the West Bank 
would be thoroughly defended by the Arab Legion. That turned out to be 
correct. However, the Jordanians suffered from some severe weaknesses, 
which the Israelis were able to use to their advantage. The Jordanians, 
although they were in well dug-in fortifications, didn't have a second line at all. 
In addition, operational reserves were far away from the front. Because the 
Israelis had complete air superiority from the 5 June, the commitment of the 
Jordanian operational reserves became impossible when the IAF was used in 
interdiction missions to disrupt the opponent's efforts to regroup his forces. 
The IAF was also used in the Jerusalem area for close air support before the 
arrival of reserves. This gave the Israelis the possibility of concentrating their 
forces on one threat at the time; first on the northern West Bank and the 
Jerusalem area and then on the southern part of the West Bank. In 
accordance with this the Israelis first concentrated three brigades — an 
armoured brigade, a dismounted paratroop brigade, and an infantry brigade -
on a series of local flanking moves in the Jerusalem sector. In the meantime 
they also launched an Ugdah pincer offensive against Jenin and Nablus in the 
northern West Bank culminating in an attack on the rear. This is why Yigal 
Yadin considers the whole campaign to be a brilliant chain of tactical 
improvisations — all based on the main doctrine of the indirect approach.434 
After a totally unexpected attack east of Jenin and the seizure of the 
Ramallah ridge, the Israelis dominated Jerusalem to the south, and outflanked 
all the Jordanian positions to the west and north. According to the OC Northern 
Command Brigadier David Elazar, the Jordanians also failed to recognise the 
main Israeli effort. The Jordanians presumably hoped to defend every single 
Wallach sees the possibility that the mission of the Arab Legion was to encircle the Israeli 
parl of Jerusalem, to seal it up and seize it. Secondly, Wallach also envisioned that the 
Jordanians would try to split Israel in two at the narrow waist between Tulkarm and the sea. 
The former threat materialised, although the objective was not achieved. The Jordanians 
never even got a chance at the latter action. 
433 Bagnall, p. 203 and Liddell Hart: Strategy of a War, Encounter (1968), p. 19. 
434 Central Front. The Six Day War Description of Combats by Commanders, description of 
Brigadier Narkiss, I.D.F. Spokesman's Office, July 1967, p. 1, a letter from Yigal Yadin to 
Liddell Hart 29th August 1967, LH 2/23, van Creveld (1998), p. 191, Cohen, p. 240 and 
Liddell Hart: Strategy of a War, Encounter (1968), p. 19. 
According to Cohen, Fouga Magister training aircraft saved Jerusalem before the arrival of 
reinforcements and before its defenders even knew the size of the threat arrayed against 
them. 
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frontier and by doing so prevent any serious penetration of their territory. This 
did not happen. The Israelis used a number of axes in establishing themselves 
upon the Ramallah ridge and cut Jordanian lines of communications so that 
their real objective remained unclear to the Arabs until their own lines had 
been secured and forces had been concentrated for the next move. Therefore, 
already drawn into the battles around Jerusalem and elsewhere along the 
frontier, the Jordanians were unable to react effectively against the new threat 
deep in their rear.435  
Tactically, although the Israelis also applied their "Conveyor-belt" principles 
on this front, they fought in more balanced combinations of troops than in the 
Sinai in general. Basically this was obviously a consequence of difficult terrain 
that necessitated the use of different types of units in co-operation with each 
other. The second reason might have been that the Israeli commanders on the 
West Bank were mostly not tank officers and were therefore more used to co-
operating with other branches. However, the Israelis drove their tanks through 
the streets of several villages, with the force shooting on all sides like the jeep-
borne commandos during the War of Independence. This physical shock was 
quite successful everywhere it was used, although mainly because of the 
opponent's lack of anti-tank weapons.436  
The capture of Jerusalem was the most difficult part of the West Bank 
operation. The Jordanians were ready to fight to the bitter end, as were the 
Israelis, to unite the ancient Jewish town. In addition, the large scale use of 
firepower and tanks was out of the question. Therefore, tactically the conquest 
of Jerusalem was a rather typical battle in a defended populated area. 
Nevertheless, the unification of Jerusalem can be seen as resulting in 
acceptable casualties. It was a battle of two wills, and the Israelis were 
prepared to pay more, though since they had complete air supremacy they 
also had the possibility of concentrating their effort. The Israelis also tried to 
use the co-operation of different types of troops in Jerusalem. In addition, the 
use of the dark still dominated, as was also the case on the other fronts."' 
9.4. Operations on the Syrian front 
The Syrians were not very active during the first days of the Six Day War, nor 
were the Israelis, despite several plans to launch an offensive earlier than it 
was made in reality. Obviously this was a result of the calculation of force 
ratios. Although the Israelis needed to find a solution to the hostile situation 
that had prevailed in the northern Jordan Valley during the entire early 1960s 
and time for the operation was going down the drain, the Israelis probably did 
not have enough forces for simultaneous offensives both in the West Bank and 
on the Golan Heights. The Syrians had deployed eight brigades organised in 
435 Northern Front. The Six Day War Description of Combats by Commanders, description of 
Brigadier Elazar, I.D.F. Spokesman's Office, July 1967, p. 1, Young, p. 136 and 140 and 
Bagnall, p. 199 — 200. 
436 Williams (1989), p. 192 and Young, p. 136. 
437 Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 268 and Bagnall, p. 200. 
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three divisions on the Golan, totalling over 30,000 men supported by several 
hundred tanks and artillery pieces. The Israelis originally had only three 
brigades in northern Galilee, but after reinforcements the force ratio balanced. 
There were eight Israeli brigades, three of them armoured including Brigadier 
Peled's Ugdah which had already fought in the West Bank; in total some 
20,000 men and 250 tanks.438 
The Syrians had thoroughly fortified the Golan Heights, which was 
composed of a continuous zone of mutually supporting bunkers, ten miles in 
depth. According to Samuel Katz, the strongholds were typically surrounded by 
an all-encompassing circular battery of guns and firing pits with infantry forces 
positioning themselves in the inner area of the fortifications, and the supporting 
tanks positioned on both sides of the stronghold. It was a formidable 
fortification, though its importance in the Syrian defence in 1967 has been 
exaggerated. It also contained several weaknesses that the Israelis were able 
to use because of the intelligence information provided by the Israeli spy Eli 
Cohen before the war. Both van Creveld and Young, who visited the area after 
the war point out this fact in their books. According to Young, the boulder 
strewn slopes leading up to the Syrian position were in fact "tankable" and 
secondly the Syrian positions, although doubtless well covered by concrete 
and wired, were often clearly visible to the naked eye and therefore also 
vulnerable to the Centurions' 105 mm guns. According to van Creveld, the 
topography made lateral movement along the slopes impossible, which meant 
that swift moves of reserves were also impossible. In addition, the Syrian lines 
had been built to overlook each other, each successive line supported by the 
line behind. This made it impossible to redirect the guns, and the farther up the 
slopes the Israeli units climbed, the less artillery support the individual bunkers 
received.4" 
In peacetime, IDF Northern Command had made several plans for different 
scenarios, two of them offensive in character. "Makevet (Sledgehammer) 
North" was an offence against the northern part of the heights and "Make vet 
South" an attack on the centre. According to these plans, the sledgehammers 
would drive a few thin wedges in, which would be expanded outwards the 
further the penetration went into enemy territory until the pincers could close in 
flat terrain suitable for armoured operations. The defensive "Make vet Center" 
was a plan for a holding operation. After the out break of hostilities on 5 June, 
the Israeli plan was modified, according to van Creveld, to take the Golan 
Heights from each end.44°  
438 Dupuy (1992), p. 318 — 319, Nordeen, p. 83 — 84 and van Creveld (1998), p. 191 — 192. 
439 Katz (1996), pi 249, Young, p. 154 — 156 and 163 and Creveld (1998), p. 191 — 193. 
See also Howard & Hunter (1967), pi 38 — 39. 
The myth of the imperviousness of the Syrian defensive lines has persisted up to this day. 
Michael Howard and Robert Hunter describe the defensive line as a masterpiece of 
defensive fortification constructed under Russian direction. Howard and Hunter estimated 
that no army in the world would be able to break it after several weeks of wearing-out 
battles. 
440 van Creveld (1998), pi 191 — 192. 
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According to Leo Heiman, the Israeli plan that was carried out on the Golan 
Heights was based on two factors: the attrition caused by the planned 100 
hours of incessant aerial and artillery bombardment and on surprise, which 
meant tactical moves and operational ruses to disguise the main thrusts and 
prevent a concentration of enemy forces against them, in other words 
dislocation of the enemy strength. In this context, Brigadier Elazar preferred to 
open as many breaches in the Syrian line as possible. Finally, however, the 
"friction of war" prevented the planned moves of ground forces. According to 
van Creveld, the Israeli lack of traffic discipline created a jam that delayed the 
effort an entire day and with these limits the Israeli main effort was then started 
with the two brigades deployed already on the northern, steepest and most 
difficult end of the Golan. Nevertheless, this area was also the least expected 
target and the defence consisted mainly of static positions on the obvious 
approaches.441  
Van Creveld writes that the Israeli operation on the Golan was not a 
combined arms one. One can mainly agree with this. From the beginning the 
teams of tanks preceded by bulldozers that opened passages and the infantry 
mostly advanced separately. The heavy artillery and air bombardment that had 
already continued for some 100 hours greatly helped the movement. Although 
it could not totally destroy the Syrian fortifications, it at least interdicted daylight 
troop movements. Several hours after the start at 11.30 hours on 9 June, the 
Israelis were able to reach the edge of the plateau. As a result of this success, 
the Syrian front began to collapse. The southern Golan fell without fighting, 
and the Syrians escaped. In the central sector during the coming night the 
Israelis were still able to continue their manoeuvre with armoured thrusts that 
ended the next day in the encirclement of the remaining Syrian armoured 
division.442 
Despite the low degree of co-operation between different branches, the IDF 
Golan operation can be seen as a joint operation of ground forces and air force 
elements. In addition to aerial bombardment and interdiction, in the operation 
aimed at cutting the Syrian lines of communication in the central Golan the 
Israelis also used heliborne combat transport to complete the encirclement and 
seize important terrain ahead of the advance. While this co-operation was 
quite successful, this action also revealed the IDF's small heli-lift capacity. 
Although the Israelis were already aware at the time of the American 
experiences in Vietnam, which showed that such a landing demanded a force 
of helicopters several times greater than Israel had, they had not developed 
their helicopter units, mainly for economic reasons and partly also because of 
a lack of trust in this kind of action. Therefore, despite the fact that a 
conceptual idea of airborne operations had already been adopted, the 
helicopter squadron that was used on the Golan was too small to transport 
even a battalion of combat troops at one go. The result was that the airborne 
441 
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troops were transferred to the heights in a continuous train of small groups, 
which increased risks and complicated logistical support.443 
On the Golan Heights, the Israelis were not able to destroy the Syrian army. 
The encirclement was also not totally successful here. The manpower mainly 
succeeded in escaping, although a large quantity of equipment was captured. 
In addition to the reasons described above, this was partly also a consequence 
of the Israeli General Staff's planning, according to van Creveld, or maybe it is 
better to say a consequence of the lack of planning. Van Creveld states that 
apparently the supreme headquarters had not thought through the campaign's 
final objectives to the end. Therefore according to van Creveld, it was only the 
tactical commanders' sense of the situation that the line that eventually 
emerged was defensible, including the southern slopes of Mount Hermon as 
well as two critical hills — Chermonit and Booster in the central Golan.444 
However, it is also obvious that political reasons prevented an extension of 
operations further towards the Syrian capital of Damascus. 
9.5. The war at sea 
The Egyptian Navy was several times larger than the Israeli. It was totally re-
organised after the 1956 War, mainly on Soviet lines. The most important 
changes were the procurement of missile boats and the founding of a 
submarine fleet. When taking into account the slight success of the Egyptian 
Navy during the Six Day War, it seems, however, that despite the pre-war 
organisational preparations, the navy was not ready for a large-scale sea war 
but only for the defence of its home waters. Other Arab countries did not 
commit their vessels against Israel's naval forces.445 
According to Louis Williams, the Israeli Navy was a strange combination of 
highly advanced concepts and very retarded and obsolete weaponry in June 
1967. This opinion seems justified. The Israeli Navy was modernising. New 
missile boats had been ordered. Therefore it is reasonable to suppose that the 
principles of the IDF operational doctrine that had been developed after the 
1956 War were also included in the navy's fighting principles and war plans. 
However, the new vessels never arrived before the war. Therefore, the Israelis 
had to rely more on indirect means, on deception and surprise than on 
technical superiority. When the war erupted, the Israeli Navy was ordered to 
prevent Egyptian naval operations against Israeli coastal facilities and 
population centres, to protect merchant shipping to and from their 
Mediterranean ports, to harass the enemy along the Mediterranean coast and 
443 R.A.C. Centre Bulletin No 4, p. 27, Young, pi 162 — 163 and Cohen, pi 248. 
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also in Egypt's home waters, and on a lesser scale to provide logistical support 
for the IDF's operations in the northern Sinai.446  
In the conditions described above, the Israeli Navy chose a two-part 
strategy of deception and offence. According to Louis Williams, the deception 
consisted of transferring landing craft during daytime overland from Haifa to 
Eilat. At night these vessels were replaced by dummies while real craft were 
transferred back to Haifa. This operation — without a single shot being fired -
was quite effective; it tied down some 30% of the Egyptian Navy in the Red 
Sea. The offensive part consisted of naval commando operations against 
Egyptian ships in Port Said and Alexandria; with the former's missile boats 
forming a real threat to Israel's army installations and population centres. In a 
way, Israeli vessels patrolling the Mediterranean coast and blocking Egyptian 
ports can also be seen as a part of an offensive strategy. This action was also 
effective."' 
The naval engagements of the Six Day War were minor. The statistics do 
not indisputably show any sinkings on either side. When comparing the 
possibilities, actions and results on both sides, the Israelis were quite 
successful. The Egyptians were passive for almost the whole time, which 
obviously was a result of several reasons, but one off them was certainly the 
lack of air force support. The only sea offensive in the Red Sea on 6 June was 
called off soon after it began because the Egyptians realised the risks without 
air support. The Israelis, for their part, tried to compensate for their 
unfavourable force ratio with mobile action. By doing this they were able to 
separate Egypt's force on two sea fronts. Secondly and more importantly, 
Israeli patrols and frogmen along Egypt's Mediterranean coast and in its ports 
and to a lesser degree in the Red Sea were seen as a threat in the Egyptian 
Navy. Therefore, already on the second day of fighting, 6 June, the Egyptians 
pulled out from Port Said and withdrew to Alexandria. This eliminated the 
imminent threat of missile attacks against Israeli targets, and in this way the 
main mission of the Israeli Navy was fulfilled.448 
9.6. Evaluations of the military art 
Professor Wallach tends to see the Israeli strategy before and during the Six 
Day War in a Clausewitzian way as does Doctor Shai. A half a year before the 
war, Wallach published a newspaper article Policy and the Conduct of War, 
where he discussed Clausewitz's theory and objections voiced against this 
theory. After this, Wallach also tried to publish broader research on 
Clausewitz's theory on war. To his surprise, he was informed that members of 
446 Williams (1989), p. 262 and Smithers, p. 20. 
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the editorial board could not find any points of interest for the Israeli reader in 
this subject. Obviously, this was also the case in military circles in general.449  
A month after the war on 15 July, 1967, Wallach gave a broadcast on Voice 
of Israel where he again brought up Clausewitz's name by saying that the 
decisive importance of the mutual relationship of policy and conduct of war is 
self-evident, since we are now only at the beginning of the political struggle in 
the wake of the military victory." Wallach's statement is controversial without a 
more thorough study, though it is not against Clausewitz's famous clause. 
According to van Creveld, at the strategic level the Six Day War was not an 
instrumental, Clausewitzian war. Despite the fact that Israel had deterrence 
power that obviously would have functioned and their doctrine at the strategic 
level was declared to be defensive, the war broke out when policy was 
inefficient. Therefore it is easy to see things like Professor Handel's concept; 
Israel's strategy of denial approach fed the possibility of eliminating the 
growing military threat with pre-emption. According to van Creveld, even 
provocation against Syria, which Shimon Peres admitted in the mid-1990s, 
was used before the war.45° 
Below the strategic level, the Clausewitzian connection seems, however, 
reasonable. Wallach and Shai both stress the doctrine of strategic defence, 
which the Israelis had adopted between the 1956 War and the Six Day War. 
According to Wallach, this meant that at the strategic level the doctrine was 
defensive. In the case of a threat, the defence at the operational and tactical 
levels was to be put into practise with offensive means. According to Shai, this 
doctrine imitates Clausewitz's theory of strategic defence where in the case of 
a threat the defender tries to find out deficiencies in his opponents defence 
and then concentrate his own efforts on these. The identification of the threat 
that formed the problem was important in this concept. The location of the 
centre of gravity of enemy forces played a central role. At the operational and 
tactical levels, the enemy COG was divided into objectives that were essential 
to the enemy. However, because these objectives were vital they also formed 
weaknesses because they were essential to the defence as a whole. 
Therefore, to eliminate the threat, counter-measures beginning against the 
tactical objectives formed a chain that continued through the operational level 
and finally removed the threat at the strategic level. In a way this model of 
thinking happened in the Six Day War. The threat to Israel was a three-front 
attack. The centre of gravity of Israel's enemies was Egypt because it had a 
dominant role among the Arabs. Therefore, Egypt was the main objective. At 
an operational level, the vulnerable targets were the Egyptian Air Force and its 
army in the Sinai. Once they were defeated, the rest would be settled one at 
time.451  
More often than Clausewitz, Liddell Hart's name is connected to the Six Day 
War. Professor Gelber recalled that Liddell Hart and his ideas were very 
449 Wallach, J. L: Voice of Israel (1967), p. 4, interview of Professor, Colonel (ret.) Yehuda 
Wallach and discussions with Doctor, Colonel (ret.) Hanan Shai. 
450 Wallach, J. L: Voice of Israel (1967), p. 4, van Creveld (1998), p. 197 and Handel, pi 538. 
451 Interview of Professor, Colonel (ret.) Yehuda Wallach and discussions with Doctor, 
Colonel (ret.) Hanan Shai. 
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popular in Israel in the early 1960s, including at the tactical level. 
Correspondingly, Adan states that at that time the "Strategy of Indirect 
Approach" itself was the art of war, it meant the ability to find and take 
advantage of opening possibilities. Within this concept the Israelis, especially 
Generals Sharon and Yoffe used, according to Adan, indirect approach in their 
operations. Thus, the practical mobility; i. e., the mobility of armoured, 
mechanised and paratroop formations, were connected to the mobility of the 
mind, which in Israeli terms meant operational mobility.452 
In contemporary sources Liddell Hart's name is also often mentioned. In the 
Voice of Israel broadcast Wallach also paid attention to Liddell Hart. Wallach 
divided Liddell Hart's influence into two and spoke both of mental and 
operational influences. According to Wallach, the Israelis were "acting on the 
spur of an indirect approach mentality" during the war. In this model of 
thinking, indirect approach meant "the mental-intellectual context of this term 
by the very selection of the time, the direction, the method and the strength of 
moves that provided the firm base for the operational and tactical moves." 
Even in May 2000, Wallach still highly valued the "Strategy of Indirect 
Approach" in the Israeli military art; according to him it has been a way of 
thinking for the Israelis, and not just a battle technique.453 
After Wallach's broadcast, Liddell Hart himself was also interviewed by 
Israel Today and the Jewish Times on 18 August 1967. In this article, Liddell 
Hart said, "the Six Day War was the best demonstration of my theory of the 
Strategy of Indirect Approach". In its subtler sense of seeking and exploiting 
the line of least expectation, the Israelis put into action a theory evolved nearly 
40 years ago." Later, the front page of the same Israel Today and the Jewish 
Times some two weeks later on 1 September 1967 said that Israel 
successfully applied Liddell Hart's military theory during the Six Day War.454 
Approximately simultaneously with the interview mentioned above, Liddell 
Hart also started to correspond with Israeli military men to get their evaluations 
of the past war. Among them were Generals Yadin, Laskov, Rabin, Tal, 
Sharon and Zamir and Colonel Wallach, most of whom Liddell Hart already 
knew either by having met them in England when they studied there or by 
having seen them during his visit to Israel in March - April 1960. The items that 
were discussed concerned both mental and operational subjects, especially in 
452 Interview of Major General Adan and interview of Professor, Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) 
Yoav Gelber. 
453 A letter from Yehuda Wallach to Liddell Hart 22nd January 1968, LH 15/5/304, part 2, 
Wallach: Voice of Israel (1967), p. 2 and 4, Wallach: Obituary of Sir Basil Liddell Hart, p. 5 -
6, Front page, Israel Today and the Jewish Times, September 1, 1967, LH 15/5/315, part 2 
and interview of Professor, Colonel (ret.) Yehuda Wallach. 
454 Front page, Israel Today and the Jewish Times, September 1, 1967, and The Perfect 
Blitzkrieg, Israel Today, The Press on Israel by Newscaster, August 18, 1967, LH 15/5/304, 
part 2, p. 5. 
See also Bond, p. 262. 
According to Brian Bond, "the Six Day War in 1967 probably provided the most brilliant 
examples of the indirect approach in Liddell Hart's lifetime." This statement, although it is 
obviously also Bond's view of the question, shows Liddell Hart's thoughts in this connection 
as well. 
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armoured warfare, and some technical issues. In this correspondence, 
General Yigal Yadin reveals that all Israeli commanders had studied Liddell 
Hart's books — Rabin not least. This statement can also be seen in Rabin's 
letter to Liddell Hart where Rabin says: You know I am as always most 
interested in reading everything you write."455 On the whole, the quotations 
above and the correspondence also show, however clear the ties between the 
Israelis and Liddell Hart had been, his keenness to find evidence of the Israeli 
application of his ideas. Nevertheless, the controversial connection between 
Liddell Hart and the Six Day War is more easily buttressed than proven wrong. 
After the correspondence with the Israelis, Liddell Hart wrote an article 
entitled Strategy of a War in Encounter in February 1968. In the beginning of 
this article, he used the same words that he had used in the interview with 
Israel Today and the Jewish Times: The whole course of the Israeli campaign, 
a perfect Blitzkrieg, was of particular interest to me because it was the best 
demonstration of my theory of the strategy of indirect approach..." True, it is 
easy to find striking similarities between the Israeli moves during the Six Day 
War and the German Blitzkrieg concept. Also, their connection to the "Strategy 
of Indirect Approach" can be seen but this also shows a good understanding of 
the situation. In addition, in today's terms the Israeli manner of fighting can well 
be examined from the viewpoint of manoeuvre warfare theory. The primary 
idea of the Israelis was to take advantage of enemy weaknesses. This was 
also in accordance with Liddell Hart's thoughts; he emphasised the importance 
of taking military actions that would have the effect of throwing the enemy's 
command and control structure off balance both physically and 
psychologically. In addition, Bagnall identifies two relevant characteristics in 
the conduct of Israeli operations: surprise and flexibility. Surprise was achieved 
at the strategic level by deception and tactically by the rapidity and sustained 
unexpectedness of the Israelis' subsequent moves. In concrete terms, this can 
be interpreted as having been a carefully planned and implemented pre-
emptive strike by the Air Force in the first phase of the war, whereas all the 
other principles of deep battle dominated the ground operations. Besides, it 
seems that the Israelis were more willing to die for their cause despite their 
unwillingness to tolerate high casualties, as Liddell Hart also noted. In this 
case the final war objectives took primary place. Therefore, the doctrinal 
principle of acceptable casualties also took concrete form in this war.456 
455 A letter from Liddell Hart to Yitzhak Rabin 11th August 1967, LH 2/19, a letter from 
Yitzhak Rabin to Liddell Hart 18th September 1967, LH 2/19, a letter from Liddell Hart to Ariel 
Sharon 11th August 1967, LH 2/21, a letter from Liddell Hart to Yigal Yadin 11th August 1967, 
LH 2/23, a letter from Yigal Yadin to Liddell Hart 29th August 1967, LH 2/23, a letter from 
Liddell Hart to Brigadier Zamir (Israel's Military Attaché) 6th October, 1967, LH 2/25 and a 
letter from Brigadier Zamir to Liddell Hart 24th October, 1967, LH 2/25. 
At least Yadin, Rabin and Sharon got similar letters from Liddell Hart. 
Something of this correspondence has to also be categorised as typical compliments, but 
despite this some evidence is revealed. 
456 Liddell Harl, B. H: Strategy of a War, Encounter (1968), p. 17, Bagnall, p. 213, Gissin, p. 
164 and Bond, p. 240. 
Bagnall's use of the term strategic must be understood as being equivalent to operational. 
As a consequence of the demonstration of force, strategic surprise wasn't possible 
anymore. 
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At the operational level, the Six Day War is often compared to the German 
offensives in the early years of WW II. According to Kadish, contrary to 1956, 
Israeli armoured warfare in the Six Day War was not based on the initiative of 
local commanders anymore but was according to the principles that were 
created between these two wars'. According to Michael Howard and Robert 
Hunter, these principles were speed, surprise, concentration, security, 
information, offence, training and morale. The rest relied on innovation, on 
appreciation of the situation, as Doctor Pa'il described it. These principles were 
quite well adopted by the IDF officer corps at all levels before the war. In 
addition, while Peter Young compares the Six Day War to the British offensive 
in North Africa in 1940 — 1941, as already discussed, and also to the German 
campaigns of the 1939 — 1941 period, a French General Andre Beaufre does 
the same in his article Une Guerre Classique Moderne: La Guerre lsraelo -
Arabe in Strategie. The destruction of the defender's air force, followed up by 
relentless armoured thrusts, was implemented in a quite similar manner. 
According to Beaufre, the only exception in 1967 was the compressed time 
frame."' 
Dan Shomron, the IDF Chief of Staff during the late 1980s and who was in 
charge of the IDF battalion that first reached the Suez Canal during the Six 
Day War, also sees the connection between the Germans and Liddell Hart. 
According to Shomron, the Six Day War was a synthesis of Liddell Hart's and 
Fuller's philosophy and the German, especially Rommel's and Guderian's, 
practice. According to him, in the Six Day War the Israelis fought against their 
opponent's psyche like the Germans did against the Poles, French and Soviets 
during the early years of WW II. Deep strikes against vulnerable enemy targets 
in the rear formed the key to the success. Professor Wallach shares General 
Shomron's opinion. In the Voice of Israel broadcast, Wallach said the mobility 
of the Armoured Corps was used in accordance with the best tradition of 
armour operations, as theoretically formed by the Englishmen Fuller and 
Liddell Hart, and actually applied by the Germans Guderian and Rommel." In 
the case of the IDF application, the tanks pushed through enemy defences 
without paying much attention to their flanks and rear, knowing that sooner or 
later the deep penetration into enemy dispositions in the rear would lead to the 
collapse of the enemy. Therefore according to Wallach, the Israeli method of 
deploying armour also deserves the title of indirect approach.458 
In the leaflet, Liddell Hart said in addition that the tactical talent of the Israeli Army is the 
highest that I have ever met, even above the level of German Army, which I put next in this 
respect." 
457 Bagnall, p. 198, interviews of Professor Alon Kadish and Doctor, Colonel (ret.) Meir Pa'il, 
Howard, Michael and Hunter, Robert: Israel and the Arab World: The Crisis of 1967, The 
Institute for Strategic Studies, London 1967, p. 39, Young, p. 183 — 184 and Beaufre, Andre: 
Une Guerre Classique Moderne: La Guerre Israel° — Arabe, Strategie July — August 1967, 
p.19. 
458 Interview of Lieutenant General Dan Shomron and Wallach: Voice of Israel (1967), p. 2 
and 4. 
See also a letter from Yehuda Wallach to Liddell Hart 29th November, 1967, a letter from 
Liddell Hart to Yehuda Wallach 7th February, 1968, Connell, John: Israel: Western Defence 
Bastion, The Anglo-Israel Association, London 1968, LH 15/5/307, p. 11 and Wallach: The 
development of Israeli Armor Doctrine. 
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The Israelis neither relied upon the concept of a single blow, nor did they 
lose sight of the supreme importance of surprise. Despite the fact that the 
possibilities for a strategic surprise had already vanished during the May crisis 
after mobilisation, the IDF succeeded in compensating for the loss of strategic 
surprise by creating a series of operational and tactical surprises. The 
successful air-strike gave the IDF operational freedom, but, nevertheless, 
instead of concentrating for the attack the Israelis dispersed their forces to 
selected points and only concentrated after the breakthrough had been 
achieved. According to Yigal Allon and Leo Heiman, this all was a 
consequence of the IDF fighting doctrine. However, while Allon, like Wallach, 
analyses the war at strategic and operational levels and tends to see the 
"Strategy of Indirect Approach" as occupying a central place, Heiman looks at 
the battles and stresses the role of tanks, as did also General Laskov.459 
Haim Laskov also wrote a letter to Liddell Hart on 22nd 
 August 1967 to 
analyse the past war at Liddell Hart's request. In this letter, Laskov favoured 
the power of tanks and says in this context that the core of Liddell Hart's 
thoughts lie in tanks and that their most versatile role was put to the test by 
Tal's division, which at that time best represented the Israeli armoured forces. 
Instead, indirect approach is not mentioned. Nevertheless, in his letter on 20 
September 1967 to Liddell Hart Laskov also acknowledged how Liddell Hart's 
books The Tanks had been a source of innovation for Israeli tank officers. 
Therefore, because Liddell Hart's writings on armoured warfare also include 
his ideas on indirect approach, this subject can be seen as having been behind 
the Israeli application of armoured warfare too, at least indirectly. 60 
In his letter to Liddell Harl, Wallach commented on Liddell Hart's article in Encounter. This 
article must have been a manuscript because it was published only some two months later. 
On the whole Wallach agreed with Liddell Hart's view. Nevertheless, in this article Wallach 
revealed his reluctance to compare the IDF's armoured warfare with Blitzkrieg. However, 
Wallach admitted that he maybe was a little bit too oversensitive in this matter. On 7 
February 1968, Liddell Hart explained that the word Blitzkrieg was the best way to describe 
this type of warfare. Originally, in the 1930s the name had been "lightning warfare". 
In Wallach's paper The development of Israeli Armor Doctrine, which ends with the wake of 
the Six Day War, Liddell Hart is, however, not mentioned, obviously because this paper 
concentrates mainly on the development of organisations. 
459 Allon: The Last Stage of the War of Liberation (1967), p. 9, Allon (1970), p. 83 and 85 -
86 and Heiman (1968), p. 19. 
46° Letters from Haim Laskov to Liddell Hart, 22nd August 1967, LH 2/13 and 20th 
 September 
1967, LH 2/13, a letter from Liddell Hart to Haim Laskov 12th September 1967, LH 2/13 and 
Wallach: Obituary of Sir Basil Liddell Hart, p. 6. 
The letter that Liddell Hart wrote to Laskov in August 1967 does not exist in the Liddell Hart 
files at King's College. However, Wallach mentions in his obituary of Liddell Hart that such a 
letter had been written to Laskov. According to Wallach, in this letter Liddell Hart wrote: "It 
has always been with mixed feelings that I have read the tributes from Guderian and other 
German Generals to my influence on their ideas and the methods of armoured warfare they 
practised in WW II. But there have never been any such mixed feelings, and only pleasure, 
in seeing how the leaders of Israel have applied those ideas, even still better." 
See also a letter from Liddell Hart to Israel Tal 12th September, 1967, LH 15/5/304, part 2, a 
letter from Israel Tal to Liddell Hart 30th November, 1967, LH 15/5/304, part 2, letters from 
Yehuda Wallach to Liddell Hart 29th November, 1967, LH 2/22 and 22nd January 1968, LH 
15/5/304, part 2 and letters from Haim Laskov to Liddell Hart 22nd November 1967 and 19th  
March 1968, LH 2/13. 
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According to Heiman, the IDF armoured doctrine in the Six Day War was 
based on the HRSH principle where the letters represent the Hebrew words for 
breakthrough, pursuit, tanks against tanks and destruction. Heiman also sees 
that the HRSH concept foresaw using the same units and formations — tanks in 
this case — for all four tasks rather than assigning different units for each stage, 
which actually happened with several exceptions on all fronts. This can also be 
seen in Major General Israel Tal's analysis Israel's Defense Doctrine. 
Backgrounds and Dynamics in Military Review, March 1978. According to Tal, 
in the Six Day War crew-served weapon systems carried the assault and 
brought the Israelis victory in every theatre with superiority in firepower. This 
latter shows quite well the growing emphasis of seeing tank formations as the 
best solution to Israel's defence problem. Doctor Gawrych also supports this 
view. According to him, Israeli tank crews exhibited mastery of fire over their 
Egyptian counterparts.461  
From the operational point of view, the action of General Tal's division was, 
however, more an exception than a rule in the IDF during the Six Day War. 
Although Tal's tanks were — as in classic armoured warfare — concentrated 
against the Egyptian defence lines to take advantage of the shock power of the 
tanks, the way they were used was more of less direct. Such was also the 
case in the breakthrough phase on the Golan. Instead, flanking, encircling and 
blocking movements were more usual in other formations which, however, 
were started with powerful preparatory breakthrough operations in many 
places. In any case, in pursuits tanks were used for swift penetrations without 
taking much care of the flanks. Thus, despite the growing trust in the firepower 
and protection of the tank, the role of movement was also important in the 
Israeli armoured doctrine in the Six Day War. The main reason for this was -
as had been in the Sinai Campaign as well — Israel's inferiority in manpower 
and the consequential vulnerability to losses. Therefore, direct breakthrough 
battles were avoided if possible despite the fact that enemy tanks were already 
seen as the main objective of tanks. However, the plan was that enemy tanks 
would meet in movement where Israel's tactical and technical superiority would 
be revealed. In addition, tanks implemented the doctrinal demands of offence, 
transferral of battles to enemy soil and the aim of achieving a decisive victory 
Originally Liddell Hart turned to General Tal for a description of the Israeli armoured warfare 
during the Six Day War. General Tal advised Liddell Hart to turn to Wallach who at the time 
was writing the history of the Israeli Armoured Corps. Finally, at the end of 1967 Liddell Hart 
got Wallach's answer. Mainly this memorandum contained battlefield descriptions. In this 
memo Wallach, however, stressed that the Israelis had acted on the spur of an indirect 
approach mentality. 
In the latter letters from Laskov to Liddell Hart discussions about IDF armour continued with 
organisational matters. After the Six Day War, Laskov was still thinking about the ratio of 
forces to space; combinations to commit as large a number of tanks as possible to the battle 
at the time. The experiences of the war showed that despite air superiority the number of 
Israeli tanks that fired, compared to the number of tanks that were fit for combat but did not 
fire, was quite low. Therefore Laskov opted for Liddell Harl's ideas of having squadrons of 
four tanks. 
In the reply Laskov wrote: "I do have a feeling that on armour you sit back, chuckle and 
wonder what fate and Israelis did to vindicate a life long teaching and preaching." 
461  Heiman (1968), p. 19, Tal (1978), p. 27 — 28 and Gawrych, George, W: The 1973 Arab-
Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory, Leavenworth Papers number 21, Courtesy of 
the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C. 1996, p. 7. 
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rather well in the war. Thus, the growing appreciation of armour in the IDF had 
a rather natural background. In any case, it should not be forgotten that the 
IDF's superiority also rested on the ability of its tactical and operational 
commanders to combine the elements of fire and movement together and 
demonstrate initiative and innovative tactics in combat, as Gawrych puts it.462 
The IDF's superior performance when compared to its counterparts was 
also a consequence of the Israeli command process. According to Martin van 
Creveld, the command system that made the success of 1967 possible is best 
understood in terms of a series of balances. This means the ability to use 
delegated decision power at the tactical level of warfare which was — and still 
is — a precondition in maintaining the initiative in mobile warfare, and a reliable 
feed-back system that is needed for forward-looking decisions at the 
operational level. According to van Creveld, this all was organised in the IDF 
during the Six Day War as follows: From the frontal commander Major General 
Gavish downward, commanders on the Egyptian Front positioned themselves 
far forward, making decisions on the spot and relying on oral orders. This 
course of action can also be extended to the other two fronts. Written orders 
and reports were drawn up only for the records of the next highest 
headquarters. Mainly the reporting system from the tactical level upwards was 
based on radio networks that linked commanders to their superiors and also to 
parallel commanders in the same operation to each other, at least at the 
divisional level on the Sinai front. In this way the Israelis were able — despite 
certain cut-offs in the network — to check and control the independence 
granted to subordinate commanders. On the whole, General Gavish has been 
largely forgotten, as was the case with the OC Southern Command during the 
1956 War as well. One reason for this might be the operational independence 
of the divisions and brigades. Southern Command had little to do with the 
operations themselves. It only transmitted the course of events to the General 
Staff where the overall plan for the war had been produced. A quite similar 
situation seems to have also occurred on the other fronts.463 
Finally, Handel names seven major sources for Israeli military strength in the 
1967 War. They were excellent planning, excellent use of time, speed, good 
matching of ends and means, motivation, night fighting, ideal size of 
formations and good command, control and communication facilities. This list 
seems to be a little bit exaggerated. Obviously the success was partly a 
consequence of the autonomy of the formations because cuts in 
communications were not rare. This caused too much reliance on 
improvisation, as Handel also notes, which for its part shows that exact 
planning was not extended to the end of the war. This shows that the ends and 
means were not in total control at the strategic level. Therefore the situation at 
462 Gawrych (1996), p. 7. 
463 van Creveld (1985), p. 200 and 202 — 203. 
According to General Gavish, the only way to observe the developments at first hand was to 
accompany the units, to look into subordinates' eyes and to listen to their tone of voice. In 
the meanwhile Gavish's forward command echelon also transmitted the picture from the 
battlefield to the General Staff. 
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the end of the war was more a final outcome of operational success than a 
long-lasting grand strategy.464 
464 Handel, p. 566 — 568. 
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10. NO PEACE, NO WAR 
The conquests of the Six Day War left Israel in a completely new situation. The 
IDF had demonstrated its military superiority and defeated its enemies' armed 
forces thoroughly and had meanwhile extended Israel's borders on all three 
fronts. For the first time in its history, Israel had strategic defensive depth 
between its population centres and the neighbouring Arab states. In 
accordance with this, Israel had reason to be optimistic about the coming 
years. However the development of the military-strategic situation did not 
come up to expectations. The period between the Six Day War and the next 
all-out war in 1973 was one of the longest periods of conflict experienced in 
the region. From July 1967 onwards, the Israeli-Egyptian front was a stage for 
sporadic artillery fire. Sometimes, there were also very heavy naval clashes -
the most famous of them being the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat in 
October 1967 — and air patrols. The activities of both armies increased in 
March. Commando raids became almost daily events and finally air force 
elements were also committed to the fighting. Finally, the fear of escalation put 
a stop to the hostilities in August 1970.465 
The military-strategic situation in Israel after the Six Day War was not 
accepted unanimously. At the strategic level, the war had been a question of 
survival from the Israeli point of view. At the operational level, however, the 
IDF had extended Israel's borders significantly and after the war the situation 
was obviously confusing. In addition, the advantages of interior lines were not 
as striking as they had been before 1967; additional territories had diminished 
the possibilities of concentrating forces, including the Air Force, on one threat 
at a time. This led to a 25% growth in the strength of the peace-time active 
army during the period between 1967 and 1973. According to van Creveld, the 
military victory in 1967 seemed to have taken the Israeli public and 
government by surprise and no thought had been devoted to the question of 
how to terminate the war itself and how to deal with occupied territories. 
Therefore Moshe Dayan, the Minister of Defence, consulted several people for 
advice on the coming decisions. First, there were people who thought that 
Israel should be prepared to return to the situation that prevailed before the 
war. Yigal Allon, deputy Prime Minister at the time, and Colonel Shlomo Gazit, 
Head of the Planning Branch of IDF Intelligence, were among those who 
supported this view. Yigal Allon emphasised strategic defence; in his opinion, 
Israel should not seek a military victory at the expense of peace treaties with 
effective security arrangements. Therefore, the transition from the cease-fire 
agreements to full peace-treaties should be carried out in one step. 
Nevertheless, the majority — including Colonel Yuval Ne'eman, who was also 
consulted by Dayan and who wrote the report This War of Our Resolution and 
465 Thornberry, Jerry R: The Arab-Israeli Conflict: The War of Attrition and Preparations 
Preceding the October 1973 War, Master thesis (military art and science), Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas 1986, p. 109 and Herzog, Haim: The Arab-Israel Wars. War and 
Peace in the Middle East from the War of Independence through Lebanon, Vintage Books, 
New York 1984, p. 198. 
See also Dupuy, p. 349. 
On 21 October 1967, an Egyptian Osa-class missile boat sank the destroyer Eilat close to 
the Egyptian port of Port Saidi 
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how to Safeguard its Achievements about this question — supported the 
viewpoint that Israel should not return the territories it had just conquered. This 
opinion was to guide the direction of Israel's security ipolicy up to the Yom 
Kippur War in 1973.466 
Before the Six Day War, Israel's military strategy had been based on the 
deterrence power of the IDF, which was expected to prevent Arab 
offensives.46  This had not, however, worked; war had broken out. 
Nevertheless, the success in the war strengthened Israel's reliance on her own 
military strength. In addition, the new operational depth gave, at least in theory, 
the Israelis more flexibility in their defensive concepts. However, the practice 
was different. Although strategic concepts were re-evaluated after the Six Day 
War and the IDF underwent technical modernisation in many ways, on the 
whole, the change was rather slight. Haim Herzog described the situation in 
Israel in the late 1960s quite aptly by saying that the atmosphere reflected "a 
false sense of security and a strategic option". Besides, those who favoured 
abandoning the conquered territories in exchange for peace were also 
supporters of deterrence. This is revealed in The Making of the Israel's Army, 
where Allon emulates Sun Tzu's thoughts by saying: The maintenance of a 
convincing balance of forces is one of the principal ways of maintaining a 
reasonable chance of avoiding a new major war."468 
In January 1968, the Six Day War-era Chief of Staff Lieutenant General 
Yitzhak Rabin resigned and was succeeded by Lieutenant General Haim Bar 
Lev. Rabin shared Allon's views. In a press interview, the resigning Chief of 
Staff said that before the Six Day War the IDF had not been a deterrent force. 
After the war, the situation had changed so that the new borders that Israel 
had created, were, from a military point of view, ideal. Despite this Rabin, like 
Allon, admitted that although another war was not inevitable, Israel had to 
prepare as if it was. In the same breath, the incoming Chief of Staff Bar Lev 
continued by saying that it was still true that in an Israeli context the best 
defence was attack, and in the event of another war the Israeli Army would 
once more fight on the enemy's soil." On the whole, this all shows the 
unchanged war-strategic and operational doctrine, at least in military circles.469 
466 Van Creveld (1998), pi 201 — 203, Allon (1970), p. 96 — 97 and Ne'eman: This War of 
Our Resolution and how to Safeguard its Achievements, p. 3 — 4. 
In the case of the West Bank and Jerusalem, there were also ideological (religious) reasons 
for keeping these areas under Israeli control. 
467 Safran, Nadev: Israel — The Embattled Ally, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
Massachusetts 1978, p. 235. 
468 Allon (1970), pi 96 and Herzog (1984), p. 195. 
The original Sun Tzu clause that lay behind Allon's phrase was: The theory of war teaches 
us not to rely on the possibility that the enemy will not come, but on preparedness to meet 
him — not to rely on the prospect that he will not attack, but on the fact that we have made 
our position invincible." 
469 Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, January 5, 1968: Rabin's Farewell to Arms, LH 
2/19, p. 7 and Prepared for all Possibilities, General Barley Takes Command, LH 2/19, p. 8 
and Israel Today 5.1.1968, Bar Lev takes over command, LH 2/19. 
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10.1. The War of Attrition 
Less than a month after the cessation of the hostilities of the Six Day War, the 
Egyptians started their first artillery strikes against Israeli targets on the east 
bank of the Suez Canal. Gradually this exchange of fire led to the so-called 
War of Attrition between Israel and Egypt in March 1969 and extended up to 
August 1970 when a cease-fire was declared. The War of Attrition can be 
described as having been commando attacks, artillery bombardment, missile 
strikes and air force and navy actions on both sides. In the meantime, the 
activities of the Palestinian guerrillas also intensified and the IDF had to divide 
its efforts to meet two different threats.47°  
From the Egyptian point of view, the objectives of the War of Attrition were 
1) to decrease the Israeli technological and military superiority, 2) to make 
Israeli retention of the lands too expensive in terms of monetary losses and 
casualties and 3) to attain parity between the IDF and the Arab armies. 
According to these aims, the Egyptians tend to divide the War of Attrition into 
four phases. They are: 1) Challenge, a demand for Israel to fight (June 1967 -
August 1968), 2) Defensive rehabilitation or active defence (September 1968 -
February 1969), 3) War of Attrition (March 1969 — August 1970) and 4) No 
war, no peace (August 1970 — October 1973). The second and third phases 
were the most important to the Egyptians; they were meant to rebuild the 
armed forces that had been battered in the 1967 War to prepare the country 
for even an all-out war in the coming years. At the operational level, the 
Egyptians invested in two main facts; making use of the proximity of forces on 
the banks of the Suez Canal and raising Israel's losses in terms of lives and 
equipment, and secondly neutralising Israel's air superiority by building a 
surface to air missile (SAM) network.47  
From the Israeli point of view, the War of Attrition between March 1969 and 
August 1970 is usually divided in two ways: strategically and operationally 
according to the means that were used. Strategically the war can be divided 
into the period from March 1969 to December 1969, which was characterised 
by political dominance over military considerations. In this phase, the tendency 
was to plan the military countermeasures so that an escalation to an all-out 
war could be avoided. The second phase started in January 1970 and 
extended up to August 1970. In this phase, Israel put military considerations 
before political ones. According to Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, this choice was 
mainly the outcome of the strategic gains secured earlier. The decision to send 
bombers deep into Egyptian territory was intended to exploit Israel's strategic 
47° Farris, p. 51, Dupuy, p. 361 — 362 and Thornberry, p. 100. 
Statistics on the Palestinian strikes can be seen for example in O'Neill, Bard E: Armed 
Struggle in Palestine. A Political-Military Analysis, Folkestone 1978, p. 237 — 241. 
Guerrilla strikes against Israeli targets both in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip 
intensified radically after 1968 and extended up to the end of 1970. It is easy to tie these 
activities to the War of Attrition. However, Israeli countermeasures also became more 
effective at the same time. 
471  El Badri, Hassan, El Maghoub, Taha, Dia el din Zohdy, Mohammed: The Ramadan War 
1973, T. N. Dupuy Associates Inc., Dun Loring, Virginia 1978, p. 10 and Thornberry, p. 111. 
According to Gawrych, El Badri's book is a semi-official history of the Yom Kippur War. 
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superiority and translate the military gains into political ones. This reflected the 
still prevailing denial strategy. It was thought that the strategic superiority 
would bring the war to an end by deciding the outcome both militarily and 
politically. Operationally the war can be divided into four phases. The first 
period from March 1969 to mid-April 1969 can be described as having been 
composed of artillery and counter-artillery strikes that were similar to those that 
had occurred earlier after the Six Day War. In mid-April, the Israelis started 
their commando raids on the Egyptian side of the Suez Canal. These actions 
continued up to the end of the year. In the third phase, which began while the 
commando raids still continued, the Israelis activated their Air Force from the 
beginning of July 1969 against the Egyptian air defence missile system. 
Finally, after January the Israelis extended the operations of their Air Force to 
also include strategic targets deep inside Egyptian territory.472 
According to Zvi Lanir, Israel had two political aims in the war: first, to bring 
the fighting to a halt without being forced to cede the conquered land and 
second, to prove to the Egyptians that this type of warfare against Israel would 
also be disastrous. These war aims were not fulfilled. Israel's strategic, but 
also operational, tactical, organisational and administrative thinking, was still 
primarily geared to a short war against a particular type of enemy. This caused 
a problem. It was impossible to prevent a total war by defeating the enemy by 
capturing territory or by destroying his forces in this war since taking the area 
on the Egyptian side of the Suez Canal would have contradicted Israel's 
political and military conception of "secure boundaries", as Lanir calls this 
concept. This meant that operational demands were also mostly defensive and 
the essential condition for a decisive victory; i.e., annihilation of the enemy, 
was therefore almost totally absent in the strategic plans. Thus the concept of 
strategic depth was also irrelevant because Israel's operational doctrine still 
supported preventing the enemy from making any territorial gains and 
improving cease-fire lines as a bargaining chip after the war.473 
10.1.1. Defence or offence; disputes over the operational doctrine 
At the end of 1968, several months before the violations of the 1967 cease-fire 
escalated to the War of Attrition, it became clear in the IDF that if the army had 
to stay along the canal, and safeguard the lives of its soldiers, it had to 
consolidate. This viewpoint was to cause intense disputes over the 
fundamental operational principles of the IDF because it was more a question 
of digging-in than consolidation. Building fortifications was something that was 
strange to the IDF, both technically and especially mentally. According to the 
principles of the "Constant Flow" doctrine, cover from enemy fire was not 
based on fortifications, but on mobility and mobile operations.474 
472 Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov: The Israeli-Egyptian War of Attrition, 1969 — 1970. A Case 
Study of Limited Local War, Columbia University Press, New York 1980, p. 117 — 118, 68 -
69, 71, 73 — 74, 81, 85 and 172. 
473 Lanir, p. 29, Tal, p. 3 and Bar-Siman-Tov (1980), p. 59 — 60. 
474 Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 136 — 137. 
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There were two main schools on how best to defend the Sinai. The first 
school, whose major representatives were the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant 
General Bar Lev, Major General Gavish, OC of the Southern Command, and 
Major General Adan, Commander of the Armoured Corps, believed in a 
defence that was partly static and partly mobile. The defensive part of this 
concept was based on a forward fortified line along the water line. This force 
was to be backed by a mobile armoured reserve in depth. The second school, 
headed by Major General Tal — then developing armoured warfare concepts at 
the Ministry of Defence — joined by Major General Sharon, who was Head of 
the Training Department at the time, was in favour of using concentrated 
armoured formations in depth in the Sinai for counter-offensives out of 
Egyptian artillery range. In this concept the forward area; i.e., the Israeli side of 
the Suez Canal, would only have been lightly held by patrols.475 
Those in favour of fortifications were trying to solve two problems: how to 
secure the line under static warfare conditions in a limited conflict, like a war of 
attrition, and how to also prevent a general Egyptian crossing. According to 
these concepts, the school led by Bar Lev saw the fortifications as one 
component in the overall defensive network. Concrete constructions were not 
meant to stand up to a large-scale Egyptian crossing. However, a permanent 
presence along the length of the canal in the strongholds would prevent 
crossings by small forces. In case of an all-out attack at points where there 
was a high degree of likelihood of Egyptians attempting to cross, the outposts 
would perhaps be able to disrupt the Egyptians' moves to some extent, delay 
their penetration in depth in the Sinai, and serve as a foothold for further IDF 
operations. In the event of an attempted Egyptian crossing, these positions 
were to be augmented by forward deployed, combat ready, armoured units 
that would fill the gaps in the thinly manned defensive line while extra 
armoured reserves would be ready in depth in the Sinai to be used in counter-
strikes. In addition, the strong points were to allow the Israelis to keep watch 
on army deployments on the Egyptian side of the Canal.476 
In September and October 1968, the Egyptians conducted a massive 
artillery bombardment against Israeli targets on the eastern shore of the Suez 
Canal. At the end of 1968, immediately following the bombardment, the IDF 
began a huge consolidation operation. This was the birth of the so-called Bar 
Lev Line. The first school, whose principal advocate was the Chief of Staff, 
General Haim Bar Lev, prevailed, though on the whole the decision was more 
political than military. The main justification behind the solution was that Israel 
didn't want to give up the Sinai, not even partly because the E ptians might 
have used this as a weapon in peace negotiations in the future.4  
475 Herzog, Chaim: The War of Atonement, Weinfeld and Nicolson, London 1975, p. 5 — 6 
and van Creveld (1998), p. 211 — 212. 
476 Bar-Siman-Tov (1980), p. 62 — 63, Schiff (October Earlhquake), p. 138 — 139 and Gissin, 
p. 330. 
477 Van Creveld (1998), p. 211 — 212. 
See also Bar-Siman-Tov (1980), p. 64 — 65 and interview of Professor, Lieutenant Colonel 
(ret.) Yoav Gelber. 
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Major General Adan was put in charge of the planning and very soon the 
OC of the Southern Command, General Gavish, accepted Adan's solution and 
submitted it to the General Staff for approval. Under harassing sniper and 
artillery fire, the fortifications were completed during the winter of 1968 — 69. 
Because the construction of fortifications was quite unfamiliar to IDF 
engineers, they mostly learned the technique from Red Army training manuals. 
Fortifications, 31 in total, called maozim (stronghold) were built at an average 
interval of about five kilometres along the Canal line: each manned by a small 
infantry force with heavy machine guns and even antitank guns, well protected 
against incoming artillery and able to observe any Egyptian moves. However, 
these strongholds were only to be an early warning line while the actual 
defensive capability was to rest on mobile armoured patrols between the 
strongholds, supported by extra armour and artillery deployed to the rear.478 
10.1.2. From tactical raids to strategic air-offensives 
In the first month and a half of the War of Attrition, Israeli operational military 
activity was limited to counter-artillery fire. However, static defence of the canal 
line gave the initiative to the Egyptians and lead to losses from massed artillery 
fire despite the cover that the newly-constructed Bar Lev Line offered. This 
rather conflicted with the operational doctrine, which emphasised the search 
for the initiative with offensive means and flexible thinking. When the Egyptians 
increased their commando raids along the Canal in the second half of April, 
Israeli opinion grew to believe that artillery defence was not enough to stop the 
hostilities. These calculations led to the adoption of a policy of reprisals, and in 
mid-April the IDF's commando raids were started. According to Luttwak and 
Horowitz, the aim of these raids, which were anything but conventional, was to 
According to Bar-Siman-Tov, Israel's political leadership recognised that mobile defence in 
depth in the Sinai was preferable to static defence from the military point of view. Despite 
that, the static system of defence was chosen. A defence on the bank of the Suez Canal 
coincided with the concept of secure bordersi 
Gelber also admits that the construction of the line was more political than military; Israel 
had to be able to control the Sinai and prevent freedom of movement by the Egyptians east 
of the Suez Canal. Gelber also saw that there were intense disputes about the placement of 
the line. The fact that the main bulk of the fortifications were not right on the shore, but in its 
vicinity, was also a political decision. A strong fortified line right on the waterline was seen as 
being too provocative, although from a purely military point of view — if the doctrine was to 
hold the line with defensive means — the decision to forlify the waterline would obviously 
have been the right solution. 
478  Williams (1989), p. 167 and 196, van Creveld, p. 225, Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 
136 — 137, Adan, p. 44 — 49 and interview of Major General (ret.) Avraham Adan. 
According to Adan, the study of Soviet manuals, which began in the 1950s, was still the 
practise after the Six Day War. This played a central role in developing the doctrine of the 
Armoured Corps, which Adan commanded at the time. Therefore, it is not amazing that 
fortification techniques in Soviet manuals were also studied. 
See also Dupuy, p. 359. 
According to Dupuy, there were a total of 30 strongholds, including two south of the Canal 
on the Gulf of Suez and one to the east on the Mediterranean coast. 
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deflect the Egyptian offensive with destabilising attacks on all sectors but the 
Canal.479 
At the strategic level, Israel was not prepared for this type of warfare. The 
fear of escalation prevented the use of the existing doctrine. The decision to 
stay in a rigid defence on the Suez Canal tied the hands of operational 
commanders and more served the Egyptian aims — exhausting Israel's military 
and economic resources. This only left the Israelis with the possibility of 
pursuing countermeasures at the tactical level, though in the final phase of the 
war the IAF was also used against strategic targets. Therefore, in 1968 — 70 
the IDF had, according to Luttwak and Horowitz, to devise new tactical 
methods, retrain officers and men, absorb new equipment and do all this while 
fighting a conventional war on the Suez front and a counter-guerrilla war on all 
three fronts.48°  
At first the Israeli commando raids were directed both against civilian 
targets, like power plants or oil refineries, and military targets in the vicinity of 
the Egyptian side of the Suez Canal. At this stage, aerial operations were 
limited, compared to what happened later in the war. The Egyptians also 
refrained from using their Air Force, obviously because they judged that it was 
not yet ready to confront the Israeli Air Force. From July 19 onwards Israel 
changed the objectives of the raids to cover only military targets like radar 
installations, military camps and naval ports and extended the area. Up to the 
end of the year, the IDF carried out ten raids deep into Egypt. The main aim of 
these actions was preventive: to make corridors for the Air Force strikes that 
were started in July, though still only on a limited scale against targets along 
the Canal, and to reduce Egypt's possibilities for transporting her commandos 
to the Sinai. Targeting the raids more deeply in the Egyptian inland can also be 
seen as having been strategic, they were meant to show that no targets in 
Egypt were safe from the IDF. According to Israeli sources, the raids were 
mostly successful, and there is no reason to doubt why this should not have 
been so. However, from the viewpoint of the war, their effect on the war itself 
was minimal because they were tactical in scale and therefore not enough to 
stop the war.481  
479 Bar-Siman-Tov (1980), p. 68 — 70 and Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 314. 
At the beginning of April 1969, the Israeli leadership shared the opinion that they could carry 
out a gradual escalation of military activity without changing the territorial status quo and the 
essential character of the static War of Attrition. However, the IDF and the Israeli public 
were also increasingly demanding that the defensive strategy should be called off and new 
initiatives should be adopted to break down increasing Egyptian self-confidence. This also 
coincided with Dayan's, who at the time was Minister of Defence, opinions. Early in May 
1969, Dayan raised the possibility of abandoning the defence at the operational level for the 
first time. 
See also Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 137. 
When the War of Attrition began, the Egyptians had, according to Schiff, noted the 
loopholes of the strong points and neutralised them. Men were injured alongside the slits, 
and there was no alternative to sealing them. However, if the loopholes had been 
constructed to face the flanks, instead of the Canal, the situation might have been different. 
489 Luttwak & Horowitz, pi 333. 
481 
 Bar-Siman-Tov (1980), p. 99 — 101 and Thornberry, p. 35 and 37. 
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When examining the tactics that the Israeli commando units used, it can be 
noted that they had striking similarities to Wingate's teachings; bold, non-
schematic raids deep into the enemy rear, and often at night. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that Major General H. E. N. Bredin, Wingate's deputy in the 
S.N.S., commented in the Jewish Observer and Middle East Review in 
October 1969 that the Israeli operations in the Upper Nile were like Wingate's 
operations three decades eariier.482  
On 20 July 1969, the Israeli Air Force entered the war as an active military 
element. This change was a consequence of the Israeli perception of the 
nature of Egypt's war aims; an Egyptian crossing of the Canal was seen as 
more a possibility after that point. The second reason was the increasing 
Israeli losses. Once Israel had decided that a crossing might be possible, she 
had, according to Bar-Siman-Tov, only two military alternatives at her disposal: 
a large-scale land operation over the Canal to hit the Egyptian forces deployed 
along the Canal, or limited use of the Air Force for the same purpose. The Air 
Force was chosen because of the fear of escalation.483 
Bar-Siman-Tov has divided the IAF bombings between July and December 
1969 into three phases according to the targets. Simplifying, the main aim of 
the IAF operations was to wipe out the antiaircraft defence system along the 
canal, destroy outposts and reduce the artillery. The final aim was to secure 
absolute air superiority, which would have eliminated the possibility of an 
Egyptian crossing since without the cover of air defence it would have not 
been possible. According to Luttwak and Horowitz, there was also a political 
aim: to weaken President Nasser's standing as a war leader.484 
According to Major General Ezer Weizman, Air Force personnel strongly 
opposed using the Air Force because of the Egyptian missile systems along 
the canal. Besides, there was also uncertainty about the tactical effectiveness 
of bombing Egyptian ground targets such as infantry, gun and mortar 
emplacements. The Air Force command also opposed an operation by the Air 
Force without a plan to use the ground and armoured forces. As a matter of 
fact, according to Gunther Rothenberg, air commanders repeatedly urged that 
conditions were suitable for a major crossing to destroy considerable portions 
of the enemy line. Nevertheless, the government refused to permit such an 
action for political reasons.485 
482 Bredin, H.E.N: Return to Ein Harod, Jewish Observer and Middle East Review, October 
17, 1969, LH 15/4/486, p. 20 - 21. 
See also Williams (1989), p. 170 — 171 and Daily Express 3 January 1970, LH15/5/315, parl 
1 
One of the best examples of the Israeli commando raids was the capture of a Soviet-made 
P-12 radar in Ras Gharib on the western coast of the Gulf of Suez on 26/27 December 
1969. In this complicated operation, heli-lifted paratroopers stole and transferred this 
modern radar to Israel and onwards to United States for further examinationi 
483 Bar-Siman-Tov (1980), p. 81 and 86. 
484 Ibid, p. 85, 88 — 89 and 91 and Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 322. 
488 Bar-Siman-Tov (1980), p. 85 and Rothenberg, p. 172. 
Weizman's comments cited in Weizman, Ezer: Thine the Sky, Thine the Land, Ma'ariv, Tel 
Aviv 1975, p. 312. 
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The result of the air actions was, however, that the IAF destroyed almost the 
entire Egyptian air defence system, which included radar sites, Sa-2 batteries, 
radar directed guns and other support facilities. In addition, serving as flying 
artillery, the Air Force was able to demolish most of the Egyptian artillery 
emplacements and major supply depots along the Canal.486 
The final phase of the War of Attrition consisted of IAF's strategic bombing 
deep inside Egypt. Despite the tactical success in the latter part of 1969, the 
hostilities didn't completely stop and the protracted war threatened the 
strategic stability of the region. Therefore the IDF supreme command 
proposed three alternatives: 1) to initiate a large-scale land operation and to 
capture Ismailia, 2) to initiate a limited operation and to capture the area 
between Qantara and Port Said or 3) to step up the air raids in scale and 
depth. All these choices meant a change from a limited offensive strategy to a 
less limited offensive strategy. Israel sought a swift military decision. The third 
alternative, IAF raids deep inside Egypt, was agreed upon. The main reason 
was that this solution was less escalatory, though it could also be effective 
because it would have an effect on Egyptian citizens. In this way, this strategy 
shares characteristics with the "Strategy of Indirect Approach". In addition, the 
IDF did not have bridging equipment at its disposal at the time, which made 
crossing operations at least questionable, especially when weighing the 
objectives and the losses.487 
At first the IAF raids focused on large military camps near Egypt's main 
cities — Cairo, Ismailia, Inshas and Hilwan. According to the IAF Commander-
in-Chief, Brigadier Mordechai Hod, the main aim was to break the will of the 
Egyptian citizens. The long-range American-made F-4 Phantom attack planes, 
which became operational in the IDF in the beginning of 1970, made these 
missions possible. After March 1970, the raids focused on the Nile Delta where 
the main targets were Sa-2 missile sites and radar stations. However, despite 
As a result of the disputes, General Weizman, the ex-IAF commander and the Chief of 
Operations at the time, left the service. 
See also Cohen, p. 289. 
According to Cohen, there was a special Integrated Operations Branch on the Air Force staff 
for joint operations at the time. 
486 Gissin, p. 331, Cordesman & Wagner, p. 20 and Bar-Siman-Tov (1980), p. 98 — 99. 
487 Bar-Siman-Tov (1980), p. 118 — 119 and 121. 
The idea of strategic bombing was originally General Weizman's. Already in September 
1969, he proposed to extend the use of the IAF. The main reason behind his thinking was 
the poor results of the limited use of the Israeli Air Force. Until September the results of the 
tactical bombing were rather poor. 
Egyptian War Minister Muhammad Fawzi and the Chief Editor of the Al Ahram newspaper, 
Mohammed Heikal, named, according to Bar-Siman-Tov, the new Israeli strategy 
"psychological strategy" or "psychological warfare" because, according to the Egyptians, the 
real effect of the raids was meant to be not military but psychological; i.e., to arouse fears 
and implant a lack of faith in the capacity of the armed forces, and sow distrust and 
dissension between the political leadership and the public (see ibid, p. 135). 
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the massive air raids, Egyptian artillery continued shelling and causing losses 
to IDF troops in the Canal line.488 
The setting up of Sa-3 missile sites manned by Soviet personnel near 
Egypt's cities, which began in the second half of March, led to a change in 
targets. Army camps were given second priority and instead missile sites near 
the large cities and radar installations in the Nile Delta took first priority. 
Despite that, at the end of June 1970 a massive air defence net — including 
Sa-2 and Sa-3 missiles and a large quantity of different antiaircraft guns — was 
installed with Soviet help. From the very beginning, it was able to cause losses 
to the IAF.489 
Bar-Siman-Tov estimates that the Soviet success in blocking the IDF in-
depth raids and in achieving a strategic balance on the canal front created, in 
fact, the conditions for ending the war. One can agree with this statement. 
Despite the fact that both Sa-2 and Sa-3 missiles were familiar to the 
Americans from the Vietnam War and in the final phase of the War of Attrition 
the United States provided the Israelis with help in the form of advanced 
electronic warfare gear to counter the new threat, the Israelis agreed to a 
cease-fire. Thus, it was more the fear of direct confrontation with the Soviets 
that forced the Israelis into peace negotiations. However, according to Ariel 
Sharon, a plan for crossing the Canal near Qantara, eliminating the Egyptian 
air-defence network in that region and withdrawing was drawn up in the IDF 
General Staff. This plan was never carried out. The risks became too high, 
obviously for the reasons that are explained above.49°  
According to Cordesman and Wagner, Israel never fully came to grips with 
the problem of suppressing the Sa-3s during the War of Attrition. It also never 
realised the potential implications of the improvement in Arab ground-based air 
defence. The report of the Agranat Committee, which was established to 
examine the Yom Kippur War, also proves this. According to the report, before 
the Yom Kippur War it was estimated that enemy air defences were in third 
place among the obstacles to IAF operations, number one was weather and 
number two deficiencies in equipment. This was a fatal error that was already 
revealed in the first hours of the next war, the Yom Kippur War in October 
1973. Therefore, it can be said, as Murray Rubinstein and Richard Goldman 
have done, that the Israeli Air Force had a foretaste of the changes that guided 
missiles were bringing to warfare, but they remained largely blind to the tactical 
implications of this new technology.491 
488 Cohen, p. 294 — 295, Bar-Siman-Tov (1980), p. 132 and Rubinstein & Goldman, p. 106 -
107. 
The first Phantoms came to Israel in September 1969. 
489 Bar-Siman-Tov (1980), p. 142 — 143 and 172. 
48° Bar-Siman-Tov (1980), p. 172, Sharon, pi 234 — 235 and Nordeen, p. 113. 
491 Cordesman & Wagner, p. 20, van Creveld (1998), p. 214, Investigating Committee of the 
Yom Kippur War; The Reporl, Jerusalem 1975, part 3.4, IDF and Defense Establishment 
Archive, Tel Aviv, p. 1356 - 1357 and Rubinstein & Goldman, p. 110. 
The report of the Investigating Committee of the Yom Kippur War, also known as the 
Agranat Committee, was published in full in January 1995. 
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10.1.3. Counter-guerrilla activities; reflections of combined arms and joint 
operations 
Although peace-time low intensity operations are outside the scope of this 
study, a short look at the counter-guerrilla operations between 1967 and 1973 
is in order because they influenced the principles of the conventional warfare 
as well. Counter-guerrilla operations can be divided into two categories, both in 
time and space and in type of action. After the Six Day War, guerrilla activities 
against Israeli targets — mainly civilian — grew steadily, reaching their peak in 
the years of the War of Attrition. Thanks to effective counter-operations, the 
Israelis were able to stop the Palestinian armed resistance in the West Bank at 
the end of 1970 and in the Gaza Strip at the end of 1971. As a result of this, in 
1972 — 1973 Palestinian activities spread outside Israel's borders. Typical 
events during this period were hijacks and strikes against Israeli citizens 
abroad, the most prominent of them being the massacre of Israeli athletes at 
the Munich Olympic Games in 1972.492 
After the Six Day War, Israel invested a lot of time and effort in developing a 
counter-terror and anti-guerrilla strategy. This strategy was heavily offensive 
and purely military at all levels. At first the IDF responded to terrorist actions 
when and where they took place but rather soon it became obvious that the 
initiative could not be left to the PLO. This led to preventive operations. In the 
Gaza Strip, the Israeli counter-actions can be described as having been 
piecemeal search and arrest operations, which looked more like police 
procedures than army operations although, in addition to special forces, IDF 
troops were also used in these missions. However interesting, these 
operations are outside the scope of this study and are therefore not studied in 
greater detail.493  
Instead, counter-guerrilla operations on the West Bank and some 
operations outside Israel's borders also represent warfare at the operational 
level. At first the counter-guerrilla actions were started with the reconnaissance 
forces of the territorial commands, the Sayerets. Their missions varied from 
pursuits and ambushes to the mining of roads used by the terrorists and 
interdicting guerrilla activities in the cities of the West Bank. However, the 
The Agranat Committee, led by the Chairman of Israel's Supreme Court Shimon Agranat, 
consisted of both civilian and military members. Its mission was to evaluate the process that 
led to the Yom Kippur War, the IDF's performance during the war itself and to provide 
suggestions for further measures. 
492 O'Neill, p. 237 — 241, Ben-Rafael, Eliezer: A Guerrilla Conflict in International Politics, 
Greenwood Press 1987, Appendix 1 and Katz (1989), p. 106 — 107, 109 — 110 and 112 -
113. 
The Jordanian civil war in 1970; i.e., the action of the Jordanian army, the Arab Legion, 
against the Palestinians in Jordan, also had a significant influence on the cessation of 
Palestinian activities in the West Bank. 
493 Tophoven, Rolf: Fedayin — Guerrilla ohne Grenzen, Bernard & Graefe Verlag fuer 
Wehrwesen, Frankfurt am Main 1974, p. 66, Feldt, Mikael: lsraelin sotilaalliset vastatoimet 
Intifadan kukistamiseksi Lansirannalla ja Gazassa, (Israel's Military Counter Measures to 
Thwart the Intifada in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip), a study from the General Staff 
Officer Course, National Defence College Finland, Gummerus Kirjapaino 0y, Saarijarvi 
1997, p. 38 — 39 and Handel. p. 564. 
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scale of the Palestinian raids and the limited manpower of the Sayerets forced 
the Israelis to change their course of action. The use of heavily armed jeeps 
and helicopters was not enough to stop the strikes. Therefore, the Israelis 
revitalised the S.N.S. principles of pre-emptive attacks against the enemy's 
home bases.494 
The first large operation of the IDF across the Jordan border was "Operation 
Toter against the Palestinian training base in the town of Karameh in the 
Jordan Valley in March 1968. The brigade scale task force consisted of 
paratroopers, tank and mechanised units, reconnaissance and engineer units, 
Air Force elements including a helicopter unit and some additional troops. The 
objective of this force was to destroy the camp and show the Arab Legion that 
the Israelis were also able to operate on Jordanian soil, if necessary. The 
operation was not a great success. According to Luttwak and Horowitz, IDF 
troops had only trained in small detachments after the Six Day War, not in 
large formations for mobile war. This caused the loss of flexibility. In addition, 
fog in the landing area delayed the use of the heliborne force that was to block 
the withdrawal roads of the guerrillas, which enabled most of the guerrilla 
fighters to slip away. Besides, the quick reaction of the Arab Legion was 
obviously a surprise to the Israelis:495 
According to Samuel Katz, Karameh was a victory to the Arabs because the 
Palestinians had fought the IDF on equal terms for the first time, and inflicted 
impressive casualties on the Israelis. Katz also states that quick, one-time 
operations that make use of massive force cannot succeed in stamping out 
terrorist threats because it means the loss of flexibility and speed. However, 
despite this statement, the Israelis didn't abandon large-scale anti-guerrilla 
operations. From 1969 to 1970, seventeen raids, in which paratroopers, 
infantry like the Golani Brigade and armour like the Barak Brigade were used, 
were conducted against Palestinian bases. After Karameh, the IDF also spent 
more time on training in garrisons and camps left behind by the Arab Legion in 
1967. The reduction of the activities of Palestinian guerrillas in the West Bank 
during that time shows that the results were good. According to Katz, the 
success on the West Bank encouraged the General Staff to extend the scale 
of the commando raids in the Suez Canal area as wel1.496 
However, the experience at Karameh was, according to Cohen, a starting 
point for future airborne operations. This operation showed the need for 
additional helicopters to transfer troops to the battlefield quickly enough and 
led to the establishment of a helicopter wing in the IAF. On the eve of the Yom 
Kippur War, the IAF had four helicopter squadrons; a training squadron of 
494 Katz (1989), p. 83, 91 and 99 and Cohen, p. 255 - 256. 
Sayeret Haruv (Central Command) was trained to use helicopters in tracking and pursuits 
while Sayeret Egoz (Northern Command) specialised in using jeeps. Sayeret Shaked in the 
Southern Command concentrated on tracking Egyptian commandos in depth in the Sinai. 
466 Katz (1989), p. 93 — 95, Katz (1996), p. 121, Cohen, p. 259 — 262 and Luttwak & 
Horowitz, p. 334 — 335. 
Cohen calls "Operation Toter by the name "Interne. 
496 Katz (1989), p. 84 and 95 and 100 — 102, Katz (1996), p. 97 and 121 and Luttwak & 
Horowitz, p. 334 — 335. 
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older equipment, and three operational squadrons. This meant a hell-lift 
capacity of at least two battalions in one flight.497 
Counter-terrorist and rescue operations in Israel and abroad were joint 
operations in most cases. A preventive operation called "Bardas 54 — 55' in 
January — February 1973 against Palestinian bases in Tripoli in Libya is one of 
the most famous. It was the first large-scale IDF raid in which each of the three 
services were represented under one unified command, although this was a 
year before the terms combined arms and joint were adopted by the IDF.498 All 
commands also contributed equally to the logistics, planning and execution of 
the raid, which was preceded by a brigade-size exercise of paratroopers at a 
site near Jericho and amphibious assault training near Haifa. In many other 
operations — depending on the time spent on training — models of objectives 
were also constructed, and assault procedures were done to split-second 
timing. Sub-commanders joined the planning to familiarise themselves with the 
details of the operation while the commanders' role was still central; they were 
trained to act according to the situation. On the whole, the change in 
leadership principles or in tactics was minimal when compared to Ariel 
Sharon's tactics before the 1956 War or even to Orde Wingate's tactics before 
Israel's independence. This time only the scale of the operations were 
extended to the combined arms or joint services level.499  
The large-scale raids were good training for combined operations. However, 
they represented more exceptions than the rule in the IDF during the period 
between 1967 and 1973. The dominance of tanks and the Air Force was the 
tendency before the Yom Kippur War. Nevertheless, the experience that the 
IDF got in multi-branch and multi-service operations was to be of special value 
during the difficult phases of the Yom Kippur War. 
10.2. The adoption of defensive defence 
The cessation of hostilities after the War of Attrition was seen in two ways in 
Israel. Politicians showed confidence in the correctness of the path taken 
during the war while soldiers mostly disagreed with this opinion. Major General 
Matityahu Peled evaluated the strategic situation in Israel in the newspaper 
Ma'ariv on 19 September 1970. According to Peled, "overconfidence in Israel's 
military strength and underestimation of the opponent took place in the shape 
of the absence of a military option for the enemy." In other words, after the War 
of Attrition Israel had no realistic scenario for an all-out war. Israel continued to 
rely on the territorial and military status quo and distrusted any political 
497 Cohen, p. 259 and 262 and The Military Balance 1976 — 1977, The International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, London September 1973, p. 33. 
According to the Military Balance, the IAF had 12 Super Frelon and 12 CH-53 transport 
helicopters, 20 Bells (AB-205 A), 25 lroquees (UH 1-D) and 5 Alouettes on the eve of the 
Yom Kippur War. 
498 Actually, ground forces command did not yet exist at that time. Nevertheless, ground, air 
and naval troops were included in this operationi 
499 Katz (1989), p. 109 — 110 and 112 — 113. 
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initiatives that would have been liable to change this. Secondly, by relying on 
the static defence system, Israeli framers of security policy ignored the tactical 
and operational experiences of the War of Attrition. Troops were — excluding 
tactical commando forces that were sent to the Egyptian side of the Canal -
tied to fixed fortifications. As a matter of fact, the operational doctrine was not 
in use during the War of Attrition at all. Besides, the tactical proximity of the 
Bar Lev Line to the Egyptian lines had made it possible for Egypt to force 
Israel to fight the War of Attrition. In addition, from the operational point of 
view, the transfer of the Egyptian missiles to the vicinity of the Canal meant a 
degree of neutralisation of Israel's air superiority in the Canal sector. This 
extremely essential influence on the IDF's operational doctrine was not 
understood despite the fact that this isolated tanks and the airforce, the 
primary components of the IDF, from each other.50° 
The belief that a security doctrine based on a static defence system had 
proved itself during the War of Attrition prevented, according to Bar-Siman-
Tov, any thorough examination of what had in fact resulted from basing 
security on static defence lines. Instead according to Louis Williams, the Bar 
Lev Line strengthened a basic misconception in the public mind that the line of 
strongholds was a massive Maginot-type construction, intended to prevent any 
crossing of the Suez Canal. However, the debate concerning the Bar Lev Line 
was reopened in the IDF between advocates of mobile defence and adherents 
of static defence. General Sharon, who shed light on this question in his 
autobiography, initiated the discussions. According to Sharon, a line of 
fortifications could not play an effective role in preventing a crossing of the 
Canal. The Israelis would only make themselves fixed targets where positions 
and movements would be under constant surveillance and therefore Israeli 
procedures would become common knowledge. Secondly according to 
Sharon, the Bar Lev Line had deprived the army of its greatest asset, mobility. 
This was against the principle of flexible thinking, which was a prerequisite for 
taking the initiative. Even worse, manning the strong points would commit the 
Israelis to a static defence on an outer line, where there was no possibility of 
winning a battle. This was against the operational doctrine in use at the 
time.5° 
 
According to these arguments, the opponents of the Bar Lev Line suggested 
that the Israelis should base their defence on the natural line of hills and dunes 
from Belusa in the north to Tasa in the south. This line runs parallel to the 
Canal five to eight miles to the east and dominates the Canal plain. Mobile, 
mainly armoured forces, would operate in the space between the Canal and 
the barrier line in the rear in order to wipe out invading Egyptian forces. A 
second line with mobile reserves would be established 15 to 20 miles from the 
500 Bar-Siman-Tov (1980), p. 191 and 198 — 200. 
Original Peled, Matti: Thoughts On Defense, Ma'ariv, September 19, 1970. 
According to Bar-Siman-Tov, Egypt's strategy of attrition failed from the purely military point 
of view, but politically it succeeded. By managing to get direct Soviet military intervention in 
the war when militarily driven to the wall, Egypt succeeded in improving its strategic balance 
vis-a-vis Israel, and this improved her political stance. 
501  Sharon, p. 220, Schiff (October Earlhquake), p. 139 — 140, Williams (1989), p. 200 and 
Rothenberg, p. 209. 
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Canal, where the mountains, including the Mitla and Gidi passes, begin. 
Infantry would not be posted along the line of the Canal, it was to only be in the 
barrier line to the rear. On the whole, it was expected that with this concept the 
Israelis could afford an Egyptian crossing as well as a penetration of a mile or 
two inside the Sinai before concentrating on Egyptian weak points in mobile 
warfare.5°2 
The adherents also agreed that the Bar Lev Line could not serve as a shield 
for the Sinai and regarded the strong posts merely as look-outs, each 
containing a platoon of infantry with a detachment of tanks, two or three at the 
most, with mobile forces patrolling between the positions. They also realised 
that the entire length of the Canal could not be held but insisted, however, that 
the positions be more than a chain of observation posts. The strong points 
would be given more fighting capability by constructing new access roads for 
armoured reserves to firing ramps along the high bank of the Canal, and a 
switch road, some miles back from the Canal, to allow artillery to move rapidly. 
Altogether, these installations were supposed to deny crossing points at major 
road junctions for a few hours and enable reserves to move Up.5u3 
The new concept was a compromise, though no substantial changes were 
made in the static defence concept. According to Bar-Siman-Tov, the reasons 
were the enormous investments that had already been spent in building the 
Bar Lev Line, the powerful inertia of routine and an inadequate will to change 
things. During Major General Sharon's tenure as the OC Southern Command 
(December 1969 — July 1973), the Bar Lev Line was completed. On the eve of 
the Yom Kippur War the line consisted of three elements: In the first line of 
defence along the Canal line were 31 stone- and sand-reinforced bunkers, 
maozims, connected to earthen ramps that were designed to provide cover for 
tanks, which would reinforce the maozims. Second, some 10 kilometres back 
in the Sinai 20 strongholds of company strength were built in a hill line, 
taozims. Third, a road network including two north — south roads and a series 
of east — west roads were constructed to make counter-attacks possible. All 
these changes show at least a slight deviation in the original plan to a more 
offensive application, which can be seen as being a consequence of Sharon's 
influence. He based the preparations on the scenario that in future the battles 
would be fought in depth in the Sinai. In this concept mobile operations would 
be Israel's best defence. The road network was a prerequisite to this type of 
warfare, longitudinal and transverse roads would give the armoured forces the 
ability to launch a counter-attack swiftly up and down the length of the front 
and to the Canal at any point. While in General Adan's concept the maozims 
were constructed to be antennae that were supposed to serve as observation 
posts and to start initial engagements after the use of reserves in depth, in 
Sharon's plan the strong points only had the role of observation. Therefore, 
5°2 Sharon, p. 220, Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 138, and Herzog (1975), p. 11 — 12. 
503 Adan, p. 49 — 52, Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 139 — 140 and Rothenberg, p. 170 — 
171. 
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they would be evacuated in the case of an all-out war. According to this 
concept Sharon also reduced the number of maozims to 18.504 
According to Zvi Lanir, the Bar Lev Line was an unsuccessful compromise 
between the static and mobile possibilities inherent in the situation. Despite the 
fact that considerable room for operational manoeuvre had been created in the 
Six Day War on all fronts, the political concept of secure borders put the IDF in 
a rigid defence and did not bring about a change in the doctrine. Zvi Lanir calls 
this strategy by the name of "defensive defence".505 The defence concept that 
was adopted can best be seen in the role of the Bar Lev Line. The weakened 
strongholds along the Canal line represented the concept at both the strategic 
and tactical levels; static defence. Operational level tank formations able to 
engage in mobile warfare in depth in the Sinai were almost separate from the 
strong points and mentally also separate from the concept of static defence 
despite the fact that the Bar Lev Line was not initially intended only for 
defensive purposes, but also as a jumping-off point for the west bank. 
However, the final result of the rebuilding and reorganising of the Bar Lev Line 
was that there were sectors without a stronghold. Therefore according to 
Schiff, some officers argued that it was possible that daylight would reveal that 
the Egyptians had transferred an infantry brigade to the east bank. General 
Dan Laner described the situation quite aptly as follows:" We have, rather than 
a line, depth. It is important to stress that this system must be managed in a 
mobile and aggressive fashion." Nevertheless, the line was the fact and 
became widely accepted as such before the Yom Kippur War, but it also can 
be supposed that it gave a false sense of security — especially after the 
reduction of forces. In any case, in an interview ten years after the Six Day 
War, Yitzhak Rabin declared, according to Rothenberg, that "there was not a 
single person in the defence establishment who suggested that we retreat from 
Suez." 06 
On the Golan Heights, the Israelis used the period between 1967 and 1973 
to make their positions as impenetrable as possible by constructing a series of 
obstacles and fortifications throughout the area, but especially along the 
eastern edge of the plateau. This line of fortifications was situated on the 
demarcation line, the Purple Line, between the Israelis and the Syrians. The 
preparations consisted of a four to six meter wide and four meter deep antitank 
ditch, an embankment on the Israeli side of the ditch including a series of 
observation posts, 17 concrete forts (mutzavim) of 10 to 30 men and a 
minefield along the border line. During the years 1972 — 1973 new roads were 
504 Bar-Siman-Tov (1989), p. 199 — 200, Thornberry, p. 26, van Creveld (1998), p. 212, 
Sharon, p. 238, 265 and 270 and interview of Major General (ret.) Avraham Adan. 
See also Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 143 — 144. 
According to Schiff, there were 16 manned, though very small, strongholds left when Sharon 
left the Southern Command. 
505 Lanir, pi 29. 
5°6 Schiff (October Earlhquake), p. 142 and 144 and Rothenberg, p. 171. 
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also built in order to facilitate the movement of tanks and the deployment of 
artillery.507 
In addition to constructing fortifications on the most hostile fronts, home 
defence was also strengthened by establishing new settlements in the Gaza 
Strip, on the Jordanian front and also on the Golan Heights. The NAHAL 
organisation provided cores for the new settlements which, according to van 
Creveld, meant that the settlements were primarily parts of the overall defence 
system and only secondarily the expansion of civilian settlements. Only in the 
vast expanses of the Sinai Peninsula was there no need to use settlements in 
the role of home defence.508 
10.2.1. Operational analysis 
According to van Creveld, during Lieutenant General Haim Bar Lev's four-year 
term in the post of Chief of Staff (1968 — 1972), the transformation of the IDF -
from an army with an almost exclusively offensive orientation to one that, 
initially at least, expected to defend and hold out — was completed. This 
statement is valid only at the strategic level of warfare where Israeli strategists 
worried about how to absorb a first blow. In January 1972, Bar Lev was 
succeeded by Lieutenant General David Elazar, while Major General Israel Tal 
was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff. According to Zeev Schiff, it was then 
expected that Tal and Sharon, the OC of the Southern Command, would 
succeed in introducing a mobile defence system, but they made no substantial 
changes. Despite the tactical defence of the Canal line, at the operational level 
the tendency towards the offence remained in existence.509 
However, the principles of mobile defence were not unknown to the Israelis 
at the time. General Adan, who had studied at the U.S. Armoured School in 
Fort Knox in 1958, had written a field manual entitled Armoured Operations 
after his return, where mobile defence was also included. Before the Six Day 
War, these principles were not valid but after the territorial conquest of the 
1967 War the situation changed. Nevertheless, rather than developing an 
appropriate doctrine based on mobile defence the use of mobile forces were 
connected to the static defence of the Bar Lev Line and on the Golan Heights 
to the fortifications of the Purple Line. According to this, mobile defence meant 
strong points in the front line, armour in reserve manoeuvring in the planned 
killing ground — also in the ramparts along the Canal line — and the main 
reserves behind these to be also used in depth in planned killing grounds of 
their own. This was in fact the concept that was meant to be used on the 
Golan Heights and in the Sinai before the reduction of the number of maozims 
and the strength of the infantry.51° 
507 Cordesman & Wagner, p. 43 — 44, Herzog (1975), p. 59 and Katz (1989). p. 117. 
508 Van Creveld (1998), p. 201. 
509 Van Creveld (1998), p. 208, Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 139 — 140 and Rothenberg, 
pi 171. 
510 Interview of Major General (ret.) Avraham Adan and Handel, p. 539 — 540. 
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According to the Agranat Committee report, before the Yom Kippur War 
defence and offence at the principal level were in balance. Nevertheless, 
during the years before the war, defensive principles had been left in the 
background. The report also shows that the principles of mobile defence were 
included in the operational doctrine, but on the whole the manuals 
concentrated almost only on offence.511  
According to Major General Yitzhak Hofi, OC of the Northern Command 
during the Yom Kippur War, the principles of active defence were included in 
the operational doctrine. This might have been the case on the Golan Heights 
but elsewhere it was obviously not the case. General Adan stressed that the 
principle of active defence was born only during the Yom Kippur War when 
mobile defence proved to be inadequate to cope with the mass of enemies. 
According to Adan, the difference from mobile defence was that active defence 
consisted of two elements: a strong defensive part that would have a static 
mission and a mobile defence containing both defensive and offensive 
elements. Thus, active defence, which also was originally an American 
practice, was a mixture of strong defence and mobile defence but was more 
defensive than mobile defence where the success mostly rested on the 
counter-strikes of mobile reserves.512 
The dominance of offence in the operational echelons can be explained 
from at least two viewpoints. First, the operational doctrine had not 
experienced any remarkable changes and second, the organisation of the IDF, 
armoured formations backed by the Air Force, was an army especially suitable 
for offence. The doctrine was still heavily offensive, though the principle of pre-
emption was not so valid anymore. Neither the Bar Lev Line nor fortifications in 
the Purple Line had reduced the offensive spirit. Despite this seemingly 
defensive strategy, the IDF still prepared for an offence at the operational 
level. According to Adan, it was generally thought in military circles that it was 
unnecessary to start a war because of the cover the Sinai offered. Therefore, 
the IDF was seen as being able to destroy the Egyptians if they tried to cross 
the Canal. It was not even expected that the Syrians would dare to launch an 
attack. Nevertheless, mobile defence was not seen as an ideal solution in the 
circumstances that prevailed after the War of Attrition, because it was thought 
that the Egyptians would try to cross the Canal, stabilise their defences and 
after that continue to push forward on a wide front. Both Adan and Gissin state 
that there also were disputes on how to cope with this problem. A crossing 
operation was chosen. This illustrates the unchanged doctrine quite well. The 
Israelis not only prepared to absorb the Egyptian crossing, but also to launch a 
counter-offensive across the Suez Canal into Egypt.513 
511 
 Investigating Committee of the Yom Kippur War; The Report, p. 1350 — 1351. 
The committee counted that there were 28 examples of offence in the manuals at the 
divisional level, but only one concerning defence. 
512 Ibid. and interview of Major General (ret.) Avraham Adan. 
513 Ibid. 
See also Gissin, p. 144 — 145. 
In this context Gissin mentions that "there is perhaps more than a grain of truth to the cliché 
that some military organisations are better at the offence than the defence, and vice versa." 
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According to Gissin, the mixture of static defence on the Canal line and the 
offensive spirit of the operational echelons in the Sinai emanated from 
problems in command and control principles. The Bar Lev Line alone 
demonstrated, according to him, the operational as well as psychological 
problems in the chain of command when the IDF tried to integrate the 
defensive and offensive orientations into its training and its command and 
control doctrine.514 In a way this was natural; in a defensive posture the sub-
commanders had — at least in theory — less room for flexible thinking or taking 
the initiative. Depending on the training, this might have been in contradiction 
with the principles of "Optional Control". Besides, in the early 1970s there was 
an ongoing change of generations in the IDF; highly offensive-spirited veterans 
of the past Israeli wars were just leaving the service and their successors were 
in between defensive and offensive thinking while the troops were still mainly 
trained for offence. 
Despite these defensive trends, at the operational and tactical levels the 
defence philosophy was based on mobile armoured formations. This was the 
case both in active and reserve formations. According to Adan, the Training 
Department of the General Staff, with its Soviet-origin Jews, examined Soviet 
doctrines, which were more or less in use in the Egyptian and Syrian armies, 
organised aerial intelligence in the Suez Canal area and in eastern Golan, and 
according to these developed a model on how to break such defence lines with 
armour. On the Sinai front, during the War of Attrition, General Adan instituted 
specialist teams to examine the lessons to be drawn from every action of the 
war. However, in the meantime, he resisted pressures to increase the number 
of armoured brigades involved in the mobile defence system. According to 
Louis Williams, his argument was that however useful the training might have 
been, committing larger forces would have resulted in wear and tear on 
engines, which had to be in first rate condition for the eventuality of a full-scale 
war. Therefore, the active armoured Sinai Ugdah was building logistic back up 
and infrastructure for absorbing reinforcements in the event of war while the 
Sinai Armoured Headquarters was preparing its contingency plans. In addition, 
a brigade commanders' forum, instituted by the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant 
General Elazar, exchanged views and new tactical concepts. That 
preparedness also included the learning of new techniques — among others, 
the crossing and bridging of water obstacles, which was trained for in 1972 on 
the Kishon River near Haifa and at Ruafa Dam in the first large-scale exercises 
since the War of Attrition.515 
After considerable study and experimentation, there was agreement that the 
Armoured Corps had to reorient itself towards massive daylight assaults on a 
brigade or even divisional scale, exploiting psychological shock, maximum 
mobility and disrupting the enemy's defences simultaneously at many 
In any case, on the Golan Heights offence was obviously still a consequence of the 
situation. The threat against Israel proper was too near for defence against quantitative 
superiority. In the Sinai, the statement sounds apt because there was also room for mobile 
defence in depth in the Sinai. 
514 Gissin, p. 144 — 145. 
515 Interview of Major General Avraham Adan, Williams (1989), p. 186 and 199 — 200, 
Sharon, p. 237 and Rothenberg, p. 123. 
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points.516 Nevertheless, none of these aims were new in armoured warfare, nor 
also in Israel, although Rothenberg describes this as new tactics. Similarities 
to the German Blitzkrieg doctrine or to the Israeli application in the Six Day 
War were clear. Continuous operations up to three days at a stretch were not 
new; this principle was already adopted in the "Conveyor-belt" system in the 
early 1960s. The difference was the organisation that was built to implement 
these tasks. General Tal, who was commander of the Armoured Corps in the 
late 1960s, preferred tanks able to advance against enemy fire. This not only 
led to the purchase of Centurion tanks, which were slower but more heavily 
armoured than previous IDF tanks, but also to the dominance of tanks in 
organisations at the expense of lighter and more mobile vehicles. This fact is 
also revealed in General Elazar's words at the time: "If a terrorist slips in 
through the Jordan Valley, the population at large is not in danger. If were 
short one tank company, the whole country's in trouble!"517 At the tactical level 
and partly at the operational level as well this also meant a change from the 
indirect approach of mechanised forces to a more Fullerian-style direct assault 
of tanks and the Air Force. Nevertheless, both of these organisations show an 
offensive-orientation, the latter maybe even more so. 
The apparent trend towards an "all-tank" fighting doctrine was not 
universally accepted in the IDF and in 1971 — 1972 there was a heated debate 
in the IDF in which critics, citing the 1967 experiences, argued the need for 
integrated combined-arms teams. Yigal Allon put these demands in words in 
his book The Making of Israel's Army. On the whole, Allon preferred defensive 
deployment in depth. However, he also saw the need for a new generation of 
tanks for counter-offensives. By rebuilding the armoured formations, the 
mechanisation of the infantry had to be completed, the power of the mobile 
artillery had to be increased and all the services had to be adapted for the 
fighting methods of the 1970s as well. This was the opinion of General Adan 
as well. He preferred fully mechanised armoured formations, where the 
infantry was also equipped with fighting vehicles that were able to follow and 
fight with the tanks dismounting only if needed. Instead, in General Tal's 
concept the mission of APCs was to transfer infantry to certain areas to make 
the continuous movement of tanks possible.518 
516 Rothenberg, p. 123, Katz (1996), p. 129 and interview of Major General (ret.) Avraham 
Adan. 
For example according to Katz, the 7th Armoured Brigade spent the latter part of 1972 and 
1973 up to the Yom Kippur War in offensive exercises. 
517 Kahalani (1994), p. 214. 
618 Rothenberg, p. 160, Allon (1970), p. 106 — 107 and Adan, p. 209. 
Allon also saw a need to improve the methods of paratroopers in long-range missions, 
though obviously this meant low intensity conflict missions. In Allon's concept, the Air Force 
would basically remain a tactical force and special attention would be given to anti-aircraft 
defence. The Navy's main task remained as it had been; to prevent the landing of enemy 
forces on Israel's beaches, though the Navy also had to develop its capacity to attack 
sensitive objectives on enemy shores, including a marine force mainly for deceptive sub-
missions. It is interesting to note that Allan's vision was mostly implemented after the Yom 
Kippur War. 
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According to Sharon, between 1967 and 1973 the IDF was overcome by a 
kind of "tank mania". Other combat arms; i.e., infantry, armoured infantry and 
artillery, were neglected and standard battle doctrines or principles of war like 
ratios of force and concentration of effort were taken less seriously. This was 
mainly based on the idea that infantry, mechanised or not, would find it 
increasingly difficult to survive and fight on the battlefield, and on the IAF's 
effectiveness as "flying artillery". Finally, the school of mechanisation was 
displaced in the early 1970s despite the experiences of Israel's previous 
campaigns. During the 1956 War in the Sinai, armour had relied heavily on 
manoeuvre, had made only a few daylight assaults and engaged other tanks 
only on a few occasions. In the Six Day War, there were still manoeuvres as 
well as direct attacks. In this war tanks and the Air Force played a leading role 
in the success, which was a reason why the tanks were trusted. "Things had 
gone nicely without too much infantry", as Adan noted; a fact that finally led to 
the reduction of the supporting branches. However, this tendency didn't 
consider the fact that the Israeli success in the Six Day War was partly due to 
the lack and inefficacy of the Arab antitank and antiaircraft defences. The other 
main reason for the development was money; if the defence allocation had to 
be concentrated on one or several branches or services, they would be the 
Armoured Corps and the Air Force as both had proved their efficiency in the 
last war.51 9 
10.2.2. Changes in organisations 
As a result of the lessons of the Six Day War, the Ugdah became a permanent 
force structure, replacing the brigade as the primary force. An army corps was 
also suggested by General Tal in autumn 1969. According to the Agranat 
Committee report, this idea was based on the experiences of the Six Day War 
where territorial commands had not been particularly successful in both 
mobilising troops and leading them on the battlefield. However, this proposal 
was not put into practice before the Yom Kippur War. Instead, permanent 
divisions came into being. According to Gideon Avidor, there were several 
reasons for this decision. First was the need to concentrate power in the name 
of economy of force. Studies of the Six Day War revealed that brigades had 
seldom operated alone on the battlefield. This was a real change when 
compared to the use of brigades during the 1956 War when many of the 
brigades had independent missions. The regular Sinai Division, which was 
established during General Adan's tenure as commander of the Armoured 
Corps, was the first real armoured division in the IDF and served as a model 
General Tal's concept for using APCs was similar to the American, British and French 
practice at the time. Unarmed APCs were only for transferring infantry from one place to 
another. 
519 Rothenberg, p. 121 and 160, Cordesman & Wagner, p. 54 — 55, Sharon, p. 304 and 
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for the reserve armoured Ugdahs. According to Avidor, the latter was a 
consequence of the thought that in quiet periods the organisation must be 
identical to that of the battlefield. This was the only way to live with and learn 
the frameworks and techniques of battle before the first shot was fired. In 
1973, the IDF had seven armoured Ugdahs, which consisted of two to three 
armoured brigades and some organic artillery. In addition, several independent 
tank battalions were created to support the few infantry brigades.52° 
The decision to create divisions as a primary force also caused changes in 
the brigades. It was believed that the "teeth" forces must be relieved of every 
burden and responsibility that was not directly connected to the execution of 
the mission. This view led to streamlined brigades of two tank battalions where 
several maintenance duties as well as artillery were concentrated at the 
divisional level. In addition, according to Luttwak and Horowitz, the tank 
battalions were stripped of some of their organic mechanised infantry and 
mortars as well. In this way armoured battalions became almost pure all-tank 
formations, which decreased the status of the brigades to a level that can be 
compared to regiments. The reorganisation might well have lightened the 
command chain of the brigades, but it certainly also meant the loss of 
independence and flexibility. Without supporting elements, the brigades were 
no longer capable of engaging in missions that lasted several days without the 
support of higher echelons. Nevertheless, according to Avidor, flexibility was 
created by the quality of the lower echelons, which would give the higher 
echelon freedom of action. With training, both officers and men in the IDF 
could execute their orders quickly and precisely at all times. In any case, 
whatever the contents of the training might have been, it is highly suspicious 
that this manner of thinking — which more resembles order tactics — was ideal 
to preserve enough room for innovation in the brigades. In this way the 
concept was also against the principles of "Optional Control".521  
520 Avidor, p. 66 — 68, Adan, p. 42 — 44, Rothenberg, p. 158, Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 363 and 
Investigating Committee of the Yom Kippur War; The Report, p. 1455. 
According to Rothenberg, an armoured Ugdah consisted of three armoured brigades of two 
tank battalions each, a reconnaissance battalion, an artillery regiment of 36 self-propelled 
howitzers and small supporting elements. The tank strength was around 200. 
Correspondingly, according to Luttwak & Horowitz, an armoured division had two tank 
brigades and one mechanised brigade. It is obvious that the quality of the equipment 
determined the terms; a brigade consisting of older tanks and APCs was obviously 
preferably called a mechanised brigade rather than an armoured brigade, as had also been 
the case earlier when the IDF did not have enough equipment to equip all armoured 
formations with modern tanks. 
See also Williams (1989), p. 195 and van Creveld (1998), p. 219. 
According to Williams, a regular armoured Ugdah consisted of two armoured brigades at 
first. The third armoured brigade in the Sinai Division had its origins in the immediate needs 
of the War of Attritioni 
Van Creveld states that the IDF was so "tankomanic" in the early 1970s that it also 
considered the possibility of setting up an armoured division without an organic artillery 
regiment at all. 
521 
 Ibid., p. 68 — 69 and 71, Katz (1996), p. 128 — 129, Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 363 and 
interview of Professor, Colonel (ret.) Yehuda Wallach. 
According to Katz, the 7th Armoured Brigade consisted of two tank battalions, one 
mechanised battalion, a reconnaissance platoon and small supportive elements. However, 
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According to Rothenberg, the "all-tank" concept never became an official 
doctrine. Despite this fact, the reserve formations of the Armoured Corps 
remained mainly oriented towards reliance on tanks and had rather little 
organic mechanised infantry, according to Weller some 14 —16 APCs to 32 -
34 tanks; i.e., 1:2. In addition, the plan was not to mobilise the mechanised 
units at the same time as the tanks units, but after them. However, this was not 
seen as being a risk, although it meant that at first the tanks would have to 
cope on their own in the case of war. Another deficiency was that mechanised 
infantry preferred to use their APCs instead of fighting dismounted. This was a 
consequence of the status of the mechanised units in the Armoured Corps. 
Mechanised infantry was to be united with the tanks and follow them in deep 
penetrations. The result was that the training level of the mechanised infantry 
for fighting dismounted remained at a low level, while their survival in deep 
armoured penetrations was also underestimated. In addition, the training level 
of the real foot infantry was even lower and, according to Weller, these troops 
were also defensively oriented. Only the Golani Brigade, the paratroopers and 
several NAHAL units were trained for traditional infantry tasks like fighting 
dismounted against enemy antitank infantry and fighting in trenches, if not in 
co-operation with the tanks. In addition, the idea of using heliborne landings or 
airdrops to support armoured spearheads in conventional warfare was not an 
influential one, although the paratroopers had rather a lot of experience in 
minor heliborne operations from the War of Attrition and operations against 
Palestinian guerrillas.522  
The situation of the fighting vehicles was also bad from the viewpoint of the 
quality of the APCs. The old M-3 half-tracks were not armed to follow tanks nor 
this brigade was a regular brigade. The reserve brigades, which were more numerous, were 
probably also more streamlined, as Luttwak and Horowitz state. 
See also van Creveld, p. 205 and interview of Major General (ret.) Avraham Adan. 
According to van Creveld, by 1973 the 21 brigades that the IDF had had in 1967 increased 
to 26 to 30, of which several of the former mechanised infantry brigades had furthermore 
been converted to armour. This also supports Luttwak's and Horowitz's views. 
According to Adan, in 1973 a brigade was clearly a tactical formation while a division had an 
independent ability to engage in two to three efforts, which in this case means battles. 
522  Rothenberg, p. 160, interview of Major General Avraham Adan, Investigating Committee 
of the Yom Kippur War; The Report, p. 1437, 1439 and 1456 and Weller, Jac: Foot Soldiers 
in the Desert, Infantry and the October War, Selected Readings on the Yom Kippur War, 
United States Army, Institute for Military Assistance, August 1975, p. 60 — 61 (original text in 
Army, August 1974). 
According to the Agranat Committee report, traditional infantry units like the Golani Brigade, 
paratroopers and NAHAL were trained to use indirect approach, to fight in trenches and to 
fight in half-tracks as well. However, such training had a lower priority, although these items 
were also in the curriculum of the officer schools. On the whole, infantry — including 
mechanised infantry — did not have independent tasks; it was planned that infantry was only 
to support the tanks. 
See also Rubinstein & Goldman, p. 115 — 116 and The Military Balance 1973 — 1974, p. 33 
and The Military Balance 1976 — 1977, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
London September 1976, p. 35. 
According to Rubinstein and Goldman, the Israelis got Arava transporl aircraft in early 1970. 
This plane, which had STOL-capabilities (short take-off and landing), was able to carry 17 
paratroopers. However, according to the Military Balance, Israel had the Aravas in 
operational service only in 1976, when they had 14 of them. Therefore, the role of Aravas in 
airborne operations before and during the Yom Kippur War was non-existent. 
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did they provide protection for their crews. According to van Creveld, only 
about one seventh of the APCs were the more modern M-113s (Zeldas). 
Likewise, artillery and mortar support, as well as antitank defence, were also 
neglected. Tanks were seen as being resilient enough on the battlefield to 
counter both the enemies' artillery and antitank defence. This led to an 
underestimation of the role of suppressing fire by artillery or mortars, although 
it was originally planned that artillery and infantry would cope with the enemy 
infantry equipped with antitank weapons. The battlefield equation in terms of 
numbers of guns and infantry units remained too weak to deal with the enemy 
masses. In addition, according to Rothenberg, by 1972 most of the IDF's 
antitank missiles had been placed in storage. Tanks were seen as being better 
for this purpose as wel1.523 
The reliance on tanks didn't enable the fighting missions by the mechanised 
infantry that General Adan had planned. In addition, the fortifications in depth 
in the Sinai were empty because of a lack of infantry. Therefore, the principles 
of mobile defence did not fully come into being before the Yom Kippur War. It 
was more "tank-defence", as General Adan called it; tanks moving from one 
place to another. On the whole, the result of the changes in the organisations 
was that on the eve of the Yom Kippur War the IDF was an army that relied 
heavily on superb tank forces and on the Air Force as "flying artillery" instead 
of preserving a proper balance between branches and services.524 
10.2.3. The Air Force, a hodgepodge of technical needs, time limits and the 
realities of allocation 
The Air Force and Navy also underwent changes after the War of Attrition, 
though more in organisations and in equipment than in operational doctrine. 
According to Cordesman and Wagner, Israel's overconfidence in its air power 
continued and before the Yom Kippur War the IAF acted as if it would still have 
freedom of action in the air. Nevertheless, it was not a question of any 
Douhetism that stressed the superiority of the air force in a war. According to 
Rothenberg, only a handful of Israeli air officers asserted that air power by 
itself could win wars, though nearly everyone believed in the decisive potential 
523 
 Interview of Major General Avraham Adan, van Creveld (1998), p. 207 and Brower, 
Kenneth S: Armor in the October War, Selected Readings on the Yom Kippur War, United 
States Army, Institute for Military Assistance, August 1975, p. 36. 
For example, General Adan, and he was not alone in his views, had demanded new APCs 
for the Armoured Corps before the war, but he was overruled by his superiors on the 
General Staff and in the Ministry of Defence so that armoured formations were left without 
modern mechanised infantry during the organisational developments before the war. 
Brower states that the Egyptians were utterly dependent on their anti-tank guns and tanks 
for protection against tanks in the Six Day War. However, the Egyptian 85 mm and 100 mm 
anti-tank guns could not penetrate the armour of the Israeli Centurions and M-48s and in 
tank-to-tank battles the Arabs were also clearly inferior, as was already discussed. 
According to van Creveld, in 1973 the ratio of tanks to self-propelled guns was 
approximately 5:1 instead of 2-3:1 as it ought to have been if each armoured division had 
been provided with its full artillery complement. 
524 Interview of Major General Avraham Adan and Cordesman & Wagner, p. 21. 
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of the aircraft-tank combination. Besides, it was widely believed that the 
Egyptian Air Force would not be ready before 1975. Therefore, the IAF sought 
out neither more advanced air-to-ground weapons nor trained its crews for 
attack missions, including those on antiaircraft missile sites. In this context 
electronic counter-measures were also neglected. In addition, the IAF did not 
develop a joint staff to organise and co-ordinate the collection of 
reconnaissance data, and the planning and implementation of missions.525 
Raanan Gissin estimates in his dissertation that the Israeli Air Force high 
command continued to base its operational plans on countering the Arab 
surface-to-air missile systems. It was expected that in the event of war the IAF 
was to be provided with the opportunity to launch a pre-emptive strike and/or 
would be given enough time to deal with the air defence missile threat before 
having to support the armoured formations. This concept was based on the 
experiences of the Six Day War and particularly on the experiences of the War 
of Attrition and the new equipment, especially on the new aircraft. During the 
so-called "electronic summer in 1970, the IAF Phantoms and Skyhawks, 
equipped with new electronic counter-measures gear and stand-off missiles -
including the American-supplied Shrikes and Mavericks - had effectively dealt 
with the threat posed by So-2 and Sa-3 missiles. Therefore, it was believed on 
the General Staff and in the Ministry of Defence that the IAF would still be able 
to suppress the Arab air-defence systems with acceptable losses.526 
Air Force personnel didn't share the optimism of headquarters. Aviem Sela, 
an Israeli fighter pilot at the time, later stated after the Yom Kippur War that the 
War of Attrition concluded with a feeling of discomfort in the Air Force. 
According to him, the IAF had no response to the huge, overlapping missile 
systems, which complemented each other. Besides, the new tracked Sa-6 
launchers were of special concern. On the eve of the Yom Kippur War, the Sa-
6 was almost unknown in the west. In addition, the Israelis had very little 
information on the almost equivalent preparations of the Syrians.527 
According to Major General Weizman, the Egyptian surface-to-air missile 
systems could have been eliminated in 1970 during the War of Attrition. It 
would have required sending in ground forces in addition to the Air Force on 
the Egyptian side of the Suez Canal. The decision not do so was political and 
led to the resignation of Weizman, as already discussed. Because of the 
different views of the performance of the IAF in the General Staff and in the Air 
Force staff, the IAF chose, according to Cohen, the tactics of playing for time. 
The IAF had to be clearheaded to absorb the lessons learned under fire, and 
to cultivate better responses. According to Gissin, this required difficult 
compromises; mostly in favour of immediate short-term considerations 
525 Cordesman & Wagner, p. 20 — 21, Williams (1989), p. 201 and Rothenberg, p. 162. 
526 Gissin, p. 366 — 367 and Rothenberg, pi 174. 
527 Cohen, p. 314. 
Although the technical nature of the Sa-6 was unknown to the Israelis, it was known that the 
Soviet Union had also delivered these missiles to both Egypt and Syria. Therefore, the 
existence of the Sa-6 aroused respect within the IAF as can be seen in Aviem Sela's words 
as cited by Cohen: We knew that Sa-6s could do everything but brew a cup of coffee and 
sing the national anthem." 
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because there was not the time required for a modernisation program. 
Therefore, the IAF prayed that this period would pass quietly. In the meantime, 
it would fill the gaps by purchasing the equipment available. This would include 
light unmanned aircraft for gathering information, passive measures like metal 
to confuse enemy radar and radar-homing air-to-surface missiles.528 
During the process of technical modernisation, the IAF began to develop 
theories for combat against missiles. According to Cohen, the scenario was a 
joint surprise attack by Egyptian and Syrian forces, the former across the Suez 
Canal and the latter over the Golan Heights. Against this threat, the Israelis 
created a series of plans that was referred to as the "Scratch File. In this plan, 
the IAF focused on concentrated attacks on the missile systems. The aim was 
still to acquire at least partial air supremacy by destruction of the missile 
networks or by at least weakening them. In air battles, the IAF expected to still 
have an edge on their Arab counterparts. However, in January 1973 most of 
the commanders who had developed the "Scratch File ended their active duty 
careers and were replaced by younger men, as was the case in the ground 
forces.529 
Up to summer 1973, technical development had not progressed as planned 
and in August 1973 the Air Force commander, Major General Beniyamin 
Peled, updated the "Scratch" plans. In his opinion, the plan was too complex, 
and was, according to Cohen, overly dependent on elements that were not 
under Peled's control, like allocations for the purchase of sophisticated 
antimissile weaponry. Therefore, instead of progressing with the proper 
equipment, the IAF was forced to retreat into the conventional paradigms of 
tactical methodology. The IAF sought methods of tricking missile batteries by 
using the capabilities of its aircraft and its pilots' skills; i.e., alterin9 attack 
altitudes and angles and reducing the time spent over the objectives.53' 
528 Gissin, pi 333, 336 — 337 and 366 — 367, Weizman, Ezer: On Eagles' Wings. The 
Personal Story of the Leading Commander of the Israeli Air Force, MacMillan Publishing Co. 
Inc., New York 1976, p. 281 and Cohen, p. 316 — 317. 
According to Weizman, on the question on how to challenge the Egyptian missile network, 
"senior Israeli officers of different ranks displayed a marked deterioration in their ability to 
think, to assess foreseeable situations and to predict developments." 
528 Cohen, p. 317 — 318. 
See also Gawrych (1996), pi 7. 
According to Gawrych, Israeli pilots received approximately 200 flight hours per year with 
emphasis on initiative. This, without considering the contents of the training, was a lot when 
compared to the western scale, without speaking of the Egyptians, who got only 70 hours in 
a more centralised system. There is reason to suppose that the Syrians were more inferior 
than the Egyptians. 
530 Cohen, p. 317 — 318, 320 and 398. 
According to Cohen, NATO members also followed the IAF's actions with curiosity; i.e., the 
questions of how to bomb missile batteries or to wage air battles in a screen of unknown 
sophisticated missiles. 
See also Rubinstein & Murray, p. 122. 
According to the authors, during the late phases of the War of Attrition the Israeli Ministry of 
Defence was so confident that the Air Force would solve the problem of the Egyptian 
missiles, that in 1970 it had rejected an American offer of remotely-piloted-vehicle (RPV) 
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The most significant organisational change in the Air Force after the War of 
Attrition was the transfer of the antiaircraft units from the artillery to the IAF. 
There were two choices: to establish an independent antiaircraft corps or join 
the IAF. According to Williams, in late 1969 the Head of Operations Branch, 
Major General Elazar, let the officers of the antiaircraft units — both guns and 
missiles — decide for themselves. The majority backed the decision to become 
part of the Air Force and by February 1971 the IAF inherited total responsibility 
for aerial defence.531  
On the whole, the IAF's role in acquiring aerial supremacy via a pre-emptive 
air strike against enemy airfields was in the process of changing. Although pre-
emption was still talked about, in practice its importance was decreasing. 
According to van Creveld, it was proposed that the IAF be employed to make 
the mobilisation and deployment of reserves possible at the outset of any 
future war, which meant using the IAF as "flying artillery'. This was a deviation 
from the principle of assigning first priority to aerial supremacy.532 
10.2.4. The modernisation of the Navy; the birth of the missile era 
The Israeli Navy abandoned its previous posture of a Great Power navy in 
miniature in the years between the sinking of the destroyer Eilat in 1967 and 
the War of Attrition. The Saar-class missile boats became operational in 1969. 
This meant flexibility in fast-attack capabilities even outside Israel's home-
waters. For the first time the Israeli Navy was properly equipped for its 
missions.533 With a mobile force armed with the most modern sea-to-sea 
missiles and electronic counter-measure devices of the time, the Navy was 
able to develop innovative tactics that gave the Israelis the possibility of 
obtaining and maintaining the initiative at the sea. Therefore, it can be said that 
before the War of Attrition the Navy also got the doctrinal ability to transfer 
battle to enemy soil, or in naval terms to the enemy's home-waters. 
Before the War of Attrition, the mission of Israel's Navy was to defend the 
coastal perimeters against enemy commando raids, hit-and-run 
bombardments and intelligence gathering. The division of forces was twofold; 
fast and lightly armed vessels protected the inner line near coasts while 
torpedo boats, destroyers and anti-submarine craft formed a screen further 
offshore in the Mediterranean and in the Red Sea in the Gulfs of Suez and 
Akaba. The forward defence was augmented by naval commandos who 
attacked enemy craft in their home ports. After the introduction of the missile 
boats during the War of Attrition, the extended operational ability enabled more 
offensive concepts. Therefore, the Navy adopted a deeper defensive strategy, 
which at the operational level took the form of offensive means; i.e., seeking 
weapons by saying that we consider the small losses in aircraft we would take in dealing 
with the SAMs to be acceptable." 
531  Williams (1989), p. 116 and Cohen, p. 430. 
532 Van Creveld (1998), p. 203. 
533 Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 297 and Williams (1989), p. 266. 
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and engaging Arab — mostly Egyptian — units in their home waters and keeping 
hostile naval forces off balance.'4 
On the eve of the Yom Kippur War, the Navy was the only IDF service that 
was fully in accordance with the technical development of warfare at the time, 
including armament, electronic warfare equipment and simulated training in 
conditions equivalent to realistic battlefield conditions. After the Six Day War, 
the Navy had, according to Schiff, been very busy in examining itself. This had 
been a consequence of the sinking of the Eilat, but maybe it was still more a 
consequence of the Six Day War. Despite the fact that the Navy had 
succeeded relatively well in the war when its equipment is taken into account, 
it was not lulled into believing in its superiority. The Navy was becoming 
obsolescent and was therefore on the edge of modernisation. The sinking of 
the Eilat was only the culmination point in getting allocations for the 
development program.535 
10.3. Towards the fifth round 
Major General Tal, the deputy Chief of Staff during the Yom Kippur War, wrote 
in his article in Israel's Defense Doctrine that after the Six Day War Israel's 
defence concept changed. According to him, all this was correct insofar as the 
question of our national existence was at stake, but it was wrong with regard to 
the possibility of Arab success in gaining limited military objectives." This 
clause can be interpreted in many ways, but the most obvious is that while the 
IDF was still capable of fulfilling its missions in an all-out war according to the 
operational doctrine, at the strategic level the defence concept was not clear at 
the time. Tal also repeatedly emphasised his opposition to strongholds that 
would impose strategic restrictions on the Israeli Supreme Command. This is 
revealed when he describes the imbalance between Israel's strategic, 
operational and tactical thinking as follows: From the Six Day War to the Yom 
Kippur War assessments of the military situation, both long and short term, 
were no longer derived from defined national goals but from conjectures, 
wishes and hopes. Instead of military strategy being derived from national 
policy, operational thinking from strategy and tactics from operational thinking 
frames of reference became confused and the process was sometimes 
reversed."536 
Quite a few Israeli scholars and military men tend, nevertheless, to hold that 
the IDF's doctrine before the Yom Kippur War was not bad, it just was not 
used as planned. According to Doctor Shai, the mobility of the mind, which had 
been the central item in the "Constant Flow" doctrine, was still appreciated at 
the operational level. Major General Adan confirms this. According to him, 
between the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War offence and the tendency 
to transfer battles to enemy territory still dominated in research, in training and 
534 Dupuy, p. 367 and Rothenberg, pi 199. 
535 Schiff (October Earlhquake), p. 298 — 299 and Williams (1989), p. 270 and 274. 
536 Tal, p. 30 — 31 and 34 and Schiff (October Earlhquake), p. 143. 
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in IDF exercises at both the tactical and operational levels. Therefore, the 
reason for the gap between strategic and operational thinking could well have 
been as General Tal described it. Military victory in 1967 and its consequence, 
operational depth, which had not been in existence before the Six Day War, 
confused thinking at political and higher military levels, but did not cause any 
remarkable doctrinal changes."' 
It is also worth mentioning that quite many of the Six Day War divisional 
commanders resigned in the early 1970s. According to Raanan Gissin, this 
rapid turnover of senior officers created a situation where the cardinal 
principle for combat command, i.e. the unity of command had to be violated so 
that the General Staff could impose its control over the conduct of operations." 
The retired generation represented the military innovation on which the IDF 
had been built. At least part of the mobility of the mind that had levelled the 
disproportion of manpower and equipment between Israel and her enemies 
during the early decades of Israel's existence vanished with these officers. In 
addition, continuous if less dramatic fighting during the War of Attrition might 
have called for less last minute improvisation. This obviously led to a higher 
degree of methodical staff work while enthusiasm and excitement might have 
been largely replaced by repetitive routine and boredom calling for different 
standards of discipline. This description, made by Brigadier Bagnall, seems to 
have been true in the IDF on the eve of the Yom Kippur War, at least in the 
peace-time army and especially in its higher staffs. However, at the tactical 
level the IDF maintained, according to Yigal AIIon, its constant alertness to 
prevent surprise attacks; i.e., commando raids, terrorist activities, shelling and 
air raids and on the other hand a full-scale war, whether in the form of an 
enemy crossing of the cease-fire lines in big formations, or marine and 
paratroop landings. This supports Adan's view of the unchanged operational 
doctrine.538 
Professor Handel estimates that Israel's major weaknesses in the War of 
Attrition were means and ends that did not match, and strategy that was too 
reactive. In addition, the opponent's aims were not understood and lessons 
were not learned. Doctor Levite goes further. According to him, the vague idea 
of military doctrine between 1967 and 1973 — including the Yom Kippur War, 
was a consequence of the success in the Six Day War that reinforced the 
IDF's cult of offensive, which later haunted the IDF. According to him, the 
extreme bias in favour of offensive operations had caused the loss of 
defensive skills, and dogmatisation of Israeli military thinking." In a way, 
537 Discussions with Doctor, Colonel (ret.) Hanan Shai Aviv and interview of Major General 
(ret.) Avraham Adan. 
538 AlIon (1970), p. 101, Gissin, pi 357 — 358 and Bagnall, p. 206. 
See also Perlmutter (1978), p. 90 and Adan, p. 70 — 71 
According to Gissin, 33 top ranking commanders (Colonels to Major Generals) were 
replaced in 1972 and 1973. According to Perlmutter, General Elazar rejuvenated his officer 
corps during his tenure as Chief of Staff, often also with secondary arguments that had 
nothing to do with past experience or professionalismi While this statement might be too 
sharp, it is obvious that a lot of professionalism was wasted. According to Adan, this should 
have not been done if there was a threat of war. In these changes, only a few rose in rank in 
the same fields. 
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General Adan supported this statement after the Yom Kippur War by saying 
that "between the War of Independence and the Six Day War the IDF lost the 
professional capability to deploy defensively." The result was that at the 
operational level Israel left its defences on the Suez Canal and on the Golan 
Heights at the level of isolated strong points. In this regard Cordesman and 
Wagner state that Israel "never came to grips with the need for positioned fixed 
defences." Instead, Israel relied on early warning for the background of the 
mobilisation that would have also formed the forward defence.539 
In addition during the War of Attrition, for the first time since Israel became 
independent, public opinion did not unanimously back operations on the 
Egyptian front. According to Zvi Lanir, the public was not united in the firm 
belief that the War of Attrition was fought to protect the very existence of Israel. 
This, for its part, weakened the strategy of denial approach, which was based 
on deterrence and if a war broke out, on a short war concept, not on a series 
of engagements in a prolonged battle. Lanir also maintains that military 
doctrine became a factor in the political process of decision making. The 
influence of a static defence doctrine along the Suez Canal during the pre-Yom 
Kippur War period supported the political conception of non-withdrawal from 
the water line without a formal peace agreement. This all crippled the Israeli 
military doctrine in the new situation. According to General Tal, this was even 
worse than the confusion of military and political thinking, meaning the 
undermining of the national consensus and the emergence of doubts and 
disagreements about national goals and objectives. This was especially 
serious because it touched on one of the most vital components of Israel's 
strength — motivation and morale.54° 
However, Handel also sees several strengths in the IDF during the War of 
Attrition, especially at the operational and tactical levels. They were the 
motivation and capability to implement raids and small commando operations. 
In this light, excluding the conflicting opinions on Israel's war policy and 
strategy between the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War, Doctor Levite's 
concept of the cult of the offensive in the IDF is not completely fair. It is true 
that the mobile and offensive operations of the short war concept were no 
longer valid between the 1967 and 1973 clashes, but this was due to the 
political context that limited offensive action for fear of escalation. It is also true 
that the concept of "defensive defence" had profound implications for the IDF's 
military doctrine, as Zvi Lanir notes.541 
 Instead, it is unfair to say that the 
tendency towards offence at the tactical and operational levels was a result of 
dogmatisation or that "defensive defence" had negative implications for tactical 
and operational initiative, improvisation and the ability to exploit opportunities. 
These sources of military strength in the IDF did not vanish in the pre-Yom 
Kippur War period. Rather the orientation towards offence showed an 
appreciation of the situation. At the tactical and operational levels of warfare in 
an all-out war, the outnumbered party did not have the luxury of only being 
539 Handel, p. 566 — 568, Levite, pi 9 — 10 and Cordesman & Wagner, p. 21. 
54° Tal, p. 30 — 31 and 34 and Lanir, p. 30 and 56. 
541 
 Handel, pi 566 — 568 and Lanir, pi 29. 
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reactive. The IDF had to maintain the traditions of flexible thinking, which for its 
part was a prerequisite for the ability to conduct mobile operations. The 
problem was more the spotty link-up of the levels of warfare. Therefore, it can 
be said that the concept of "defensive defence" in Israel was a strategy that 
consisted of three almost separate parts; rigid defence on the cease-fire lines 
at the strategic level, preparations for offence at the operational level and use 
of tactical forces in commando and counter-guerrilla operations at the tactical 
level. Especially problematic was the gap between the strategic and 
operational levels where the former did not provide precise direction for 
operational implementation. 
The opinions above illustrate the confusion that existed in Israel after the Six 
Day War. There was a firm belief that the next war would be a limited conflict 
that could be coped with by using static defence. The strategic solution was 
therefore obviously a consequence of the assumption that the Arabs would not 
be capable of launching an attack for a long time. However, this strategy did 
not take form in the operational and tactical fields despite the fact that already 
during the War of Attrition this strategy was against the foundations of the 
doctrine — to avoid a prolonged and exhausting war. Therefore Handel's 
statement "poor learning of lessons" is quite apt; changes in operational 
doctrine were not made. 2 
According to everything above, perhaps the IDF's most serious failure was 
that it did not see the future battle after the War of Attrition. Despite the failure 
of the IAF's strategic bombing against Egypt's inland targets, which finally 
stopped the fighting during the War of Attrition, the government did not re-
examine its decision-making process. In addition, the decision to return to the 
no peace, no war" state of affairs was backed by the superpowers. Although 
the IAF was quite successful in its missions, the Israelis contented themselves 
with looking for technical countermeasures. They refused to understand that 
something basic and essential was in the process of changing, and that the 
IDF could not mainly rely on the Air Force as "flying artillery anymore, as Tal 
notes. The Israelis did not realise that Israel's far greater firepower, when 
compared to all the Arab states, would not save them in the tactical and 
operational land battles of the coming years. Therefore, the mistakes that were 
made were not so much failures of techniques or doctrines, but mistakes of the 
supreme command, which did not succeed in anticipating and preparing for 
future battles, as Zeev Schiff also writes in his book October Earthquake.543  
There also were exceptions, but in general, Israel's government and the IDF 
were confident in the lull after the War of Attrition of the performance of their 
542 Lanir, p. 29 and Gissin, p. 329. 
See also van Creveld (1998), p. 220 and Herzog (1975), p. 41. 
According to van Creveld, when General Elazar entered the post of Chief of Staff in 1972. 
he replaced the existing "Goshen" plan with a limited war concept "Ofek 1". According to 
"Goshen", the Arabs would have been able to confront Israel with no fewer than fifteen 
divisions (of which eleven would be Egyptian) and 5,000 tanks, though it was estimated that 
this would not have been possible before 1976. 
Herzog also states that Israeli intelligence estimated in 1973 that the Arabs would not be 
able to launch an all-out war before sometime in 1975. 
543 Schiff: October Earthquake, p. 306 — 307, Tal, p. 28 and 34 and Handel, p. 559. 
248 
armed forces. This was an illusion and the Yom Kippur War proved that this 
was a delusion. In the "no peace, no war" era, Israel experienced the most 
common error of armies; it prepared for the last war that it had fought. 
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11. THE YOM KIPPUR WAR 
The fifth Middle Eastern war, the so-called Yom Kippur War, broke out on 6 
October 1973 at 14.05 hours when the Egyptians and the Syrians launched a 
joint offensive against Israel.544 At the strategic level, the start of hostilities was 
a surprise. However, some evidence that something was about to begin had 
been gathering in Israel. Therefore, while at the strategic level the Israelis 
failed to read the intelligence information, at the operational and tactical levels 
indications of an all-out war were much clearer and some preparations were 
also made to cope with this threat. 
The Yom Kippur War was fought on two fronts: on the Golan Heights and on 
the Sinai/Suez/Egyptian front. In addition to Egypt and Syria, other Arab 
countries also committed their forces to show Arab solidarity, but their 
numbers and effect were quite small. Jordan did not open a third front, rather it 
sent two armoured brigades to the Golan. According to Trevor Dupuy, Jordan's 
caution was a consequence of Jordan's ineffective air defence system, a 
complete lack of antitank missiles and a small and outmoded air force.545 War 
against Israel would have been disastrous, as non-participation would have 
been politically. Therefore, a defensive posture along the Jordan River while at 
the same time augmenting the Syrian war effort was seen as the best solution. 
The phases of the Yom Kippur War are divided in different ways in the 
studies and literature. The most lucid manner of investigating the course of 
events is to examine the two fronts one at a time.546 On the Golan Heights, the 
fighting can be divided into three phases from the Israeli point of view. The first 
phase, the period from 6 to 8 October can be described as having been a 
containment and holding phase when the IDF was forced to retreat, especially 
on the southern edge of the Heights. The period from 8 October, after the 
arrival of reserves, up to 10 October was a counter-attack phase. During these 
days, Israel succeeded in retaking the territory it lost. Finally, from 10 to 14 
October, the IDF launched a major offensive towards the Syrian capital city of 
544 Often this war is called the October War as well. The Arabs use the name the Ramadan 
War after the holy month and the Egyptians also use "Operation Badr". In the latter case, 
the 6 October of that year marked the 1,350th anniversary of the battle of Badr, which 
launched Mohammad's triumphal entry into Mecca and the subsequent spread of Islam. 
Herzog also uses the name the War of Atonement together with the Yom Kippur War. Yom 
Kippur is the holiest day in the Jewish calendar, the Day of Atonement. See for example 
Aker, Frank: October 1973. The Arab-Israeli War, Archon Books, Connecticut 1985, p. 16 
and Herzog (1975). The title of Herzog's book is The Atonement War. 
Several sources give 14.00 as the time when the war started. 14.05 is more generally usedi 
545 Dupuy, T. N: The War of Ramadan. An Arab Perspective of the October War, Selected 
Readings on the Yom Kippur War, United States Army, Institute for Military Assistance, 
August 1975, pi 56 (original text in Army, March 1975). 
546 Another way to describe the course of fighting might be the schema that Rothenberg has 
usedi He divides the war into four major phases. It began with a holding phase. 6 — 7 
October, and continued with only partially successful counter-attacks on 8 — 10 October. 
This was followed by the Israeli offensive against Syria, complemented by the repulse of an 
Egyptian assault on 11 — 14 October. The last phase was an Israel offensive across the 
Canal, on 15 — 25 October. See Rothenberg, pi 185. 
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Damascus. This operation was stopped in front of the inner defence line of 
Damascus on 14 October. In addition, on 21 — 22 October the Israelis 
recaptured the observation post on Mount Hermon that they had lost on the 
first day of the war. This operation was separate from the other operations on 
the Golan Heights. 
Four phases can be seen on the Egyptian front from the Israeli viewpoint. 
The first was the containment phase, which took place on the same days as on 
the Golan, 6 to 7 October. The first counter-attack was launched on 8 October 
with poor results and after that the Israelis moved to a holding action that 
lasted a week up to 15 October. The holding phase in the Sinai included a 
major Egyptian attack that was repelled by 15 October. The last phase began 
on the night between 15 and 16 October when the Israelis started their 
offensive across the Suez Canal into Egypt's rear. This phase ended with the 
siege of the Egyptian 3rd Army, which lasted up to the final cease-fire on 24 
October. 
11.1. Arab strategy versus Israeli expectations 
According to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's memoirs, the decision to go to 
war was made on 30 November 1972.547 Afterwards, the time that was left 
between the decision and 6 October 1973 was spent on different kinds of 
preparations; including training, tactics, organisations and armament. By April 
1973, a coalition with Syria was agreed upon; according to this plan Israel 
would have to fight on two fronts simultaneously. However, despite this 
concept for an all-out offensive, the Egyptians set limited objectives for the war 
in accordance with their capabilities. The Syrians later also accepted these 
aims.548 
According to Field-Marshal Mohamed EI-Gamasy, the war aim was to upset 
the regional political and military balance and lay the groundwork for conditions 
better suited for exploiting the power struggle in the region." In this framework, 
the Arabs chose their strategy as follows: 
- Force Israel to fight on all fronts at the same time and prevent its strategy of 
fighting on one front at a time. 
- 	
Use both the Syrian and Jordanian fronts to expose Israel's heartland, 
especially through the Air Force. 
547 Sadat, A: In Search of Identity, Collins, New York 1978, p. 237. 
548 Gawrych (1996), p. 11 — 12, Wakebridge, Charles: The Egyptian Staff Solution, Military 
Review, March 1975, p. 4 and 6 and EI-Edroos, S. A: The Hashemite Arab Army 1908 -
1979, Amman, Jordan 1980, p. 485 — 486. 
The decision included the deportation of the Soviet military advisers in Egypt. According to 
President Sadat, this would give him freedom of action. Syria did not do the same. 
See also Asher & Hammel, p. 50 — 51 and O'Ballance, Edgar: No Victor, No Vanquished. 
The Arab-Israeli War 1973, Presidio Press, Novato CA 1997 (original 1978), p. 37. 
According to Asher and Hammel, Syria's President Assad did not initially support Egypt's 
limited war concept. Only in June 1973 did he acquiesce with the decision to recover only 
the territories lost in 1967. 
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Disperse Israel's mobilised and strategic reserves. 
Block Israel's naval lines of communication in the Mediterranean Sea and in 
the Red Sea. 
Use the Fedayeen guerrillas extensively within Israel itself. 
Start offensive action as soon as possible. Time was seen as being to 
Israel's advantage.549  
In addition to the political and military activities taken on the road to the war, 
the Arabs implemented a long-term operation for deception. By building 
defences along the Suez Canal line, the Egyptians were able to cover their 
preparations and train their forces. In annual autumn manoeuvres of various 
sizes, the troops practised co-operation, including crossing operations followed 
by an advance into the desert. Syria prepared itself likewise. In the political 
arena, the Arabs still showed interest in a peaceful solution to the "no peace, 
no war" situation. In addition, several smaller events were planned and 
implemented to mislead the Israelis: including a train hijacking in Austria to call 
Israel's attention to this secondary question, an announced demobilisation, 
officer pilgrimages and high level ministerial visits, all in the first half of October 
1973.5°°  
Finally, the period that the Arabs selected for their attack depended on a full 
moon, when the effects on the tides in the Suez Canal would be at a minimum. 
Yom Kippur also happened to be in the favourable time period. On that day, 
the readiness and strength of the Israeli fortifications both in the Sinai and on 
the Golan Heights were expected to be slight.551  
The concentration of Arab forces was not unknown to the Israelis. Many 
studies point out that there was no lack of advance warning of the coming war 
in Israel. However, there were weaknesses in the interpretation of the data. 
After the Six Day War, the Intelligence Branch of the General Staff had 
become the senior intelligence agency. Therefore, while its tactical intelligence 
usually was good, its strategic evaluations left, according to Rothenberg, 
something to be desired. Zeev Schiff tends to hold a similar view. Despite 
Israel's security situation, she had no national defence council. The Ministerial 
Committee for Defence Affairs lacked staff workers as was also the case within 
the government. This meant that civilian authorities had to base their 
549 EI-Gamasy, Mohamed Abdel Ghani: The October War, The American University in Cairo 
Press 1993, p. 130 and 161. 
Major General (later Field-Marshal) EI-Gamasy succeeded Lieutenant General Saad El-
Shazly as Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Army in the later phases of the Yom Kippur War. It 
was said that Shazly collapsed during the war. However, his replacement was obviously 
more a consequence of different views on how to finish the war. 
559 Wakebridge, p. 8 — 9. 
551  EI-Gamasy, p. 180 and Dupuy (1975), p. 50. 
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judgments purely on data presented by the Intelligence Branch without the 
possibility of verifying the sources of information.552 
In 1973, the IDF and its Intelligence Branch were still greatly concerned with 
the war against terrorism. However, the concentration of 300,000 men with 
thousands of tanks, and the transfer of artillery, armoured reserves, heavy 
bridging equipment and fighter bombers forward in the first days of October 
1973 simply could not escape notice, as van Creveld mentions. Nevertheless, 
the Israelis did not see this as an imminent threat. This was based on the 
assumption that the Egyptians could not risk a canal crossing, while a Syrian 
attack was thought to be more probable but less risky. On 5 October, one day 
before the start of the hostilities, Prime Minister Golda Meir invited her "War 
Cabinet", consisting of several central ministers and military men, to a session 
to estimate the probability of a war. In this meeting, the Head of the 
Intelligence Branch, Major General Eliyahu Zeira, who had an independent 
status in parallel with the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Staff, reported 
on the information in Israeli hands, but suggested that war was not imminent. 
Prime Minister Meir, Minister of Defence Moshe Dayan and Chief of Staff, 
Lieutenant General David Elazar agreed, although the mood was, according to 
Schiff, more pessimistic in the Central Security Institution.553 
Despite the results of the Cabinet meeting, the IDF headquarters had 
already declared Konenut Gimel (Alert C), the highest state of alert for the 
standing peace-time army. In addition, the 7th Armoured Brigade was ordered 
to the Golan to reinforce Israeli defences there. These decisions, which 
General Elazar also announced in the Cabinet session, were of crucial 
importance, especially on the Golan Heights where the IDF had much less 
operational depth than in the Sinai.554 
552 Rothenberg, p. 178 — 179, Schiff (October Earthquake), pi 35 — 37 and Ben Meir, 35, 48 
— 50 and 94 — 95. 
The role of civilian control in military matters and intelligence was reinforced according to the 
suggestions of the Agranat Committee after the Yom Kippur Wari However, the role of the 
Head of Military Intelligence was not institutionalised despite several changes in practice. 
553 Van Creveld (1998), p. 239 and Schiff (October Earlhquake), p. 16 — 18, 23, 26 — 27 and 
101 
However, the possibility of an Egyptian attack was, according to Schiff, already planned for 
in 1969. At that time, the IDF held a General Staff war game that included a possible 
Egyptian afternoon offensive. General Weizman was then responsible for the underlying 
assumptions, which held that the best time for an Egyptian crossing offensive would be 
between 14.00 and 15.00 hoursi Timing like this would have allowed the Egyptians a few 
hours of daylight, without over-exposing them to the Israeli Air Force. 
See also Rothenberg, p. 178 — 179. 
According to Rothenberg, General Zeira relied heavily on sophisticated electronic 
equipment. This was a consequence of Zeira's stay in the United States as a military 
attaché, which appeared to give him an inflated view of American power and commitment to 
Israel. 
554 Katz (1996), p. 134 — 135. 
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11.2. The Golan Heights — from mobile defence to offence 
11.2.1. Plans and preparations 
The Syrians committed five divisions and three independent brigades to the 
battles on the Golan Heights. Expeditionary forces from other Arab countries 
consisted of an armoured division from Iraq, armoured brigades from Saudi 
Arabia and Jordan, a Moroccan brigade, and commando units from the 
Palestine Liberation Army. With this starting force of about 60,000 soldiers, 
some 1,200 tanks, 600 artillery pieces and 275 combat aircraft, the Syrians 
planned to break through Israeli defences on the Golan Heights at three 
points. According to Asher and Hammel, Syria's operational plan did not so 
much focus on fighting as on mowing down the opposition. This was based on 
the assumption that Israel, under massive attack by Egyptian armed forces on 
the Sinai front, would not be capable of containing the mass and firepower that 
the Syrians planned on committing.555  
In the overall plan described above, the essential elements of Syria's 
operation were the isolation of the Golan from Israeli reinforcement, the 
disruption of support and command facilities and the overpowering of Israeli 
combat units. Infantry divisions — reinforced with additional armoured brigades 
— were to break through in the first echelon: the 7th Infantry Division in the 
north stretched along the Kuneitra — Damascus road, the 9th Infantry Division 
in the centre in the Kushniya region aimed at dividing in two to the north and 
south and the 5th Infantry Division along the approach from Nawa to Rafid, an 
area that the Israelis called the "Rafid Opening". These main efforts were to 
form a double envelopment to destroy the Israeli forces on the Golan Heights. 
Behind these infantry divisions was the second echelon, two armoured 
divisions, which were to rush through the gaps, overcome local Israeli 
reserves, exploit forward and finally reach the escarpment overlooking the 
Jordan River Valley. The 3rd Armoured Division between Sassa and Katana 
was to reinforce the northern axis of attack, and the 1st Armoured Division near 
Kiswe prepared to add its strength to the southernmost axis. These divisions 
were also Syria's operational reserves and in this context responsible for the 
defence of Damascus. Tactical air support was arranged to begin with the first 
attack and afterwards to cope with Israeli reactions. In addition, helicopters 
were to transport commandos for deep raids in conjunction with border actions 
to seize bridges over the Jordan and seal the battlefield off from 
reinforcement.5" 
In October 1973, Israel's wartime manpower strength was over 310,000 
men. The volume of major equipment varies depending on the sources, but 
some average numbers can be given; some 2,000 tanks, over 3,000 
APCs/half-tracks, less than 600 artillery pieces and some 475 combat aircraft. 
555 Knapp, George E: Antiarmor Operations. Antiarmor Operations on the Golan Heights, 
October 1973, Spiller, Roger J. (General Editor): Combined Arms in Battle since 1939, U.S. 
Army Command and General Staff College Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1992, p. 30, 
Wakebridge, Charles: The Syrian Side of the Hill, Military Review, February 1976, p. 22 and 
Asher & Hammel, p. 55. 
556 EI-Edroos, p. 494 — 495, Knapp. p. 30 and Asher and Hammel, p. 57 — 59. 
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The ground forces were organised in seven armoured divisions and 18 
independent brigades.557 
On the Israeli side, responsibility for the defence of the Golan Heights rested 
with the 36th Armoured Infantry Division under the command of Brigadier 
Rafael Eytan. This division was the only peacetime force in the Northern 
Command and the only mechanised division in the IDF at the time. This force 
consisted of parts of three brigades and one NAHAL battalion. Its strength was 
about 12,000 men, less than 200 tanks and 44 artillery pieces that were all, 
however, self-propelled. This symbolises the crushing superiority in force ratio 
that the Syrians enjoyed: 10:1 in manpower, 7:1 in tanks and 25:1 in artillery 
pieces. The understrength 188th Armoured Brigade (Barak), which was the 
only peace-time armoured force on the Golan, manned the southern part of the 
Purple Line from Rafid to Kuneitra. The 7th Armoured Brigade occupied the line 
north of Kuneitra to the slopes of Mount Hermon. A battalion of the Golani 
infantry brigade and the 50th NAHAL Paratroop battalion, in squad and 
platoon-sized groups, occupied the scattered strongpoints along the Purple 
Line. In addition, there were about 16 NAHAL settlements, mainly in the area 
of Kuneitra, but they had, according to Wakebridge, no defences to speak of 
and were therefore evacuated almost as soon as the fighting began. In case of 
war, the regular components of Eytan's division were to be augmented by a 
reserve armoured brigade and two reserve mechanised brigades. In addition, 
two additional reserve divisions were to reinforce the Northern Command on 
the Golan.558  
According to Knapp, the Israeli plan was based on the expectation that the 
active forces on the Golan would be able to act as a tripwire and to delay the 
Syrian advance until Israeli reserves could mobilise and deploy. Brigadier 
Kahalani — at the time commander of the 77th Battalion of the 7 Armoured 
Brigade — confirms this in his book A Warrior's Way. Therefore according to 
him, the deployment was also planned to be nose-heavy; all forces in the 
strongpoints were stationed very close to the border, including the tanks of the 
Barak Brigade. The intention was to meet force with force, though the tanks 
were, according to van Creveld, not primarily intended to man defensive 
positions along the Purple Line; rather they were to be used in concentrated 
counter-attacks. On 6 October the Barak Brigade had, however, four battalions 
deployed along the Purple Line; infantry in the strongpoints and the tank 
battalions in prepared battle positions on the flanks and in the rear of the 
infantry. According to van Creveld, the decision to also reinforce the Purple 
557 Cordesman & Wagner, p. 16, Dupuy (1992), p. 602, Gabriel, p. 21 and The Military 
Balance 1973 — 1974, p. 33. 
558 Asher & Hammel, p. 86, Dupuy (1992), p. 613, Knapp, p. 29, Wakebridge, p. 21 and 
Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 64 — 65. 
Dupuy calls the 36th Division the 36th Mechanised Division. 
See also Katz (1996), p. 139. 
According to the author, the sectors between the Barak and the 7th Brigade were arranged 
at the very outbreak of the fighting when the commanders personally divided the 
responsibility for the defence of the Golan Heights between themselves. This also shows the 
surprise caused by the attack, especially at the divisional and command level. It also 
illustrates the ability of sub-commanders to take the initiative. 
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Line with tanks was based on the assumption that the Syrian preparations 
would turn out to be only the usual border clash. However, the 7th Brigade was 
not deployed in hull-down positions in the Purple Line right at the beginning. 
The idea was to keep this force in reserve. However, because the Syrians 
attacked on a wide front, the 7th Brigade was also committed to frontline battles 
after the first hours of the war.559 The strengths, orders of battle and losses of 
the Yom Kippur War can be seen in Appendix 17. A map of the operations on 
the Golan Heights during the Yom Kippur War can be seen in Appendix 18. 
11.2.2. Holding phase — mobile defence 
The Syrians started their offensive with a 55-minute artillery and aerial 
barrage. After this, all three infantry divisions, spearheaded by tank brigades, 
joined the offensive in their own directions as planned. According to Schiff, the 
operational principle of the Syrians was to bypass Israeli defences in depth 
and to not tangle with the strongpoints on the Purple Line because there would 
be time for them later. This was a good plan, but at crucial times on the first 
night and second day of the battles the rigid command system failed to make a 
decision about the use of reserves, which was partly also a consequence of 
the unexpectedly tough Israeli defence.56° 
Brigadier Syed Ali EI-Edroos (Pakistan Army, ret.), who has written a study 
entitled The Hashemite Arab Army 1908 — 1979, has also studied the wars of 
the Middle East from the Arab point of view on the whole. According to him, 
the Syrians had opted for the Soviet doctrine of "Continuous Penetration" 
whose central concept was the surprise of the enemy by concentrating large 
forces which would breakthrough, wave after wave, by using vast volumes of 
fire focused on a narrow sector of the front. Therefore, it was essential in this 
doctrine to keep the breakthrough point open even at the expense of great loss 
of life, to advance through it to encircle the enemy forces and to finally destroy 
them.561  
The adoption of the Soviet doctrine had many advantages, but also 
disadvantages. According to EI-Edroos, the main reason for operational 
failures was the rigid orthodoxy with which the Syrians used the inflexible and 
unyielding "Continuous Penetration"; originally designed for the Russian 
temperament and environment. The Syrians moved in a tight formation 
bunched closely together in order to maximise their fire potential and to 
559 Knapp, pi 29, Kahalani (1994), p. 161, Kahalani (1984), p. 12 — 13 and Asher & Hammel, 
p. 81 and 86. 
See also Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 50 — 51. 
According to Schiff, the C alerl was an order to command posts and units to be prepared 
and, in the standing army, a cancellation of leave. It was not a specific order to deploy or 
take up positions. Therefore, when war broke out, the Barak Brigade's tanks were not quite 
at their firing points, though they stood ready for war in their tank parks in the vicinity of the 
strongposts. 
569 Asher & Hammel, p. 85 — 86, Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 64 — 65. 
561  EI-Edroos, p. 493. 
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confuse the individual targeting of the Israeli tanks. The latter worked well, the 
former less. According to Katz, the Israeli tank positions had a hard time 
identifying clear silhouettes of individual Syrian tanks in the middle of the 
smoke and clouds of dust. In theory, the Syrian forces were also constructed in 
accordance with combined arms principles where the balance of different 
branches was in harmony. In practice, this was not the case. Most glaring was 
the lack of co-operation between the tanks and the motorised infantry 
equipped with antitank weapons. Therefore, the principle of massing wave 
after wave of forces led to unnecessary losses, which were yet more 
aggravated by the fact that the armoured units raced forward ahead of the 
engineers, which jammed the troops against the Israeli antitank ditch.562 
From the Israeli point of view, the initial Syrian artillery and aerial barrage 
was just long enough to allow the Israelis time to overcome their shock and 
fear, unlike in the Sinai where the bombardment lasted only some 20 minutes. 
Despite this and despite their problems along the antitank ditch, the Syrians 
were able to push forward in the southern part of the Golan. The Barak 
Brigade, which was responsible for the defence of the southern sector, had too 
much ground to cover, especially when comparing its mission to a terrain that 
favoured the Syrian advance more than the northern sector defended by the 
7th Brigade. Therefore, every Barak Brigade tank on the Golan had been 
committed in less than 40 minutes of action.563 
However, the Israelis had several advantages, which were to become crucial 
during the battles. First, the Israelis knew the terrain, including those units that 
had been transferred to the Golan on the eve of the war. Brigadier (then 
Lieutenant Colonel) Avigdor Kahalani, whose battalion was sent to the Golan 
nine days prior to the alert, describes the preparations for a possible war on 
the Golan in his book The Heights of Courage. According to him, Colonel 
Avigdor Ben-Gal, commander of the brigade, who had a premonition of the 
coming war, also rotated officers of the remaining two battalions to allow them 
to study the terrain on the Golan. This included range-finding cards for each 
position. Second, Israeli commanders and sub-commanders were willing and 
able to delegate decision-making and take independent decisions. This is also 
revealed in Kahalani's text; the idea of what should be done in each area of 
the Golan was discussed before the war and when the main part of the brigade 
arrived on the Golan, this planning process was extended to the tank-
commander level. There is also good reason to suppose that Colonel Yitzhak 
Ben-Shoham's Barak Brigade and the infantry battalions on the Golan Heights 
had done the same. Finally, despite the huge imbalance between the strength 
of the Syrian and Israeli forces during the first two days of the fighting, Israel's 
defence on the Purple Line succeeded quite well. Only three strongpoints fell 
562 Ibid., Katz (1996), p. 158, EI-Edroos, p. 493 and Asher & Hammel, p. 90. 
See also O'Ballance (1997), p. 125 and 218 — 219. 
According to one U.N. officer interviewed by the author, the Syrian attack "was not like an 
attack, it was like a parade ground demonstration." 
O'Ballance also estimates that co-operation between the Syrians and the expeditionary 
forces from other Arab countries hardly existed. However, this was not important on the 
whole because of the small size of the foreign forces. 
563 Asher & Hammel, p. 85 — 86 and 92 and Aker, p. 35. 
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during the assault. The rest maintained their ability to continue fighting and, as 
a matter of fact, these positions caused severe problems to Syrian supply 
columns that tried to keep up with the armoured advance. Later on the 
strongpoints in Israeli hands were central gateposts when the IDF started its 
counter-offensive.564 
OC of the Northern Command, Major General Yitzhak Hofi's dispositions 
also clearly illustrate the Israeli understanding of the military geography on the 
Golan Heights. Already before the arrival of the reserves, General Hofi had 
made several changes in the order of battle. The most important of them was 
the decision to return the 77th Tank Battalion from the Barak Brigade to the 7th 
Armoured Brigade. The 77th Battalion had been in the area the longest and 
therefore had the best chances of fulfilling its mission. This decision reflected 
Hofi's concern for the northern sector, which was crucial especially from the 
viewpoint of a possible springboard for a counter-offensive. The Barak 
Brigade's responsibility for the less defensible terrain was also narrowed. 
However, this change was made by changing the chain of command between 
the two brigades, not re-deploying the units, which also shows — not only 
organisational flexibility — an understanding of the importance of the terrain. 
The knowledge of the battleground that was already adopted was more 
significant than a firm chain of command. At the same time as these changes, 
all command echelons anticipated the upcoming battles by gathering internal 
reserves.565 
Bellamy sees the battles of the Golan as being near a linear attrition battle, 
unlike the events on the Sinai front where there was more room for a classic 
operational encirclement. This allowed the Israelis to swing round behind the 
Egyptians and knock them off balance. In the holding phase, there was not an 
option on either front. Instead, the IDF applied manoeuvre according to its 
doctrine of transferring the battles to enemy soil on both fronts later in the 
counter-offensives. In addition, it also is difficult to see the first two days of 
battle on the Golan as static battles of attrition, at least from the Israeli point of 
view. The Israelis tried tactical manoeuvre, according to the principles of 
mobile defence, avoided attrition and also succeeded despite the heavy losses 
that the Syrian fire inflicted on the defenders, especially on the Barak Brigade. 
By using small reserves, the Israelis were able to keep the Syrians in a posture 
of a constant change. The chief tactic was to approach enemy columns without 
being detected and set up ambushes. Although this action was mostly 
reactive, it obviously was also a consequence of the delegated command 
system, which enabled a better picture of the situation than the one the 
Syrians had. Therefore, it can be said that while the operational concept was 
not in Israeli hands in the holding phase, tactical initiative was never 
completely lost. This was a crucial point for motivation and furthermore, after 
564 Katz (1996), p. 143, Asher & Hammel, p. 38, Kahalani (1984), p. 12 — 13, Kahalani 
(1994). p. 160, Wakebridge (1976), p. 22 and Knapp, p. 31. 
565 Asher & Hammel, p. 106 — 108, Williams (1989), pi 205 and Katz (1996), p. 138. 
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the arrival of the reserves, a good foundation for switching from the holding 
phase first to counter-attacks and then to a counteroffensive.566 
11.2.3. Counter-attack — the search for possibilities 
The Arabs were wrong in one calculation for the war; Yom Kippur did not 
complicate Israel's mobilisation, on the contrary, all Israelis were easily 
reachable at home on that day and, in addition, the normally snarled roads 
were almost empty, which greatly facilitated mobilisation. Therefore, despite 
the fact that the Israelis did not have 48 hours of early warning for mobilisation 
and disposition of forces, in practice the main bulk of reserves were ready for 
action in less than 48 hours. Maybe not with the equipment or in the areas that 
were precisely planned for them, but ready for use anyway. This process 
showed amazing flexibility both in practice and in plans.567 
Despite the fierce pressure on both fronts, the depths of the Sinai allowed 
further possibilities for defensive holding actions and therefore General 
Headquarters gave priority to the Golan front on the second day of fighting, 
including the concentrated use of the Air Force. At first the reserves were sent 
to join the blocking battle, and to reinforce the job of the standing army, 
especially in the critical southern sector of the Golan. According to Schiff, this 
contributed to the salvation of the Golan, but it prevented General 
Headquarters from creating an immediate pressure point on either front. 
However there was no question of mounting an all out counter-offensive in this 
phase, all forces were committed to holding actions and stabilisation of the 
situation. Nevertheless, on the Golan the Syrians were also slowly losing their 
operational initiative after the evening of 7 October. They were unable to 
maintain their initial success despite the fact that they identified tactical 
opportunities in the Rafid area and committed one of their reserve armoured 
divisions to battle in this area.568 
566 Kahalani (1984), p. xi, Bellamy, p. 113 and Aker, p. 75. 
See also Asher & Hammel, p. 138. 
According to the authors, ambushes were trained for before the war. However, it is obvious 
that they were not trained for implementation in certain areas, but according to the situation 
and according to a commander's judgmenti 
567 Katz (1996), p. 181 and Asher & Hammel, p. 133 — 134. 
Three fully constituted reserve brigades and two separate reserve battalions deployed on 
the Golan before nightfall of 7 October. This was about 28 hours after the onset of the wari 
One advantage was also that the separate battalions were, according to Asher & Hammel, 
trained on the Golan. 
568 O'Ballance (1997), p. 134, Knapp, p. 31 and Barclay, Ci N. (Brigadier, British Army, ret.): 
Learning the Hard War. Lessons from the October War, Selected Readings on the Yom 
Kippur War, United States Army, Institute for Military Assistance, August 1975, p. 46 
(original text in Army, March 1974). 
See also Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 92 — 93 and 106. 
The decision to reinforce the Golan first was a result of a meeting of the War Cabinet on the 
morning of 7 October. In this meeting, Dayan had displayed great pessimism when General 
Elazar informed him that the situation was bad but did not require a retreat. After this 
discussion, General Bar Lev (ret.) was sent — without command authority — to the Northern 
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The question of why the Syrians were not able to extend their tactical 
success to operational success has remained one of the secrets of the Golan 
battles, although plenty of solutions are given in different studies and the 
literature. On the night between 6 October and 7 October, the Syrians 
hesitated over where to deploy their reserves. According to Asher and 
Hammel, this decision-making process took about five hours; it took almost 12 
hours to carry it out. One reason for this might have been the unwillingness to 
commit the armoured reserves to battle because these divisions were also 
responsible for the defence of Damascus. In any case, this delay gave the 
Israelis time to channel their first reserves to the most threatened areas.569 
After the decision to first settle the situation on the Golan, Northern 
Command outlined a plan to first contain the Syrians and then drive them back 
to the Purple Line. According to this plan, the Israelis aimed first to balance the 
force ratio and at this stage launched specific limited counterattacks to 
establish a coherent defensive line through the southern Golan. Therefore, 
Brigadier Eytan's responsibilities were reduced when Major General Moshe 
Peled's reserve armoured division took over the main burden of the defence in 
the southern sector east of Lake Kinneret. In the meanwhile, the Northern 
Command started to create opportunities for a counter-offensive. According to 
this concept, Eytan's responsibilities in his southern sector were further 
reduced and Major General Dan Laner, whose armoured division had also just 
entered the Golan, assumed, in addition to his own forces, command of 
Eytan's forces in the sector. According to Asher and Hammel, this 
arrangement went against every pretence of organisational stability, except 
that of section by section and platoon by platoon, Laner repeated the outlines 
of his plans to units that had been placed under his command. By the morning 
of 8 October the Israelis were able to create a clear centre of gravity for their 
forces for a further counter-offensive.579 
According to Asher and Hammel, the turning point of the war was on 7 
October at 17.00, when Colonel Uri Orr's armoured brigade reached the Nafak 
Camp. At this stage, the Syrians also halted their offensive for a while. The 
Syrian thrusts had become jammed, their operational centre of gravity had not 
yet been achieved and finally the offensive culminated before it had reached 
Command to gather impressions. Towards evening, he called Prime Minister Meir and 
informed her: The situation is bad. Perhaps very bad, but not desperate." This led to the 
decision to first settle the situation on the Golan Heights. 
569 Knapp, p. 30 and 32 — 33 and Asher & Hammel, p. 184 and 207 — 208. 
See also van Creveld (1998), p. 232. 
Van Creveld also gives an explanation that supports the theory that the Syrian southern 
flanks had been threatened, although he admits that even the Israelis seem to be unable to 
agree which of their units could have been responsible for this move. However, by this time 
Major General Moshe Peled, commander of the 146th Reserve Armoured Division, had met 
with Generals Bar Lev and Hofi, who had outlined a general plan to repel the Syrians behind 
the Purple Line. In accordance with this plan, General Peled suggested that the 205th  
Armoured Brigade, released to the Norlhern Command from General Headquarters' 
reserve, be immediately transferred to the southern end of the Golan before the 
implementation of the divisional plan. Therefore, the threat that the Syrians faced might 
have been the vanguard of this brigade. 
57° Asher & Hammel, p. 136, 178 — 179 and van Creveld (1998), p. 231. 
260 
the set operational objective. A high-level war conference was held at the 
Syrian supreme command at this time. According to the Syrian Minister of 
Defence, Major General Mustafa Tlass, the reason for halting the offensive for 
a while was, however, not a consequence of the loss of momentum due to the 
stubborn Israeli defence. It was the threat that the Israelis could pose if they 
advanced eastward along the northern valley route. The Syrian air defence 
was not able to guarantee close ground support in this sector because this 
area was outside the air defence screen. This reasoning, provided by 
Wakebridge, sounds logical and at least partly explains why the Syrians, after 
a pause, continued their offence in the northern sector of the Golan. 
Nevertheless, the Israeli mobile defence during the first two days should not be 
underestimated; it obviously caused delays that were a contributory cause to 
the war conference. On the whole, the Syrian halt gave the Israelis enough 
time to prepare a counter-offensive, which finally also happened on 10 
October. In addition, the Syrian fear, the sheltered access via the northern 
valley route to the Golan Heights, was revealed to the IAF.571  
By morning on 8 October, Peled's division had taken over responsibility for 
the defence in the southern Golan and during the day the main bulk of Laner's 
division joined the battles as well. On that day, the Israelis were already able to 
concentrate forces in certain areas, but in most cases the Syrian force 
concentrations were still too strong for direct assaults. Therefore, the Israelis 
applied their old tactics; they tried to encircle the Syrians and advance towards 
their lines of communications. This manner of fighting was especially typical in 
the reserve units, which were already familiar with tactics like this since the 
days of the Six Day War. At this time the Israelis also found a weak point in the 
Syrian lines and pushed to the Rafid — Kuneitra road. This move left the 1st 
Armoured Division without roads for supply and altered the tide of battle in the 
central Golan. From that moment, Syrian decision-making focused, according 
to Asher and Hammel, less upon regaining the Golan than upon containing 
possible Israeli initiatives.572 
After the war conference on 7 October, the Syrians changed their centre of 
gravity for action to the northern sector of the Golan between Tel Hermonit and 
a hill named The Booster'. This area is ideal for tank movements and battle, 
and was important because an Israeli advance here would have threatened 
571 
 Kolstela, Risto: Clausewitz ja Yhdysvaltain sotataito, (Clausewitz and the Art of War of 
the United States of America), a study of the General Staff Officer Course, National Defence 
College Finland, Gummerus Kirjapaino Oy, Saarijarvi 1998, p. 83 — 85, Wakebridge (1976). 
p. 29 and O'Ballance (1997), pi 137. 
See also Cohen, p. 360, Dupuy (1975), p. 55 and van Creveld (1998), p. 232. 
Several other reasons for the Syrian halt are also given. According to Cohen, in the most 
critical phases of the battles from the Syrian point of view, the Syrians ran out of air defence 
missiles for a 24-hour period until the Soviets were able to re-supply them. According to 
Dupuy, the Syrians were unable to provide logistical support to maintain the early 
momentum of the 5th Division. Van Creveld also writes that Israel threatened Syria with 
nuclear weapons. The two first arguments sound logical, although they alone don't explain 
the whole situation. There is not yet any information about the possible use of nuclear 
weapons. In any case, the Syrians continued their offensive after the break, whether they 
were threatened with nuclear weapons or noti 
572 Asher & Hammel, p. 221 — 223, 249 — 249 and 251 and Katz (1996), p. 155. 
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the Syrian flanks. Therefore, the Syrians also committed their other armoured 
reserve division, the 3rd Armoured Division, there. In practise this meant, 
however, the loss of concentrated effort. In the fierce tank-to-tank battles on 
the 8 and 9 October, the defending 7th Armoured Brigade was able to block the 
thrust despite the fact that the defenders were noticeable inferior in force ratio, 
though qualitatively they were better and obviously also more motivated.573 
11.2.4. Counter-offensive — a return to operational offence 
After 9 October, the initiative was completely in Israeli hands. They were able 
to push the Syrians slowly backward over the next two days. However, this 
move was a consequence of tactical initiatives — as had been the case during 
the Six Day War. Without concentrating force, the advance was also rather 
dissipated in the Syrian anti-armour belt. At first the Israelis had planned to 
continue their offensive in the southern sector of the Golan. The fact that the 
Israelis had implemented a brigade-level reprisal in this area in 1970 and 
therefore had experience with the terrain and possibilities in this direction 
supported this plan. Several other reason made the Israelis change their 
minds. First, the Syrians were too strong for Peled's division alone and if there 
was a need to continue the offensive immediately the concentration of forces 
would have taken too much time. Therefore, this possibility was excluded. 
There were already two divisions on the northern sector. Second and more 
important, the northern route was the shortest way to Damascus. If the Syrian 
capital was threatened, the Syrians would probably deploy their forces 
defensively and closer to Damascus. This idea fulfilled the principle of 
dislocation; if there were not enough troops to force the enemy to retreat, the 
enemy had to be pressured via other means such as threatening their 
vulnerable targets, in this case the capital city of Damascus. Third, the slopes 
of Mount Hermon would protect the flank of the advance and, in addition, 
made the support of the Air Force possible because it was now possible to use 
both the northern valley route and the "Fatahland" for sheltered access. 
Finally, the flatter terrain in the northern sector allowed the massing of forces, 
and made the Syrian tanks more vulnerable in mobile warfare.574 
On 10 October, Chief of Staff, General Elazar ordered the tactical offensives 
to come to a stop by saying that the IDF needed to mount a general offensive 
into Syrian-held territory. According to Asher and Hammel, this information 
573 Wakebridge (1976), p. 23 — 24 and Katz (1996), p. 155 — 156. 
574 Rothenberg, p. 192, Asher & Hammel, p. 256 — 257 and Aker, p. 87. 
See also Leonhard, p. 98 and van Creveld (1998), p. 233. 
According to van Creveld, Elazar's real objective in mounting the counter-offensive towards 
Damascus was to make the Syrians press the Egyptians to send more forces across the 
Suez Canal to help relieve the pressure on the Golan. 
Leonhard gives an illustrative example of dislocation by describing the battle between 
Hercules and the giant. Because Hercules was too weak to face the giant in a direct battle, 
he had to throw the giant off balance. In this battle, Athena whispered in Hercules' ear: 
"Move the giant! Move the giant!" By threatening Damascus, the Israelis did the same thing. 
Elazar's idea of forcing the Egyptians to move can also be seen in this light. 
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was interpreted in the headquarters of the Northern Command as a preliminary 
order for a coming offensive within the next 24 hours. However, it still remains 
unclear whether the IDF already had an offensive plan for the Golan at the 
time, as they had for the Sinai front. Pasi Rekila, who has studied tank and 
antitank battles on the Golan during the Yom Kippur War, states that Israeli 
operational plans ended with mobilisation and after that the idea was to act 
according to the situation. At the command level this might be true, although 
the existing operational doctrine stressed the principle of transferring the battle 
to enemy territory. If such plans existed, they are still secret today, obviously 
because the no war, no peace" situation still continues on this front. 
Nevertheless, some data on offensive plans at a lower level can be seen; for 
example, in Kahalani's The Heights of Courage. On 9 October, Kahalani got a 
preliminary order, "Plan Gil", from his superior, Colonel Ben-Gal, to start an 
advance into Syria. General Adan also reveals in his book, Banks of the Suez, 
that the Israelis acted according to a plan on the Golan, which, however, might 
well also mean plans for the defensive phase. In any case, the Israeli cabinet 
approved an offensive into Syria on 10 October with the goal of moving within 
artillery range of Damascus by capturing Sasa in the third and innermost 
defensive line covering Damascus. The Israelis hoped to take Syria effectively 
out of the war with this drive by forcing Syria to accept a cease-fire.575 
The attack, twin pronged, as Zeev Schiff calls it, began at 11.00 on 11 
October; occurring at the same time as the final Syrian assault, which was 
aimed at taking Kuneitra. In manoeuvre, the Israelis were superior to the rigid 
Syrian command system and on the night of 11/12 October, the Syrians made 
— on recommendation of their Soviet advisers — the decision to withdraw to the 
Sasa Line. This line was regarded as being strong enough to stand up to 
Israeli pressure. It was also thought that it did not give the Israelis a possibility 
of encircling and destroying their troops in the outer defence fortifications, 
which were not continuous, as had been the case in the Six Day War. 
According to Schiff, the operational objective was to destroy the Syrian forces 
while the conquest of the terrain was not so important. This coincides with the 
principles of the Israeli operational doctrine, which stressed the importance of 
decisive victory. This aim, at least partly, also explains why the Israelis still 
tried to attack the Sasa Line, which they had reached rather quickly, from 14 
October onwards. The Syrian forces were not destroyed although they had 
had to abandon most of their guns and vehicles. Beginning on the 13 October 
assaults on both sides continued until the day of the cease-fire, 22 October. 
The Israelis were mostly in a defensive posture and were able to hold the bulk 
575 Asher & Hammel, p. 257 — 258, Gawrych (1996), pi 55 Kahalani (1984), p. 122, Rekila, 
Pasi: Sotatoimet Golanilla 1973 panssarintorjunnan ja panssarien kayton kannalta 
tarkasteluna (Battles on the Golan Heights in 1973 from the viewpoint of Anti-tank Defence 
and Armour), a study from the General Staff Officer Course, National Defence College of 
Finland, Helsinki July 1995, p. 9 and Adan, pi 92. 
On 9 October, Ben-Gal asked Kahalani: "Do you remember 'Plan Gil' to inform him of the 
coming operation. This question was about a preliminary order, which shows that something 
was planned beforehand in this sector of the Golan, although the preparations for this might 
also have happened during the state of readiness before the war. 
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of the Syrian, Iraqi and Jordanian counter-attacks. The Israelis held the Sasa 
Line up to the end of the war.576 
The only offensive action in this period was the recapture of Mount Hermon. 
After the fall of the Israeli position on Mount Hermon, the IDF tried to recapture 
the post on 8 October with an improvised operation that did not succeed. The 
operation was repeated on 21 October, this time with a thoroughly planned 
and minutely co-ordinated set-piece joint operation. The timing of the 
simultaneous attack on the upper position with heliborne troops and on the 
lower positions with a combined force of infantry and tanks from different 
directions surprised the Syrians. This operation can be seen as a return to the 
tactics and principles that were applied during the War of Attrition in large 
counter-guerrilla operations in this area.577 
11.3. Sinai — from tactical disasters to operational success 
11.3.1. Plans and preparations 
The Egyptian "Operation Bade consisted of two phases. The first phase, the 
crossing, called for five infantry divisions to cross the Suez Canal and form five 
bridgeheads with a depth of five miles in 24 hours. This offensive was to be 
implemented on a broad front without a main effort. In 48 hours these 
bridgeheads were to be consolidated into two army level bridgeheads -
including the transfer of the mechanised and armoured divisions to the east 
bank of the Sinai — with a depth of nine miles east of the Canal, also 
destroying Israel's mobilised reserves. Doctor Gawrych, who has interviewed 
some high-ranking Egyptian Yom Kippur-period officers, estimates that a third 
phase was planned as well. This was probably to proceed with an offensive 
eastward, most likely to capture the operational objectives in the vicinity of the 
Mitla and Gidi passes. This doesn't coincide with the concept of limited war 
aims, but the condition of being prepared for further missions depending on,the 
situation can be interpreted as having been the third phase, which would not 
originally have been very precisely planned. However, according to Gawrych, 
the Egyptian Armed Forces trained and planned as if they would seize the 
576 Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 178, Gawrych (1996), p. 55 and O'Ballance (1997), p. 
339. 
See also Dupuy (1992), p. 467 — 468. 
On 13 October, three armoured brigades of Laner's division were able to ambush the entire 
Iraqi division near Tel Shaar. This illustrates Israel's superiority in mobile warfare rather well, 
although it also shows the lack of co-operation between Syria and her allies and the 
weaknesses in their operational intelligence. 
577 Katz (1989), p. 120 — 121, O'Ballance (1997), p. 214 and Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 
276. 
Although risky, the decision to use heliborne troops was taken to surprise the Syrians and to 
save time. Schiff describes that on foot the troops would have had to cross "Fatahland" on 
the Lebanese-Syrian border, which would have meant wasting many hours and fighting 
terrorists en route. 
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Sinai passes and expected to transfer some air defence missiles to the east 
bank for that offensive as wel1.578 
The Egyptian war plan was based on a rather thorough knowledge of the 
Israeli war plans and doctrine, contrary to the previous wars. Despite the 
acknowledged Israeli superiority in air combat and in mobile warfare, it was 
assumed that with training, discipline and indoctrination the Egyptian soldier 
would become competent enough to face the Israelis, especially in defensive 
combat. A quick seizure of several large bridgeheads on the east bank, 
correspondingly, would give the Egyptians the initiative that was needed before 
consolidating a defence; the Israeli operational commanders in the Sinai were 
supposed to lose the important early hours by seeking to discover the Egyptian 
main effort. In addition, after the Israeli recovery from the first shock, they were 
expected to act according to their doctrine; launching rapid armoured counter-
offensives. This gave the Egyptians the possibility of exploiting Israel's 
sensitivity to casualties. The IDF thrusts to rescue the personnel in the Bar Lev 
Line fortifications and the efforts to re-conquer the line were supposed to be 
blocked with antitank infantry while all the forces in the limited bridgehead and 
the second echelon were to be protected from the Israeli Air Force with the air 
defence network situated along the west bank of the Canal.579 
The Egyptians committed a total of eight mechanised divisions, two 
armoured divisions, and 20 separate brigades in two armies to "Operation 
Bade. This amounted to 315,000 men, some 2,100 tanks and an almost 
equivalent number of APCs, over 1,200 artillery pieces, 550 combat aircraft 
and over 80 helicopters.58°  
578 Gawrych (1996), p. 20 — 22, EI-Shazly, Saad: The Crossing of the Suez, American Middle 
East Research, San Francisco 1980, p. 36 — 39, El Badri, p. 19 and Loefstedt III, Arthur B: 
Yom Kippur 1973: An Operational Analysis of the Sinai Campaign, Naval War College, 
Newport RI February 1996, p. 7 — 8. 
In contemporary Egyptian literature the third offensive phase into the depths of the Sinai is 
disputed. According to El Badri, the Egyptian operational objective was limited to a depth of 
10 to 15 km in order to remain within the air defence umbrella. General Shazly, as well as 
War Minister Ahmed Ismail, also opposed the third phase because the Egyptian Air Force 
lacked the capacity to challenge Israel's superiority for control of the skies in the Sinai. 
In his research, Doctor Gawrych interviewed Field-Marshal EI-Gamasy, commander of the 
Air Defence Forces, General Muhammad Ali Fahmi and Chief of the Military Section at the 
al-Ahram Strategic Studies Institute, Murad Ibrahim al-Dessouki, who was commander of a 
mechanised infantry battalion during the Yom Kippur War. 
See also Morris, John, S: U.S. Army Deliberate River Crossings: A Bridge Too Far?, School 
of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas 1997, p. 19 and Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 346. 
According to Morris, the decision to attack on a wide front was also a consequence of the 
Egyptian fear of Israeli air strikes. 
According to Luttwak and Horowitz, the Egyptian war plan combined the strategic offensive 
of the Canal crossing with strictly defensive tactics immediately afterwards. In any case, as a 
matter of fact, the Canal crossing enabled the realisation of the strategic war aims via 
tactical defence. In this plan, the ties between the levels of warfare can easily be seen. 
579 EI-Shazly, pi 224 — 225, Dupuy (1975), p. 49 and Gawrych (1996), p. 20 and 34. 
58° Dupuy (1992), p. 606 and 608 and Cordesman & Wagner, p. 16 and 24. 
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The Israeli defence in the Sinai, as on the Golan Heights, relied on the 
mobilisation of reserve forces, which constituted 2/3 of the ground forces of the 
Southern Command commanded by Major General Shmuel Gonen. Everything 
was based on the assumption that the IDF would have at least a 48 hour early 
warning of an invasion. Two different plans were created: "Dovecote" 
(Shovach Yonim) and "Rock" (Sela). In both plans, the Israeli General Staff 
expected the Bar Lev Line to serve as a defensive "stop line", as Doctor 
Gawrych calls it, a line that had to be held in every case.581  
The "Dovecote" plan was to be applied in a limited crisis with only the 
regular forces of the Sinai Division, which was to be reinforced with additional 
troops, if necessary. According to this plan, one armoured brigade was 
stationed behind the forward line of fortifications. Its primary mission was to 
move forward and occupy the firing ramps along the front between the 
fortifications in case of an Egyptian attack. Two armoured brigades were 
positioned behind the defensive forward line. One was also to reinforce the 
forward line while the second prepared to counterattack the Egyptian main 
effort. With air support, it was expected that "Dovecote" troops could contain 
even a major assault until the reserves arrived. A significant detail in the 
"Dovecote" plan was the fact that the Sinai Division had no mechanised 
infantry, which was needed to cope with enemy antitank infantry. According to 
Adan, these units were reserves that were to be mobilised in case of an 
emergency.582 
The other plan, "Rock", was for an all-out invasion. Should the regular forces 
prove inadequate for defeating the attacking Egyptian troops, then Israel would 
also mobilise reserve formations, two armoured divisions. In this plan, the main 
aim was to launch a counter-attack as quickly as possible, even over the Suez 
Canal if needed. This plan required air supremacy and elimination of Egypt's 
air defence system in the Canal area to allow air support for the armoured 
thrusts.583 
When the Yom Kippur War broke out, Israel had fewer troops in the Sinai 
than even the "Dovecote" plan required. The total manpower on this front was 
12 -15,000 men, less than 300 tanks, no mechanised infantry — according to 
Adan they were reserve troops — less than 50 artillery pieces and some 70 
antitank weapons. On the Sinai front, the force ratio before Israeli mobilisation 
was similarly overwhelmingly unfavourable, as was the case with the Israelis 
on the Golan: in manpower 1:8 to 1:10, in tanks 1:6, in artillery 1:30 and in 
antitank weapons almost 1:90. When comparing the numbers of combat 
aircraft and trained pilots, the forces were nearly equivalent in size. This does 
not tell the whole story, however, because Israel had to divide her Air Force 
between two fronts, and simultaneously support both ground forces and strike 
against air defence targets. The Bar Lev Line, on which both operational plans 
581  Gawrych (1996), pi 16 and Loefstedt, p. 9. 
582 Rothenberg, p. 180, Gawrych, George W: Combat Engineering, Egyptian Engineers in 
the Crossing Operation of 1973, Spiller, Roger J. (General Editor): Combined Arms in Battle 
since 1939, U.Si Army Command and General Staff College Press, Fort Leavenworth, 
Kansas 1992, pi 45 and Adan, p. 57. 
583 Adan, p. 58 and Gawrych (1996), p 18. 
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rested, was too weak to even channel the Egyptian attack. Besides, about half 
of the strongholds had been closed before the war. Therefore when the war 
started, only 16 strongholds were manned by no more than about 450 men, 
less than a battalion, from the Jerusalem Infantry Brigade. They had little or no 
combat experience. In addition, none of the three brigades were deployed 
according to the "Dovecote" plan, a failure that Chief of Staff General Elazar 
only became aware of after the war according to Gawrych. The strengths, 
orders of battle and losses of the Yom Kippur War can be seen in Appendix 
17. A map of the operations on the Sinai front during the Yom Kippur War can 
be seen in Appendix 19.584 
11.3.2. Containment — the weaknesses of "defensive defence" are revealed 
Egypt also surprised the Israelis, although there was also a premonition of the 
coming war at the operational level in the Sinai Division headquarters. 
According to Schiff, at least Major General Albert Mendler, commander of the 
Sinai Division, had a premonition of the coming war — like Colonel Ben-Gal on 
the Golan front — and demanded that the Southern Command give him 
permission to deploy his armoured brigades according to the "Dovecote" plan. 
He was rebuffed. Finally, on 6 October, just a short time before the start of 
hostilities, Mendler was authorised to move at 16.00, two hours before the 
expected invasion hour. However by then, this decision was too late because 
the main bulk of the Sinai Division was still, on average, 100 kilometres away 
from the Canal.585 
The short but very intense air force and artillery barrage, lasting 25 minutes, 
did not give the Israelis time to recover from their shock, unlike on the Golan 
Heights where the preparatory bombardment lasted twice as long.586 
 
Therefore, the loss of advance warning at a tactical level meant that the 
Southern Command did not have a possibility of getting a picture of what was 
going on — not to mention having an idea of Egypt's intentions and centre of 
gravity. The Southern Command was also not capable of concentrating its 
584 Cordesman & Wagner, p. 24, Dayan (1976), p. 387, Gawrych (1996), p. 32 — 33, Adan, 
pi 57 and Rothenberg, p. 180. 
See also Schiff (October Earthquake), pi 134. 
According to Schiff, nine of the 16 manned strongholds fell or surrendered; most during the 
first days and the last after a week. The Israelis were able to evacuate six strongholds and 
the remaining one, on the Mediterranean coast, was held to the end of the war. 
585 Schiff (October Earthquake), pi 20 — 21, Williams (1989), p. 204, Gawrych (1996), p. 32 -
33 and Sharon, p. 294. 
According to Williams, Mendler's tanks were ordered to remain in their normal positions to 
avoid any indication of major preparations. 
586 Asher & Hammel, p. 85 — 86. 
See also Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 344. 
According to the authors, the air attack succeeded — not only in cutting the communications 
of the Bar Lev Line bunkers to the rear — but also in destroying most of the long-range guns 
that were supposed to provide fire support for the strongholdsi 
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forces to deal with the Egyptians when they were most vulnerable before the 
consolidation of the bridgeheads. 
The conquest of the Bar Lev Line fortresses was secondary to Egypt's plan 
and therefore only a few men attacked the strongholds. The primary objective 
was to get a foothold in the Sinai. The Israeli counter-measures were 
scattered. Edgar O'Ballance, who among other sources interviewed several 
Israeli officers in his book No Victor, No Vanquished, says that there was not 
one, but several Israeli armies in the Sinai in the first two or three days; i.e., 
various units charged around the desert without any control or co-ordination. 
Unsupported tank battalions were thrown piece-meal into battles like cavalry 
charges, as Herzog puts it.587 
The description above quite accurately interprets the situation on the east 
bank of the Suez Canal during the first days of the war. The principle of not 
surrendering territory to the Egyptians, as well as the tendency to cling to the 
"Dovecote" plan, led to attempts to reach the Canal line, but these attempts 
were not concentrated. In addition, the time for this had passed. The chaotic 
situation also reveals that operational intelligence had failed badly, partly 
because the Egyptians attacked on a broad front and partly because the 
Southern Command failed to combine the crumbs of tactical intelligence 
information at its disposal. As a consequence, the situation denied the IDF the 
ability to concentrate on any one major Egyptian threat. In addition, the 
construction of the air defence network along the western banks of the Canal 
had effectively prevented aerial intelligence since the War of Attrition.588 The 
failures were also partly consequences of a lack of trust in the spot reports of 
subordinates, which for its part shows that the Israelis still did not believe in an 
all-out war at the operational level in this phase. 
According to van Creveld, the IDF could easily have afforded to let the 
Egyptians advance until they were beyond the range of their antiaircraft 
missiles. The Sinai offered enough room for manoeuvre and, in addition, the 
Israelis also had fortifications and ramparts for tanks in its depths. However, 
this would have meant abandoning the Bar Lev Line, which ran counter to 
Israeli strategy and was also against the principle of not leaving IDF soldiers in 
enemy hands. The picture of the situation was, however, unclear in the 
Southern Command. Therefore on 6 October, though not directly attributable 
to Egyptian actions, the Israelis still contributed to the magnitude of their initial 
failure with their piecemeal counter-attacks towards the Bar Lev Line. 
According to Schiff, General Mendler was even given an order to prepare for a 
Canal crossing. By morning on the second day, 7 October, some 80,000 
Egyptians and 500 tanks had crossed the Suez Canal and ten heavy bridges 
587 Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 69, O'Ballance (1997), p. 86 and 349 — 350 and Herzog 
(1975), p. 191. 
According to O'Ballance, individual Israeli soldiers also spoke of conflicting orders later after 
the war, and of a lack of liaison and accord between the political and military leaders as well 
as of administrative confusion; and of arms, equipment and ammunition shortage. 
588 Loefstedt, p. 13 and Morris, p. 21 — 22. 
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were operational for further crossings. The initiative was totally in Egyptian 
hands. The Sinai Division had lost 2/3 of its strength by this time. 89 
On 7 October, General Headquarters gave General Gonen permission to 
evacuate those forward strongholds that were accessible, and to conduct a 
tactical withdrawal to a more defensible line despite the opinions of the 
commanders of the reserve divisions that were just about to arrive at the front. 
According to O'Ballance, all three divisional commanders — this also includes 
the commander of the Sinai Division — favoured smashing through the 
Egyptians, seizing some bridges and crossing the Canal before the 
bridgeheads could be strengthened and stabilised. This illustrates the 
offensive spirit at the operational level. General Gonen obeyed General 
Headquarters' will and deployed his forces on the so-called Lateral Road some 
20 miles east of the Suez Canal, leaving only a screen on the Artillery Road. 
However according to Schiff, nobody mentioned the word "retreat". This was 
totally unknown to the Israelis since the early days of the War of Independence 
and was also highly suspect by the fighting morale of the IDF; therefore the 
operative word was "regrouping". Zeev Schiff calls the tactics that Gonen 
adopted by the name of no retreat and no counter-attack", meaning that the 
Sinai Division tried to gain time without loosing territory before the arrival of the 
reserves. In practise, the existing forces stepped back and forward, 
withdrawing and assaulting the same hills. These tactics showed not only the 
strategic unwillingness to abandon terrain to the Egyptians, but also a neglect 
of the possibilities that the depth of the Sinai would have offered for tactical 
solutions.59°  
The first of the reserve armoured divisions reached the Sinai passes only 24 
hours from the beginning of the mobilisation. Without taking into account 
certain shortages in the organisations and equipment of these divisions, the 
pace of the mobilisation and the following deployment also showed excellent 
flexibility in the Sinai. Not even the Egyptian heliborne commandos, which 
589 
van Creveld (1996), p. 225, Morris, p. 23, Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 70, 101- 102 
and 105, Herzog (1975), p. 181 and Sharon, p. 295. 
According to Schiff, the lack of artillery and mortars was a hard fact from the beginning of 
the war. Obviously the knowledge of how to use artillery had also weakened. 
See also O'Ballance (1997), p. 91. 
According to O'Ballance, fierce and speedy armoured attacks continued during the first 
night, but they were piecemeal. The Israelis made fourteen such attacks but each was of 
company strength, and all were repulsed. 
590 Williams (1989), p. 209, Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 79 and 113, van Creveld (1985), 
p. 207 and O'Ballance (1997), p. 99. 
See also Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 91 and 148. 
Schiff sheds light on the problems that Gonen encountered. Defence Minister Dayan gave 
Gonen "a ministerial advice to withdraw on the afternoon of 7 October. Gonen had to fit this 
suggestion in with Elazar's plans. This reveals the irregularities in the relationship between 
the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Staff. Elazar was also in a difficult situation with 
Dayan's advice, which caused confusion several times during the wari Although Elazar 
usually kept his own council, his subordinates were in trouble when they tried to solve which 
orders were the real ones. In a way, this also aggravated the already bad chain of command 
in the Southern Command. Besides, Dayan spent, as in the Sinai Campaign of 1956, most 
of his time in the field; unattainable to the command net. Therefore, contradicting orders 
were difficult to resolve. 
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were sent in dozens of helicopters to block the Israeli deployment, were able to 
prevent the rush of reserve divisions to the front, though they caused several 
delays. In addition, only the possibility of the threat made the Israelis cautious. 
In a way, it seems amazing that the Egyptian Air Force made virtually no effort 
to interfere with the Israeli lines of communication in this phase. It is obvious 
that this inactivity was a result of the Egyptian calculations that their air force 
couldn't challenge the IAF. The air defence umbrella gave enough cover to the 
bridgeheads. Nevertheless, the passivity of the Egyptian Air Force left the 
helicopters without fighter cover, with disastrous results.591  
However with the additional divisions in the vicinity of the passes, the 
situation from the Israeli point of view was no longer desperate, although it was 
grave. The depth of the Sinai gave the Israelis — at least in theory — room for 
operational manoeuvre. However, the picture of the situation was still too 
optimistic in this phase. According to Gawrych, the IDF had begun the 
transition from the "Dovecote" plan to "Rock" in this phase. Because the 
Egyptians had already established their bridgeheads on the Sinai side of the 
Canal, this change was, however, no longer realistic. Both Adan and Sharon 
reveal that the picture of the situation made it impossible to know how to best 
deploy the reserves. Nevertheless, offensive means can be seen in their plans 
on how to counter-attack.592 
11.3.3. Counter-strikes — inadequate combined-arms efforts materialise 
The first concentrated Israeli counter-attacks in the Sinai were implemented 
during 8 October. This day is not highly regarded in the Israeli art of war and it 
591  Williams (1989), p. 209, Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 60 and 79, Gawrych (1996), p. 
37 — 38, Loefstedt, p. 16, Adan, p. 14 and 24 and Sharon, p. 293. 
The spearheads of the Israeli reserve divisions reached the passes 17 hours after the call-
up. 
According to Schiff, the Egyptian commando operation was a bold one, but the results were 
slight. Without air cover, the helicopters were easy prey. Therefore, the attempt to block the 
Israelis before they reached the battlefield was the most expensive part of Egypt's offensive. 
Schiff estimates that the Egyptian Army had 20 commando battalions at the time. How many 
of them were used during the war remains unclear. 
According to Adan, the Southern Command and also the General Headquarters did not 
believe their subordinates' reports of the extent of the commando landings at first. 
See also Aker, p. 31, Cohen, p. 342 and O'Ballance (1997), p. 89 — 90. 
Cohen mentions that the Egyptians landed five commando regiments, some 1,700 soldiers 
in 72 helicopters, in the first two days. Correspondingly, according to Aker, the Egyptians 
dropped some 2,000 commandos in the Sinai. Despite the fact that almost 50 helicopters 
were shot down, most of the commandos returned to their lines, missions — causing delays 
to the Israeli force concentrations — accomplished. The Syrians were much more cautious in 
their landings, obviously because the IAF's focus was on the Golan during the early days of 
the war. 
According to O'Ballance, the Egyptian commando battalions, formed in 1961, were modelled 
on the American Green Berets. A platoon consisted of about twenty-four men — which was 
the maximum load of a Mi-8 helicopter. Three platoons formed a company, and three 
companies a battalion. A "group" could consist of one or more battalions. 
592 Gawrych (1996), p. 41, Adan, p. 33 and Sharon, p. 293. 
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contains a lot of items that are still occasionally the subjects of heated 
disputes. Nevertheless, in general it can be said that the IDF failed in two big 
areas. First, the command and leadership system at the operational level did 
not work according to the principles that were adopted in the doctrine. This 
was a reason for the fact that the Israelis, instead of concentrating, dispersed 
their forces. Second, it was revealed that the organisational development after 
the Six Day War had not gone in accordance with the tactical and operational 
principles and plans. The most severe problem was the inability to cope with 
the antitank and antiaircraft defences.593 
In the war conference that was held on the evening of 7 October at the 
Southern Command command post, it was decided that a limited counter-
attack would be launched on the morning of 8 October. However, battles of 
attrition were to be avoided. The main reason for the scale of the counter-
attack was the simultaneous operations on the Golan Heights. According to 
Gawrych and van Creveld, this deviated from the Israeli strategic principle of 
avoiding multi-front offensives; in this case on the Golan Heights and in the 
Sinai.59 
 However, General Elazar's approval of a limited counter-strike in the 
Sinai shows that the main emphasis was put on the Golan battles, which 
illustrates the aim of avoiding simultaneous multi-front offensives. Therefore, 
the role of the offensive action in the Sinai can be seen in the light of trying to 
keep the initiative in Israeli hands. As a matter of fact, Elazar acted exactly 
according to the strategic principles by doing so. 
The aim of the Israeli counter-strike was to push the bridgeheads out of the 
area between the Lexicon Road — a field road that went parallel to the Canal in 
the vicinity of the banks — and the Artillery Road with a two-division flanking 
manoeuvre. However the Canal line was to be avoided because of the 
Egyptian antitank defence. The operational area was divided into three 
divisional sectors: the battered Sinai Division got responsibility for the easiest 
southern sector while the fresh armoured divisions of Generals Adan and 
Sharon divided the operational area in the Canal sector, Adan's division in the 
north and Sharon's in the central sector.595 
However, the rest of the planning and implementation went wrong from the 
very beginning. Because of the over-optimistic picture of the situation, the 
Southern Command changed the missions of the attacking divisions several 
times before and during the offensive. Major changes dealt with the linking up 
with the strongholds and preparations for crossing, which all were in 
contradiction with General Elazar's general outlines. The reasons for these 
changes have not been published yet — if they even exist — but it can still be 
593 O'Ballance (1997), p. 105 and 178. 
Mohammed Heikal writes that U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told him that the 
Americans thought that the Israelis would be in a position to deliver a devastating counter-
attack against the Egyptian forces in the Sinai within 48 hours of the opening of hostilities. 
As a matter of fact, the Israelis were able to concentrate two armoured divisions in the Sinai 
at this time, but a devastating counter-offensive was not possible. Both Generals Adan and 
Sharon also admit this. 
594 Gawrych (1996), p.41-42 and 54 and van Creveld (1985), p. 211. 
595 Gawrych (1996), p. 41 — 42 and 44 and Williams (1989), p. 209. 
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supposed that the over-optimistic assessment made General Gonen seek 
possibilities for crossing the Canal already in this phase of the war. In addition, 
orders were transmitted over the radio net, which caused misunderstandings 
that still remain unclear. The counter-attacks in the Sinai were poorly co-
ordinated and failed to achieve their objectives as a consequence. So, instead 
of implementing a concentrated flanking manoeuvre Adan's leading brigade 
passed — in several cases only in platoon-size combinations — in front of the 
Egyptian line, while the other two brigades also met a massive ambush of 
antitank weapons. Finally, the remnants of Adan's division were forced to 
withdraw. In addition, changes in Sharon's mission sent him south instead of 
concentrating even those armoured forces that were already available for the 
counter-attack. This move also left a critical junction for further Israeli 
operations in Egyptian hands. The Israelis later had to open the passage to the 
Canal by force. On the whole, the tendency of instinctively acting offensively 
without the bare necessities to push through enemy lines and in a piece-meal 
fashion — including the Sinai Division's rushes to the Bar Lev Line at the 
beginning of the war — greatly served Egypt's strategy of causing the Israelis 
as many losses as possible. This is nicely illustrated in van Creveld's phrase 
"How Adan could expect to stay out of range and rescue the maozim — let 
alone expect to cross the canal — remains a mystery."596  
Afterwards, plenty of researchers have — with the wisdom of hindsight -
criticised the IDF's operational principles in the Sinai during the containment 
and counter-strike phases. The core of these ideas can be crystallised in 
Luttwak's and Horowitz's statement that the Israelis missed the opportunity for 
a much more conclusive victory when they didn't allow the Egyptians to 
advance as deep as they wanted. However, this opinion does not take the 
Egyptian limited war concept into account; originally the Egyptians did not plan 
to advance into the depths of the Sinai. This makes statements like Luttwak's 
and Horowitz's inconsistent. Second, the Israelis also had, in theory, the 
possibility of fighting in depth in the Sinai and preparations — including roads, 
fortifications and firing ramps — and plans were made for this possibility. 
According to General Adan, at the operational level the enemy was to be 
destroyed in chosen killing zones with the reserve armoured divisions using 
the principles of mobile defence. This was not the decision that was taken. The 
strategy of not abandoning the Bar Lev Line made the possibility of using 
mobile defence in depth in the Sinai irrelevant. However, this decision was not 
made at the operational level."' 
596 Gawrych (1996), p. 50, van Creveld (1985), p. 213 — 217 and 225 — 226, van Creveld 
(1998), p. 227, Adan, p. 107 — 108, 111, 115 — 116 and 190 and Aker, p. 39. 
Adan also writes that reports of positive results by armoured reconnaissance could have 
misled Gonen. It was not rare for armoured reconnaissance units to push through enemy 
lines. 
597 Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 377 — 378, Adan, p. 46 and interview of Major General (ret.) 
Avraham Adeni 
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1 1.3.4. Holding phase — defence precedes offence 
After the failed counter-attacks on 8 October, IDF troops held a line that run 
approximately along the Artillery Road. However, the Egyptians had been able 
to gain access to several important strongholds in the central sector, which 
later delayed the Israeli counter-offensive over the Canal. On 9 October, it was 
also decided, as a consequence of the command and operational problems, 
that ex-Chief of Staff Lieutenant General (ret.) Haim Bar Lev would go to the 
Southern Command as the Chief of Staffs personal representative. To 
camouflage this move, five other retired generals were recalled to service and 
also attached to Elazar's staff as advisers. In practise, Bar Lev became the 
acting OC of the Southern Command while Gonen became his deputy.598 
According to O'Ballance, the Israelis had three choices after the failure of 
the first concentrated counter-attack: the first was to launch a major offensive 
against the Egyptian bridgeheads, the second was to make another 
concentrated effort to cross the Canal at a single point and the third was to 
wait until the Egyptians advanced and meet them in the open desert and finally 
beat them at mobile warfare. At the strategic level, Bar Lev and Elazar opted 
for the third choice: to delay any further offensives while organising their own 
forces and waiting until the bulk of the Egyptian armour had crossed the Canal. 
They would then permit the Egyptians to attack first and in this way try to 
balance the force ratio before crossing the Canal. General Adan also shared 
this view; the losses during the first days of fighting and the time that was 
needed to increase Israeli strength were the main reasons to wait, but the idea 
of a counter-offensive was in the background the whole time.599 
At the operational level, the Israelis applied the principles of mobile defence 
during the holding phase. This phase saw only tactical battles. The withdrawal 
to the Artillery Road was not, according to Adan, planned beforehand. In 
addition, although taozims were constructed in the depths of the Sinai, 
according to Adan, the net did not extend up to the Artillery Road. The existing 
taozims were mostly unmanned as well because of the lack of infantry. 
Therefore, the idea was, according to Elazar, to move around during the next 
few days. However, this was not carried out exactly according to the principles 
of mobile defence. Because of the shortage of infantry and APCs, the Israelis 
were forced to use their tanks in mobile defence, but not in depth. In this 
method of fighting, which Adan calls "tank-defence", tanks moved around on 
the battlefield left and right, but not in depth. In this concept, the little infantry 
598 Gawrych (1996), p. 50 and 55, Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 155 and Aker, p. 93 and 
96. 
According to Aker, Gonen had studied armoured tactics at the Staff College in Camberley, 
England before the Six Day War. He was well known for his good performance as the 
commander of the 7th Armoured Brigade during the Six Day War. It seems, however, that he 
did not have the ability to rise above this level. 
599 O'Ballance (1997), p. 112, Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 377 — 378, van Creveld (1985), p. 208, 
van Creveld (1998), p. 229 and interview of Major General (ret.) Avraham Adan. 
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that was available was used to give cover to the tanks; mostly at night 
however.60°  
However, the decision to temporarily deploy defensively was not accepted 
unanimously. During the counter-attack, Sharon's division had uncovered an 
unmanned gap between the two Egyptian armies, and to him this was a 
possibility to take the initiative. However, despite Sharon's protests, the 
supreme command chose to wait. The more threatened Golan took first 
priority. Sharon, nevertheless, violated Elazar's concept of avoiding attrition 
and made a number of counter-attacks on 9 October to gain control of the 
taozims held by the Egyptians and make his way to the Canal. This was all in 
vain, leading only to Israeli losses. Adan estimates that on 9 October the 
principle of concentrating force overrode initiative. It was calculated that the 
Southern Command did not have enough force yet for both a crossing and a 
holding action in the Sinai. In addition, according to Adan, the Israelis did not 
yet have bridging equipment on the front. Although the Israelis would have 
been able to capture some Egyptian bridges, they would not have been 
enough to increase the strength in the bridgehead. Therefore, as a matter of 
fact, the Israelis would have lost the advantage of surprise by acting according 
to Sharon's view.601  
The decision to wait for the Egyptian move also reveals several other 
interesting details. First, it shows that Israel did not have enough forces for 
simultaneous wars on two or more fronts; this principle was wisely written into 
the IDF doctrine. The most crucial element was the Air Force. The transfer of 
ground forces from the Golan front was not so important for balancing the 
force ratio, it might not even have been possible to a large extent. This balance 
was to be achieved by allowing the Egyptians to attack first. In mobile warfare, 
the Israelis expected to be superior to the Egyptians, and they were not wrong; 
especially when they also had the advantage of being in a defensive posture. 
Third, the decision also reveals that the final aim of the war was still a decisive 
victory, which was to be achieved with an over-all offensive across the Canal 
into the Egyptian rear. 
On 14 October, the Egyptians started their offensive from the bridgeheads 
towards the Sinai passes. Loefstedt and Barclay estimate that with the 
operational pause after the consolidation of the Egyptian bridgeheads, the 
initiative quickly passed over to the Israelis - culminating in the disastrous 
attack toward the passes. Once the initial plan had run its course, the 
Egyptians lacked the flexibility to exploit their successes. The decision to 
continue was not made unanimously by Egypt's General Staff. It meant moving 
out from under the air defence umbrella into mobile warfare; i.e., to those parts 
of the military art where the Israelis were strong and the Egyptians were weak. 
Nevertheless, the decision was made, although mainly for political reasons to 
draw Israel's attention away from the Golan front. This operation was hoped 
600 Interview of Major General (ret.) Avraham Adan and van Creveld (1985), p. 208. 
601 Interview of Major General (ret.) Avraham Adan and Gawrych (1996), p. 54 — 55. 
According to Gawrych, Gonen's inability to control Sharon was the final reason for sending 
Bar Lev to the Southern Command. However, the decision to not dismiss Sharon rather 
shows that Elazar appreciated Sharon's command abilities more than he disliked his 
disobedience. 
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for on the Israeli side, although the Israelis feared, according to Adan, that the 
Egyptians would push slowly forward on a broad front; taking their air-defence 
network with them. This did not happen, however. The Egyptians started a 
deep penetration, which gave the Israelis the advantage. Once they recovered 
from their first shocks, the Israelis showed a degree of flexibility. Therefore, 14 
October is, quite rightly, generally seen as the turning point of the war. The 
Egyptians lost the operational initiative in this phase and were put on the 
defensive from then up to the end of the war.6°2 
Egyptian tactics in mobile warfare had not developed significantly since the 
1960s, but some changes had been made. Frank Aker describes this in his 
book October 1973. The Arab-Israeli War. Egyptian infantry was trained to 
move toward an objective in co-ordination with the fire support of tanks. In 
theory this followed the combined arms principle. The personnel carriers 
spearheading the attack stood, however, little chance against Israeli tanks that 
acted flexibly in platoons or companies, concentrating their fire on the 
personnel vehicles. Thus when a vehicle was damaged, survivors had to flee 
on foot through the field of fire. In addition, tanks still moved in rigid column 
formations and were therefore very vulnerable to Israeli ambushes. When the 
tanks were disabled, the APCs also had few possibilities of continuing their 
thrust. On this one day, the Egyptians lost some 250 damaged or wrecked 
tanks, and the number of destroyed APCs was yet greater. This was a serious 
blow to the Egyptians and balanced the force ratio between the Israelis and 
the Egyptians. This made the Israeli crossing of the Suez Canal possible.6°3 
11.3.5. Counter-offensive — a continuation of "Constant Flow" 
O'Ballance states that an Israeli plan for crossing the Suez Canal had been in 
existence since 1968. This coincides with the Southern Command plans during 
the War of Attrition. This plan, known as "Operation Gazelle", envisaged a 
crossing at one of three points; near Kantara, near Deversoir, or just north of 
Port Suez. According to Katz, during General Sharon's tenure as OC Southern 
Command this plan was revised and renamed "Abirey LeV' (Stout Heart). 
Concrete preparations for accessing the Canal line were also made then.6°4 
602 Loefstedt, p. 13, Barclay, 46, Gawrych (1996), p. 56 — 57, interview of Major General 
(ret.) Avraham Adan, Aker, pi 100 and O'Ballance (1997), p. 246. 
See also Dupuy (1975), p. 54. 
According to Dupuy, General Shazly urged General Ismail to take advantage of the early 
successes during the first days of the war and continue the thrust to seize the Sinai passes. 
Ismail did not agree because he did not want to throw away the possibility of a defensive 
victory. At the time, the Egyptians quite realistically estimated that they had rather small 
chances against the Israelis in mobile warfare. 
There is no evidence that the 14 October operation had any significant effect on the Syrian 
front. 
603 Aker, pi 30, O'Ballance, p. 161 and Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 213 — 214. 
6" O'Ballance (1997), p. 153 and Katz (1989), p. 124 — 125. 
See also Rothenberg, p. 193 — 195 and Gawrych (1996), p. 59. 
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As early as 9 October, the Southern Command started to revise its crossing 
plans. Repeated frontal attacks to dislodge the bridgeheads were seen as too 
exhausting, maybe even impossible. Therefore, the only real option for 
throwing the Egyptians off balance was a crossing operation into the Egyptian 
lines of communication on the western side of the Suez Canal. In mobile 
operations, the Israelis had a possibility for a partial victory that would have 
shortened the war. In addition, a thrust to the west bank of the Canal made it 
possible to punch holes in the air defence network, which later on would have 
allowed the IAF to gain partial air supremacy, which was an important part of 
the IDF's deep penetration concept.6°5 
Zeev Schiff states that the lack of tactical reserves — which can be 
interpreted as being operational when the Israeli definitions of the military art at 
the time are recalled — forced the Israelis to concentrate their efforts on a 
single bridgehead. It is obvious that there also were other reasons for this 
decision, although the principle of concentrated effort played a central role, 
especially after the failed piece-meal attacks of the early days of the war. 
General Sharon's forces had uncovered the seam between the two Egyptian 
armies on the bridgehead. This was an opportunity for the Israelis. 
Coincidentally, this choice happened to coincide with the Southern Command 
plan. In addition, the Great Bitter Lake offered a protected southern flank to the 
operation. On the night of 14/15 October, Chief of Staff Elazar got the approval 
of the "War Cabinet" for the crossing.606 
Before the operation, the Southern Command re-organised its troops into 
two elements. Already on 9 October the responsibilities of the Southern 
Command were divided in two: a new command called Southern Sinai District 
was made responsible for the defence of the more peaceful southern part of 
the Sinai south of the Suez Canal under the command of Major General (ret.) 
Gavish. The second defensive division under the command of Brigadier 
Sassoon was made responsible for the northern part of the Sinai. This freed 
the Sinai Division, commanded after the death of General Mendler by Brigadier 
Kalman Magen, for a crossing. In addition, a part of the Sinai Division was 
detached to a third defensively deployed division on the eastern bank of the 
Canal under the command of Colonel Israel Granit. Thus, before the crossing 
the defensive elements consisted of a strength of about three divisions, 
obviously with older armament and equipment. The crossing force consisted of 
the three already committed armoured divisions of Adan, Sharon and Magen, 
Rothenberg also calls the crossing plan in the Yom Kippur War by the name of "Gazelle" 
while Gawrych names it "Stout-hearted men". According to Rothenberg, the plan was drawn 
up in 1971. 
605 Rothenberg, p. 193 — 194. 
606 Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 182, O'Ballance (1997), p. 222, Barclay, p. 47 and 
Gawrych (1996), p. 59. 
According to O'Ballance, an American SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft still confirmed on 13 
October that there was a large area about 40 kilometres in width that was devoid of troops 
on both sides of the Canal south of Ismailia and the Great Bitter Lake, i.e., in the planned 
crossing site,. 
O'Ballance also mentions that a number of Arabic-speaking intelligence groups from 
Sayeret Matkal had crossed the Canal already from 12 October onwards to gather 
information without arousing suspicion. 
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which were reinforced with additional brigades and infantry battalions, hastily 
assembled to give cover from the Egyptian antitank teams. This arrangement 
enabled the Southern Command to concentrate on the crossing and created a 
clear centre of gravity for the forces in the penetration. In other words, the 
Southern Command formed a mobile group to exploit success in the offensive. 
In addition, the defensive divisions formed the operational reserve of the 
Southern Command, while they were also able to put pressure on the Egyptian 
bridgeheads. On the whole, this division of force can also be seen as the seed 
in the background of the organisations and missions of the army corps 
command that were established in the IDF after the war.6°7 
According to Schiff, the objective of the crossing operation was not to seize 
territory, but to break the Egyptian army. This coincides with Israeli doctrine 
and also with manoeuvre warfare theory. First and foremost, the Israelis aimed 
at pushing the Egyptians off balance by threatening mobile operations in their 
vulnerable rear areas — including finally also the threat that the deep 
penetration presented to the capital city of Cairo. Dupuy also presents another 
aim; to disrupt the Egyptian air defence network to enable the IAF to provide 
support.6°8 
The Israeli operational plan for the crossing was as follows: Sharon's 
division would open the road to the Canal, take the bridgehead and secure the 
crossing site on both sides of the Canal. Adan's division would then cross 
over, destroy the Egyptian air defence system to allow the IAF to provide 
support, and finally turn south and encircle the southern Egyptian Army. 
Finally, Magen's division would also cross the Canal and relieve Sharon to 
secure the access to the Canal. While the overall plan was carried out in broad 
outline as planned, it took several more days then the two days that were 
planned for. Two things delayed the implementation in the early phases of the 
operation. First, the Egyptians had a tight grip on an area called the "Chinese 
Farm" and this area was the only route to get the bridging equipment to the 
shore. Therefore, the Israelis had to open a road, called the Akavish Road, by 
force against a fortified enemy with heavy losses. Although Sharon was able to 
fight his way to the crossing site with his encirclement and cover operation, 
and take the bridgehead on the night of 16 October, the opening of the road for 
the bridges caused a one-day delay in the crossing, which was finally started 
on the night of 16/17 October. Second, the Egyptian pressure against the route 
to the crossing site made the supreme echelons of the IDF cautious because 
of a fear of being cut off, and so in itself a successful initial crossing was not 
607 O'Ballance, p. 151 — 153 and 224, Dupuy (1992), p. 612, Adan p. 188, 255, and 327 -
328, Gissin, p. 346 and 348 and van Creveld (1998), p. 234. 
The divisions that were committed to the crossing consisted of four to five brigades; i.e., the 
actual strength of the crossing force was equivalent to four divisionsi 
Bellamy defines a mobile group as an element of an army or front's forces designed to 
exploit success in the offensive." See Bellamy, p. 125. 
608 Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 264 and Dupuy (1975), p. 54. 
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continually followed through on. This gave the surprised Egyptians time to 
recover and start to organise their defence west of the Canal.6u9 
The decision not to continue the offensive after taking the initial bridgehead 
has also been a reason for heated disputes after the war. After Sharon's 
crossing, the Southern Command and General Headquarters gave orders to 
cease all crossing activities. This was a consequence of the difficulties in 
opening the Akavish Road to the crossing site for the pre-constructed bridges 
as well as of keeping it open for supplies. From Sharon's viewpoint, the 
decision not to continue was a waste of the use of success, as he says in his 
autobiography: "Rather than exploiting surprise we were forced to wait." At this 
time, however, Sharon's attention was already on the west bank of the Canal. 
This aggravated the situation on the east bank. Therefore, Adan's forces were 
also committed to keep open the access to the Canal. In this situation, Sharon 
suggested that the plan be changed to let him continue while Adan kept the 
corridor open. However, changes were not made. The danger of being cut off 
by increasing the force in the bridgehead and continuing the crossing, and by 
taking care of supplies without the bridges did not result in an optimistic 
estimate of the future. In this light, the supreme command's decision to wait is 
understandable.61°  
It took one day and two nights for the Egyptians to realise the extent of the 
Israeli crossing. After that, the crossing site came under heavy artillery fire and 
aerial attack. It is easy to say that the Israelis lost the best possibilities 
provided by the initial surprise. However, the realities of the situation were as 
described in the previous paragraph. Christopher Bellamy estimates that if the 
Egyptians had launched a counterattack on the west bank at this time, there is 
no doubt that the Israeli forward detachment would have been wiped out. This 
might well have been true. Mohammed Heikal reveals that the Egyptians had a 
plan called "Plan 200" to deal with Israeli penetration of the west bank and one 
of the three estimated crossing places was near Deversoir, i.e., exactly where 
the Israelis crossed the Canal. Why the plan was not implemented remains 
unclear, but it seems that there were miscalculations of Israeli intentions as 
well as communication problems.611  
609 Gawrych (1996), p. 60, 62, 65 and 72, Dupuy (1975), P. 55 and Herzog (1975), p. 220. 
According to Dupuy, the Egyptians had, at the time of the Israeli crossing, one and half 
armoured divisions, one or two mechanised divisions, at least two reserve infantry divisions 
and a number of independent armoured. mechanised and infantry formations between the 
Suez Canal and Cairo. There are fewer forces on Gawrych's map. It is probable that there 
were several divisions in this area at the time. However, it is obvious that these reserve 
formations were not in a state of immediate readiness and were also qualitatively weaker 
than those divisions on the eastern side of the Canal. 
610 Sharon, pi 317 — 318 and 322, Herzog (1975), p. 227, Aker, p. 107 — 109 and Schiff 
(October Earthquake), p. 247 and 249. 
6" Bellamy, p. 115 and O'Ballance (1997), p. 242. 
O'Ballance explains that the defence on the west bank was left to foreign troops who were 
only lightly armed. This does not, however, explain why news of the Israeli penetration 
between the two Egyptian armies on the east bank took so long time. The explanation can 
be found in the interpretations of the situation and in the chain of command. 
See also Barclay, p. 47. 
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On the morning of 18 October, the Israelis were able to continue their plan. 
At this stage, the aim of quick and decisive victory was not, according to 
Gawrych, any more acute and, as a matter of fact, it took a further five days for 
the Israelis to push some 100 kilometres southward, encircle Suez City and cut 
the lines of communication of the Egyptian Third Army. Despite the fact that 
the Israelis were able to make a gap in the Egyptian air defence network and 
use the IAF, the last phase of the war was not a lightning war, as Doctor 
Gawrych points out. The reasons for this were many. The most important is 
obviously the lost momentum, during the 36 hour hesitation the Egyptians 
were able to at least tolerably organise their defence. Secondly, the Egyptians 
were more motivated and better trained in this war, especially the officer corps 
and were able to continue fighting, even when surrounded. Finally, the ever-
lasting disputes over operational decisions in the Southern Command were 
apparently also sub-reasons for the delays. Pondering whether or not to 
continue against the lines of communications of the Egyptian Second Army in 
the north or the Third Army in the south caused diversions from the original 
plan to move south. Although the main effort was eventually made in the 
south, the strength used was less than originally planned and time was wasted 
as well. Nevertheless, on 23 October the IDF has encircled the southern 
Egyptian army and the next day the cease-fire became effective.612 
The daring Canal crossing operation shows clearly that the doctrine of the 
IDF had not changed. In addition, it is interesting to discover how the Israeli 
plan coincides with the "Strategy of Indirect Approach" and the theory of 
manoeuvre warfare. By taking a controlled risk and by allowing the Egyptians 
to attack first, the Israelis "moved the giant", i.e., they forced the Egyptians out 
from under their air defence umbrella into mobile warfare, where the Israelis 
excelled and their opponents did not. This phase was then followed by a deep 
thrust through the Egyptian weak point and against their vulnerable rear. In 
addition, at the strategic level of warfare, the aim of seeking a decisive victory 
also reflects the strategy of the denial approach. A military victory would have 
returned deterrence power to the IDF. 
11.4. The Air Force in the missile era 
The Israeli Air Force was prepared — according to its existing doctrine — to 
implement a pre-emptive air strike against enemy air bases and air-defence 
targets in order to gain aerial superiority, which was a prerequisite to 
supporting the ground forces. On the morning of 6 October, Commander-in-
Chief of the Israeli Air Force, Major General Beniyamin Peled was informed by 
Chief of Staff, General Elazar that Syria and Egypt intended to attack at sunset 
on the same day. After a short discussion it was decided that the IAF should 
prepare a pre-emptive strike against the Syrian missile batteries at noon. This 
was, according to Cohen, a deviation from the existing "Scratch" plan, which 
gave priority to the Egyptian front. The new plan was also, however, cancelled 
According to Barclay, the Egyptians considered the initial Israeli crossing nothing more than 
a hit-and-run commando-type raid, like the Israelis had implemented during the War of 
Attrition. 
612 Gawrych (1996), p. 65 and 68 and Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 258. 
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for political reasons and the IAF was ordered to engage in intercept missions. 
This quick change caused confusion in the IAF staff and squadrons, and 
delays in the implementation because of the need to re-arm the planes for the 
new tasks. The doctrinal demand of aerial supremacy as a backdrop for mobile 
ground operations — the main task of the IAF — became a dead letter until the 
counter-offensive phase and even then the IAF only partly dominated the 
skies.613 
The Egyptian and Syrian plans for their air forces and air defence systems 
were defensive — excluding the initial aerial bombardments and several 
occasional minor strikes later during the war. The reluctance to commit their air 
forces in full was obviously derived from the experiences of the past wars. 
Israel's superiority in the air was acknowledged. Because of this, the Israeli air 
defence was not severely tested during the war. Therefore, knowing their 
deficiencies and the Israeli tendency to use their air force as "flying artillery", 
the Arabs made, according to General Ghazala, a decision to challenge the 
IAF with a massive ground-based air defence network that could give cover to 
ground operations and deny the Israelis reconnaissance flights. This overall 
decision was a realistic one, it aimed to cause the IAF loss of life and planes 
that would have been unacceptable to Israel, as Doctor Gissin writes. 
However, the trust in land-based air defence restricted the use of their own air 
forces as well. Missions had to be planned beforehand and while this 
shortcoming was not a decisive one because of the adopted doctrine, both the 
613 Dougherty, Stanley J: Defense Suppression. Building Some Operational Concepts, 
School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University Press, Alabama 1992, p. 14, Williams 
(1989), p. 117 and Cohen, p. 322, 352 — 354 and 358. 
According to Cohen, weather conditions were also unfavourable for the pre-emptive air 
strike, but obviously this was not a decisive factor behind the decision against the air-strike. 
In addition, the IAF lacked knowledge of the precise locations of Arab missile batteries. This 
also shows the belief that a war was not very probable. 
See also Aker, p. 48, O'Ballance (1997), p. 289 — 290 and Rubinstein & Murray, p. 128 -
129. 
Aker states, that the Egyptian aircraft were hidden underground or in combat-ready concrete 
hangars to avoid an open invitation to destruction by the IAF. Destruction similar to that of 
1967 was therefore impossible. This was known within the IAF and was obviously one 
reason to refrain from using the pre-emptive air strike. 
Rubinstein and Murray state that after the war both Benyamin Peled and Ezer Weizman 
criticised the decision to cancel the original plans. They both preferred air defence 
suppression operations and in this context knocking out the missiles should have been given 
a higher priority. 
According to O'Ballance, President Sadat said in an interview with The Times, 4 June 1976 
that: "Israel has air supremacy, not superiority, it is true", which can be interpreted as saying 
that the IAF didn't dominate the skies during the Yom Kippur War. 
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Egyptian and the Syrian air-defences made many friendly kills during the 
war.614 
The Egyptian missile batteries were placed in a mosaic — like the North 
Vietnamese system around Hanoi during the Vietnam War — in the area of the 
west bank of the Suez Canal to offer mutual defence. This network was 
complemented with hundreds of anti-aircraft guns. The Sa-2s launchers, 
effective at medium and high altitude, were protected by Sa-3s, which were 
effective at low and medium altitude. Anti-aircraft artillery reinforced this 
network by giving cover against hedgehop bombing. This concept gave cover 
at all flight altitudes and extended up to 30 kilometres into the depth of the 
Sinai. It fulfilled its requirement to support the bridgeheads well. In addition, 
this stable network on the west bank was intended to be reinforced with mobile 
Sa-6s and Sa-7s that were supposed to be placed in the bridgeheads, 
including mobile radar to detect incoming flights. The Israelis had experience 
with the Sa-2 and Sa-3 missiles from the War of Attrition and the existence of 
the Sa-6s and Sa-7s was also known, but the effectiveness of the Sa-6s, and 
the large number of Sa-7s, plus the jamming resistance of the new radar 
systems were not.615 
614 Rodwell, Robert R: The Mideast War: "A Damned Close-run Thing", Selected Readings 
on the Yom Kippur War, United States Army, Institute for Military Assistance, August 1975, 
p. 68 (original text in Air Force Magazine in February 1974), Ghazala, Mohamed Abdel 
Halim Abou: The Suez Crossing, an interview with Major General Mohamed Abdel Halim 
Abou Ghazala, Military Review, November 1979, p. 5, Gissin, p. 100 and Cordesman & 
Wagner, p. 86 and 90. 
General Ghazala, who commanded the arlillery forces of the Egyptian Second Army during 
the Yom Kippur War, speaks of the Egyptian plans in the interview. Sources on the Syrian 
plans have not been made available. However, Syrian weapons, tactics and action during 
the war were similar to the Egyptiansi Therefore, it can be supposed that their plans were 
parallel to the Egyptian ones. 
According to Gissin, the possibility of downing a large number of friendly aircraft was a 
calculated risk that goes back to the Soviet advisers. 
Cordesman and Wagner count that a total of 58 Arab planes were downed by own air 
defence. 
615 Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 253, Cordesman & Wagner, p. 74, Aker, p. 27 and 80 
and Nikunen, Heikki ja Lappi, Ahti: Ilma-aseen kaytto ja ilmatorjunta Vietnamin ja Lahi-idan 
sodissa, Ilmatorjunnan vuosikirja 1975 — 1976 (The use of the Air Arm and Air Defence 
during the Vietnam and Middle-East Wars, the Finnish Air Defence Yearbook 1975 — 1976) 
p. 184 — 185 and 190. 
See also O'Ballance (1997), p. 41, Dougherly, p. 14, Cohen, p. 368 and Dupuy (1992), p. 
608. 
According to O'Ballance, the Syrians had wanted to use their Sa-6s in an air battle that 
occurred in Syrian airspace between the Israelis and the Syrians some one month before 
the war. The Soviet advisers suggested avoiding this because the Israelis would have been 
prematurely alerted to the effectiveness of this new weapon. 
According to Dougherty, the Egyptians had 63 missile batteries of 4 — 6 launchers each (25 
Sa-2s, 20 Sa-3-s, 17 Sa-6s). Dougherly bases his numbers on a ground report of the U.S. 
Military Equipment Validation Team, which made a tour of Israel between 28 October — 8 
November 1973. According to Cohen, the Egyptians had 70 batteries. If we use Dougherly's 
formula to count the batteries, the numbers shown by Dupuy are larger, as is typical of those 
studies made soon after the war. It seems that Dupuy and others who present larger 
numbers of missiles have counted all the pre-war inventories, including those deployed 
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The Syrian air defence system was quite similar to the Egyptian one. 
Nevertheless, the concept of deploying the launchers deviated slightly from the 
Egyptian because the fixed launchers were somewhat further from the front. 
According to Cohen, the front line was protected by sophisticated Sa-6 
missiles. This part of the system, reinforced with shoulder-fired Sa-7s and anti-
aircraft guns, was mobile. The static second and third lines of Sa-2s and Sa-3s 
were deployed more deeply in Syrian territory. This concept, like their allies' 
one along the Canal line, also provided cover at all levels of the skies.616 
Although the 1967 cease-fire lines had given the IDF and IAF more room for 
manoeuvre, flight distances to targets had lengthened and the supply lines that 
needed to be protected were much longer than before. In the Yom Kippur War, 
when Israel faced a two-front assault, this meant that IDF General 
Headquarters had to divide the IAF's strength in two, which later meant losing 
the advantage of concentration during the first two days of the war. 
Anticipating this dilemma, General Headquarters established a new system, a 
forward command post of the IAF under the command of the former IAF 
Commander-in-Chief, Major General (ret.) Mordechai Hod, in the Northern 
Command as early as 6 October. The main aim of this arrangement was, 
according to Cohen, to relieve the IAF's Main Control Centre of tactical 
engagement in the war, though he hints that the creation of this system was 
also done to pacify the ground forces. In practice, this meant that decision-
making in joint operations was delegated below the General Staff level for the 
first time. The forward command post had the authority to use the IAF 
according to its needs. Experiences of the system were obviously good 
because, when the Golan front was stabilised, General Hod went south to 
establish a forward command post for the Southern Command as well.617 
In practice, the Air Force ground support was almost all the Israelis had to 
help their ground forces until the mobilisation was concluded. This was a costly 
action and difficult to co-ordinate. According to Cordesman and Wagner, the 
IAF was neither trained nor had the command system to allocate sorties, 
analyse losses or manage air battle. Therefore, the creation of the forward 
command post can also be seen as coming from these problems. However, 
the IAF did well in the intercept missions in Israel's airspace and Israel proper 
was not seriously threatened after the initial air strikes. By contrast, there was 
no question of any aerial supremacy over the area of the front during the first 
days of the war and Arab air strikes were not rare. This would confirm 
Kahalani's account when he recalls the events of the 7 October as follows: 
inside Egypt and Syria. In addition, in some statistics the Sa-7s, counted in the same 
category, confuse these figuresi 
616 Cohen, p. 351 and 387 and Nikunen & Lappi, p. 190. 
The number of Syrian batteries was supposedly between 30 and 40, of which some 10 were 
Sa-6s. According to Cohen, the precise number was 31. 
617 
van Creveld (1998), p. 233, Cohen, p. 326, 349 and 400 and Williams (1989), p. 117. 
Cohen also mentions that Regional (air defence) Control Centres were already in existence 
before the war. However, they were obviously aimed more at surveillance than leading the 
use of airpower in wartime. 
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We had always been promised that the Air Force would take care of the sky, 
but we hadn't seen them for two days."618 
At noon on 7 October, the focus of the IAF was put on the Golan front, 
although at the time the IAF was, according to Cohen, still prepared to attack 
the Egyptian missiles along the Suez Canal. Van Creveld writes that at this 
phase — and connected to it the establishment of the IAF forward command 
post on the Golan — the IAF was divided in two. In the chain of command, this 
can be interpreted along van Creveld's lines. The forward command post took 
responsibility for aerial support on the Golan while the IAF staff took care of 
the Egyptian front. Instead, the flight capacity of the IAF was not divided, at 
least not fifty-fifty. In south the IAF reduced its flight intensity while the bulk of 
the capacity of the IAF was given to the Syrian front.619 
The new plan, "Dugman 5' as Cohen calls it, was aimed at destroying the 
Syrian air defence missiles. The decision to switch to suppression of the air 
defence was made when the ground support was countered by forward air 
defences. The change, however, caused confusion similar to the earlier 
change from pre-emption to interception, maybe even more so because the 
locations of the Syrian missile sites were still less well known than the 
Egyptian ones. According to Cohen, of the 31 missile batteries only three 
active ones were identified and only one was destroyed while another was 
damaged. Six Phantoms were lost and the result was that no attempt to launch 
another all-out operation was made again during the war. However, although 
the decision to change the IAF's missions and the priority between the fronts 
has been a disputed issue since the war, in the light of statistics it is highly 
dubious that the IAF would had performed better using the original plans. 
According to van Creveld, the IAF lost almost one hundred aircraft destroyed 
or damaged between 6 and 9 October; i.e., more than one fifth of its pre-war 
strength. These numbers, originally presented by Major General Beniyamin 
Peled in a lecture in January 1988, show that had it been sustained the IAF 
would quickly have reached the point where it could no longer have been able 
to guarantee air superiority even over Israeli territory.620 
Dougherty states that the shortage of electronic counter-measure (ECM) 
equipment — both in quantity and quality — poor tactics and improved jam 
resistant surface-to-air missiles contributed to the high attrition rate of the IAF. 
618 Cordesman & Wagner, p. 92 and Kahalani (1984), p. 71. 
See also Asher & Hammel, p. 82 and Schiff (October Earthquake), 57. 
To compensate for the lack of forward air support controllers, the IDF used different means; 
for example, patrols that marked targets beforehand at night. This dangerous action was 
often a waste of time and illustrates well the problems in close-air-support because of the 
instability of the tactical battlefield. 
619 
van Creveld (1998), p. 233 and Cohen, p. 352. 
620 Cohen, pp. 353 — 354 and 362, Cordesman & Wagner, p. 82, Schiff (October 
Earthquake), p. 48 and van Creveld (1998), pp. 240 — 241. 
Cohen mentions that on the morning of 12 October, General Peled stated that the erosion 
rate of the IAF would reduce his ability to protect the nation's skies within several days if 
there was no change along the front. After some time the pilots learned to live with the Arab 
missiles, and the rate of losses began to decrease. At this phase, deliveries from U.S. 
storage made up for the plane losses. 
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Therefore, instead of progressing with the proper equipment, the IAF was 
forced to seek tactical and technical methods of tricking missile batteries, but 
with slight results. Because of the fear of losses — and there were plenty of 
those — the efficacy of the missiles forced the Israelis to fly at a very low 
altitude, i.e., within the range of anti-aircraft guns. This was also very costly, 
according to both Cordesman and Wagner and Gissin, some 40 percent of 
Israel's aircraft losses (of the total losses attributed to ground defences) were 
due to anti-aircraft artillery. Nevertheless, despite the losses quite many of the 
IAF's pilots shared, according to Cohen, the view that the missile network 
could have been completely demolished if the IAF had mobilised all its attack 
and airborne capabilities for two days. The losses during the first days of the 
war argue otherwise. At this time the technical and tactical methods, in 
addition to the shortage of intelligence information on the mobile missile 
batteries, would obviously not have been enough to neutralise the enemy 
ground-based air defence systems. According to Cordesman and Wagner, 
Israeli pilots were not trained to use ECM equipment. This was revealed in the 
tactics that the IAF used during the early days of the war; rather than overflying 
the missile sites directly, the pilots flied around the edges. This shows a 
mistrust in and ignorance of the equipment.621  
Like the ground forces' commanders, their IAF colleagues were also quick 
to learn from their mistakes. Despite the early setbacks, General Peled 
continued to believe that the IAF had to continue to give priority to the Syrian 
front. Instead of still trying to achieve aerial supremacy, Peled now argued that 
interdiction; i.e., destruction of the enemy's ground forces before they could 
reach the battlefield, should be the IAF's primary mission. On the evening of 7 
October, when larger reserve forces reached southern Golan, the method of 
trying to provide close support and tactical interdiction was changed. It is 
obvious that at this stage the possibility of threatening the Syrian southern 
flank by accessing the battlefield via the northern valley route had also 
occurred to the Israelis. This provided an opportunity to extend the battlefield 
into the Syrian depth, to disrupt the momentum of enemy troops that had not 
yet engaged in battle, to destroy the integrity of the enemy's operational 
scheme and to take the initiative. All this can be compared to the principal 
aims of manoeuvre warfare. From 7 October onwards, the IAF concentrated 
on interdicting the commitment of the Syrian reserves, leaving the tasks of 
621  Dougherly, p. 14, Cordesman & Wagner, p. 74 and 83 and Gissin, p. 139 and Cohen, pp. 
388 — 389. 
According to Dougherty, the IAF had only 161 ECM pods and 30 radar-homing and warning 
sets available in 1973. 
See also O'Ballance (1997), p. 289. 
According to O'Ballance, the United States also had more recent ECM equipment that was 
not delivered to Israel. It is not known if this equipment was effective against Sa-6si Neither 
were Lance ground-to-ground missiles, which would have been effective against the missile 
sites, in Israeli use. 
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offensive counter-air, close-air-support and suppression of the Syrian air 
defence system in second place.622 
From 9 October onwards, during the counter-offensive, targets in the Syrian 
rear — airfields, power plants, oil refineries, military command posts — were 
included in the target lists as well. Primarily the extension of the target list 
resulted from Syrian launching of ground-to-ground missiles against an Israeli 
air base, but basically the aim was more than that. According to Cohen, the 
attacks were intended to carry a double message: firstly, they were to inflict a 
physical blow that would disrupt the Syrian war effort, at least for a while, and 
secondly, the message was a psychological threat. In addition to the ground 
forces' offensive towards Damascus, the air strikes also showed that no place 
on Syrian soil was out of the range of the IDF. On the whole the decision to 
extend the war into Syria proper was a significant one and was influential both 
at the operational and strategic levels of warfare. Already after two days of 
fighting the Israelis aimed both to undermine the opponent's strength and to 
lessen the Syrian long-term war capacity. In a way the strikes against the 
airfields also showed a return to the pursuit of aerial supremacy, at least the 
Syrians were forced to allocate additional aircraft to protect the airfields. In 
addition, the air strikes against the Syrian Central Command and Air Force 
Headquarters showed the application of the "Strategy of Indirect Approach". In 
manoeuvre warfare theory this is called dislocation. The Israelis had been able 
to reveal the weak point of the Syrians and concentrate their efforts on this.623 
During the counter-offensive on the Golan front the IAF continued to attack 
individual missile batteries. Although the results were not decisive in terms of 
numbers — during the war only three batteries were destroyed and five 
damaged — this was a major portion of the mobile batteries that protected the 
Syrian ground forces and certainly influenced the ground battles. At this stage 
the IAF had also found tactical and technical means to avoid and destroy the 
missiles. The older models of surface-to-air missiles were jammed routinely 
with chaff from transports and helicopters. Evasive manoeuvring was also 
622 Cohen, p. 400, O'Ballance (1997), p. 137, Dougherty, p. 15 and Gissin, pp. 418 — 419. 
After the war, according to Gissin, the concept of ground support was changed. In close-air-
support the IAF was to engage the targets at no closer than some five miles behind the front 
line. The area between this line and the front line became the responsibility of artillery. 
See also Aker, p. 24 — 25 and Cohen, p. 360. 
According to Aker, the Israeli pilots began to attack from over Jordanian territory, skimming 
in a low, northward curve, they hugged the ground contours until they burst over the Golan 
plateau, achieving a flanking approach to the Syrian armour and then departed toward 
Lebanon and the Mediterranean. 
623 Dougherty, p. 15, van Creveld (1998), pp. 240 — 241, Cohen, pp. 352 and 357 — 358 and 
Cordesman & Wagner, pp. 82 and 92 - 93. 
The role of Frog ground-to-ground missiles during the war was not a decisive one. 
Cordesman and Wagner state that it was more the massive integrated air defence net of 
older Sa-2 and So-3s than the mobile Sa-6s and ZSU-23-4s that forced the IAF to 
concentrate on the suppression of the air defence in the rear areas. This also shows the still 
prevailing pursuit of aerial superiority. 
See also O'Ballance (1997), p. 285. 
According to O'Ballance, the Syrian air defence network had been placed on the Damascus 
Plain, leaving the rear areas open to air strikes. This eased the IAF's task. Nevertheless, 
according to Cohen, up to Damascus the road was full of air defence weapons. 
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used. The Sa-6s were different, but the Israelis were also able to reveal 
several weaknesses in this system. An American air defence specialist, 
William O. Staudenmaier, states that although the target indication radar of the 
Sa-6 launchers was mostly immune to the chaff spread by the Israelis, at that 
time the Sa-6s were dependent on Sa-4 long track radar for altitude 
discrimination and early warning information. The Soviets had not, however, 
delivered the latter radar to the Middle East at that time. This meant that the 
Sa-6s could be blinded at a high altitude because the weapons launch 
trajectory for maximum acceleration was low. The Israelis discovered this 
during the war and changed their approach; they began to use high and steep 
attack profiles to destroy the launchers. In addition, later during the war on the 
Egyptian front the Israelis were also able to reveal deficiencies in the 
frequency ranges of the Sa-6 launchers, which used radio links for 
communication instead of land wires and were therefore vulnerable to 
electronic warfare attacks.624 
Even during the counter-offensive on the Golan Heights, the IAF continued 
to interdict the Egyptians by destroying the Egyptian bridges that crossed the 
Suez Canal. Although this effort was, at this stage, done on a lesser scale than 
in the north, the IAF was capable of destroying numerous bridges, some of 
them dummies, but the Egyptians had the capacity to construct them over and 
over again. This job was also a costly action for the IAF. When the IAF's 
priority was transferred to the Sinai, the above mentioned deficiencies, which 
also existed in the Egyptian air defence network, were mostly revealed. This 
made several technical modifications and improvements in the IAF's tactics 
possible even before the suppression of the air defence began. 
As on the Golan, the Israelis also used the contours of the terrain on the 
Egyptian front, in this case the possibility of approaching the Egyptian left flank 
by skimming in at sea level. On the morning following the start of the Israeli 
crossing, a methodical attack on the Egyptian missile batteries from Qantara to 
Suez began. In these repeated waves of strikes, the missile system was 
paralysed and on 18 October the IAF achieved, according to Schiff, aerial 
supremacy in the area, which obviously meant — not total aerial superiority -
but aerial supremacy in the area of ground operations. According to Cohen, a 
total of 43 missile batteries were destroyed or damaged. In these attacks the 
IAF used not only conventional bombing, but also anti-radar missiles, 
television guided missiles and bombs plus ECM. Although this new weaponry 
624 Cohen, p. 354, Cordesman & Wagner, pp. 83 — 84, Staudenmaier, William O: Learning 
from the Middle East War, An Arab Perspective of the October War, Selected Readings on 
the Yom Kippur War, United States Army, Institute for Military Assistance, August 1975, p. 
40 (original text in Air Defense Trends in April-June 1975), Rodwell, p. 67 and Aker, p. 50. 
See also Cohen, p. 390 and Coleman, Herbert J: Israeli Air Force Decisive in War, Aviation 
Week and Space Technology, December 3, 1973, p. 49. 
Cohen states that one reason for the IAF's ability to learn to live with the missiles was two 
American Jewish pilots who volunteered for the IAF and provided their experience from the 
Vietnam War. No information on other foreign volunteer pilots has ever been revealed, 
despite hintsi Rather, American pilots flew plane reinforcements to Israel, but they had no 
role in the battles. 
According to Coleman, several Syrian missile batteries were redeployed from the Golan 
Heights to around Damascus. 
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was obviously not revolutionary, it made the IAF attacks both more lethal and 
gave them more survivability.62 
On 17 October, IDF ground forces were able to cut a hole in the Egyptian air 
defence network and later the armoured spearheads continued to carve still 
more missile-free air corridors into the Egyptian depth. This was a decisive 
achievement. According to Cordesman and Wagner, the full suppression of 
the Egyptian air defence would not been possible without the support of the 
ground forces. This is why Gissin tends to see that the traditional definition of 
close support — with the air force taking the lead — reversed itself during the 
Yom Kippur War, or at least there was interaction when the IDF ground forces 
paved the way for air operations. The armoured formations and artillery 
destroyed 11 batteries. Although this was only 1/3 of what the IAF destroyed, 
most of the missiles destroyed by the ground forces were Sa-6s that were 
situated in the central area of further Israeli operations. The holes in the 
missile belt enabled relatively safe ground support.626 
The performance of the IAF during the Yom Kippur War is often criticised. 
True, there were weaknesses in the action of the Air Force, although many of 
them resulted from factors that they were beyond the IAF's control. However, 
some seem to originate in the general belief in Israel's military superiority after 
the Six Day War. The most important of the IAF's deficiencies were its lack of 
a tactical intelligence system in a hostile environment and an inadequate 
command, control and communication system to deal with intelligence 
information and get target priorities right, plus inadequate interoperability with 
the ground forces.627 
Nevertheless, the IAF quite successfully applied the principle of "Optional 
Control" in the command system, in contrast to the ground forces. Gissin calls 
this "A Single Manager with Positive/Optional Control Capabilities". In this 
625 Aker, pp. 37 — 38, Cohen, p. 368 and 390, Cordesman & Wagner, pp. 83 — 85, Nikunen 
& Lappi, p. 191 and Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 253 and 284. 
The IAF used at least the American-made Shrike anti-radar missiles and Maverick, 
Rockeye, Walleye and Hobos television guided assault missiles and bombsi 
According to Schiff, only eight of the Egyptian missile batteries remained on 22 Octoberi 
626 Gissin, p. 118, Cohen, p. 368, Aker, p. 113 and O'Ballance (1997), ppi 248 — 249 and 
303. 
According to O'Ballance, most of the So-6s were knocked out by artillery hitting their 
antennas. 
See also Dougherty, p. 15. 
According to Dougherly, the IAF flew almost 2,300 sorties on the Egyptian front between the 
start of the crossing and the cease-fire, but lost only four planes. Before the crossing the 
numbers were some 3,200 sorties and 38 lossesi This tells something of the new efficiency 
of the IAF. 
627 
van Creveld (1998), p. 277 and Gissin, pp. 414 — 415. 
According to Gissin, the rather slow rate of recovery was also one of the weaknesses. 
Later after the war the introduction of remotely piloted vehicles (RPV) — miniature 
aeroplanes equipped with intelligence devices — was one solution to the intelligence problem 
in a hostile environment. 
See also Weizman, p. 290. 
Just before the war, General Ezer Weizman stated that the IAF was prepared for battle but 
not for war. 
287 
concept all air defence components — radar stations both in the air and on the 
ground, surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft artillery and all combat aircraft -
were under the direct command of the IAF commander for the first time. 
Despite the seemingly centralised command, this application of "Optional 
Control" made possible the allocation of resources in a flexible manner, and a 
switch from centralised command to a decentralised one, if necessary. The 
creation of the forward command posts can be seen exactly in this light and 
has strong similarities to the command principles of the ground forces that 
were created to master the time-space problem and maintain the initiative. 
Therefore, the origin of the IAF command system can also be seen in the 
concept of "few against many". In the IAF, this meant flexible command at the 
strategic level that trusted at the tactical level in small formations, pilots' skills 
and initiative more than in large combinations where problems of co-ordination 
would have limited individual initiative. However, the control and concentration 
of force at the operational level came true every time when operational tasks 
between counter-air missions, close-air-support, interdiction and strategic 
bombing were changed. Although the IAF did not mass flights against enemy 
targets, it did use continuous waves of small formations that — according to the 
principle of appreciation of the situation — was, in this war as in the Six Day 
War, a more effective and economic means.628 
According to Cordesman and Wagner and Cohen, during the war the Israeli 
Air Force flew 11,200 sorties of which 8,400 were against Egyptian targets. 
This clearly shows that the main effort of the IAF was (despite the fact that the 
priority was first given to the Golan front for several days) on the Egyptian 
front, as it had also been during the Six Day War. Of these 11,200 flights the 
IAF lost, according to Cordesman and Wagner, 109 fighters and six 
helicopters, meaning a loss-rate of 1 percent, which is not much when 
compared to the intensity of the battles. The majority of the losses were 
attributed to ground-based air defence. The number of IAF planes downed in 
air-to-air combat varies from Cohen's 6 to Dupuy's and Cordesman's and 
Wagner's 21. Correspondingly, the Arabs lost 230 combat aircraft and 55 
helicopters in air-to-air battles. That constitutes 65 percent of the total of their 
losses. This shows the superiority of the IAF in counter-air tasks. In addition, 
when the number of missiles launched by the Arabs, about 2,000 — 3,000 Sa-
2/3/6s and some 5,000 Sa-7s according to Cordesman and Wagner, is 
compared to the kills, the ground-based Arab air defence was also inefficient. 
Only some 60 percent of the kills were attributed to surface-to-air missiles. 
However, the IAF lost nearly 20 percent of its planes. In the long-term — and 
without reinforcements — this would have been a serious problem for the 
IAF.629 
628 Gissin, pp. 108 — 110, 120, 127, 376, 379, 385 — 386 and 422. 
As during the Six Day War, the IAF sought flexibility and a quick response to the changing 
conditions in this war by having the pilots leaving on missions briefed by those who had just 
returned. 
629 Cordesman & Wagner, pp. 73 — 74, 80, 82, 86 and 90, Cohen, p. 390, Rubinstein & 
Murray, p. 128, Aker, pp. 51 — 52 and Dupuy (1992), p. 609. 
Cordesman and Wagner state that the Israelis also had superior air-to-air missiles, 
Sidewinders and Shafrirs. 
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Handel estimates that the IAF discovered that attacking the Egyptian and 
Syrian airfields was costly and ineffective while the defensive interception of 
Egyptian and Syrian aircraft allowed the Israelis to hit both the aircraft and their 
less easily replaceable pilots.63° However, this statement does not consider the 
fact that if the Arab air defence installations — including airbases and planes -
had not been suppressed, the Arab air force would have remained a potential 
threat. This would have been against the IAF's doctrine. The lack of aerial 
supremacy would have complicated the ground force operations on both fronts 
and, in addition, the possibility of air strikes in the Israel proper would also 
have remained. Besides, only in defensive tasks would the IAF have been 
used below its performance level, especially because the Arabs were, 
excluding the first days of the war, rather passive in the air. Therefore, relying 
purely on statistics that show that the main part of the Arab air forces was 
destroyed in air-to-air battles is misleading. Without the offensive action of the 
IAF this result — the neutralisation of the Arab air defence and airpower -
would not have been possible. 
11.5. The Israeli Navy — a dream fulfilled 
The naval strategies of Egypt, Syria and Israel during the Yom Kippur War 
were different and this explains why battles in the naval theatre were not 
decisive for the final results of the war. Despite the fact that the Israeli Navy 
had fulfilled its modernisation plans on the eve of the war, its open sea 
capability had not been developed. In the short war concept this was seen as 
secondary and therefore the emphasis was put on developing an effective 
force for battles in the coastal waters. With the introduction of the new missile 
boats, the Israeli Navy became a highly offensive tactical force that, though 
inferior in strength, was able to compensate for this deficiency with technical 
and tactical superiority. Ideologically, this was parallel to the ground forces and 
the Air Force; the principal aim was to take advantage of enemy weaknesses. 
In practise the Navy was, because of the pre-war development programme 
and training, better prepared for modern warfare in the missile era than the 
other services of the IDF. As a matter of fact, Israel was the first state that 
based her naval defence on sea-to-sea missiles. In addition, the Navy was 
better trained for joint operations with the Air Force than the ground forces 
were. 
The mission of the Israeli Navy was to defend the sea frontier and prevent it 
from becoming another battlefront. This task was to be implemented with 
According to Dupuy, the IAF downed 287 Arab planes in air-to-air combat, of which 55 were 
helicopters. Ground based air defence was responsible of 36 kills, 66 were miscellaneous or 
unknown and 58 were downed by friendly fire, for a total of 447 planes. 
See also Gissin, p. 151. 
According to Gissin and also Cordesman and Wagner, the loss ratio had been 4 percent 
during the Six Day War. However, this lasted only the first day. Even in the worst day of the 
Yom Kippur War, the loss-rate was below the 1967 value, some 3 percent. 
63° Handel (1994), p. 575. 
See also Barclay, p. 46. 
According to Barclay, the Egyptians had only one and a half trained pilot for every aircraft 
while the Israelis had four or five per plane. 
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offensive tactics; the Israeli Navy was to confront the Arab navies immediately 
when they moved to conduct bombardments on Israeli targets. The main 
emphasis of the Israelis was put on the Mediterranean Sea; in the Red Sea 
Israel had no missile boats. However, in the Gulf of Suez Israel also had 
several naval units, chiefly patrol boats and naval commandos. Despite the 
small size of this force, their doctrine was similar to that in the Mediterranean; 
to force the Egyptians onto defensive with offensive tactics. This concept 
proved the old concept of a "fleet in being" was still viable, the size of any force 
should never be underestimated. If there was just one vessel, it could still pose 
a threat. Nevertheless, the Israeli Red Sea force was helpless in the face of a 
blockade.631  
The Egyptian strategy was based on a naval blockade outside the range of 
the Israeli Air Force. This was not harmful in a short war from the Israeli point 
of view, but in the long-term it might have been because Israel had no mine-
sweepers and, according to Dupuy, the Egyptians were aware of this. 
Therefore, the strategy chosen was a realistic one. The Israelis enjoyed 
freedom of action in the inner waters. The Syrian strategy is more difficult to 
grasp. The Syrian Navy neither joined the naval blockade nor was very active 
in her coastal waters. Therefore it can be supposed that the Syrian naval 
strategy was mainly defensive and concentrated on protecting the coastal 
areas.6 2 
Despite the different strategies, several clashes did occur between the 
belligerent countries. Sources on the results of the naval powers and the 
statistics on ships sunk are contradictory but two facts are distinguishable; 
firstly, the Israeli missile boats were superior to the Arab vessels and secondly, 
the Egyptian naval blockade was very effective. According to Dupuy, the 
Egyptians claim that they were able to reduce the commercial traffic to Israel's 
Mediterranean harbours by more than 85 percent and to Eilat by 100 percent. 
As a matter of fact, there are some hints that the consumption and supply of oil 
were, in the latter part of the war, a serious problem for the Israelis. But in the 
clashes, the Israelis were able to sink some 15 Syrian and Egyptian vessels, 
including several missile boats, and obviously without major losses of their 
own. This shows the technical superiority of the Israeli made Gabriel sea-to-
sea missile over the Soviet-made Styx missile and also the up-to-date ECM 
systems of these boats. According to Dupuy and O'Ballance, the co-operation 
631  Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 167, Williams (1989), pp. 270 — 271, Cordesman & 
Wagner, pp. 107 — 108 and van Creveld (1998), p. 242. 
632 Dupuy (1992), p. 557, Cordesman & Wagner, pi 107 and O'Ballance (1997), pp. 307, 309 
and 312. 
According to Dupuy, the Egyptian supreme command was not very satisfied with this 
defensive strategy. This is revealed in an interview with Commander-in-Chief, Egyptian 
navy, Rear-Admiral Fuad Zukri conducted by O'Ballance. According to Zukri "in this war our 
navy was not offensive enough, it was not given any offensive mission." However, the 
decision to prefer the blockade was a realistic one. The efficiency of the IAF was well known 
and the Egyptians — as well as the Syrians — had little with which to cope with this threat at 
sea. 
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between the Israeli Navy and Air Force also proved to be effective, helicopters 
locating enemy boats and fighters giving cover.633 
The Israeli concept of using naval power offensively forced the Arabs to 
withdraw. From 14 October onwards, after two costly clashes with Israeli 
missile boats, the Syrian vessels stayed in their ports despite the fact that the 
Israeli Navy continued shelling Syrian targets occasionally, even up to the end 
of the war. The course of events were broadly similar on the Egyptian sea 
front. After the clashes between the Egyptian and Israeli missile boat off the 
Egyptian coast on the nights 8 — 9 and 11 — 12 October, the Egyptians also 
began to respect the efficacy of the Israeli Saar-class boats. Thereafter, 
according to Dupuy, the Egyptian Navy refused to challenge the Israelis except 
when they threatened important naval installations. The Egyptians were to 
some extent more active in the Red Sea naval theatre. Egyptian warships in 
this arena shelled Israeli installations in the Sinai and supported the ground 
operations with commando landings, but without distinguishing results. Rather, 
it was the Israelis that succeeded in this theatre as well. With similar tactics, 
though more intensive in scale, the Israeli torpedo and patrol boats forced the 
Egyptians to move their torpedo boats further back into harbours out of range 
of where the Israelis could take action.634 
According to Dupuy, the Egyptian defensive tactics frustrated the Israeli 
Navy's hopes of winning significant victories against Egypt. This seems logical. 
Although the efficacy of the Israeli Navy was tested and proved in the few sea 
clashes that occurred during the war, the passivity of the Egyptians — and the 
Syrians as well — inclined Israel to underestimate the naval strength of her 
enemies. Nevertheless, the Israeli Navy was the only one of the IDF's services 
that was able to fulfil its mission as it had been defined. Israeli success in the 
naval theatre gave them freedom of action in coastal waters, which later 
cancelled the threat against the sea flanks of the ground forces, as well as 
against the civilian targets in Israel proper. In this way it freed ground forces 
and the Air Force to concentrate on their main efforts. In addition, the tactics, 
technical applications of weapons and the use of ECM equipment were to 
show the direction for the development of naval warfare after the war — at least 
in coastal waters — and also elsewhere.635  
633 Cordesman & Wagner, pp. 18 and 105 — 106, Dupuy, pp. 559, 561 — 563 and 609, 
O'Ballance (1997), p. 316 and 322, The Military Balance 1973 — 1974, p. 33 and The Military 
Balance 1974 — 1975, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London September 
1974, p. 34. 
The statistics on ships sunk vary according to the sources. According to Cordesman and 
Wagner and Dupuy, the Egyptians lost 10 vessels, of which two were missile boats, and the 
Syrian lost five vessels, three of them missile boats. Israel lost one vessel that is not 
categorised. According to O'Ballance, the Israeli Navy lost at least two, perhaps three Saar-
class missile boats. However, according to Military Balance. in September 1974 Israel still 
had 12 Saar-class vessels. 
634 Dupuy (1992), pp. 559, 561 and 563 — 564, O'Ballance (1997), pp. 316 — 317 and Katz 
(1989), pp. 127 — 128. 
635 Dupuy (1992), p. 561 — 562 and 564. 
The complete supremacy of the Israeli Navy did not extend to Egyptian and Syrian waters 
because of the activity of the coastal artillery. 
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11.6. Assessment of the operational art 
When assessing the IDF's performance during the Yom Kippur War, five 
elements of warfare are picked above the others in the post-war evaluations. 
They are the strategy of "defensive defence", intelligence, pre-war planning, 
combined arms principles and the command system. The first two are linked to 
the strategic level. The weaknesses in strategic intelligence are widely known 
and admitted and the strategy of "defensive defence" is also acknowledged as 
having been too inflexible. However, there is less discussion of the importance 
of these two factors in the operational solutions. It seems that the main 
responsibility for failures on the battlefield have been put on the operational 
commanders' shoulders. 
When one is evaluating the results of the Yom Kippur War, simplifying, it 
can be said that Israel's strategy failed because the war broke out. Israel did 
not have the 48 hour time period that military intelligence had promised for an 
orderly call-up. This was a fatal error and, as a matter of fact, the Agranat 
Committee concluded in its report after the war that there were no grounds for 
such an absolute guarantee. In the intelligence community, estimates are 
always speculative, as General Ehud Barak says in his article Issues in 
Intelligence. Information is gathered from many factors, some of them in 
enemy hands, and can never be perfectly relied on. Such was also the case in 
October 1973 and when the situation was revealed, it was too late to mobilise. 
The pre-emptive air attack was also cancelled because of the international 
environment.636 
The strategic failure had implications for the IDF's operational echelons. 
During the early days of the war, the IDF hesitated over what to do, especially 
on the Sinai front. Hesitation, which was a consequence of a mixture of over-
confidence and a poor picture of the situation both at the strategic and 
operational levels, led to tactical set-backs on the Bar Lev Line that prevented 
effective counter-operations in the early phases of the war. First and foremost, 
it was the strategic decision to defend the Canal line that prevented the 
operational levels from acting according to the situation. According to Handel, 
the principle of "defensive defence", which he calls the "yield no inch" policy, 
meant forsaking even the possibility of mobile defence and manoeuvre.6 7 
Even so, mistakes were also made at the operational level both before and 
during the war, the most known of them the obsolete force structure when 
compared to the picture of warfare at the time and the failures in the command 
process during the war itself. In addition, the Israeli plans did not take enough 
636 Chorev, Moni: Surprise Attack. The Case of the Yom-Kippur War, the Industrial College 
of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington D.C. 1996, p. 4 
— 5 and 21 — 22. 
Ehud Barak's comments in Hebrew are cited in Offer and Kover (ed.): Intelligence and 
National Security, Barak, Ehud: Issue in Intelligence, p. 493. 
According to Chorev, three things seems to stand out from the rest in the background of the 
surprise: 1) The lack of direct evidence, which made it very difficult to assess the information 
correctly, 2) the persistence of preconceptions, even in the face of evidence and 3) the 
intelligence assessment affecting the operational concept and vice versa. 
637 Handel (1994), p. 573. 
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account of the wide varieties of chance for their own advantages in the Sinai. 
On the Golan Heights, the Israelis were surprised at the strategic level as well. 
However, despite the crushing inferiority in strength, the greater preparedness 
in an environment that was more suitable for "tank-defence" than that of the 
Sinai and the priority of support — including the IAF — led to early, though 
costly, success. The Israelis never totally lost their freedom of action on the 
Golan, even in the mobile tactical battles. 
11.6.1. Combined arms principle 
The deficiencies in the IDF's force structure, most significantly the lack of 
mechanised infantry trained to co-operate with tanks, the lack of foot infantry 
on the whole and the lack of artillery seriously limited the IDF's ability to fight 
throughout the operational depth. Jonathan House sees a similarity with the 
German force structure during WW II here: at first the Germans had organised 
mechanised infantry in their Panzer divisions, during the war they abandoned 
this structure. In Israel, this was done over the long-run. After the 1956 War, 
tanks and mechanised infantry were in balance in the organisations, but 
gradually up to the Yom Kippur War the percentage of mechanised infantry -
as well as foot infantry — was reduced. According to Gelber, this was done in 
light of the experiences of the Six Day War where the combination of armoured 
forces supported by the Air Force had proved to be successful. In any case, 
the tendency of favouring tanks and neglecting other arms went against the 
combat multiplication effect that is achieved when the various arms are 
synchronised in battle. During the Yom Kippur War, the lack of an integrated 
all-arms approach in the Israeli concept caused the loss of the synergistic 
combat multiplication, which occurs when someone presents an enemy with 
complementary efforts, especially in the enemy's depth beyond the forward 
lines of troops. That was the case when the IDF armoured units tried to push 
their way through the Egyptian bridgeheads to the Suez Canal.638 
Ariel Levite tends to hold that the IDF was a prisoner of its doctrine when it 
tried to transfer the battles to enemy territory. Defensive skills had been lost 
and premature counter-attacks led to heavy losses. True, the Israelis were 
victims of their doctrine, but it is too harsh to say that the operational doctrine 
was bad, it was just not used, as Doctor Shai puts it. Loefstedt has estimated 
that because of the underestimation of the combined arms principle, the result 
was that the campaigns were fought as close battles, which lengthened the 
campaigns and raised casualty rates. In other words, the IDF's organisational 
deficiencies did not enable doctrinal deep manoeuvres, instead, the lacks in 
arms synchronisation led to a war of attrition, especially in the Sinai. Because 
636 Investigating Committee of the Yom Kippur War; The Report, pi 1356, House, p. 179 and 
interviews of Professor, Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Yoav Gelber and Doctor, Colonel (ret.) 
Meir Pa'il. 
See also Cordesman & Wagner, p. 53, Dupuy (1992), p. 608, Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 368 
and The Military Balance 1973 — 1974, p. 33. 
In theory, Israel had almost two armoured vehicles for the infantry for each tank. However, 
only 1/8 of them were modern APCs capable of following the tanks. This was also the case 
with artillery pieces. Only a small minority were long-range self-propelled weapons. 
293 
of the previously mentioned facts, it is not fair to say that it was only the 
offensive tactical or operational principles that caused the set-backs during the 
first days of the war. Moreover, since the hastily assembled infantry lightened 
the burden of the tanks during the holding phase, the Israeli operational 
success rested on offensive doctrine after this and this tendency was also to 
remain after the war. But the link between organisations and doctrinal 
principles becomes clear in this context.639 
When comparing the application of the combined arms principle in the Sinai 
and on the Golan Heights, the differences are evident. Generalising, it can be 
said that on the whole the Israelis were more successful on the Syrian front 
than on the Egyptian front. There were several reasons for this. First, the IDF 
already had infantry equipped with APCs, jeeps and antitank weapons on the 
Golan Heights before the war. Troops were also trained to co-operate with 
tanks — as were infantry officers on the whole, according to Pa'il. Yet more 
importantly, the IDF's Golan forces had battle experience from the past years' 
anti-guerrilla operations in "Fatahland". It is obvious that General Eytan had 
some role in this. In the early 1970s, he had been the Chief Infantry and 
Paratroop Officer and, according to Weller, had the ability to use his infantry 
more imaginatively than most IDF commanders at the time. In Eytan's concept, 
mechanised infantry was also trained to fight dismounted in platoon 
combinations. According to Asher and Hammel, the entire Israeli defensive 
force on the Golan — tanks, self-propelled artillery, infantry, and armoured 
infantry — could all be in motion on short notice. Therefore, while the tank was 
also the main instrument of mobile defence on the Golan Heights, the flexible 
use of all arms covered the tanks better against enemy antitank patrols and 
commando teams than was the case in the Sinai before the completion of the 
mobilisation and the ad hoc creation of foot and mechanised infantry. In 
addition, at the very beginning the primacy of the Air Force support in wearing 
down the Syrians was significant.64  
The removal of infantry, as well as mortar units equipped with half-tracks 
from the organisations of the tank battalions was also a serious mistake that 
was revealed during the first days of the Yom Kippur War, especially in the 
Sinai where the streamlined armoured brigades were in use. It is also 
interesting to note that those units that were removed from the modernised 
639 Levite, pi 10, discussions with Doctor, Colonel (ret.) Hanan Shai and Loefstedt, p.18. 
See also Investigating Committee of the Yom Kippur War; The Report, p. 1341. 
This report presents a charl of the hierarchy of the dominant leadership principles at 
formation level. The core idea of this example is the primacy of the principle of using 
manoeuvre to wear the enemy down. 
640 Katz (1989), p. 94 and 100 — 102, interview of Doctor, Colonel (ret.) Meir Pa'il, Asher & 
Hammel, p. 141 and Weller (1975), p. 63. 
Weller interviewed Eytan in the early 1970s before Eytan was assigned to the Golan. It is 
obvious that Eytan rooted his concept of how to use infantry in his division in exercises 
before the war. 
According to Katz, large combined and joint operations were conducted against Palestinian 
guerrilla bases since 1969, mostly in "Fatahland'. These operations included forces of the 
Golani and Barak Brigades, Sayeret Egoz and often also squadrons from the Air Force. 
The ratio between the tank formations and infantry units at the beginning of the Yom Kippur 
War on the Golan Heights was some 2 : 1, not very bad in terms of pure numbersi 
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brigades were transferred to the older armoured brigades with Sherman tanks. 
A large proportion of these brigades were deployed on the Golan Heights 
during the Yom Kippur War. Therefore, the result was that in the Sinai, which 
had been the main operational area for tanks since the creation of the 
Armoured Corps, the organisations, as well as the plans, were not in 
accordance with the operational doctrine of deep battle while on the Golan the 
force was relatively well balanced with the doctrinal demands of avoiding 
attrition in mobile operations in depth.641  
The greater Israeli success in the battles of the Golan is sometimes also 
explained by the commanders' ability to apply combined arms principles. 
Generals Hofi, Eytan and Laner were all paratroopers. According to Sharon, 
they were well aware of the advantages of combined arms battle from their 
past experience. On the other hand, high-ranking commanders in the Sinai 
were — excluding some exceptions like Sharon himself — armoured officers. 
Therefore, it is often said, especially by the paratroopers, that the continuous 
tank attacks against Egyptian tank-killer teams during the first days of battle 
were a consequence of the highly specialised IDF armour officers' inability to 
rethink their tactics and realise the need for artillery support and for a mixed 
combat-team approach. In a way this statement, as seen in Luttwak and 
Horowitz, is justifiable. During the first day on the Sinai front, primacy in the 
mobilisation of reinforcements was still given to the tank forces despite the 
failures of the Sinai Division in the counter-attacks. Nevertheless, as Luttwak 
and Horowitz also admit, on the whole it can not be proved that commanders 
on the Egyptian front were less educated in understanding the advantages of 
synchronising different arms, though there certainly were views on the 
superiority of tanks on the battlefield in the Armoured Corps as well. The ability 
to converge according to the situation supports this statement. In the battles 
that were fought in the Sinai from 8 October onwards, the tendency to balance 
the force structure by gathering and equipping infantry in order to give cover to 
the tanks as well as by concentrating the little artillery that was present reveal 
the armoured officers' understanding of combined arms battle.642 
The different tactical and operational views of Israeli tank commanders and 
paratroopers have to be examined in a wider time span than the first three 
days of the war. Luttwak and Horowitz shed light on this question. The IDF 
641 Adan, p. 206 — 208, Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 104 — 105 and Eshel, David: 
Chariots of the Dessert, Brassey's, London 1989, p. 88 — 89. 
See also Rothenberg, p. 158 — 159 and Katz (1996), p.128. 
Rothenberg states that Adan also preferred tanks. However, according to Adan, M-113s 
(Zeldas) gave sufficient cover and possessed enough mobility to co-operate with Centurions 
and M-60 Pattons, the most modern tanks in the IDF at the time. 
It is also interesting to note that the 7th Armoured Brigade had a mechanised infantry 
battalion and some supporting elements as well. Obviously this was a consequence of 
organisational disputes that were not settled before the war. 
642 Sharon, p. 150, interview of Major General (ret.) Uri Simhoni, Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 368 
— 369 and 376, Adan, p. 206 — 208. 
Both Generals Hofi and Eytan had been Sharon's subordinates. Simhoni was Operations 
Officer in the Northern Command during the Yom Kippur War. According to him, hard life 
and almost daily action had trained the IDF's forces to co-operate on the Golan. Simhoni is 
also originally a paratrooper. 
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armour doctrine, which stressed tanks' usability in mobile battles to take 
advantage of the possibilities on the battlefield was adopted and trained for in 
the IDF from the early 1950s and since then it has proven to be suitable for the 
qualities of the IDF's manpower in Israel's conditions. On the other hand, the 
role of paratroop forces was seen not only in swift wartime deep penetration 
operations — which on a wider scale have not yet been seen in the wars of the 
Middle East — but also in peacetime anti-guerrilla operations. These both were 
aimed, simplifying, at converging on a single objective in a carefully planned 
assault on a static enemy, as Luttwak and Horowitz express it.643 So, these 
schools — the armoured and infantry, one might say — represent different 
methods of warfare and can not be compared so easily. The IDF's principle of 
using tanks can be seen as an action at the operational level while paratrooper 
operations have mainly been meticulous tactical actions. Nevertheless, Israeli 
armour in the Sinai was at first used to contain the enemy offensive via 
piecemeal counterattacks, which was in contradiction of the principles of 
armoured warfare. According to Kahalani, this was not, however, a 
consequence of the disputes over tactical and operational doctrine before the 
war, but of lack of choice.644 There were not enough available forces at the 
time to launch concentrated counter-attacks. In any case, this statement does 
not explain the organisations that were not suitable for combined arms battle. 
Not to mention the poor preparedness, delays in using the existing plan, 
command problems and inadequate Air Force support, which can be seen as 
being among the main reasons behind the operational failures on the Sinai 
front during the first three days of the war. On the other hand, according to 
Williams, tank crews at the tactical level, both regular and reservist, displayed 
professionalism, exceptional gunnery, dedication to mission and motivation 
during the war on both fronts.645 
643 Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 368 — 369. 
644 Kahalani (1984), p. xi. 
See also Sharon, p. 295. 
Sharon also mentions that the Southern Command broke the basic rules of armoured 
warfare by committing the armoured reserves in piecemeal counter-strikes. He writes that 
"Instead of using the tanks in large forces as armoured fists, they frittered them away 
piecemeal. Instead of taking advantage of the tanks' potential for manoeuvre and surprise, 
they were launching them at fixed targets along known approach routes, allowing the 
Egyptians to anticipate them and organise a deadly reception." 
646 Williams (1989), p. 211 and Gissin, p. 320. 
Williams bases his statement on a report of IDF analysts led by Major General Moshe Peled. 
At tactical level, the innovation in the ranks of the armoured forces had never vanished. 
According to the reporl, survivors from tanks that had never operated together were 
regrouped and returned to battle and exhibited tenacity and good tactical judgment, and 
often operated without senior officers. According to Gissin, several foreign observers have 
pointed out that the IDF's reserve units in 1973 fought and were led as well as regular army 
units. 
See also Gawrych (1996), pi 76, O'Ballance (1997), p. 115 and Schiff (October Earthquake), 
p. 172 and Gabriel, p. 179 —181. 
When evaluating the performance of the IDF during the Yom Kippur War, the intensity of the 
fighting should be remembered. According to Sharon, this war was Israel's first real war, the 
others had only been battlesi The intensity of the fighting in 1973 produced a high ratio of 
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According to General Elazar, the Yom Kippur War taught the Israelis the 
importance of the combined arms principle at the tactical and operational 
levels of warfare.646 Despite the organisational deficiencies, the Israelis were 
able to recover from the set-backs already during the war. Doctor Gissin states 
that the experience of the Yom Kippur War seems to indicate that the 
organisation that is capable of organising combined defensive-offensive 
operations within the shortest response time will have an advantage on the 
future battlefield.647 This happened to be the IDF during the Yom Kippur War. 
In a few days, in less than a week really, the Israelis were able to analyse their 
deficiencies in the command chain and organisations, suitably modify them to 
counter the challenge of the battlefield and wrest operational initiative from 
their enemies. It is a respectable achievement for any army in such a short 
period of time. 
While the combined arms principle was more or less in use on the Golan 
Heights from the very beginning of the war, the Israelis also learned and were 
able to use the support of infantry, mechanised infantry and artillery to relieve 
the burden of tank crews, especially at night-time on the Sinai front after the 
holding phase. In this phase, mobile defence in the Sinai came into being and 
IDF troops began to strike the Egyptians with small detachments supported by 
mobile infantry units and artillery. Indeed, it has not been shown that the lack 
of antitank weapons was a decisive deficiency on either front. Tanks were still 
able to cope with enemy tanks if only they had covering infantry against enemy 
antitank patrois.648 
 
psychiatric cases, mostly at the tactical level. Doctor Gawrych estimates that the figures 
ranged from 12.3 to 23.1 percent of all nonfatal casualties. According to O'Ballance, in a 
study published in the Israeli Medical Association journal, 9 percent of all the Israeli 
wounded were psychiatric cases. This coincides with Gawrych's numbers, which had only 
counted nonfatal cases. Gabriel puts the rate of battle-shock casualties between 3.5 percent 
and 5 percent, meaning obviously serious psychiatric reactions while the numbers for all 
categories were obviously higher. According to Schiff, there were hundreds of psychiatric 
cases, to put it purely in terms of raw numbers, but most of them were returned to battle 
after a short rest. 
646 Elazar, David: Military Lessons in Williams, Louis (ed.): Military Aspects of the Israeli-
Arab Conflict. International Symposium, Jerusalem 12 — 17 October 1975, University 
Publishing Projects, Tel Aviv 1975, p. 248. 
647 Gissin, p. 146. 
648 Of the Sinai front; EI-Shazly, p. 162, Katz (1989), p. 124 — 125 and Adan, p. 40, 152, 205, 
255 and 284 — 286, of the Golan front Asher and Hammel, p. 192 and 200, Katz (1989), p. 
119, Katz (1996), p. 184 and Kahalani (1984), p. 129. 
Special forces were used in commando-hunting and reconnaissance tasks, Sayeret Shaked, 
for example, joined the conscript paratroopers in countering heliborne Egyptian commando 
forces. Tactically Shaked secured ten square kilometre zones called boxes, and then closed 
in from all sides for the kill. 
See also O'Ballance (1997), p. 192, House, p. 176 and Cordesman & Wagner, p. 65. 
Sometimes the combined arms principle was violated purposely. This shows an 
understanding of the situation. In Tel Shams on the Golan front, for example, a paratroop 
brigade used indirect approach; darkness, silence — artillery support was cancelled 
intentionally — and an unexpected attack direction to surprise their enemy. 
According to House, the Israelis had refused to purchase American-made TOW antitank 
missiles before the war because they still considered the tank to be the best antitank 
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Israeli airborne operations were rare during the Yom Kippur War. In 
addition, it is generally estimated that helicopters were used ineffectively 
despite experiences in Vietnam War. Three of the operations where 
helicopters were used during the Yom Kippur War are worth mentioning; 1) on 
the Golan during the last days of battle a heliborne unit was transferred to 
Syrian territory to set up an ambush for the Syrian reinforcements, 2) the re-
conquest of Mount Hermon where paratroopers were helilifted to their task to 
save time and to take advantage of surprise, and 3) connected to the Suez 
crossing a heliborne assault against an Egyptian electronic monitoring station 
on Jebel Ataka. In a way, this undersized use of heliborne forces shows that 
large landing operations also did not play a central role in the Israeli 
operational doctrine in the 1973 War. Amos Perlmutter provides a rather 
critical view of this. According to him, one of the main IDF deficiencies during 
the Yom Kippur War was the inability to use paratroopers according to their 
potential, which means that they were not used in support of the armoured 
forces and the Air Force to eliminate enemy antitank and antiaircraft weapons. 
In any case, however true this statement might be, the use of heliborne 
landings would have been a risky business without air supremacy; a fact the 
Egyptian and Syrian commando operations proved very well. Despite the fact 
that the IAF, in theory, had transport capability for numerous smaller landings 
or two larger battalion landings at a time, the operations were implemented 
only during the latter part of the war when the Israelis had at least partial aerial 
supremacy.649 
The role of artillery during the war also deserves some remarks. According 
to Cordesman and Wagner, the IDF made little effort to integrate its artillery 
into its concept of mobile warfare prior to the war. Only a few of the artillery 
pieces that Israel had on the eve of the Yom Kippur War were self-propelled 
and even fewer were modern. Besides, artillery was trained and organised as 
a separate arm, which can be seen in the problems with using and co-
ordinating fire in the early days of the war. This is also perfectly revealed in 
Brigadier Kahalani's battlefield description in The Heights of Courage where he 
says that until the Yom Kippur War "artillery has always seemed to me to be 
something we can win without, perhaps because it doesn't do much harm to 
tanks." Kahalani changed his views during the war.65°  
The Yom Kippur War was also the first of the Arab-Israeli wars where IDF 
artillery experienced losses. Already during the initial bombardments on 6 
October, the Egyptians destroyed much of the IDF's artillery contingent in the 
Sinai, according to Aker some 40 percent. On the other hand, Eshel states that 
only a few artillery pieces on the Golan Heights were wrecked in the Syrian 
fire. This was also important to the success of the combined arms battles on 
weapon. However, during the war the Americans delivered TOW systems to the IDF. With 
hastily improvised training and tactics, the Israelis scored, according to Cordesman and 
Wagner, some 13 hits against 9 tanks out of 20 shots fired. Older Israeli SS-11 and Cobra 
missiles were mostly left in storage because they had been too difficult to train with for 
reserve forces while light anti-tank rockets (LAWS) had too limited a range. So, most Arab 
tanks were destroyed by Israeli tanks. 
649 Herbert, p. 101 — 102, Katz (1989), p. 119 — 121 and 125 and Perlmutter (1978), p. 88. 
650 Cordesman & Wagner, p. 53 — 55, 66 and 68 and Kahalani (1984), p. 32. 
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the Golan. Nevertheless, the principles of how to deploy artillery were similar 
on both fronts. During the War of Attrition, the Israelis had adopted, instead of 
digging-in, the principle of changing firing positions to avoid enemy fire. 
However, according to Brigadier Arie Mizrachi, this principle was not an 
advantage during the Yom Kippur War on the Sinai front; to the contrary, under 
Egyptian visual observation, which was almost omnipresent in the early 
phases of the war, the IDF artillery suffered rather heavy losses. The rougher 
features of the terrain on the Golan made Syrian fire control much more 
difficult, which at least partly explains the battlefield durability of the IDF 
artillery.651  
During the holding phase, the number of IDF artillery pieces grew, but the 
numbers were never decisive during the war. The initial 44 weapons on the 
Golan tripled during the war with the two additional divisions. Though the exact 
numbers are not available on the Sinai front, the quantity might have been 
approximately equivalent to the forces on the Golan if the total inventory of IDF 
artillery pieces — excluding antitank guns — was some 300, as has been 
estimated. On the whole, however, the role of artillery on the Golan Heights 
seems to have been more significant than in the Sinai. There was no room for 
decisive manoeuvre in defence on the Golan, as there was in the depths of the 
Sinai. It is also obvious that the purely technical preconditions for using artillery 
support were better on the Golan, where knowledge of how to use artillery was 
better and where the artillery was better able to survive the initial Syrian 
artillery and aerial attacks. For example, in the battles of the 7th Armoured 
Brigade between Tel Hermonit and a lower hill approximately five kilometres to 
the south called "the Booster" — a place that was later named "the Valley of 
Death" — long-range artillery joined, according to Katz, the battles with 
accurate fire already during the holding phase. In any case, the Israelis had 
adopted combined arms principles during the counter-offensives on both 
fronts, including the use of artillery - especially in preparatory bombardments 
preceding manoeuvre.652  
In his book The Sword and the Olive, Martin van Creveld describes the 
combined arms battle on the Golan Heights during the IDF's counter-offensive 
as follows: "No longer did the tanks charge on their own; instead they moved 
inside an artillery "box" formed by thousands of exploding shells while they and 
their accompanying APCs raked every rock capable of offering shelter with 
machine-gun fire." Artillery followed the tank divisions and joined in the 
preparatory bombardments on the Sinai front as well. In addition, long-range 
artillery, transferred to the western side of the Suez Canal, played a central 
role in punching holes in the Egyptian air defence network. What is interesting 
in the methods that the IDF adopted during the Yom Kippur War is the fact that 
651  Movshovitz, Yoram — Petreanu, Dan: The Arlillery Corps — 1948 to Present, IDF Journal 
IV, NO. 3, Fall 1987, p. 19, Ghazala, p. 7, Aker, p. 39, Eshel, David: The Yom Kippur War, 
Peli Printing Works Ltd., Hod Hasron 1978, p. 40 and Mizrachi, Arie: Israeli Artillery Tactics 
and Weapons — Lessons Learned in Combat, Field Artillery 1/1990, p. 9 — 10. 
Brigadier Mizrachi was the commander of the IDF Arlillery Corps before he resigned in 
1983. He served as a battalion commander and fire supporl officer in an armoured brigade 
during the Yom Kippur War. 
652 Katz (1996), p. 159 and Cordesman & Wagner, pi 54. 
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the Israelis chose to favour artillery over infantry to support the tanks. 
According to Cordesman and Wagner, this decision was made for two 
reasons; first, self-propelled artillery could keep up with the tanks and second 
the use of artillery spared the infantry from casualties.653 
11.6.2. "Optional Control" versus "Reversed Optional Control" 
According to Gissin, the contradiction between doctrinal and political views, as 
well as the new technological realities, was one of the primary causes for the 
IDF's command, control and communications problems in the Yom Kippur 
War. One can mostly agree with this statement. The Agranat Committee 
report, instead, mostly put the responsibility for the failures on a crisis of 
confidence at the operational level between superiors and subordinates. 
Although such situations existed on the Southern front, it is biased to 
concentrate only on the deficiencies in the operational echelons. Basically, it 
was the political views that gave the IDF guidelines to prepare only for limited 
conflicts. However, this doesn't deny the fact that the command process in the 
Southern Command was in crisis during the first few days of the war.654 
Until the early morning of 7 October, Gonen's headquarters were situated in 
Beersheva, after which the command post was transferred 30 miles closer to 
Dveila. This complicated the situation, especially because of Gonen's personal 
command style. The atmosphere in the Southern Command command post 
was, according to Adan, anything but controlled for planning and supervising 
the operations. Procedures for staff work were absent and outsiders -
especially reporters who had been given access to the war room — disturbed 
the command process. In addition the commanders of the reserve divisions -
Adan and Sharon who earlier had been commanders of Commander-in-Chief 
Southern Command, General Gonen — had their own views on how to fight. In 
this environment the pre-war plans were not used until the point where they 
had become obsolete. It is easy to speculate what would have happened if the 
active tank brigades had been deployed to the Suez Canal according to the 
plan. Because of the unrealistic picture of the situation — and for whatever 
653 Katz (1996), p. 252, van Creveld (1998), p. 232, Adan, p. 196 and 359 Dupuy (1992), p. 
594 and Cordesman & Wagner, p. 55 — 56. 
General Adan's statement of the situation on 10 October perfectly describes how easily the 
Israelis were satisfied when speaking of artillery. He states that he had a lot of artillery 
available on that day, when Adan's division had 40 artillery pieces,. 
See also Asher & Hammel, p. 125. 
Israeli and Arab principles in using artillery support deviated from each other significantly. 
While Arab arlillery doctrine emphasised massive saturation fire, Israeli principles called for 
precision firing at specific targets. Statistics do not reveal which system was more effective. 
However, from the Israeli point of view it can be estimated that their solution was the only 
one that could be carried out with such a small amount of artillery. Besides, the IDF also had 
some big calibre weapons (155 mm and 175 mm), which were generally seen as only being 
effective in precision firing. In addition, the fire control principles also had their influence on 
chosen methods. Underdeveloped systems often emphasise the principle of saturated fire. 
654 Gissin, p. 339 and Investigating Committee of the Yom Kippur War; The Report, p. 1368 
— 1369 and 1405 — 1406. 
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other reasons there might be to explain the delays — the deployment of the 
regular forces was not carried out until it was late. This was the beginning of 
the process that is generally called by the name of "Reversed Optional 
Control". According to Generals Adan and Sharon, Gonen made his evaluation 
of the situation without relying on his subordinates' information in the early 
phases of the war, although they were on the spot of the action and he was 
some 150 km back from the front. Instead of delegating decision-making and 
relying on subordinates' appreciations of the situation and reporting, the 
Southern Command itself made decisions that were often based, not on 
information from subordinates, but on intuition and assumption. Despite the 
grave reports from the front in the afternoon hours of 6 October, the mood in 
the Southern Command was still optimistic.655 
Van Creveld sees General Elazar's distrust in his subordinates as a basic 
reason behind the "Reversed Optional Control" principle. According to van 
Creveld, commanders were compelled to wait for his orders and therefore 
positioned themselves too far to the rear while their units went on the offensive 
and consequently lost touch. Gelber also tends to see the command process 
as van Creveld does, all information went along the hierarchy. While there 
might be some basis for these statements, all this can not be generalised. 
First, if Elazar had made his own choices in the rejuvenation of his officer 
corps, the statement of distrust sounds a little bit strange. Second, while Elazar 
was blamed for the failures in the south and was forced to resign after the war, 
he as the Chief of Staff — realising that Israel did not have the strength to fight 
simultaneously on two fronts — had to order priorities that restricted the 
autonomy of the Southern Command. According to Adan, this more showed a 
good appreciation of the situation and was therefore a strategic decision. By 
doing this, Elazar exploited the interior lines and concentrated first on the most 
655 Adan, p. 33 and 92, van Creveld (1985), p. 206, 208, 224 and 230 — 231, van Creveld 
(1998), p. 239 — 240, O'Ballance (1997), p. 100, Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 70, Sharon, 
p. 293 and 304 and Investigating Committee of the Yom Kippur War; The Report, p. 1368 -
1369 and 1405 — 1406. 
The tendency to believe that the situation was better than it really was is called the "Vietnam 
syndrome" in the Agranat Committee report. 
The crisis of confidence between the operational commanders was at least partly a 
consequence of the resignations of many of the senior officers before the war. 
Adan and Sharon were both senior to Gonen and several months before the war Gonen had 
been Sharon's subordinate. This was a natural cause reason of friction, too. 
According to Adan, Gonen also looked down on the Egyptians. This underestimation might 
also have caused delays if Gonen trusted in the fighting abilities of the strongholds and 
waited for his strength to grow for a concentrated counter-offensive. 
Sharon writes that he pressured Gonen to transfer his command post closer to the front, but 
this happened only on the morning of 7 October. 
See also Morris, p. 20 — 21 and 23, Dupuy (1992), p. 585 and Cohen, p. 347. 
Cohen and van Creveld locate the Southern Command forward command post in Um 
Hasheiba. Obviously this is the same place that Sharon calls Dveila. Sharon built this small 
town of fortified underground command centres, including intelligence installations that could 
see deep into Egypt, during his tenure as OC Southern Command. 
Morris states that the first Egyptian tank units crossed the Canal at about 18.30 hours on 6 
October. If the plans were activated earlier, this might have given the Israelis a better 
chance of meeting the Egyptian second echelon, especially if the estimate made by Dupuy 
is even partly true; the Bar Lev Line decisively delayed the Egyptian crossing in its early 
stages. 
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dangerous threat, a decision which Wallach sees as being striking similar to 
General Yadin's actions during the War of Independence. Third, General 
Elazar had to act in the political framework, which stressed the limited war 
concept before the war. Therefore it is obvious, as a consequence of this, that 
the control of the commands was tightened to avoid provocations that could 
lead to a war. This detail created a situation where, according to Gissin, the 
cardinal principle for combat command, the unity of command was violated." In 
any case, this was against the principle of "Optional Control" and might partly 
explain the difficulties between the General Headquarters and the Southern 
Command.656 
In this atmosphere of top-heavy control of the war, General Elazar found 
himself during the first days of the war, according to van Creveld, reporting to 
his own direct superiors — to the "War Cabinet" — at the very time when he was 
supposed to be making decisions that he had reserved for himself; giving 
overall operational guidelines, allocating reserves and giving priorities to the 
commands. Being out of his command centre, Elazar was compelled to rely on 
his subordinates' reports, many of which were misleading. Although the 
overconfidence in the IDF's performance can be seen as having been the main 
reason behind the first operational decisions, in theory the principle of 
"Optional Control" worked at the General Staff level, although only from the top 
down. The reporting was based, however, on too optimistic a battle picture that 
later on led to decisions that were not appropriate for the actual situation. 
Therefore, as van Creveld states, instead of certainty being created by means 
of supervision from the top down, uncertainty spread from the bottom up. 
Waking up to this reality made the General Headquarters cautious and forced 
it to tighten its control of the Southern Command at the expense of the loss of 
initiative.657  
Luttwak and Horowitz also criticise the Israeli planning process before the 
war as being behind the failures of the Southern Command. The new situation 
created by the Arabs' continuous and permanent readiness to strike after the 
War of Attrition should have, according to them, resulted in a basic change in 
the defence plans in the Sinai. No change was made although the plans called 
for changes in deployments in a zero-warning situation, as the researchers 
656 Van Creveld (1998), p. 240, Gissin, p. 357 — 358 and interviews of Professor, Lieutenant 
Colonel (ret.) Yoav Gelber, Major General (ret.) Avraham Adan and Professor, Colonel (ret.) 
Yehuda Wallach. 
See also Katz (1996), p. 125, van Creveld (1985), p. 209, Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 
91, 148 and 283, Asher & Hammel, p. 157 and Cohen, p. 347. 
According to Katz, Gonen had been Elazar's choice for the post of OC of the Southern 
Command. Nevertheless, Gonen's designation was also a political one. He was a heroic 
brigade commander of the Six Day War with a good public reputation. There was no 
experience at the time with his abilities as an operational commander. 
Because of the unresolved relations between the Chief of Staff and the Minister of Defence, 
Moshe Dayan's role was more confusing than supporling. Dayan, the hero of Israel's past 
wars, regularly intercepted Elazar's orders during the Yom Kippur War and showed a lot of 
hesitation during the war. Although Elazar usually kept his own council, this certainly made 
his role much more difficult. 
657 Van Creveld (1985), p. 220 and 229 — 230, Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 122 and 
Gawrych (1996), pi 46 and 49. 
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have said. According to them, a permanent forward deployment should have 
been the solution in this environment. The Israelis were also, according to van 
Creveld, aware of the Arab arsenal of thousands of antitank weapons, but it 
did not cause any significant changes. According to Adan, the operational 
practice in autumn 1973 was to react instinctively and push the tank units to 
the strongpoints — without the cover of infantry and artillery. In the first two 
days, the Israelis acted according to these principles while the Egyptian 
antitank infantry established ambushes and killing zones that caused serious 
losses to Israeli units.658 
When the war broke out, the IDF General Headquarters led the territorial 
commands in totally different ways. While the Northern front was given a lot of 
independence in its fighting, the Southern Command was kept under the 
General Headquarters' supervision. Three facts might explain this. First, 
according to Adan, Gonen's repeated requests for changes in plans or orders 
of battle limited his authority. Nevertheless, whatever his capacity to lead the 
Southern Command, his position between the General Headquarters' 
tendency to limit his authority and his divisional commanders' demand to be 
active was not easy. The General Headquarters' viewpoint of giving priority to 
the north, however, prevailed. Third, the fact that Elazar had been the OC of 
the Northern Command — thus knowing the conditions, people and plans -
might explain his attitude to giving more freedom to the north as well.659 
 
Maybe as a consequence of the reasons explained above, the Northern 
Command acted rather well according to the principles of "Optional Control". At 
first General Hofi's command post was situated side by side with that of 
Brigadier Eytan's staff in Nafah. This arrangement made it possible to get a 
picture of the difficulties that the 36th Division had on the Golan and to also 
control the minor reinforcements that were available during the first two days. 
In the early hours of 7 October, Hofi's command post proved to be too near the 
front and after delegating responsibility for the defence of the Golan to 
Brigadier Eytan, Hofi left for his command bunker in Nazareth. In addition, it 
seems that the Israelis on the Golan followed — unlike in the Sinai where the 
plans existed but were not followed — their pre-war ideas on how to fight in this 
area better from the very beginning, at least during the defensive phase. 
According to van Creveld, personal relations among commanders in the 
Northern Command were also better than in the south. This was an extremely 
658 Luttwak & Horowitz, p. 343, van Creveld (1998), pi 232, Adan, p. 82, Gawrych (1996), pi 
39 — 40 and O'Ballance (1997), p. 105. 
According to van Creveld, the head of the IDF's planning branch, Brigadier Avraham Tamir, 
had warned his superiors before the war of the Arab antitank threat, but without results. 
The Sinai Division lost at least 2/3 of its tanks during the first two days. 
659 Katz (1996), p. 125, Asher & Hammel, p. 157 and Adan, pi 33. 107 — 108, 111 and 149. 
According to Asher and Hammel, Dayan's orders to the Air Force bypassing Elazar and his 
pressure to withdraw from the Golan Heights provoked Elazar. He made it clear to Dayan 
that as the Chief of Staff, he, not Dayan, was authorised to issue direct orders to the military 
forcesi Elazar's way of trusting his subordinates on the Golan was also revealed when he 
told Dayan that General Hofi was the on-the-spot decision-maker on the Golan and would 
make evaluations of the situation, not Dayan. 
See also van Creveld (1985), p. 227. 
According to van Creveld and contrary to Katz, Elazar had little confidence in Gonen. 
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important matter and clearly shows the role of the combination of trust and the 
maintenance of aim in the result of the battles. The first two days of 
independent fighting by the tactical echelons freed the divisions and the 
Northern Command to concentrate on the operational problems; thus, while 
Hofi fixed his attention on the larger picture, Eytan focused his on controlling 
the holding battles and the arrival of reserves on the Golan Heights. Obviously 
the use of armoured formations in mobile defence on the Golan was rather 
flexible already at the beginning of the war for these reasons — in addition to a 
better force structure than that of the Sinai. Especially the 7th Armoured 
Brigade, which was originally designed for the Sinai, and was trained there, 
distinguished itself during the battles. This shows the appreciation of the 
situation. In addition, Elazar's hints on 10 October of a general offensive into 
Syrian-held territory also shows the function of the command process, where 
superiors give the overall guidelines of operations while the subordinates have 
the power to decide how they will implement their commanders' will.66° 
According to Herzog, the principal Israeli error in the initial battles in the 
Sinai was in the indecision about whether the armoured brigades of the Sinai 
Division were to concentrate on linking up with the fortifications or on repelling 
the Egyptian crossing. On the whole, the question of delays in the Israeli 
operational decision-making during the early phases of the war has occupied 
researchers' minds up until today. On 5 October, a day before the beginning of 
the hostilities, General Bar Lev, at that time the Minister of Commerce and 
Industry and a member of the "War Cabinet", estimated that with the number 
of tanks in the Sinai the IDF would be able to stop even 1,500 Egyptian tanks, 
if the tanks were alerted. This never happened. The decision not to deploy the 
Sinai Division according to the "Dovecote" plan was made by General Gonen. 
According to Rothenberg, it has been suggested that Gonen, who was known 
as an aggressive fighter, feared that an early deployment of tanks might 
frighten the Egyptians into calling off their attack. This would have, later on, 
deprived him of the opportunity to thoroughly defeat the Egyptians. Although 
this manner of thinking coincides with the doctrinal principle of a decisive 
victory, the explanation given by van Creveld seems more credible. According 
to his view, Gonen tried not to unnecessarily provoke the Egyptians because 
war was not yet certain and when permission to move the armoured brigades 
of the Sinai Division was finally granted, it was based on the assumption that 
the Egyptian offensive would begin at 18.00 hours. Van Creveld also gives 
another explanation which might have influenced Gonen's decision-making. 
Gonen had dissipated his forces in premature counterattacks in an exercise in 
1972. This experience might well have been in his mind when he delayed the 
use of his reserves.661  
On the morning of 7 October, the picture of the situation was still very 
unclear. This, of course, also had also an impact on the Israeli counter-actions. 
660 Van Creveld (1998), p. 240 and Rothenberg, p. 189, Schiff (October Earthquake), pi 48 
and 67, Asher & Hammel, p. 134 and Katz (1996), p. 145. 
To maintain the reporting system, both Hofi and Eytan sent their representatives to their 
sub-echelons. 
661  Herzog (1975), p. 181, Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 26 and 101 — 102, Rothenberg, p. 
183, van Creveld (1985), p. 205 — 206 and 208 and Gawrych (1996), p. 32 — 33. 
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Despite Gonen's difficulties with his division commanders, Gonen failed, 
according to Gawrych, to act as an operational commander. This problem is 
revealed in Elazar's biography where Elazar describes his and Gonen's 
discussion during the first days of the Yom Kippur War as follows: "I think 
about tomorrow . . . That's my job. Whoever's shooting now, neither the front 
commander nor I can help anymore. That's a divisional commander's problem. 
I'm constantly telling him: Shmulik, let's talk about what will happen tomorrow." 
This gives reason to suppose that instead of thinking about the next and the 
very next moves, in the "fog of war" Gonen got tangled in tactical issues that 
only confused the actions of his subordinates instead of allocating them 
support.662 
There are numerous criticisms of Elazar's decision to limit the scale of the 
counterattacks on the 8 October. In theory, this solution violated the 
operational doctrine of concentrating armour in deep battle despite the 
demands to wait until all the reserves had arrived.663 It can, however, be said 
that using a certain principle of war is usually in contradiction with some other 
principle. Such was the case within the IDF in the Sinai on 8 October. General 
Gonen tried to get the initiative with swift counter-moves, which was against 
the principle of concentrating forces. Therefore, it was the situation that 
dictated the chosen means and gave them their order of importance. However, 
initiative had had a central role before the war — as it had also had earlier. In 
this light, Gonen's decision was in line with these principles. On 8 October, 
nevertheless, the initiative was in Egyptian hands, though the Southern 
Command had not yet understood this. In this phase, the lack of infantry and 
artillery — most of these forces were still in their mobilisation centres — made 
the plan for a limited counter-offensive, however, highly vulnerable to the 
Egyptian foot infantry, which was equipped with masses of antitank 
weapons.6" 
8 October is the best example of "Reversed Optional Control". Traditionally, 
commanders in the IDF monitored their subordinates' radio nets to keep 
662 Gawrych (1996), p. 50 and 55. 
Elazar's citation is borrowed from Gawrych's The Albatross of Decisive Victory. The primary 
source is Bartov, Hanoch: Dado: 48 Years and 20 Days, Ma'ariv, Tel Aviv 1981, p. 389. 
663 Van Creveld (1985), p. 212 — 213, Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 94, Loefstedt, p. 15 
and Sharon, p. 296. 
According to van Creveld, Gonen favoured a night-time Canal crossing by Adan's and 
Sharon's divisions, each operating in his own sector and using Egyptian bridges. Generals 
Sharon and Mendler also recommended a two-division counterattack and crossing on the 
morning of 8 October. Adan only aimed at taking the initiative away from the Egyptians and 
blunting their westward advance by a limited counter-attack. According to him, any attempt 
to link up with the strongholds was bound to fail and therefore the remaining ones were to be 
evacuated. In this atmosphere Chief of Staff, General Elazar made the decision in favour of 
a limited counterattack. As many of the Bar Lev Line strongholds as possible were also to be 
rescued, but only by way of exploiting successi In this phase, the situation on both fronts -
which was worse than expected — had little by little crystallised in the General Headquarters. 
According to Schiff, at this time the Israelis did not yet have a possibility to concentrate 
forces for a large-scale attack, including Sharon's division. 
664 The Arab antitank arsenal consisted of hundreds of antitank missiles, mostly Soviet-made 
Saggers, and thousands of RPG-7s, also of Soviet-origin. 
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themselves aware of the overall situation. This system was, however, based 
on an operational concept where freedom of action for the brigades and 
divisions was broad while the role of the superiors in operational 
implementation was mainly supervisory. During the Yom Kippur War, the 
Southern Command still monitored its subordinates. Not so much to supervise 
them at the time, but to get information that tactical and operational orders 
could be based on. In practice this meant that, instead of applying the principle 
of "Optional Control", the Southern Command had adopted the principle of 
"order tactics", which certainly was not favoured by the experienced division 
commanders. When orders were given from the rear, tens of miles away from 
the front line, the picture of the situation was always obsolete by the time 
decisions were made in the Southern Command. In addition, several human 
errors in interpreting the messages aggravated the situation still more, 
although, according to van Creveld, the IDF had a communications system in 
1973 that was technically about as good as it could be.665 However, techniques 
were not the reason for the failures, they were caused by problems with 
principles. Finally, this all led to a vicious circle of changes in tasks for the 
divisions that ended in the total failure of the counter-attack on 8 October. 
From 10 October onwards, when the Southern Command had already 
deployed defensively in depth in the Sinai, "Reversed Optional Control" came, 
according to van Creveld, to an end. This was the day when General Bar Lev 
was appointed personal adviser of the Chief of Staff in the Southern 
Command. According to Gissin, the presence of a top command echelon in the 
front line enabled the Israelis to not only first centralise the chain of command 
to achieve some control, but also to return quickly back to the "Optional 
Control" method. Although the arrival of Bar Lev did not cancel out the 
personal disagreements over the conduct of operations, Bar Lev represented 
the generation that had adopted the principles of the "Constant Flow" doctrine 
and in this way shared the views of his division commanders.666 In this way, 
666 Van Creveld (1985), p. 230 — 231. 
According to the author, despite the improvement in the communication systems, the Bar 
Lev Line, as well as the Purple Line, lacked a Position and Azimuth Determination System, a 
Position Location and Reporting System, and various sensors linked to computers and 
television screens. These devices might at least partly have eliminated the uncertainty. 
666 Van Creveld (1985), p. 230 — 231 and Gissin, p. 346 and 348 
See also Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 156, Dupuy (1992), p. 54 and interview of Doctor, 
Colonel (ret.) Meir Pa'il. 
According to Schiff, Sharon was the father of the theory that the Egyptians would be hit hard 
if they tried to break into the Sinai. This was against Bar Lev's viewpoint of waiting. In 
addition, Sharon and Bar Lev also had unresolved old disputes concerning the construction 
of the Bar Lev Line and how to fight against terrorists. This relationship hampered the chain 
of command during the whole war and led to several obstinacies by Sharon. 
Dupuy tends to see Sharon's influence behind the crossing. While this might well have been 
true in operational details — "Operation Gazelle" was planned during Sharon's tenure as OC 
Southern Command — the crossing was, nevertheless, Southern Command's operation, 
supervised by the General Headquarters and the final decision was taken by the "War 
Cabinet". 
According to Pa'il, Bar Lev was an excellent commander who possessed a broad vision of 
the military art. From a professional point of view, he was also an offensively oriented 
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simultaneously with the organisational changes and with the re-arrangement of 
territorial responsibilities, the principles of "Optional Control" were gradually 
returned to during the holding phase. This is one of the facts that explain the 
IDF's further success during the counter-offensive. 
According to the Agranat Committee report, the principles of war were also 
misinterpreted during the war.667 This view is interesting because there were 
not any priorities assigned to the principles of war in the IDF, it was the 
situation that determined things. From the viewpoint of General Headquarters, 
concentration of force — i.e., giving priority to the fronts in turn — was the most 
important issue while from the point of view of the Southern Command and its 
divisions, initiative was the most important principle. The realism of the 
General Headquarters — some might also say the extreme caution — won, not 
only in this case but also several times later. The right time for a Suez Canal 
crossing was a source of dispute, as were the questions of whether to take 
advantage of the success and continue the crossing immediately and finally of 
how to advance in the Egyptian rear. While it is impossible to prove which 
principles and actions would have produced the best final outcome, it seems 
that the Agranat Committee still appreciated more the central principles behind 
the existing Israeli operational doctrine than those chosen by the General 
Headquarters, which were less risky but lengthened the war. 
The tactical command process is criticised only slightly. Tactically, the Israeli 
defence can be described as a mobile defence, as already discussed. On the 
mobile battlefield, time; i.e., the time spent on decision-making, was the most 
important factor. Therefore, IDF commanders at all levels of organisation 
placed themselves on the spot of the events during the battles to exert as 
much personal control as possible over the events and also over the morale of 
their own troops. This was already familiar to the Israelis, but was — as was the 
case also in the past wars — to cause a large number of losses among 
commanders. During the first two days, the nose-heavy command system was 
also obviously the only way to control the arrival of reserves that were sent to 
the front in small combinations of companies and sections, even smaller teams 
were not rare. All reinforcements were taken command of, often not in the 
original combination, but under command anyway. This principle later enabled 
the collection of the scattered forces for concentrated counter-attacks.668 
commander whose name is often wrongly connected to the Bar Lev Line, which was 
constructed during his tenure as Chief of Staff. 
667 Investigating Committee of the Yom Kippur War; The Report, p. 1359 — 1360. 
668 Katz (1996), p. 145 and 165 and Asher & Hammel, pi 118 and 135. 
The attitude of the IDF commanders to their mission can be seen in Colonel Ben Shoham's 
words to his superior, C-in-C Northern Command, General Hofi: "What we can do now, we 
might not be able to do later." Colonel Ben-Shoham lost his life when he abandoned his 
command centre and moved closer to the battle with his mobile forward command group of 
one tank and a communications half-track. His tank was destroyed on the second day of 
fighting, on 7 October. 
Nevertheless, at the very beginning according to Katz, the command process was "the 
scene of a claustrophobic chaos" as one divisional intelligence officer recalled it. At the 
brigade level, operation rooms, intelligence rooms, and command rooms were full of 
requests for additional manpower and supply, searches for any new information by the 
General Headquarters and attempts to direct a desperate fight for survival. 
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11.6.3. Rehabilitation of operational offence 
Zvi Lanir states that the problems of applying the strategy of denial approach; 
i.e., preventing the Egyptians and Syrians from making any territorial gains, did 
not rest on any operational concept before the Yom Kippur War because 
maintaining a deterrence power on the Suez Canal line and on the Golan 
Heights was beyond Israel's military resources. Amos Perlmutter supports this 
statement. According to him, the construction of the Bar Lev Line was not a 
sign of a change in the IDF's military doctrine, but a political misinterpretation 
of Israel's ability to deter her enemies. As a consequence of this, Israel had to 
pay a high price in this conflict. Professor Handel goes further still. According 
to him, during the war Israel achieved its greatest successes in purely 
defensive tank battles against Syria before 10 October and against the 
Egyptians on 14 October. If the results of the Yom Kippur War are studied 
purely from the viewpoint of statistics, Handel's statement is true. According to 
Major General Uri Simhoni, on the Golan Heights, for example, 2/3 of the 
Syrian losses were caused during the containment and holdin phases while 
most of Israel's own losses came during the counter-offensive.6 
On the whole, the statements above seem to be approximately correct. The 
imbalance between the defensive strategy, the General Staff's vision of 
offensive operations and the doctrinal demand for decisive victory was clear. 
However, these opinions neglect some basic facts. First, purely defensive 
battles had obviously lengthened the war and this was against the existing 
doctrine that stressed first and foremost the short war concept. Second, while 
the IDF in the Sinai had enough room for mobile defence, on the Golan it did 
not. This leads to a speculative question; if the Israelis had not been active 
what would have happened if their lines had been broken? As a matter of fact, 
See also O'Ballance (1997), p. 115 and 135, Schiff (October Earlhquake), p. 172 and Asher 
& Hammel, p. 182 and 232. 
Panic was not absent during the first two days. The commanders' role in preventing this with 
their own presence was important. In addition, the Israelis established roadblocks to control 
run-aways and to return individuals and in several cases groups to the front. To anticipate 
battle stress, teams of physicians, psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers were 
dispatched to assist badly mauled troops, one of which was the Barak Brigade. 
669 Lanir, p. 30 — 32, Handel (1994), p. 575, Perlmutter (1978), p. 85 and interview of Major 
General (ret.) Uri Simhoni. 
See also Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 264. 
According to Lanir, the Israelis were unable to achieve a decisive victory even on the Syrian 
front. Obviously this is a dilemma of one's viewpoint. At the strategic level, a peace treaty 
remained unattainable. At the operational level, the IDF pushed the Syrians away from the 
territory held by the Israelis and crushed a large portion of the Syrian forcesi Nevertheless, 
the Syrian forces were not destroyedi 
Lanir also sees that after the Yom Kippur War it was questionable whether Israel could 
successfully pursue the goals of territorial conquest and destroying the enemy in order to 
achieve a decisive outcome and maintain its territories in the future anymore. One can agree 
with this. From the geographical point of view, the Israeli borders were already as good as 
they could be before the Yom Kippur Wari However, it is not necessary to connect these two 
aims together, during the Yom Kippur War, for example, the conquest of territory was, 
according to Schiff, secondary. The main aim was to destroy the Arab armies, end the war 
and maybe in this way also return the deterrence power of the IDF. The implementation of 
this aim was possible only on enemy soil. 
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this problem also existed in the Sinai, though it was not so acute. If the Israelis 
had retreated to the defiles, this would have given the Egyptians a possibility to 
increase their strength in the Sinai — including an air defence network — which 
might have increased their hunger and later on might also have lengthened the 
war. In addition, from the operational point of view, because it was always 
inferior in manpower, the IDF was trained to seek possibilities on the battlefield 
and threaten enemy weaknesses, which were often targets in the rear. This all 
led to use of the indirect approach. This manner of fighting, which was seen as 
being a precondition for the short war concept, was not possible without 
offensive tactics. Nevertheless, it is probably a correct conclusion that the 
pursuit of a decisive victory in the short war concept was costly in this war. 
Organisationally and technically the IDF was not prepared enough for deep 
battles. 
The framework for an offensive orientation can also be seen in the light of 
past experience. In 1956 and 1967, the IDF had been successful in offensive 
operations, and this was also the case in 1973 when the IDF had repelled the 
imminent threat on Israel proper with offensive operations. Despite the 
hesitation at the strategic level, however, the IDF operational commanders and 
the reserve were trained for the offensive. This is revealed in an interview 
conducted by Geoffrey G. Prosch of Brigadier Kahalani in Military Review in 
1979. According to Kahalani "Our doctrine believes that the best defence is a 
good offence. Most of our training was on how to attack. Our ideology 
preaches that if you attack, you have more of a chance for success. Israeli 
tacticians teach that you really can't achieve a victory through defence, so it 
was not emphasised in our service schools. The defence is very dangerous 
because it gives the initiative to the attacker." Brigadier Bagnall also tends to 
see the mental aspects of warfare as being behind the Israeli way of warfare, 
which was to obtain moral superiority over the enemy by vigorous and 
sustained offensive action. It can be estimated that in 1973 all these facts were 
still based on the same preconditions that had been the central pillars behind 
the doctrine when it was created in the 1950s. According to Kahalani, one of 
the main problems during the initial phases of the Yom Kippur War was that 
the IDF was forced to fight a defensive-type war. This gave the attacker the 
initiative and made the IDF react to where the attacker was making his main 
effort. This kind of action was attrition, which had to be avoided by taking the 
initiative back with offensive means.67° 
According to General Simhoni, the operational commanders in 1973 were 
also tactically still very experienced. Loefstedt estimates that a superior grasp 
of the operational art was the key to the stunning recovery and operational 
success of the Israelis. Gissin describes this as decisiveness and confidence 
in judgments amidst the uncertainties and confusion of battle; i.e., the 
commanders had intuition and could read the battlefield. This was the main 
factor that, according to Simhoni, saved Israel during the Yom Kippur War. 
Gissin also has a theory on this behaviour of the IDF commanders. According 
to him, there is no doubt that the personality of a commander and his 
67° Levite, p. 10, Prosch, Geoffrey G: Israeli defense of the Golani An Interview with 
Brigadier General Avigdor Kahalani, Israeli Defense Forces, Military Review October 1979, 
p. 3 — 4 and 6 and Handel (1994), p. 573. 
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experience will greatly determine the decision and solution he is likely to adopt. 
Nevertheless, Gissin also admits that the commander's orientation and that of 
his subordinates is a function of the training doctrine as well. On the Golan, 
this appreciation of the situation is revealed in the counter-offensive where the 
use of success after the initial success in the southern part of the front was 
cancelled because this would have meant a frontal offensive on a highly 
saturated battlefield while correspondingly the northern sector had advantages 
for rapidly concentrating forces against vulnerable Syrian targets. With its 
certain similarities to the operations of the Six Day War, this shows how a 
tendency towards the indirect approach had been adopted as a part of the 
Israeli military art, whatever its origin.671  
The Israeli operational commanders understood the need to engage the 
enemy in a deep mobile battle on the Egyptian front as well. Particularly 
important was the ability of the Israeli leadership at the theatre and senior 
tactical level — i.e., at the divisional level — to read the battlefield and seize the 
initiative when the Egyptians paused on the bridgeheads on the west bank of 
the Suez Canal. The swift switch from defence to offence was, according to 
Loefstedt, a result of the recognition of the vulnerability of the Egyptian 
operational rear, as their operational armoured reserves were also mostly 
already deployed on the eastern side of the Canal. Professor Brian Bond — as 
well as Jac Weller — tend to see this as being the best example of Liddell 
Hart's ideas of deep penetration, which was aimed at paralysing the enemy 
command by cutting his communications, threatening alternative objectives 
and spreading panic. Indeed, it is difficult to estimate what really would have 
happened if the Israelis had immediately continued to follow up on their 
success after the crossing. The realities of the situation should, however, be 
remembered in this question. From the viewpoint of the Southern Command 
and the General Staff — without enough bridges to increase the strength of the 
bridgehead — it would obviously have been too risky to continue the crossing 
671  Interview of Major General (ret.) Uri Simhoni, Gissin, p. 144 and 362, Loefstedt, p. 18 and 
Asher & Hammel, p. 141 — 142. 
On the whole, General Simhoni did not believe in large manoeuvre on the Golan after the 
Yom Kippur War, unlike in the Sinai. Despite the fact that operational mobility had not been 
a problem for the IDF since the 1960s, the Golan is too open and has been too full of forces 
to surprise the enemy with the traditional deep armoured thrusts. In any case, quick changes 
in the main effort proved to be successful in 1973. This shows that the possibility of throwing 
the enemy off balance with unusual action still prevailsi 
See also O'Ballance (1997), p. 350 — 351 and Handel (1994), p. 566 — 568. 
O'Ballance states that the top Israeli generals, Elazar, Eytan, Peled, Mendler, Gonen and 
Adan, formed a team of only average ability, a team that did not always pull together. 
Handel supports this view. According to him, the middle and higher level IDF commanders 
presented a mediocre leadership. While the problems in the chain of command seem to 
have been mostly true, the underestimation of the tactical abilities of the IDF commanders 
can not be agreed with. From the operational point of view, they were just the "old war 
horses" who were able to turn the tide of the war. The recovery from the strategic surprise 
and from the tactical and operational set-backs in a few days shows more than average 
operational abilities. 
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before securing the passage to the Canal line despite the fact that this meant 
the loss of surprise and obviously lengthened the war.672 
Despite the final results of the war, the Israeli operational doctrine and 
military leadership is often criticised. Newell states that forced to react to the 
surprise of simultaneous Syrian and Egyptian attacks, the Israeli decentralised 
conduct of the war could not adequately cope with the chaos of war. This 
opinion is partly misleading. First, despite its surprise, the IDF General 
Headquarters very soon perceived the essentials of the situation and gave 
priority to the Golan front. At the command level responsibilities were also 
clear, though the intervention of the General Headquarters probably 
complicated the command process, especially in the Sinai. Therefore, the 
conduct of war was more centralised than decentralised, as was also the case 
between the Southern Command and its divisions. As a consequence of this, 
the lack of a clear picture of the situation delayed implementation of decisions 
during the early days of the war. Still, the Israelis were able to recover quickly 
from their set-backs. This is a clear indication of the fact that the operational 
doctrine — which included decentralised decision-making — was still sound if 
only it was followed. For this Newell has a suitable quote: "Writing doctrine 
appropriate to the conditions and machinery of war is more science than art; 
executing doctrine in the chaos of battle is more art than science." When 
interpreting this, the Israeli operational doctrine, which had been created 
according to the experiences of the past, proved to still be suitable, despite the 
fact that it neglected several factors like the combined arms principle. After 
balancing the organisations of the ground forces as well as returning to the 
original priorities in the tasks of the Air Force, the existing doctrine proved to 
be sound. In the charge of the veterans of the "Constant Flow" doctrine, the 
IDF was able to recover in the chaos of the battle and switch swiftly to counter-
offensives that transferred the battles away from Israeli-held territory and 
negated the immediate threat to Israel, proper.673 
672 Loefstedt, pi 14 and 16, Bond, p. 268 and Weller, 1975, p. 59. 
The Israeli crossing was also a special one on a historic scale. Not even the eastern side of 
the Canal was totally in Israeli handsi This shows the abilities of Israeli operational 
commanders to take risks. 
See also Sharon, p. 330 and Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 258, 266 and 272. 
The dispute over how to continue the offensive on the west bank of the Canal also caused 
delays. Sharon preferred, instead of the original plan to make the main efforl towards the 
south, to move north. He was able to change his mission and was given permission to push 
northwardsi This dispersed the force that the IDF had on the west bank and might also have 
lengthened the war. However, Sharon's reasons for moving northwafds seem to be justified, 
especially in the light of the general aims of the deep penetration. They were: First, three 
quarlers of the IDF forces in the Sinai were facing the norlhern fronti Therefore, in Sharon's 
concept the IDF could have applied greater pressure on the northern Egyptian Army than on 
the southern. Second, the Egyptian reserves were positioned in front of Cairo, from where 
they could threaten the flank of a southern advance. Third, the IAF bases were closer to the 
north which gave a possibility for more effective air support. Finally, the IDF had to move 
north at some time anyway to widen the bridgehead, this was not possible to the south 
because the southern flank of the bridgehead rested on the Great Bitter Lake. 
673 Newell, p. 29 and 87. 
See also Handel (1994), p. 566 — 568 and 573. 
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Finally, when estimating the viability of the Israeli operational doctrine and 
the performance of the IDF, it seems that basically the existing doctrine was 
sound as soon as it was applied. This, nevertheless, does not deny the fact 
that Israel's strategy failed because operational success did not guarantee 
peace. The fact that Israel signed a peace treaty with Egypt a few years after 
the war was beyond Israel's strategy. This is, however, another matter and is 
not include among the subjects of this study. 
Handel lists the major sources of Israeli military weaknesses and strengths in the Yom 
Kippur War. According to him, the shorlages were too much improvisation, a poor 
command, control and communication system, overall mediocre middle and higher level 
leadership, confused military doctrine, poor understanding of defensive warfare, no night 
fighting, poor staff work, poor in operations in large formations and poor use of time. The 
strengths were motivation, excellence in air and sea warfare and fast and excellent learning 
of technological lessons and adaptation. While most of these can be agreed with, the 
weaknesses are mostly connected to the command system, not to the operational doctrine 
or the tactical and operational abilities of the commanders. 
Handel also states that Israel might have benefited from a totally or partly defensive doctrine 
in 1973, but failed to plan, train and develop her army for this purpose. The question is how 
could the Israelis have known of the limited war aims of the Arabs, not to mention whether 
they even were limited if there was a clause about the possibility of continuing the offence 
according to the situation in their plans. 
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12. AFTERMATH 
The Yom Kippur War was not a victorious war for Israel, although the 
operational achievements were decisive on both fronts. Purely in terms of the 
numbers of losses per day, the Yom Kippur War was less costly than the Six 
Day War had been. However, the duration of the Yom Kippur War increased 
the total losses. Therefore, according to van Creveld, the public felt betrayed, 
and its belief in the IDF's superiority was thoroughly shattered because the IDF 
was incapable of achieving a quick victory against its adversaries.674 
On 2 April 1974, about a half year after the war, the Agranat Committee, 
which was formed to determine what had gone wrong in October 1973, issued 
its first, twenty-five-page, interim report of the 1,511-page document that was 
finished on 30 January 1975. Only twenty years later was the report released 
in full to the public. At the beginning, the investigation was limited to examining 
the intelligence factors and the state of Israeli preparedness. On 10 July, the 
second report, a 423-page document, was completed but only a few extracts 
from it were made public as well and, according to Rothenberg, only 42 pages 
were released for publication in 1979. However, it seems that the central 
conclusions were already known in the latter part of the 1970s, although most 
of the details were kept secret until January 1995.675 
According to Katz, primarily intended to appease the disturbed public, the 
findings of the committee led, instead, to dramatic political and military 
resignations. Prime Minister Golda Meir and Minister of Defence Moshe Dayan 
resigned voluntarily. The Chief of Staff was made responsible for the failures of 
the IDF and the committee recommended that he resign. While in theory this 
was correct — the commander is responsible for his forces — many of the facts 
that had been behind the development of the IDF before the war were not 
under General Elazar's control and, in addition, during the war Elazar showed 
significant judgment. In a way it seems that Elazar was sacrificed to the public. 
It was also recommended that Major General Gonen resign. According to the 
report, he had shown poor tactical judgment. In addition, the report found — as 
already discussed — shortages in the chain of command, in organisations, in 
technical preparations, and in tactical fighting principles on the missile-age 
battlefield. These finding were to cause great changes in the IDF before the 
1980s.676 
674 Van Creveld (1998), p. 243 and 247 and Dupuy (1992), p. 333 and 609. 
According to Dupuy, Israeli losses in killed, wounded and prisoners or missing were a little 
bit more than 12,000 in the Yom Kippur War. In the Six Day War, this number was 5,500. 
Losses per day were 639 in the Yom Kippur War while they were 917 in the Six Day War. 
Arab losses in the Yom Kippur War totalled almost 37,000; i.e., three times those of the 
Israelis. 
One of the results of the Yom Kippur War was also that a research institute called the Jaffee 
Center for Strategic Studies was opened in Tel Aviv University to study defence issues. 
Before that Israel's defence community had been too proud to consult outside advisers. 
675 Katz (1996), p. 195, O'Ballance (1997), pi 272 — 273, Rothenberg, p. 212 and 
Investigating Committee of the Yom Kippur War; The Report. 
676 Katz (1996), p. 195 and Rothenberg, p. 212 — 213. 
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Zeev Schiff estimated after the Yom Kippur War that despite all Israel's 
victories and growing military power, Israel could not and can not deter her 
enemies from attacking, which meant that — as long as there were no peace 
treaties between the parties — Israel had to prepare for the next war. This was 
what actually happened. With the withdrawal from the Sinai in the late 1970s, 
Israel returned to the old principle of "defence through attack", as Lanir puts it. 
At the strategic level, Israel had neither territorial demands nor aggressive 
intentions against her neighbours' armed forces, but if she was to be an object 
of aggression, at the operational level the defence was to be implemented with 
offensive means. This had been the case since the 1950s and it was what the 
IDF was trained for. However in this context, the seizure of enemy territory was 
still included in the doctrine, though more to be used as a bargaining card than 
to enlarge the battlefield. This shows that the current boundaries were seen as 
being safe enough for Israel proper.677 
According to this revised concept, Israel continued to arm herself, and at an 
accelerating pace. This also shows that the strategy of denial approach had 
remained unchanged; i.e., if deterrence did not work, the main aim was to 
pursue a decisive victory. The only thing that changed was the interpretation of 
the concept of pre-emption. After the Yom Kippur War, the Israelis realised 
that it was not possible to speak of a large scale pre-emptive offensive — like 
that of the Six Day War. Therefore, according to Schiff, at best it was possible 
to speak of a pre-emptive strike, or of maintaining a strategic force to 
guarantee a second strike if the Arabs started a war. Nevertheless, according 
to the Agranat Committee report, the enemy antiaircraft missile networks 
would have to be suppressed before mobile action could begin. In a way this 
also shows the tendency to maintain the existing doctrinal principles of first 
acquiring aerial supremacy for further operations.6 8 
To avoid possible surprises and to delay an Arab first strike in the future, the 
IDF more than doubled its standing army from 75,000 to 172,000 by 1982. In 
the meanwhile, the strength of the mobilised reserve was also increased by 
some 60 percent from 275,000 to over 400,000. The Agranat Committee had 
also advised that Israel would have to mobilise as soon as a major threat was 
detected. Therefore, the demands for the time that was needed to mobilise 
were tightened. According to Gabriel, by moving mobilisation depots and 
stores closer to the potential combat areas and by streamlining and 
677 Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 310 — 311 and 314 and Lanir, p. 36. 
678 Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 310 — 311, 315 and 318, Rothenberg, p. 212 — 213, 
Avidor, p. 71 and van Creveld (1998), p. 253 — 254 (Original Inbar, Efraim: Israeli Strategic 
Thinking After 1973, Journal of Strategic Studies 6:1 (March 1983), p. 37 — 57). 
Schiff also estimated that time was not on Israel's side because in the long-run it was 
obvious that Arab military preparations would get better. Therefore, she had to make greater 
efforts to achieve a true peace. 
See also Katz (1996), p. 195 and Gawrych (1996), p. 79. 
Several researchers have maintained that there were numerous changes in the IDF's 
doctrine. However, a closer study reveals that this is a question of the substance of the 
definitions. Katz and Gawrych both, for example, state that there were significant changes in 
the IDF's doctrine. While Gawrych doesn't analyse these items, in Katz's interpretation the 
changes were mostly technical, tactical and mind-set modifications connected to the 
combined arms principle. There is no question of a change in doctrinal principles. 
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computerising the call-up system of the reserves, on average, the IDF needed 
24 hours to mobilise its reserve to 60 percent strength and 48 hours to come to 
full strength after the improvements. The new system was tested in the 1975 
and 1976 manoeuvres and the IDF was, according to Rothenberg, able to get 
the majority of its combat units ready in 48 hours. In addition, along the Jordan 
River and on the Golan Heights the IDF revived, according to van Creveld and 
Schiff, the Haganah-style territorial forces of older reserves, though van 
Creveld states that rather little came of this. However, according to Gabriel, 12 
territorial infantry brigades were established in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
and investments were also made in building strongholds, minefields and anti-
tank ditches to hold off the initial assaults and to buy time for the mobile main 
forces.679 
The force structure was also revised. The main changes concerned the 
balance between different arms and the modernisation of equipment. The 
development was started under the control of Major General Adan. It is 
interesting to note that despite the bad experiences in using tanks during the 
Yom Kippur War, the number of main battle tanks was doubled to some 3,600 
— 3,800 tanks between 1973 and 1982. This means that the number of 
armoured brigades was also doubled. The number of armoured fighting 
vehicles almost tripled from 3,000 to 8,000 in 1982. Some 4,000 of these were 
modern M-113s which means that mechanised units that were attached to 
armoured formations were then really mechanised — not only motorised — to 
keep pace with the tanks and to give them cover, at least in theory. According 
to van Creveld, this meant the jettisoning of the all-tank doctrine. Inside 
armoured divisions, each armoured battalion was provided with a company of 
APC-riding infantry.680 The strength of the IDF in 1982 can be seen in 
Appendix 20. 
When the development programme was started, General Tal also saw the 
need for mechanised infantry and other supporting arms although in his 
concept the tank was still "the core and backbone of the armoured formations, 
all of whose arms are mobile and some of them also armoured." However, it 
can be seen from this statement that the tank was still the decisive weapon of 
land warfare to Tal while all other arms were integrated into the formation in 
order to support the tank. The main purpose of the armoured forces was to 
end wars quickly by deep penetration of the enemy while conquest of terrain 
wasn't so important anymore. In a way, the still existing dominance of tanks 
supports Doctor Pa'il's views that up to the 1990s a large percentage of Israeli 
officers did not understand that mobility on the battlefield was not only the 
mobility of tanks but also the mobility of the supporting arms. However, this 
679 Rothenberg, p. 212 — 213 and 215 — 216, Gabriel, pi 21 and 62 — 63, Cordesman & 
Wagner, p. 110, van Creveld (1998), p. 253 — 254 and Schiff (October Earthquake), p. 316 -
317. 
According to Gabriel, in 1982 Israel was able to mobilise a total ground force of 450,000 in 
24 hours! 
In 1982 the IDF could, according to Gabriel, mobilise 33 armoured, 10 mechanised, five 
paratroop, 12 territorial infantry and 15 artillery brigades. 
680 Van Creveld (1998), p. 254 and 256, Gabriel, p. 21, Cordesman & Wagner, p. 54 — 55 
and 111, House, p. 179. 
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statement can only be evaluated through the tasks of the different arms, pure 
numbers don't reveal the imbalance between arms. Nevertheless, the 
experiences of the 1982 War prove that there is some truth to Pa'il's 
opinion."' 
In addition, other arms were also modernised and equipped according to the 
demands of mobile warfare, the most important of them being artillery. Mortar 
units that had been dropped from the organisations were re-attached to the 
tank battalions to give them immediate fire support. The IDF's artillery more 
than tripled its self-propelled guns from 300 to some 950 by 1982, while the 
calibre also increased. After the Yom Kippur War, the IDF also returned to the 
old principles of dug-in artillery. Self-propelled armoured artillery pieces were 
seen as having more battlefield durability in solid firing positions. The re-
adoption of this concept also shows — despite the increased ability to follow 
tanks in mobile operations — that since 1973 Israeli operational principles more 
and more stressed the primacy of firepower instead of movement. However, 
one should remember that the defensive methods of deploying artillery was 
mainly a consequence of the static no peace, no war" situation on the 
northern borders of Israel after the Yom Kippur War. In addition, after the Yom 
Kippur War the Israelis also concentrated — in addition to the quantitative and 
qualitative modernisation of the Artillery Corps — on training all officers in 
artillery fire control methods regardless of their arm.682 
In addition, to correct the deficiencies in maintenance and preparation, the 
new Inspectorate for Maintenance was set up in 1975. One cut was also 
made; organic reconnaissance battalions were taken away from the divisions. 
According to van Creveld, it was expected that this task would be carried out 
by new technology. In light of the experiences of the 1982 War in Lebanon, 
however, many officers at the operational level regarded this move as an 
error.683 
The combined arms doctrines were tested in several large-scale 
manoeuvres in the Sinai. In 1975, the manoeuvre plan called for the attacker 
to break through a strongly defended zone. According to Rothenberg, this 
offensive was in many ways reminiscent of Sharon's attack in Abu Ageila 
during the Six Day War. It was started at night and when the enemy was 
thrown into confusion and breaches had been made, armour passed through 
the gaps to exploit the success in the enemy rear. This manoeuvre shows that 
the IDF had not abandoned their tanks even with the hard lessons of the Yom 
Kippur War, because they had proved to be suitable for Israeli conditions. 
According to Brower, during the Yom Kippur War tanks had proved the fact 
that using tanks is "people-cheap" and "material-expensive". Despite the large 
numbers of lost tanks, they saved human lives. However, while the Sinai and 
681  Rothenberg, p. 214 and 217, Tal, p. 37 and interview of Doctor, Colonel (ret.) Meir Pa'il. 
682 Gabriel, p. 21, Mizrachi, p. 9 — 10, Movshovitz & Petreanu, p. 19 and Ben-Dor, Charles: 
Artillery's role in the North, IDF Journal IV, NO. 3, Fall 1987, p. 35. 
683 Van Creveld (1998), p. 254 and 256, Gabriel, pi 21, Cordesman & Wagner, p. 54 — 55 
and 111 and House, p. 179. 
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Golan might have favoured the use of deep armoured thrusts, this was not and 
is not the case on all the other fronts facing Israel.684 
Jac Weller has examined the role of foot infantry during the Yom Kippur 
War. According to him, the lack of foot infantry in the Yom Kippur War showed 
that the mechanised infantry also needed foot mobility.685 On the whole, 
however, as the numbers for the change clearly reveal, the modernisation 
programme was conducted at the expense of the numbers and training level of 
foot infantry. The manoeuvres in the Sinai also clearly demonstrate that the 
IDF prepared to combine the strengths of the Six Day War-period IDF and the 
experiences of the Yom Kippur War without trying to analyse the future 
battlefield in greater detail. The principles that were learned during the Yom 
Kippur War and refined in the exercises after the war, proved, however, to be 
ineffective during the "Peace for Galilee" campaign in Lebanon in 1982. 
Neither large encirclements nor the principle of using artillery to wear down 
enemy anti-tank defences were possible in 1982. The main experience of the 
Lebanon War was the need for foot infantry to cover the armoured spearheads 
in built-up areas, in forests and in mountainous terrain. Although this war was 
not a typical conventional war, the shortage of trained foot infantry was 
revealed in mountainous terrain against the Palestinian guerrillas. Therefore, in 
a way, Israel, which drew on the experiences of the Yom Kippur War for the 
bases of the development programme, still prepared for the last war. The IDF 
that was in existence in 1982 would certainly have been superior under the 
conditions of the Yom Kippur War. In mountainous Lebanon against guerrilla 
patrols and Syrian armour, the Israeli tank army was only partly successful. 
This development magnificently illustrates how difficult it is to prepare for future 
wars. 
Connected to the facts mentioned above, there are quite a few statements 
along the lines that with the change of the command generation that had 
experienced all Israel's past wars flexible thinking also vanished. However, the 
1975 manoeuvre testifies to the fact the IDF had not lost its pursuit of mobility, 
although after the Yom Kippur War the tendency of favouring firepower above 
movement was growing. According to Gelber, this was more a result of the 
saturated battlefield and also a consequence of lessening one's own losses. 
Nevertheless, it seems that there is some truth in the statement that firepower 
684 Rothenberg, p. 217 — 218 and Brower, p. 37. 
See also Avidor, p. 71. 
Avidor based his 1978 article on the Israeli tendency to still base the IDF on armour after the 
Yom Kippur War so that as long as there was no significant technological change in the 
tools of war, the strategy and tactics will remain similar in principle to those of previous wars 
as far as the operation of the mobile, armoured force is concerned." In 1978, this statement 
might have seemed rational and as a matter of fact, it was, from the viewpoint of 
conventional war. The next Israeli war was, however, not conventional and the conditions 
were also almost totally different from what the IDF had prepared for. 
685 Weller, 1975, p. 59. 
Weller also predicted in 1975 that the ratio of APCs to tanks would increase to at least 1:1. 
In addition, — and as a consequence of the latter — he also forecasted that mechanised 
infantry would continue to fight from its vehicles. Both of his predictions were to come true in 
1982. However, the losses of mechanised units forced them to dismount, but without training 
and experience in this type of fighting the results were rather poor. 
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has replaced movement. Kadish and Shai recall the experiences of the 1982 
War. Kadish mentions that regular soldiers were prone to use firepower and 
technical means while reserve soldiers, who represented a wider age group, 
were more imaginative and flexible. This is a dilemma that all advanced armies 
have faced on the modern battlefield. In Israel according to Shai, the IDF woke 
up to this reality in the 1990s and since then has again emphasised to its 
officers the importance of understanding the principle of the maintenance of 
aim and the "mobility of mind" in addition to purely physical mobility.686  
Two bigger organisational changes were also carried out; the creation of an 
army corps formation, Gayis or Gayessot, as the Israelis call it and the 
establishment of the Ground Forces Command. According to Rothenberg, the 
army corps was first time introduced late in 1975 and then tested during the 
manoeuvres in 1975 and 1976. Like the brigades in the 1950s and the 
Ugdah's later on, the composition of each corps varied according to its mission 
and as a matter of fact corps were also established according to need. In the 
"Peace for Galilee" operation, the IDF used army corps. The reasons for 
maintaining non-fixed organisations for corps were the same as before, to 
retain maximum flexibility.687 
The general explanation for the command problems during the Yom Kippur 
War was that they were a consequence of the lack of an operational echelon 
above the division and below the command level. After the Yom Kippur War, it 
was still seen that regional commands were not able to carry out peace-time 
activities, mobilise troops in the case of emergency and be in charge of 
operational forces during wartime. While this might be true in theory, the 
command problems during the Yom Kippur War can not only be explained by 
organisational deficiencies. During the early phases of the Yom Kippur War, 
Israel had no more operational echelons than during the Six Day War. In any 
case, after the creation of the corps command, the existence of this echelon 
has divided the opinions of past and present Israeli military leaders. The most 
common opinion has been that the army corps echelon lengthened the chain 
of command more than made it clearer. Professor Gelber is the most critical. 
According to him, the establishment of the army corps was a consequence of 
the Southern Command's inability to lead two specific divisions — Sharon's and 
Adan's — during the Yom Kippur War. This is why the Southern Command was 
put under supervision of General Bar Lev and divided in two. According to 
General Shomron, the division of the Southern Command was made to 
concentrate forces in a certain direction. It seems that both opinions are partly 
right. It is obvious that during the Yom Kippur War the division of the Southern 
Command in two before the crossing and the establishment of new divisions 
embodied the need to decrease the number of subordinates at both levels. In 
addition, the aims of facilitating the command and control process and making 
686 Interviews of Professor, Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Yoav Gelber and Professor Alon Kadish 
and discussions with Doctor, Colonel (ret.) Henan Shai. 
687 Ibid., p. 215, Lorch, p. 59 and Gabriel, p. 75. 
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seen. 
General Simhoni shares General Shomron's opinion that the army corps 
was established for facilitating the command chain while divisions maintained 
their independence. Instead, according to Adan, the army corps was 
unnecessary because at the command level there usually is only one corps. 
According to him, this organisation would only be justified if some special arms 
were concentrated at corps level. Nevertheless, during operation "Peace for 
Galilee" for example, the Northern Command was in charge of an army corps 
of five brigade/division-size components and was, in addition, directly in 
charge of five other brigade/division-size elements. This total strength would 
obviously simply have been too much to control for one command echelon. 
Simhoni also sees that after the creation of the army corps, one command 
echelon was too much in the IDF, though Simhoni does not name the exact 
one and argues his case more for logistic reasons; the growth in the number of 
command echelons also lengthened the logistic chain. This also seems to be 
true. Despite the creation of the army corps, brigades also kept, according to 
Shomron, their status of being used in independent operational tasks.689 
In the atmosphere of these disputes, the army corps didn't prove to be what 
it was exactly expected to be. According to Gelber, the army corps command 
became a big echelon — almost equivalent in size to a command, but without 
true responsibility — that was not able to co-ordinate mobile operations like 
Rommel's staff had been able to do during WW II in the Western Desert. 
Therefore, it seems that more important than the question of should the army 
corps exist or not is the question of how to use it: only to co-ordinate orders 
between divisions and a command or to also accord it independent decision-
making power. This manner of thinking, sharing the General Staff's operational 
responsibility with commands, and later with corps, seems to have been quite 
strange to the Israelis, and operation "Peace for Galilee" was not an exception 
in this regard. According to van Creveld, the IDF had also become at this time, 
despite the growth in its size, top-heavy with massive operational staffs.699 
688 Interviews of Professor, Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Yoav Gelber and Lieutenant General 
(ret.) Dan Shomroni 
689 Interviews of Lieutenant General (ret.) Dan Shomron, Major General (ret.) Avraham Adan 
and Major General (ret.) Uri Simhoni. 
690 Interview of Professor, Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Yoav Gelber and van Creveld (1998), p. 
247. 
The tendency towards centralised superior command might have been a consequence of 
the disputes between Ben-Gurion and his subordinate commanders over the final aims of 
the War of Independence. In any case, excluding operations during the War of 
Independence, it seems that the commands have not had any true responsibility for 
operations. The General Staff has been indirectly in charge of operations, using the 
commands only to control the orders given. 
Gelber provides an illuminating example of the independence of the army corps. According 
to him, Rommel didn't need a colonel to supervise whether every sergeant did his job. The 
principle of Auftragstaktik worked better with reliance. 
See also Gabriel, p. 22 — 23. 
the concentration of forces in different operational directions possible can be 
688 
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The establishment of a Ground Forces Command, MAFCHASH (Mifkedet 
Kochot Ha-sadeh, Ground Forces Headquarters) came into being only after 
operation "Peace for Galilee". This organisational and functional change had 
already been a recommendation of the Agranat Committee, but it was only in 
1983 that the IDF brought together the Infantry, Artillery, Armour and 
Engineering Corps and moved to a unified command structure of the three 
services with each commander responsible to the Chief of Staff for day-to-day 
operations. Up until this point in time, the Chief of Staff had maintained two 
"hats", as General Shomron puts it. There were two main reasons for the 
change and both ultimately derived from the Yom Kippur War. First was the 
aim of concentrating all services under one single commander during time of 
war. In light of the experiences of the 1973 War, the Chief of Staff could not 
concentrate simultaneously on being in charge of both the ground forces and 
the defence forces. However, this change resulted in rather slight changes 
because during a war ground forces formations were to be attached to the 
territorial commands. Therefore secondly and more important, the 
development of the ground forces became the main task of MAFCHASH. A 
balanced development of different arms required an inspectorate to supervise 
this task. Nevertheless, on the whole, the Ground Forces Command was not 
established without disputes. One of the main opponents was the first Chief of 
Staff after the Yom Kippur War, Lieutenant General Mordechai Gur. According 
to Gur, the creation of MAFCHASH cancelled out a lot of ground forces 
independence, decentralised the command system, duplicated staff efforts and 
removed the Chief of Staff from supervising training and combat readiness.691  
In a way, Gur's statement seems to be exaggerated, though without proper 
staff orders his statement might well come true. In practise, however, the 
ground forces had dominated the other services up to this time. From the Air 
Force and Navy viewpoints, this had meant continuous fighting for their 
interests. Therefore, the IDF had lost its ability to conduct joint efforts to some 
degree as well. Thus, the establishment of MAFCHASH meant more a real 
ability for joint operations, even at levels below the General Staff, without 
mentioning the balanced development of the arms of the ground forces. In 
addition, the creation of MAFCHASH changed the organisation of the General 
Staff. In this context, a department that was responsible for research and 
According to Gabriel, since 1973 commands have grown and their role has expended. When 
speaking of peace-time duties, this can be seen as having been true. Territorial commands 
have even begun to develop doctrines specific to their own areas, almost on an alarming 
scale because specialisation might weaken the training level of the reserve to fight in 
different battlefield environments. However, during wartime there is no proof of the 
increased independence of the commands, not even during the 1982 War. 
691  Investigating Committee of the Yom Kippur War; The Report, pi 1461, Abramowitz, Jeff: 
The Evolution of the Ground Corps Command, IDF Journal Vol. III, NO. 3, Summer 1986, p. 
8 and 12, Drori, Amir: "We are Responsible to Develop Further", IDF Journal Vol. III, NO. 3, 
Summer 1986, p. 16 — 17, Abramowitz, Jeff — Weinraub, Jeff: The IDF in '86. Interview of 
Lieutenant General Moshe Levy, IDF Journal Voli III, NO. 2, Spring 1986, p. 7 — 8 and 
Rothenberg, p. 215. 
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developing tactics, and doctrine as well according to Gelber, was also 
established in the Ground Forces' Staff.692 
There were not many changes in the Navy in the years after the Yom Kippur 
War. Israel had succeeded rather well on her sea flanks, the naval doctrine 
had proved to be suitable as was the case with the technical development of 
the Navy before the war. Instead, the Air Force underwent rather significant 
changes, though they were mostly of a technical nature. According to Cohen 
and Gissin, the first lesson learned was that in order to minimise the damages 
of a surprise attack, the IAF could not rely on pre-emption but had also to 
develop a counter-offensive capability under conditions where a first strike was 
not possible. According to Gissin, this required a large and modern air force. In 
this concept, a counter-offensive capability meant the ability to first suppress 
enemy air defence networks before a counter-offensive of the ground forces. 
Logically — if we do not speak of a first strike — this is not far from the previous 
principle of destroying enemy air force components on the ground before 
starting ground offensives. Therefore, it can be said that the priorities of the 
tasks of the IAF were only updated for the missile era after the Yom Kippur 
War. Instead, technically the IAF was modernised. In purely numerical terms, 
the number of combat aircraft increased some 25 percent up to 1982. 
However, qualitatively the growth was much greater. Up to 1982, the Israelis 
had reconstructed their command systems and battle management 
technologies — including the creation of an autonomous IAF branch 
responsible for ground intelligence — bought sophisticated new planes, 
adapted electronic warfare systems, made advances in remotely piloted 
vehicles and sensor systems and purchased airborne warning and air control 
systems in order to manage its air battles.693 
692 Ben-Dor, Charles: Ground Forces Headquarters. Combined Forces at Every level, IDF 
Journal 17, Summer 1989, p. 6 — 8, Abramowitz, p. 12 and interviews of Professor, 
Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Yoav Gelber and Major General (ret.) Uri Simhoni. 
Simhoni, who has been one of the chiefs of the department that was responsible for 
researching tactics, compares this organisation to the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC). 
Also interviews of Lieutenant General (ret.) Dan Shomron and Major General (ret.) Adan and 
discussions with Doctor, Colonel (ret.) Shai. 
Shomron and Adan both saw the advantages of MAFCHASH rather than the possible 
weaknesses. General Shomron was the first Commander-in-Chief of the ground forces and 
Major General Drori his successor. Lieutenant General Levy was the Chief of Staff when the 
Ground Forces Command was created in the General Staff. 
Shai also saw the advantage of balancing the development of different arms in the creation 
of MAFCHASH. Up to this time, the past decades had been more or less dominated by 
armoured forces. This had already begun during Laskov's tenure as Chief of Staff. This had 
not only meant loss of the combined arms advantage but also the loss of joint services 
command. Gradually the Armoured Corps had come to comprise the defence forces, 
supported by air and naval arms. 
693 Cohen, p. 397 and 425, Gissin, pi 106, 112 — 113, 128, 415 — 416, 422 — 423 and 432, 
Rothenberg, p. 212 and 221 — 222, Cordesman & Wagner, p. 16, 11 — 113 and 118 and The 
Military Balance 1981 — 1982, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London 1981, 
pi 52. 
According to Cordesman and Wagner, the IAF had 476 combat aircraft and no armed 
helicopters in 1973. In 1982, the numbers were over 600 combat aircraft of which 275 were 
329 
Gissin sees the introduction of Airborne Warning and Control System 
(AWACS) planes as a continuation of the delegated decision-making process 
in the IAF. The Yom Kippur War, as well as the Vietnam War a little bit earlier, 
had clearly demonstrated, according to Gissin, the deficiencies of centralised 
command systems in a heavily saturated hostile environment of surface-to-air 
missiles and large numbers of fighter aircraft on both sides within a confined 
time and space framework." Therefore, Gissin sees the use of AWACS aircraft 
in the IAF — however technologically advanced — as being more rooted in the 
operational command and control doctrines than in technologies. AWACS 
systems also enabled the IDF's traditional principle of "command bypassing" in 
modern warfare, where all formations in the air were still to be under the direct 
control of the commander of the air force and his designated deputies despite 
the command chain on the ground. One central reason for the purchase of the 
AWACS planes was also the fact that Israel had only a little ground radar and 
it was vulnerable.694 
Helicopters were kept under the command of the Air Force despite the 
tendency to develop combined arms combinations. This was mainly for 
logistical reasons, but it can be expected that there was no need to change the 
existing concept: the principles of co-operation were already adopted in the 
early 1960s. In the meantime, the airlift capability of the IAF also rose with the 
purchase of the new C-130 transports. In 1976, in the context of the Entebbe 
rescue operation, the IAF Commander-in-Chief, Major General Peled, 
suggested that paratroopers be sent to conquer Uganda or at least the city of 
Entebbe. While the first aim might have been an exaggeration, this reveals, 
however, that the IDF also had — in addition to the theoretical ability to conduct 
at least two battalion-size heliborne operation in the vicinity of Israel — long-
range airborne capacity, possibly even for a brigade-size airdrop. On the 
whole, it seems, however, that there was no longer any room for traditional 
paratroop operations in the Middle Eastern environment, their fate has been 
the same as cavalry's in the first half of the 20th century, as Simhoni puts it. 
Instead, Simhoni estimates that the role of heliborne landings is growing; not 
just among paratroopers, but also for other infantry units. In addition, the first 
armed helicopters entered service in the IAF at the end of the 1970s, including 
tank-hunting helicopters for whom combat theories were, according to Cohen, 
created in separate and joint exercises with the ground forces. Despite this 
fact, the role of attack helicopters in operation "Peace for Galilee" was slight, 
obviously because of their vulnerability to shoulder-to-air missile patrols in the 
mountainous terrain. Besides as a consequence of the small size of the IDF's 
area of operations, helicopters and tanks can be seen as being rivals in tank-
hunting missions. In this concept tanks, which can stay on the battlefield the 
attack capable, and 42 armed helicopters in addition to a transport force of over 40 
helicopters and some 50 fixed-wing planes. 
694 Gissin, p. 106, 112 — 113, 128, 415 — 416, 422 — 423 and 432. 
Later, when the AWACS systems were in use in the IAF, the airborne systems were 
primarily used as a relay communication post between aircraft and the ground control 
station. This technical implementation was a consequence of the IAF's operational style and 
tactics of low level penetration and did not lessen the tactical authority of the airborne 
systemsi Originally, the Americans recommended the AWACS systems to the IAF, obviously 
also for commercial reasons. 
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whole time — without refuelling for example — are, according to Simhoni, more 
suitable for this task.695  
It should be remembered that after the Yom Kippur War the guerrilla 
problem that was connected to the events in Lebanon rose steadily. This 
forced the IDF to develop means to cope with this threat as well. It also forced 
the IDF to use conventional troops to support the operations of special troops, 
the most prominent being operation "Litanr in March 1978. While these 
operations gave little to the IDF from the viewpoint of conventional warfare, 
they, however, provided experience in joint operations on a smaller scale as 
well as some expertise in fighting in mountainous terrain against guerrillas. 
However, the guerrilla problem remained and, in addition, it seems that the 
experiences gained from fighting were not taken as seriously as could be 
supposed. Despite the fact that armoured and mechanised forces joined 
operation "Litanr, the over-confidence in the omnipotence of mechanised 
forces continued and the real problems were revealed only in 1982.696 
Aside from in Israel, the experiences of the Yom Kippur War were also 
interpreted elsewhere much more than the previous wars of the Middle East. 
There are at least three reasons for this. First, when speaking of the extent, 
duration, number of troops and intensity of the past wars of the Middle East, 
the Yom Kippur War is generally seen as the only real war in this list, the 
others had been more or less campaigns.697 Second, the Yom Kippur War was 
the first conventional war in the missile era, other than the Vietnam War which 
was partly a guerrilla and counter-guerrilla war from the military point of view. 
Third, almost all the most modern American and Soviet weapons were used by 
the opposite sides. This provided an opportunity to study their performance. In 
addition, Israel fought successfully in a low defensive belt against a superior 
enemy on the Golan Heights. This corresponded to the picture of warfare that 
was expected in Eastern Europe in fighting between NATO and Warsaw Pact 
forces. 
The United States and the United Kingdom are obviously the countries that 
learned the most. According to Paul Hardy, the Yom Kippur War caused a 
reordering of the priorities of the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC). Shortly after the war, the Americans established a Special 
695 Cordesman & Wagner, p. 113, van Creveld (1998), p. 267, Cohen, p. 473 — 476 and 
interview of Major General (ret.) Uri Simhoni. 
696 Katz (1996), pi 198, Katz (1989), p. 140 — 142 and Rothenberg, p. 227 — 228. 
During operation "Otani', the IDF used, in addition to special forces like Sayeret Golani, 
Sayeret Matkal and Border Guard Ya'Ma'M, their regular brigades, including paratroopers, 
the Golent Brigade, and the 7th and 188th Armoured Brigades. 
697 Sharon, p. 76. 
See also Gabriel, p. 179 — 181. 
The intensity of the fighting in 1973 can be seen in the numbers of battle stress casualties 
as welli In 1973, the IDF undertook a program to prevent and treat battle shock. Trained 
battle psychologists were assigned to every brigade and division and made responsible for 
monitoring the morale and stress levels of combat units. Methods for measuring combat 
morale and confidence were also developed so that it was possible to survey forces through 
a questionnaire, transmit the results to rear headquarters for a computer analysis and report 
to commanders in less than 24 hours. The object was prevention. 
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Readiness Study Group to identify and assess specific operational problems 
that would probably have an effect on the Army and to recommend 
improvements to overcome those problems on a future battlefield. According to 
Shai, the main aim — which was a consequence of the Yom Kippur War — was 
to find balance between arms and services. Rothenberg goes further still by 
stating that the battles on the Golan Heights were cited in official U.S. Army 
publications as a model of how to fight outnumbered and win". It seems that 
there are several facts that support this statement. First, according to Hardy, 
the principle of active defence was a brainchild of Generals William Depuy, the 
Head of TRADOC, and Donn A. Starry, commander of the U.S. Armoured 
School in Fort Knox. They saw the Israeli way of fighting during the Yom 
Kippur War as representing just the combat doctrine that could be applicable 
to Europe. Second, although the Israelis had also had initial deficiencies during 
the Yom Kippur War — especially in the use of the Air Force and in balancing 
the armoured forces, infantry and supporting arms (equivalent to the problems 
that the German Panzergrenadiers had experienced during the later years of 
WW II) — the Israeli solution of adapting the existing organisation and 
equipment to extend the battlefield convinced the Americans of the fitness of 
active defence. Finally, this led to the birth of the "AirLandBattle" doctrine and 
to its European application, the "Follow-on-Forces" doctrine where Nigel T. 
Bagnall, who wrote his study of the Israeli art of war, played a central role.698 
While the Yom Kippur War served as an example of modern conventional 
warfare, the Israelis did their own analysis and modifications. However, the 
IDF's success in operation "Peace for Galilee" clearly shows how difficult it is 
to estimate the next war correctly and to prepare properly for it at both 
doctrinal and purely practical levels. IDF Chief of Staff, General Mordechai 
Gur's lecture early in 1978 sheds light on this problem. He compares the 
development of the military art to a missile as follows: 
" A proper command system might be compared to a ballistic missile. A 
good missile will reach its objectives while overcoming those forces, the 
weather, wind, etc. It is built on the assumption that unforeseen forces 
will affect its flight; and it must be able to identify and overcome those 
698 Hardy, p. 53, 65 — 66, 77, 142 — 143, 146 and 173, discussions with Doctor, Colonel (ret.) 
Hanan Shai, Rothenberg, p. 188, McInnes Colin: BAOR in the 1980s, Defence Analysis 
4/1988, p. 383 — 385 and Farndale, Martin: Operational Level of Command, RUSI-journal, 
3/1988, p. 26. 
Depuy was deeply interested in German ideas about Panzergrenadier tactics after the 
October War. According to Hardy, that war had clearly demonstrated the need for close co-
operation between tanks and infantry to defeat enemy anti-tank infantry. The Israeli solution 
of allowing their infantry to fight from their APCs as long as possible was consistent with 
Depuy's beliefs about combined arms and suppression. In addition, the German operational 
doctrine HDv 100/100 published in September 1973 — before the Yom Kippur War — was 
used by Depuy, Starry, and their staffs. 
Later in March 1981, a year before the "AirLandBattle" doctrine (FM 100-5) was published, 
General Starry wrote an article Extending the Battlefield in Military Review. Although the 
Yom Kippur War is not specially mentioned in this article, the Korean War and Middle 
Eastern wars where the Soviet operational concept, tactics and equipment had been used, 
were in the background of Starry's ideas. See Starry, Donn S: Extending the Battlefield, 
Military Review, March 1981, p. 31 — 50. 
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forces during that flight. A controlling mechanism is needed, correcting 
its course when necessary, but without causing the missile to stop. Only 
when the missile is far off course, however, is its self-destruct 
mechanism activated. But only in case the missile is clearly not about to 
reach its target. ... A proper command system should be able to set 
itself goals, and then strive to attain those goals in spite of the clear 
realisation that things will go wrong, but also in the confidence that, 
when they do go wrong, the system will be able to overcome the 
obstacles... Such a system might operate in two different ways. The first 
is to plan everything in detail, then start going. The second is to lay 
down general objectives only and to start going at once. The IDF 
normally takes the second of these ways. ... A proper command system 
is based on three principles, namely (a) a clear definition of the 
objectives to be attained; (b) thorough planning; and (c) a proper order 
of priorities."699 
This citation describes the past of the IDF rather well as well. The 
development of the art of war is a complicated process involving numerous 
issues. This complexity can be controlled only with clear goals. In Israel, the 
red thread has been mobility. The Israeli Defence Forces have handled the 
pursuit of this aim at the operational level of warfare relatively well. However, a 
war is an entity composed of both political and military matters where complete 
victory — remembering the relativity of this word — can be reached only at the 
political level. Today, in the year 2001, the Middle East is still in the throes of 
low intensity conflict. 
699 This lecture was originally given in Hebrew. The English translation is made by Martin van 
Creveld and can be seen in his book Command in War, p. 194 — 195. 
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Conclusions 
The purpose of this study has been to examine the background and reasons 
behind the search for operational mobility within the Israeli Defence Forces. 
This study covers the years from the late 19th century up until the late 1970s. 
During these years, the self-defence of the dispersed Jewish settlements in 
Palestine took shape as modern armed forces. Since the late 1930s, already 
before the establishment of the Israeli Defence Forces, the most central issue 
behind the development of the military art has been the pursuit of mobility. For 
the Israelis, this has been a means of compensating for certain weaknesses, 
the most important of them being geographical vulnerability and inferiority in 
manpower. 
The concept of operational mobility is not new. It can be dated back to the 
time when a caveman surprised his enemy instead of meeting him club-to-
club. In the 20th century, the best known theorists behind the concepts of 
operational mobility are Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart and Major General John F. 
C. Fuller, the most known practitioners have been the German Panzer 
Generals during WW II and the Israelis since WW 11. In light of military theories 
ranging from the Chinese Sun Tzu up to the 20th century theorists and 
practitioners, the Americans created a theory called Manoeuvre Warfare 
Theory in the 1970s. This is the reason why the development of the Israeli 
military art is also connected to the theory of manoeuvre warfare in places. 
The IDF's operational principles since the late 1930s can be seen as 
paralleling the classic thoughts behind operational mobility as well as the 
theory of manoeuvre warfare. This shows that the Israeli military art has not 
developed separately from developments elsewhere, but is in its broad 
outlines only an evolution of past theories and experiences. Nevertheless, the 
views of the role of classic military theory differ in Israel. Some scholars and 
soldiers, who tend to see this question in a practical way, stress the 
importance of officers in the young IDF in the Israeli military art. The other side 
is that group that tends to see the influence of the theorists of the military art 
as significant to the background of the development of the IDF. It seems that 
the truth lies somewhere in between. 
The central aims behind operational mobility and manoeuvre warfare are the 
same. According to manoeuvre warfare theory, it is not possible for the side 
that is weaker — mainly in terms of manpower and firepower — to adopt 
defensive principles from an operational point of view. Therefore, the main 
purpose is to take advantage of enemy weaknesses by moving troops, 
although manoeuvre can also be seen on the mental level of warfare. The 
main principles of manoeuvre warfare are pre-emption aimed at surprising the 
opponent; dislocation aimed at rendering the enemy's strength irrelevant; and 
disruption, which means attacking the opponent's vulnerabilities, including by 
psychological means. At the physical level manoeuvre warfare can be 
described as consisting of organisational means and command and control 
principles that will make the observation — orientation — decision — action-circle 
faster, and in this way improve the performance of the military force. This all 
illustrates that manoeuvre warfare theory also represents only an analysis of 
past theories and practices. 
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During the period that this study covers, the development of the Israeli art of 
war can be divided into five main phases: 
1) the period of individual infantry and guerrilla tactics from the 1930s to the 
eve of the War of Independence in 1948, 
- 2) the mobile infantry era from the War of Independence to the 1956 Sinai 
Campaign, 
- 3) the era of the tank-air army or lightning warfare from the end of the 1956 
War, 
- 4) the dominance of tanks or the all-tank era, 
- 	
5) the budding period of combined arms. 
The foundation of the Israeli doctrine was laid down as early as the time 
before WW II, when the state of Israel did not even exist. In the early years of 
the 20th century, an increasing number of Jews who lived outside of Palestine 
immigrated to Palestine as a consequence of the aims of the Zionist 
movement, and because of the persecution of Jews in Eastern Europe. This 
immigration gradually caused growing disputes between the indigenous Arab 
population and the Jewish pioneers. At the very beginning, the Jews relied on 
hired local Arab and Circassian guards to defend their isolated settlements. 
This continued until 1904 when the second wave of immigration came to 
Palestine from Russia and Eastern European. These people had some 
experience with defence because they had protected their earlier homes 
against different gangs of bandits. The second movement of pioneers 
organised a small secret organisation called Bar-Giora in 1907. Two years 
later this group was expanded and renamed Hashomer. Hashomer began to 
train the members of the settlements to use weapons and organised armed 
guards against banditry, and thus took the defence of the settlements into its 
own hands for the first time. At the very beginning, Jewish tactics were based 
on the teachings of individual leaders with different — and often non-military -
backgrounds. 
During World War I, British troops conquered Palestine. Three battalions of 
Jews were authorised to enlist in the British Army. Although this so-called 
Jewish Legion did not gain any real combat experience, many of the future 
leaders of Israel served in the Legion and gained a lasting respect for regular 
army procedures. In the years that followed, this training became significant 
when the British-trained men assumed a leading role in defence affairs, 
especially when the IDF was established during and after the War of 
Independence. 
The period of independent infantry 
The Arab threat materialised three times during the 1920s and 1930s in the 
form of an overall attack on Jewish settlements and towns. The weakness and 
unwillingness of the Mandate authorities to protect the Jews strengthened their 
thoughts about defence against the Arabs and led to the foundation of the 
Haganah organisation, which can be seen as the real ancestor of the IDF. 
During these years, the semi-legal Haganah organised its ranks. The defence 
of settlements became the major concern. By inducting all citizens over the 
age of 17, both men and women, as members of the Haganah, a fair basis for 
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defence was laid. In addition, a spirit of defence was born amongst the 
pioneers in the settlements, which was totally different than traditional Jewish 
pacifism. Everyday life in a continually changing hostile environment also 
formed a basis for innovative defence principles. 
During the third and longest Arab uprising before World War II from 1936 -
39, the Haganah made its most dramatic developments. It had to develop 
methods based on fast raids on enemy bands, aiming at their destruction and 
getting rid of the local threat. Three measures were taken, two of them largely 
contributed by the British. The first was the establishment of mobile Field 
Companies. The core of these forces was a small and unofficial mobile unit 
called Ha-Nodedet (patrols or wanderers), which was composed of volunteers 
from the Jerusalem Haganah in 1936. Nodedet was led by a Russian 
immigrant, Yitzhak Sadeh, who was one of the real forefathers of Israeli tactics 
and doctrine. This force finally broke the tradition of passive defence and is 
also seen as the basis of the Israeli Armoured Corps. In 1937, Nodedet formed 
a skeleton of country-wide mobile forces called FOSH (Plugot Sadeh, field 
companies). These units paved the way for the future Israeli fighting doctrine. 
Their tactics were new; they didn't wait passively for Arab attacks, rather they 
set out to track down and ambush the Arab guerrillas. 
The second measure was the establishment of the Jewish Settlement Police 
(Notrim) with British assistance. Jews selected from a list of "reliables" were 
taken into this para-military force, which consisted of three main elements: a 
number of regular units called Special Constables, a large number of unpaid 
"supernumeraries" and mobile units. Within the ranks of the Settlement Police, 
the Jews were able to extend the trained reserves of the Haganah. 
The third measure, and the one which was to have more of an indirect 
influence than the others on the future IDF, was the foundation of a special 
unit, the Special Night Squads (S.N.S.) under the command of the British 
Intelligence Officer Captain Charles Orde Wingate in spring 1938. Wingate left 
his mark on the military thinking of the Haganah from the tactical level to 
theoretical concepts, and his influence can be traced to subsequent Israeli 
campaigns. The most important influences were the principles of surprise, 
initiative, mobility and delegated leadership, which, however, were also 
principles emphasised by Sadeh. During Wingate's tour in Palestine, the Jews 
also got their first introduction to Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, the British military 
analyst who created the famous "Strategy of Indirect Approach" theory, which 
represents the modern interpretation of the classic principles behind the 
thinking on mobility, and is also often linked to the Israeli art of war. It is also 
obvious that already in the late 1930s and early 1940s, Liddell Hart's ideas 
were rooted in Israeli military thinking, though the extent remains unclear. 
During WW II, as the German-Italian threat from North Africa came closer, 
the British again made some informal arrangements with the Haganah and 
established a full-time military organisation called PALMACH, mainly for armed 
scout missions. These companies were formed from the Settlement Police and 
S.N.S. veterans, and in this way the already adopted tactical skills were 
transferred to these new units. The threat did not materialise, but over 2,000 
PALMACH members got military training which, combined together with their 
innovative tactics and other military skills, had an important role in the Israeli 
art of war in the future. After WW II, PALMACH and the remnants of the FOSH 
formed the skeleton of the Haganah. However, PALMACH was an elite group 
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of socialist-oriented pioneers from the settlements, which caused disputes 
between them and the Haganah leaders after the War of Independence when 
the IDF was regularised. 
Jews also enlisted in the British Army during WW II. Over 28,000 Jewish 
men and 4,000 women served in its ranks of whom approximately 450 were 
promoted to officer. Many of these men and women immigrated to Palestine in 
the latter part of the 1940s. Their skills were in the background of the formal 
training and organisation of the IDF. Military experience in all branches of the 
army, in the commandos, in the air force and in the navy as well as Israeli's 
first introduction to administration and logistics originates mainly with the 
British Army. In addition those Jews — mainly PALMACH members — who 
served in the British Special Air Service in North Africa during WW II brought 
ideas about long-range penetration of mobile forces to Palestine. 
When the War of Independence finally broke out in May 1948 after a half a 
year of various hostilities with the Arabs (a period called the Battle on the 
Roads), the Israelis were quite well prepared to fight from the viewpoint of 
organisational matters and trained manpower. The Israelis were at least equal 
to their enemies in manpower, without speaking of their qualitative advantage. 
In addition, the organisation of the whole army was already in existence; the 
General Staff was established and in charge of operations, regional 
commands (Southern, Central, Eastern and Northern) were formed and 
missions were divided between territorial and mobile units. It was also an 
advantage to operate on interior lines against the dispersed thrusts of the 
enemies. 
The real weakness of the Israelis was the lack of heavy arms and aircraft. 
The Israelis tried to compensate for this disparity with their innovative tactical 
skills, and they finally succeeded in a quite satisfactory fashion. During the 
war, arms purchases also improved the situation. Elements of the indirect 
approach and the early tendency towards manoeuvre can already be seen in 
this war, although mainly at the lower levels of command. Although brigade 
organisations were already in use, in practice they were only administrative 
frameworks for small unit action; i.e., company and battalion operations. 
The Israelis had, however, learned to disperse and concentrate their forces, 
they knew the area of operations and were capable of gathering intelligence 
information. Typical mobile operations were — especially in the southern front -
deep penetrations into the enemy's rear with jeep-borne units. In addition, 
instead of using frontal attacks, the Israelis emphasised strikes against the 
enemy's flanks or tried to encircle them with the aim of disrupting their will to 
fight. Night attacks were also used often. 
The major weakness in the Israeli performance during the War of 
Independence was their inability to control and lead larger formations (in this 
case brigades). This happened on the Jordanian front in particular, where 
there was no space for deep operations and the adversary was the well-
trained Arab Legion. The impact of the Air Force was also — except for the final 
stages of the war when the command structure was unified — quite 
insignificant; although quite soon after they purchased their planes, the Israeli 
got air superiority in their own areas. Naval operations were rare. 
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The era of mobile infantry 
After the War of Independence, the force structure of the IDF was stabilised, 
but not without disputes between ex-PALMACH members and other parts of 
the former Haganah. The organisational structure had been ready before the 
preceding war and was kept almost intact. However, IDF personnel 
experienced changes when Prime and Defence Minister David Ben-Gurion 
finally made a decision to favour the British-trained officers. Ben-Gurion 
wanted to remove the political, para-military and haphazard character of the 
PALMACH from the higher echelons of the army, and gave these missions to 
British-trained professional soldiers who were loyal to their political leaders. 
This dilemma led to some dismissals of senior PALMACH officers, but many of 
them also stayed. Younger PALMACH officers, who had not yet reached 
command positions, mainly stayed. This was a real advantage in the years to 
come. With British style administration and the innovative fighting skills of 
PALMACH, the new IDF could adopt the best traits of both models. British-
trained officers were responsible for organisational matters and wartime 
planning while younger PALMACH officers were responsible for training. 
The overall system of the defence forces was not adopted from Switzerland, 
as is usually thought. It had similarities with the Swiss system, but the Israelis 
developed a system of their own. A small cadre of regular officers, N.C.O.s 
and quite a large number of conscripts with a rather long service record formed 
the skeleton of the army. They were backed by a well-trained reserve whose 
skills were guaranteed by a long period of annual refresher training. Early 
warning in mobilisation was based on territorial defence and, on the most 
hostile frontiers, on the so-called para-military NAHAL settlements. 
Israeli fighting doctrine was also designed between the War of 
Independence and the 1956 Suez Crisis, and its major features have remained 
the same without any remarkable changes up to this day. This doctrine is 
divided into three levels: conditioning factors, political-military factors and 
operational area. 
The operational doctrine was based on several principles that have since 
modified Israeli military thinking as well as their organisations. First of all, 
because of the small and vulnerable size of the country, the overall purpose 
was to transfer the battles to enemy soil. This emphasised offensive principles 
and mobility. A short war concept was adopted because of the limited war 
economy in manpower, material and economic resources. However in the 
meantime, the Israelis emphasised the overall aim of achieving a decisive 
victory for deterrence purposes, which also could, nevertheless, be costly, but 
if the victory was seen as necessary, a certain rate of casualties would have 
been acceptable. Because of their inferiority in terms of quantitative strength, 
the Israelis also relied on qualitative superiority, both in manpower and in 
equipment. The principle of retaliation attacks was also adopted to reinforce 
the deterrence policy. Finally, the concept of pre-emption was already 
considered in the early 1950s, although it was not yet applied. Nevertheless, 
even in the period after the 1950s, pre-emption did not become a self-evident 
fact, rather it was thought through thoroughly in every single case. In the 
1950s, these doctrinal principles — quite similar to the principles of manoeuvre 
warfare — also began to effect IDF organisations, although not so much before 
the 1956 Suez Crisis. 
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In the first part of the 1950s, because of the small size of the defence 
allocations, infantry was still the main branch, although the question of mobility 
was acute. This tendency dominated in the early 1950s during Generals 
Makleff's and Dayan's tenures as Chief of Staff. Infantry dominance was quite 
natural at the time because both Makleff and Dayan were infantry officers. 
Dayan, however, had good experiences with motorised infantry in the War of 
Independence, and during his tenure he rooted the ideas of mobile infantry in 
the IDF. 
Nevertheless, after the War of Independence there also was a school of 
tank officers in Israel. They were led by Colonel Haim Laskov. However, 
disputes over the role of the tank in future wars were not rare. Therefore, up 
until the 1956 Suez Crisis there was no common agreement on how the tanks 
should be used in battle. Three major opinions existed. The first was held by 
the mobile infantry school as emphasised by the General Staff. To them, tanks 
were support weapons. The second school was the manoeuvre school to 
whom tanks, used for battalion-size independent striking missions, 
represented a force to be used for indirect approach behind the enemy front 
after the infantry breakthrough. The third school — consisting of most of the 
tank officers — favoured the German-style fighting doctrine; self-sufficient 
armoured brigades composed of combat teams of tanks, mechanised infantry 
and additional units to fan out in deep narrow thrusts and cut the enemy into 
isolated pockets and finally destroy him. However, the tank school also 
adopted the opinion that grinding tank-to-tank battles were to be avoided if this 
slowed the advance of the armoured spearheads. 
Finally, a short time before the 1956 War, Ben-Gurion reached a decision in 
the spirit of Laskov; to deploy armour effectively and with maximum mobility in 
the largest possible concentrations. The principal mission of the tanks was 
defined as the destruction of enemy forces and not the seizing of territory. The 
concept of massed tanks coincided with the Israeli doctrine. In the ranks of the 
tank officers, armour was already seen as a means of paralysing enemy forces 
with swift penetrations into their depth against vulnerable targets. This also 
included, however, the seizing of geographical objectives — for instance vital 
road junctions — although this aim was, in itself, not a decisive one for tank 
formations, nor was it vital in the doctrine of the IDF. The principal purpose 
was to get space for continuous operations to finally destroy or paralyse 
enemy forces. Therefore — and for the first time in the IDF — tanks with both 
fire-power and ability to move under fire were regarded as a tool to destroy the 
adversary's forces, including reserves and armoured formations. This 
corresponded to the aim of a decisive victory. However, because of a lack of 
quantity, armour was not supposed to be used in exhausting frontal attacks 
against enemy masses. It was to be used according to the concept of indirect 
approach by keeping pace and concentrating forces against enemy 
weaknesses. These concepts, initially based on copied foreign manuals -
mainly British, which ultimately had their origin in German manuals — became 
the basis of all ground forces in the IDF, not only the Armoured Corps. 
The role of the Air Force grew during this phase while the Navy was seen as 
being in the second tier of development. This latter point did not mean that the 
Israelis didn't understand the possible threat of their two (Mediterranean and 
Red Sea) naval theatres. Because of a shortage of money, the Navy simply 
was not top priority, although one might say that before the 1956 Suez 
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Campaign there were not priorities between the branches. The Air Force, 
however, underwent a transformation. While Israel's Air Force was like a 
miniature great power air force with different types of planes in different 
missions in the War of Independence, in 1956 a large part of the Air Force was 
made up of multi-purpose jets that could be used both in bombing and 
interceptor missions. This transition was mainly made before the 1956 War, 
and the IAF already theoretically had the ability to launch a pre-emptive strike 
in 1956. In any case, the concept of pre-emption was obviously not fully 
adopted before the 1956 Suez Crisis. 
The 1956 Sinai Campaign, the Israeli operation Kaddesh, was an 
exceptional war from the Israeli point of view because many of the opening 
movements were planned secretly in the political arena with the British and the 
French. This put some constraints on the operations, which the Israeli field 
commanders did not know. Chief of Staff Dayan favoured the idea of swift 
penetrations into the enemy's rear, but didn't trust the technically unreliable 
tanks — and therefore the General Staff opted for a blend of the mobile infantry 
and manoeuvre school approaches. Armour was not concentrated in Ugdahs, 
divisional frameworks that were established before the war. However, tanks 
were kept in brigade organisations, as were other forces. Ugdahs, which 
aimed at being operational commands, kept only a little of their decision- 
making power, and delegated the rest to the brigades. Therefore the brigades 
in the Sinai Campaign represented more than tactical formations, which for its 
part revealed a gap — the lack of an operational echelon — between Israeli 
strategic and tactical decision-making. In this war, operational decisions were 
in many cases made at the tactical level according to successes and not 
according to national aims. 
Inside the Armoured Corps, an independent role for armour capable of 
spearheading an assault was already adopted and this was to have a decisive 
role in the war. On the other hand, the paratroop brigade, which was supposed 
to spearhead a possible offensive in the peacetime planning, only had a 
secondary role — except for the opening move, where a paratroop battalion 
was dropped deep in the Sinai to implement the casus belli of the Anglo-
French commitment to the war. Armoured brigades were first kept in reserve. 
Nevertheless, during the war they were committed to battles, mostly with 
independent missions and at first against Dayan's specific order to keep tank 
formations in reserve. However, the mechanised and armoured units 
performed well. Commanders applied what they had learned, acted intuitively 
according to the situation and tried to make use of success, terrain and enemy 
weaknesses along the lines of Liddell Hart's "expanding torrent" concept and 
Fuller's "Plan 1919". 
Dayan, Wingate's "pupil", played a large role in the war plan. Although some 
initial frontal attacks were used more or less ineffectively, the tendency to find 
holes in enemy lines and breakthrough his lines of communications dominated. 
After the Egyptian withdrawal order in the northern and central sector of the 
Sinai, the Israelis acted according to the concept of the "expanding torrent". In 
this way tank formations assisted by the Air Force, mainly via interdiction, 
made their way to the Suez Canal. In addition, the Israelis pushed one of their 
brigades through mountainous and pathless terrain on the southern part of the 
front, applying the principle of preferring the hazards of terrain over those of 
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the enemy and encircled the Egyptian troops by total surprise, an operation 
that later was compared to Liddell Hart's indirect approach. 
The birth of lightning warfare doctrine 
Because of the positive experiences with the use of tanks, the ideas of the 
mobile infantry school were abandoned after the war, and the manoeuvre 
school and an independent armour school formed the basis of the armour 
doctrine in the years that followed. The tendency towards mobility 
strengthened when Chief of Operations Yitzhak Rabin and reserve General 
Avraham Yoffe planned a doctrine, called "Constant Flow" in this study, in the 
beginning of the 1960s. This concept was based on the assumption that troops 
would be safe while constantly on the move, while they would be in danger in 
fixed fortifications. In this way, the IDF — at least partly — abandoned the idea 
of trench warfare and fixed defence, including fortifications. Simplifying, the 
"Constant Flow" doctrine stressed indirect action; this meant mental mobility at 
a planning level and operational and tactical mobility in practice; i.e., flanking 
attacks, infiltration and attacks from the rear. In the early 1960s these 
principles were also written into different levels of manuals. 
This all also affected the organisations. The Israelis re-built their divisional 
task forces, Ugdahs, although only in reserve. The Ugdahs consisted of a 
small permanent staff and brigades and auxiliary units according to the task. 
These task forces were not only trained for operative penetrations and 
encirclements, but also for breakthrough battles in the initial phases of the 
fighting. At a tactical level, brigades and their lower echelons were trained for 
fast, mobile battles, and for surprise attacks and ambushes, in other words for 
the kind of action where the possibility of being tied down in attrition warfare 
was slight. At frontal and General Staff level, the Israelis emphasised unusual 
thinking, planning and implementation, alternative concepts of operations 
including deception, and the ability to change plans according to the situation. 
The idea of unorthodox thinking put heavy stress on the chain of command 
and on commanders. Therefore, the Israelis adopted a command process that 
was equivalent to the German Auftragstaktik. The fathers of this principle, 
called "Optional Control" in Israel, were Generals Haim Laskov and Yitzhak 
Rabin. The basic idea of "Optional Control" was that commanders should lead 
their troops in battle not with strict orders from a higher echelon, but with the 
overall operational scheme of their superiors. This meant that the objective or 
aim was important; the way you implemented the mission was not. This 
manner of thinking was seen as being absolutely necessary in the constantly 
changing situations of mobile warfare and the only way to maintain initiative 
and tempo. 
The Israeli Air Force was also re-built according to the operational doctrine. 
In the early 1960s, the IAF's overall tasks were both defensive and offensive: 
to shield mobilisation and interdict the flow of enemy forces on the main axis, 
and to be a striking force. In the IAF, this was interpreted as being primarily 
implemented with a pre-emptive air strike. Once the skies were clear, the IAF 
was to devote itself to its second task, supporting the ground forces. The IAF 
thoroughly analysed its own and enemy strengths and weaknesses in their two 
preceding wars. This led to the selection of specific aircraft, weapons and 
tactics, and to the training of both pilots and ground personnel. In addition, a 
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special emphasis was laid on intelligence. With these lines, the IAF achieved 
simultaneous pre-emption and ground support capabilities in the early 1960s 
with only some 200 jets. Devised upon a model similar to that of the German 
Luftwaffe in "Operation Barbarossa", the IDF also devoted itself to destroying 
the enemy air power on its airfields to achieve air-superiority, which was seen 
as a pre-condition for using the mobile ground forces. In addition, the IDF also 
established its first helicopter squadrons in the early 1960s. They were 
capable not only of rescuing pilots, but also of transporting combat troops 
within the range of the helicopters. Nevertheless, a doctrine for using 
helicopters was not created. 
The IDF and its doctrine were put to the test in the Six Day War in 1967. It 
succeeded in a satisfactory manner, although a great part of this belonged to 
the Air Force, which was able to destroy the enemy air power on its airfields. 
Therefore, the movements of the ground forces were much more easier with 
the protection of complete air superiority, just as the Israelis had planned. The 
operations of the ground forces were very unlike, though all were implemented 
in the spirit of mobility with tanks playing a central role. Brigadier Israel Tal's 
Ugdah represented the best of the Israeli armoured warfare developed in the 
years before the war. Tal massed his forces against Egyptian defences and 
after breakthrough pushed to the Egyptian lines of communication. The 
operation of General Avraham Yoffe's Ugdah through terrain that the 
Egyptians had regarded as impassable is, correspondingly, a good example of 
the use of the principle of "expanding torrent", about which Liddell Hart was 
excited to say that it was the best demonstration of his theory of the "Strategy 
of Indirect Approach". Nevertheless, this operation was also based on using 
tanks as was mainly the case on the Jordanian and Syrian fronts. However, 
the tendency towards flanking operations and finding gaps in enemy defences 
can also clearly be seen on the West Bank and on the Golan Heights. This 
shows that despite the growth of firepower and cover with the increase of the 
armoured forces, operational principles had not changed significantly since the 
1950s. In the Six Day War, Israel's operational concept was also to surprise 
her enemies and take advantage of their weaknesses instead of pushing 
through with force to balance the quantity. 
The dominance of tanks 
The conquests of the Six Day War left Israel in a completely new situation and 
gave the Israelis groundless feelings of security. In addition, the military victory 
led to some degree to overconfidence in the IDF's military capabilities. Peace 
on the Egyptian front came to an end very soon, extending to the War of 
Attrition in 1969 — 1970. On the whole, the period between the Six Day War 
and the next Middle Eastern war, the Yom Kippur War in 1973, was a heated 
period of political and military disputes. 
In the clashes of the War of Attrition, Israel adopted a strategy of "defensive 
defence", which meant that no inch of Israeli occupied soil would be yielded to 
enemies. Operationally this meant the construction of fortifications for the first 
time in the IDF's history since the self-defence of the settlements, the Bar Lev 
Line on the eastern shore of the Suez Canal and a girdle of forts in the Purple 
Line on the Golan Heights. This also meant that although the operational 
doctrine had not experienced changes after the Six Day War, in practise the 
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imbalance between the strategy and operational principles at least confused 
the thoughts of operational commanders; i.e., how should forces be used in 
the case of an all-out war. This was also the case when the Yom Kippur War 
broke out in October 1973. Plans were made but not implemented, especially 
in the Sinai. In addition this not only shows Israel's views on the impossibility of 
a large-scale war, but also Arab abilities to deceive the Israelis and prepare for 
the war according to realistic objectives. 
The construction of fortifications took a lot of money and forced the IDF to 
concentrate its development programmes on certain sectors. Tanks and the 
Air Force had succeeded well in the Six Day War and took priority, excluding 
the fact that the Navy's development programme was already in process and 
was not interrupted. Nevertheless, the Israelis drew distorted conclusions from 
the Six Day War. Israeli success in the war had not been a consequence of the 
superiority of tanks and aircraft on the battlefield, rather it was the lack and 
inefficiency of the antitank and antiaircraft capabilities of Israeli's opponents 
and the opponents' lack of an Air Force. However, in light of the experiences of 
the Six Day War, the IDF introduced permanent armoured Ugdahs between 
1967 and 1973 where the main bulk of the force consisted of tanks while other 
arms were neglected. This went against the combined arms principle and, in 
addition, meant at least a partial loss of the flexibility to create forces according 
to the threat and conditions. In addition, the Air Force was still to assist the 
armoured formations as "flying" artillery despite the experiences with 
antiaircraft missiles in the War of Attrition and the growing anxiety of the Air 
Force staff on this question. Therefore, only the Navy, with its new missile 
boats, was in accordance with the scenario of the future battlefield. 
The strategy of "defensive defence" and the fear of the escalation of the 
hostilities led to a tightening of the command and control principles of the 
operational forces, especially in the Sinai. Although this is understandable, it 
went against the "Optional Control" principles and centralised the command 
process. In addition, many of those commanders who had experienced all of 
Israel's past wars resigned or were indirectly forced to resign in the 
rejuvenation process of the IDF commanders in the early 1970s. 
In the Yom Kippur War, the Arab surprise attack, in connection with the 
confusion of Israel's strategic aims and operational practise, deficiencies in 
organisations and weaknesses in command, control and communication 
principles, almost put Israel on the verge of destruction. During the first few 
days of the war the situation was grave on both the Syrian front on the Golan 
Heights and on the Egyptian front in the Sinai. In the Sinai, the IDF had room 
for mobile defence except that this principle was in its infancy. Therefore, and 
according to the plans for a limited war, Israeli tanks rushed towards the Canal 
line without covering infantry to support the infantry in the Bar Lev Line 
bunkers, with disastrous results in the Egyptian antitank traps. Such was the 
case with the first co-ordinated counter-attacks as well. The attacks were not 
so co-ordinated, nor were they concentrated and they were made according to 
a completely biased picture of the situation. In addition, the Air Force was 
encountering great difficulties with the Egyptian and Syrian air defence 
networks. The pre-emptive strike was cancelled, mainly for political reasons. 
The possibility of a strike had existed, though its efficiency might have been at 
least questionable. Besides, the resources of the IAF had to be divided to both 
fronts. Therefore, after the initial failures, the Israelis chose to stay in a 
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defensive posture in the Sinai until the situation on the Golan front had been 
resolved. In the Sinai, the Israelis had, however, room to retreat, though this 
word was never mentioned. 
On the Golan, Israel did not even have room to retreat. However, the forces 
were better prepared for battle — though initially also greatly quantitatively 
inferior — and acted according to their plans. On the Golan, the mobile defence 
of combined arms enabled the defence to hold until the arrival of the reserves. 
After the holding action, the Israelis immediately went over to the offence. The 
role of experienced commanders, including reserve divisions, was central in 
this. Traits of the use of indirect approach as well as ideas from the "Constant 
Flow" doctrine can also be seen in the counter-offensive. In continuous mobile 
operations the Israelis tried to threaten the Syrian weak points and, in this way, 
were able to draw the threat away from Israel proper. 
In the Sinai as well, the IDF acted according to its old operational doctrine 
after the holding action. The unmanned seam between the two Egyptian 
armies gave the Israelis a possibility of throwing the Egyptians off balance. 
According to this concept, the Israelis launched an offensive of three divisions 
across the Suez Canal into the Egyptian rear after the holding action and 
surprised the Egyptians despite the fact that both belligerents had planned for 
such a possibility during the War of Attrition. However, the Egyptian pressure 
on the eastern shore of the Canal made Israeli political and military leaders 
cautious. This caused delays that lengthened the war, but this can be seen as 
realism. Despite this fact, the Israelis were able to seize both Egyptian armies 
in the Sinai, one of them completely. As with the counter-offensive on the 
Golan, the role of the veteran commanders of the IDF was also central in the 
crossing operation. 
Simplifying, it can be said that during the Yom Kippur War, the Israelis did 
not implement the pre-emptive policy, rather they were forced to absorb the 
first blow. Although this was mainly a consequence of the imbalance between 
the political aims and military implementation, in the counter-offensives on both 
fronts the IDF mainly followed its old operational doctrine of "Constant Flow"; 
transferring the battles onto enemy territory, putting him off balance and trying 
to end the war as quickly as possible. In addition, the aim of decisive 
operational victory — the destruction of the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces -
can also be seen behind the final operations although this aim was not 
achieved. 
The budding era of combined arms 
After the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli public felt betrayed because the IDF was 
incapable of achieving a quick victory over its adversaries. In this atmosphere 
an investigating committee, called the Agranat Committee, was established to 
analyse the past war. The report, which was released to the public piecemeal, 
caused turbulence both in Israel's Government and in the supreme command 
of the IDF and led to resignations. The committee also made suggestions on 
the organisation, equipment and armament of the future IDF. 
The change that the IDF experienced by the early 1980s was enormous in 
the quantity and quality of arms and manpower, but rather slight in doctrinal 
principles. The latter can be explained by the conditioning factors behind the 
doctrine. Despite the Camp David Peace treaty with Egypt in 1979, the 
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political, geographic, demographic and economic circumstances that had 
formed the guidelines for the military-political and operational factors had not 
changed significantly with regards to changes in the Arab countries. Instead, a 
better economy and foreign — mainly U.S. — help made it possible to 
modernise the whole IDF. 
During the decade following the Yom Kippur War, the operational forces of 
the IDF were fully mechanised. This means that all armoured formations were 
reinforced with mechanised infantry with modern APCs and with self-propelled 
artillery, which all shows the growing emphasis on firepower at the expense of 
movement. These changes were mainly finished by the end of the 1970s. 
Nevertheless, as had happened before the Yom Kippur War, the IDF also 
prepared for the last war this time too, without enough consideration of the 
possibility of a different war in the future. It is obvious that the IDF that was in 
existence in "Operation Peace for Galilee" in 1982 would have been successful 
in conditions equivalent to the Yom Kippur War. However, the rugged terrain of 
Lebanon did not make the full use of a mechanised army possible. The lack of 
foot infantry was revealed, which was a basis for further changes after the war. 
In addition, the continuous change of the order of battle showed the 
weaknesses of fixed organisations in certain conditions. On the other hand, the 
Air Force had done its homework well and had acquired superiority over the 
antiaircraft missile networks in less than 10 years. 
On the whole, events between the Yom Kippur War and "Operation Peace 
for Galilee" also illustrate how the development of the military art is a 
continuous process of considering the future, developing theories and 
concepts, principles, and tactical and technical means and counter-means. 
Thus, the development of the art of war is an endless race where the party that 
is able to form a better combination of the facts listed above will probably be 
more successful. Nevertheless, it will greatly help if the conditioning factors are 
realistically grasped. In Israel, this prerequisite has been fulfilled rather well as 
the stability of the doctrine reveals. This has mainly also provided quite good 
guidelines for the operational art, where mobility has been the red thread. For 
Israel, mobility has been a means of compensating for her geographic, 
economic and demographic inferiority. In the Israeli Defence Forces, mobility 
was at least up to the Yom Kippur War (inclusive) itself the art of war. In any 
case, wars can not be solved at the operational level, however decisive the 
victories might be. This fact can be seen in the situation of the Middle East 
today. 
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APPENDIX 1 
FULLER'S PRINCIPLES OF WAR 
General Tactical 
1) Objective 1) Demoralisation 
2) Offensive 2) Endurance 
3)  Mass 3) Shock 
4)  Economy of Force 
5)  Movement 
6)  Surprise 
7)  Security 
8)  Co-operation 
Holden Reid: J. F. C. Fuller: Military Thinker, p. 36. 
FULLER'S OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES 
1) From the military point of view, one hour is not 60 minutes, but what is 
accomplished in 60 minutes. 
2) The most effective form of defence is mobile defence, which permits the defender 
to protect his fighting power without surrendering the initiative. 
3) In the offence and defence in manoeuvre warfare, the main aim should be the 
dislocation of the enemy's command and organisation, and not just the 
destruction of his fighting troops, though this should not be neglected. 
4) All plans should be based on the defensive offensive, the strongest form of war. 
Even lightning offensive advances should be founded on a secure base; if they 
were not, movement forward would lack backbone. 
5) The pursuit is the most important act in battle because, if correctly organised and 
launched, it guarantees the annihilation of the enemy and the attainment of the 
political object of the war. 
Holden Reid: J. F. C. Fuller, p. 36 and B. H. Liddell Harl, p. 67. 
LIDDELL HART'S TACTICAL PRINCIPLES 
1) Adjust your ends to your means. 
2) Keep your objective always in mind. 
3) Choose the line of least expectation. 
4) Exploit the line of least resistance. 
5) Take a line of operation that offers alternative objectives. 
6) Ensure that both plan and dispositions are flexible — adaptable to circumstances. 
7) Do not throw your weight into a stroke whilst your opponent is on guard. 
8) Do not renew an attack along the same line after it has once failed. 
Liddell Hart: Strategy, p. 335 — 337. 
Al = air interdiction 
CAS = close air support 
IE = inner edge of encirclement 
(holding enemy in) 
OE = outer edge of encirclement 
(deflecting attacks to relieve encircled force) 
1 = Phase 1: penetration 
2 = Phase 2: encirclement 
3 = Phase 3: continued exploitation 
APPENDIX 2 
THE GERMAN BLITZKRIEG DOCTRINE IN 1941 - 1942 
DIVE BOMBERS 
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Macksey: The Tank Pioneers, p. 141 
Bellamy: The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare, p. 94 
APPENDIX 3 
TOPICS OF THE TRAINING PROGRAMME OF THE SPECIAL NIGHT SQUADS 
1. The Nature of War, the Warmachine, Infantry tasks and " Soldiers' 
Commandments." 
2. The Infantry Platoon in battle. 
3. Infantry in Defence. 
4. Infantry in Attack. 
5. Leadership and military vices. 
6. The tasks of different forces (Field Artillery in support of Infantry in the field, the 
tasks of Engineers and the tasks of Cavalry). 
EMPHASIS OF LECTURES AND TRAINING 
1. Intelligence 
2. Surprise 
3. Initiative 
4. Operational independence 
5. Mobility. 
TEMPORAL DIVISION OF TRAINING PROGRAMME 
1. Three days of lectures around a large sand-table. 
2. Drilling and exercise in and around the camp. 
3. Patrol work (4 days). 
4. Furlough (4 days). 
1) Sykes: Orde Wingate, p. 174, 2) Bredin, H.E.N. (Maj-Gen.): Return to Ein Herod, Jewish 
Observer and Middle East Review, October 17, 1969, LH 15/4/486, p. 20 — 21 and 3) 
Account of the action of the Special Night Squads, typescript copies of documents to Liddell 
Hart given by Captain Wingate in Autumn 1938, LH 15/5/300. Liddell Harl enclosed the 
original ones in a letter, dated 1 June 1950, to the Israel Defence Forces Archive. 
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Losses 
Israel Arabs 
Total 21 000 40 000 
Killed 15 000 25 000 
Wounded 6 000 15 000 
1) Arab Legion of Transjordan. 
2) Arab Liberation Army. 
3) Arab Army of Salvation. 
4) Dupuy gives the smaller numbers and van Creveld the bigger ones. The reason for 
this remains unclear. 
5) 2-pounder scout cars, later also half-tracks. In addition the Israelis had, according 
to Katz, some 100 home-made armoured cars. 
6) In May only six 65 mm and a 20 mm. In October sixty 75 mm. 
7) At the end of the war in spring 1949, the IDF had, according to Cohen, some 200 
aircraft. 
8) Corvettes. In addition the Israeli naval forces had a few motorboats and a number 
of frogmen. 
9) Israel's only adversary with a navy was Egypt. She had several old British Coast 
Guard craft. 
1) Dupuy: Elusive Victory, pi 117 and 123 — 125 2) van Creveld: The Sword and the Olive, p. 
78, 3) Herzog: The Arab Israeli Wars (1982), p. 20 — 21 and 48, 4) Katz: Fire & Steel, p. 23 
and 36 — 41 and 5) Rothenberg: The Anatomy of the Israeli Army, p. 58. 
International Border 
Front Before Ten Days 
Front Before 
Operation "Hiram" 
Conquests of 
Ten Days (July '48) 
Conquests -
Operations "Hiram" 
Attack 
Hanna 	 ,„... 	 I . 
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Mahanay 
R 
Akbara. 
APPENDIX 5 
EXAMPLES OF ISRAELI OPERATIONS DURING THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 
Operation "Hiram" 29 to 31 October 1948 
Herzog: The Arab-Israeli Wars (1982), p. 90. 
Attack 	  
Raid 	
 Maggio.* 
International Border. 
Israel Territory 
	  
Jewish 	  
Post 860 
Arab 	
 O 
Operation "Horev" 22 December 1948 to 8 January 1949 
2 
Herzog: The Arab-Israeli Wars (1982), p. 99. 
my..4 
• / 
....„7, .... — n \ ,...;,,, 
/ 	 \ \ \ \ 	 ° BeerSileba--8.. 
\ ‘ 
to Ismailia 
Auta (Nitzana) 
Egypt 
Israeli Attack 
	  
Arab Withdrawal 	  
Bridge 	  
Road Block 	
 X 
? 	 t 	 Km 
afe 
The conquest of Auja (Nitzana), operation "Horev", 27 December 1948 
3 
Herzog: The Arab-Israeli Wars (1982), p. 101. 
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APPENDIX 7 
DOCTRINE OF THE IDF IN THE LATE 1990s 
TO DEFEND THE EXISTENCE, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY 
OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL. 
TO PROTECT THE INHABITANTS OF ISRAEL AND TO COMBAT ALL FORMS 
OF TERRORISM THAT THREATEN THE DAILY LIFE. 
SECURITY DOCTRINE 
Basic Points 
• Israel cannot afford to lose a single war. 
• Defensive on the strategic level, no territorial ambitions. 
• Desire to avoid war by political means and a credible deterrent posture. 
• Preventing escalation. 
• Determine the outcome of war quickly and decisively. 
• Combating terrorism. 
The Operational Level 
Defensive Strategy - Offensive Tactics 
• Prepare for Defense 
- A small standing army with an early warning capability, 
regular air force and navy 
- An efficient reserve mobilization and transportation system. 
- Move to Counter-Attack 
- Multi-arm coordination. 
- Transferring the battle to enemy territory quickly 
- Quick attainment of war objectives. 
Capabilities 
• Intelligence 
• High capability to destroy mobile targets 
• Long-range capabilities 
• Anti-missile defense 
• All-weather and low-visibility capabilities 
• Advanced training systems  
Main Areas of Activity 
• Continuous high state of readiness for war 
• Anti-terrorist warfare 
• Combating terrorism by Palestinian 
rejectionist groups 
• Building the armed forces for the future 
battlefield 
http://www.idf.il/English/MAIN.HTM, 13.7.1999 at 12.45 
APPENDIX 8 
APPROXIMATE STRENGTHS, ORDERS OF BATTLE AND ESTIMATED LOSSES 
OF OPPOSING FORCES DURING THE SINAI CAMPAIGN 1956 
Strengths 
Israel Egypt 
Manpower 30 — 50 000' 45 000 
Tanks 400 2 530 3 
APCs 450 200 
Artillery pieces 150 500 
Self-propelled anti-tank guns 50 
Combat aircraft 155 4 255 5 
Vessels 25 6 50 '  
Orders of battle 
Israel 
Chief of Staff (Dayan) 
Southern Command (Simhoni) 
77th Ugdah (northern Sinai, Laskov) 
- 1st Infantry Brigade 
- 	 11th Infantry Brigade 
- 27th Mechanised Brigade 
38th  Ugdah (central Sinai, Wallach) 
4th Infantry Brigade 
10th Infantry Brigade 
7th Armoured Brigade 
- 37th Mechanised Brigade 
202nd Paratroop Brigade (Mitla) 
9th Infantry Brigade (Sharm-el-Sheikh) 
12th Infantry Brigade (Gaza) 
Air Force (Tolkowsky) 
Navy (Tankus) 
Egypt 
Minister of Defence, Commander-in-Chief 
Eastern Military Zone (Sinai) 
3rd Infantry Division 
- 4th Infantry Brigade 
- 5th Infantry Brigade 
- 6th Infantry Brigade 
8th (Palestinian) Infantry Division 
- 86th Palestinian Brigade 
- 87th Palestinian Brigade 
- 26th National Guard Brigade (Egyptian) 
4th Armoured Division 
- 1st Armoured Group 
- 2nd Armoured Group 
- 2nd Infantry Brigade 
2nd z Light Reconnaissance Regiment 
Sharm-el-Sheikh Region 
- 21st Infantry Battalion Group 
Gaza Command 
Port Said Region 
Air Force 
Navy 
2 
Egyptian losses 
vs. Israel vs. Anglo-French forces 
Killed 1 650 1 000 650 
Wounded 4 900 4 000 900 
Missing 6 185 6 000 185 
Total 12 735 11 000 1 735 
Aircraft 215 15 200 8 
Israeli losses 
Killed 189 
Wounded 899 
Missing 4 
Total 1 092 
Aircraft 15 
1) Dupuy gives the larger numbers and van Creveld the smaller ones. 
2) 100 AMX-13s and 300 M-4 Shermans. 
3) Includes Su-100 assault guns. 
4) 19 Mysteres, 25 Ouragans, 25 Meteors, 29 Mustangs, 16 Mosquitos, 20 Harvards, 
16 Dakotas, 3 Nords and 2 B-17s. 
5) 45 MiG-15s, 40 Vampires, 38 Meteors, 49 //-28s, 8 Furies, 20 Commandos, 20 
Dakotas, 35 miscellaneous transports. 
6) 2 destroyers, 3 frigates, 12 torpedo boats, 3 landing craft and several patrol boats. 
7) 2 destroyers, 7 frigates, 2 corvettes, 8 minesweepers, 21 motor torpedo boats, 1 
landing craft and several small patrol boats. 
8) On the ground. 
1) Dupuy: Elusive Victory, p. 209 and 212 — 213, 2) van Creveld: The Sword and the Olive, p. 
142 and 3) Jane's Fighting Ships 1956 — 57, Jane's Fighting Ships Publishing CO., LTD, 
London 1956, pi 217 — 218 and 170 - 173. 
0 kilometers 50 
_:- 
tIONC6111,7"=106n912.,--,7121.11111811. 
miles 	 50 
APPENDIX 9 
OPERATION "KADDESH" IN THE SINAI CAMPAIGN 1956 
Van Creveld: The Sword and the Olive, p. 140. 
APPENDIX 10 
ISRAELI TACTICAL COMBAT PRINCIPLES DURING THE SINAI CAMPAIGN 1956 
ACCORDING TO S. L. A. MARSHALL 
1) Leading means moving to the point of the main danger if decisive pressure is to 
be maintained. There is no excuse for holding back. 
2) When orders can't get through, assume what the orders would be. 
3) When in doubt, hit out. The short route to safety is the road to the enemy hill. 
4) Don't attack head-on; there is usually a better way. 
5) If you must go in head-on, don't present a broad target. 
6) When troops are truly exhausted, hold back and rest them. 
7) Waste no energy in useless movement. Maintain the pace of the attack so long 
as physical resources seem sufficient. 
8) If the force designated to attack is not suitably armed to overrun the position, pull 
off and call for what is needed. Avoid useless wastage. 
9) Don't delay the battle because of supply shortages which lie beyond its probable 
crisis. 
10) Keep your sense of humor if you would save your wits. 
11) When trapped by sudden fire, movement means salvation more surely than a 
foxhole. 
12) Always try for surprise in one form or another. 
13) When local surprise is possible, don't expose movement with premature fires. 
14) In the attack, risk, risk, risk. 
Marshall: Sinai Victory, p. 22 — 23. 
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APPENDIX 13 
PROGRAMME OF THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE FLIGHT COURSE DURING 1960s 
Preliminary selective tests. 
Pre-preparatory stage 
theory 
physical training 
first flights. 
Preparatory stage 
- ground exercises within a company framework. 
Primary stage 
- basic air training 
first solo flight 
orientation to fighter-aircraft, to helicopters or to orientation. 
Basic stage 
- flight training. 
Senior basic stage 
parachuting 
- rescue course 
- officers' training. 
Advance phase 
- solo flights on tactical aircraft. 
After the flight course the operational training course still separated the fresh pilots 
from the certified ones. 
Cohen: Israel's Best Defence, p. 156 — 158. 
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APPENDIX 14 
ISRAELI OPERATIONS DURING THE SIX DAY WAR 
Sinai Front 
Van Creveld: The Sword and the Olive, p. 181. 
Latru ISRAEL 
Advance to the River Jordan 
June 5-7, 1967 
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2 
Williams: Israel Defence Forces, inner cover. 
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Williams: Israel Defence Forces, inner cover. 
APPENDIX 15 
APPROXIMATE STRENGTHS, ORDERS OF BATTLE AND ESTIMATED LOSSES 
OF OPPOSING FORCES DURING THE SIX DAY WAR 1967 
Strengths 
Israel Arab total Egypt Syria Jordan 
Manpower 250 000 248 000 - 130 000 - 63 000 2 55 000 
328 000 210 000 1  
Tanks 800 - 2 000 — 1 000 — 750 2 290 5 
1 000 3 2 300 1 300 4 
APCs 1 500 6 1 845 1050 '  585 7 210 
Artillery 200 960 575 315 263 
SAMs 50 160 8 160 
AA guns 550 over 2 000 950 1 000 143 
Combat 
aircraft 
286 9 680 430 10 130 11  18 
Vessels 20 — 25 12 over 85 13 over 20 14 
1) Gawrych gives the smaller number and Dupuy the larger one. Dupuy has also 
counted Egyptian forces committed in Yemen. They were at least 50 000 at that time. 
2) All not committed. 
3) The smaller number is presented in Military Balance and in The Lessons of Modern 
Wari This includes 200 M-48 Pattons, 250 Centurion Mark 5s and 7s, 150 AMX-13s 
and 200 Shermans. Dupuy has counted 400 Shermans and Super Shermans. 
4) The larger number also includes assault guns. The forces consisted of over 400 T-
34s, over 450 T-54/55s, over 100 Su-100s and over 100 JS-3s. 
5) 200 M-48 Pattons and 90 Centurions. 
6) M-2 and M-3 halftracks. 
7) Soviet-made APCs. 
8) Sa-2s. 
9) 92 Mirage Ms, 24 Super Mysteres, 82 Mysteres, 55 Ouragans, 24 Vautours and 60 
Fouga Magister trainers. 
10) 55 Su-6s, 163 MiG-21s, 40 MiG-19s, 100 MiG-15/17s, 30 Tu-16s and 43 //-28s. 
11) 40 MiG-21sIMiG-19s, 68 MiG-15/17s, 15 Tu-16s and 4 II-28s. 
12) 2 — 3 destroyers and frigates, 9 — 15 patrol and torpedo boats, 3 — 4 submarines, 3 
landing craft. 
13) 7 destroyers and frigates, 12 submarines, 18 missile boat (8 Komar, 10 Osa), 44 
patrol and torpedo boats and 5 landing craft. 
14) 4 Komar missile boats and 17 patrol and torpedo boats. 
2 
Israel's order of battle 
Chief of General Staff (Rabin) 
Southern Command (Gavish) 
Armoured Division (northern Sinai, Israel Tal) 
Armoured Brigade 
- Armoured Brigade 
Paratroop Brigade 
- Armoured Recon Task Force 
- "Granit" Task Force 
Armoured Division (central Sinai, Avraham Yoffe) 
- Armoured Brigade 
- Armoured Brigade 
Armoured Division (southern central Sinai, Ariel Sharon) 
- Armoured Brigade 
- Infantry Brigade 
- Paratroop Brigade 
Armoured Brigade (Gaza) 
Infantry Brigade 
Paratroop Task Force (Sharm-el-Sheikh) 
Central Command (Narkiss) 
Infantry Brigade (Jerusalem) 
Paratroop Brigade 
Mechanised Brigade 
Infantry Brigade (Kalkilya) 
Infantry Brigade (Latrun) 
Northern Command (Elazar) 
Armoured Division (Jordan front, Elad Peled) 
- Infantry Brigade 
- Armoured Brigade 
- Armoured Brigade 
Composite Division (Syrian front, Dan Laner) 
- Armoured Brigade 
- Infatry Brigade 
Infantry Brigade 
Air Force (Hod) 
Navy (Nun) 
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Losses 
Israel Egypt Syria Jordan Iraq 
Killed 983 3 000 600 696 
Wounded 4 517 5 000 700 421 
Captured/ 15 5 000 570 2 000 
Missing 
Total 5 515 13 000 1 870 3 117 
Tanks 394 13 700 86 179 
Aircraft 40 — 49 14 356 15 55 18 15 
13) According to Dupuy, half were repaired and returned to full operational status. 
14) Lower end of range is given by Dupuy and Cordesman and Wagner and higher 
end by Cohen. 
15) According to Dupuy, 322 during the first day, on 5 June. 
1) Dupuy: Elusive Victory, pi 333 and 337 — 340, 2) Cordesman & Wagner: The Lessons of 
the Modern War, vol. 1, p. 15 and 17 — 18, 3) Gawrych: Key to the Sinai, p. 77 — 78, 4) 
Cohen: Israel's Best Defense, pi 253 and 5) Military Balance 1966 — 1967, p. 37 — 38 and 41. 
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4 
Israel's order of battle 
Chief of Staff 
Southern Command 
252nd Armoured Division (Mendler, Magen) 
- 3 — 4 armoured brigades 
- 1 infantry brigade 
162nd Armoured Division (Adan) 
- 2 — 5 armoured brigades 
- 1 paratroop brigade (16 — 17 October) 
- 1 infantry brigade (21 — 25 October) 
143rd Armoured Division (Sharon) 
- 3 armoured brigades 
- 1 paratroop brigade (15 October) 
- 1 infantry brigade (8 — 13 October) 
146th Composite Division (Sassoon) 
- 3 mechanised infantry brigades 
(created c. 13 October) 
440th Composite Division (Granit) 
- 3 mechanised infantry brigades 
Southern Sinai Command (Gavish) 
- 2 infantry of mechanised brigades 
Central Command (Ephrat) 
- 2 brigades 
Northern Command (Hofi) 
36th Mechanised Division (Eytan) 
- 2 armoured brigades 
- 1 infantry brigade 
- 1 paratroop brigade 
240th Armoured Division (Laver) 
- 3 — 4 armoured brigades 
- 1 infantry brigade (attached c. 9 October) 
146th Armoured Division (Moshe Peled) 
- 3 — 4 armoured brigades 
Air Force 
Navy 
Egypt Syria 
Minister of War, Commander-in-Chief 
Chief of Staff 
Second Field Army 
18th Infantry Division 1  
2nd Infantry Division 
16th Infantry Division 
21st Armoured Division 2 
23rd Mechanised Infantry Division 3 
3 artillery brigades 
1 parachute brigade 
1 independent mechanised brigade 
1 engineer brigade 
Commando group 
Third Field Army 
7th Infantry Division 
19th Infantry Division 
4th Armoured Division 4 
6th Mechanised Infantry Division 3 
2 artillery brigades 
1 mortar brigade 
1 independent mechanised brigade 
1 engineer brigade 
Commando group 
Red Sea Command 
- 2 infantry brigades 
- 1 commando group 
General Headquarters' reserve 
- 2 mechanised infantry divisions 
3rd Mechanised Infantry Division 
2 independent armoured brigades 
3 independent artillery brigades 
1 independent parachute brigade 
2 air assault brigades 
5 independent commando groups 
Presidential Guard Brigade 
Air Force 
Air Defence Forces 
Navy 
Minister of Defence 
Chief of Staff 
1st Armoured Division 
- 2 armoured brigades 
- 1 mechanised brigade 
- 1 artillery brigade 
3rd Armoured Division 
5th Infantry Division 
- 2 infantry brigades 
- 1 mechanised brigade 
1 armoured brigade 
- 1 artillery brigade 
7th Infantry Division 
9th Infantry Division 
General Headquarters' forces 
3 armoured brigades 
2 infantry brigades 
1 mechanised infantry brigade 
- commando group (5 battalions) 
parachute battalion 
- Desert Guard Battalion 
Air Force 
Navy 
Iraqi contingent 
- 3rd Armoured Division 
Jordanian contingent 
- 40th Armoured Brigade 
Moroccan contingent 
- mechanised infantry brigade 
Saudi Arabian contingent 
- 20th Armoured Brigade 
Palestinian Liberation Army 
- 2 commando brigades 
5 
Egypt's and Syria's orders of battle 
1) Egyptian divisions include on average two infantry brigades, one mechanised 
brigade, one armoured brigade and one artillery brigade. 
2) One armoured brigade, one mechanised brigade and one artillery brigade. 
3) Two mechanised brigades, one armoured brigade and one artillery brigade. 
4) Two armoured brigades, one mechanised brigade and one artillery brigade. 
6 
Lo
ss
es
 
Is
ra
el
 
A
ra
b 
to
ta
l 
E
gy
pt
 
Sy
ria
 
Jo
rd
an
 
Ira
q 
O
th
er
 A
ra
bs
 
Ki
lle
d 
2 
83
8 
8 
52
8 
—
 8
 9
70
 
5 
00
0 
3 
10
0 
—
 3
 5
00
 1  
28
 
21
8 
—
 2
60
 2  
10
0 
W
ou
nd
ed
 
8 
80
0 
19
 5
49
 
12
 0
00
 
6 
00
0 
49
 
60
0 
30
0 
Pr
is
on
er
s/
 
m
is
si
ng
 
50
8 
8 
42
1 
—
 8
 5
51
 
8 
03
1 
37
0 
—
 5
00
 3  
20
 
Ta
nk
s 
44
0 
—
 8
40
 4  
2 
45
4 
—
 2
55
4 
1 
10
0 
1 
20
0 
54
 
10
0 
—
 2
00
 
AP
C
s 
40
0 
o
ve
r 
85
0 
45
0 
40
0 
Ai
rc
ra
ft 
10
3 
39
2 
22
3 
11
8 
21
 
30
 
H
el
ic
op
te
rs
 
6 
55
 
42
 
13
 
SA
M
 b
at
te
rie
s 
47
 
44
 
3 
Ve
ss
el
s 
1 
15
 
10
 
5 
1)
 Lo
w
er
 e
nd
 o
f t
he
 ra
ng
e 
gi
ve
n 
by
 D
up
uy
 a
nd
 h
ig
he
r b
y 
C
or
de
sm
an
 a
nd
 W
ag
ne
r. 
2)
 Lo
w
er
 e
nd
 o
f t
he
 ra
ng
e 
gi
ve
n 
by
 D
up
uy
 a
nd
 h
ig
he
r b
y 
C
or
de
sm
an
 a
nd
 W
ag
ne
r. 
3)
 Lo
w
er
 e
nd
 o
f t
he
 ra
ng
e 
gi
ve
n 
by
 C
or
de
sm
an
 a
nd
 W
ag
ne
r a
nd
 h
ig
he
r D
up
uy
. 
4)
 Hi
gh
er
 e
nd
 o
f t
he
 ra
ng
e 
re
fle
ct
s 
to
ta
l l
os
se
s.
 T
he
 ID
F 
w
as
 a
bl
e 
to
 re
tu
rn
 s
om
e 
40
0 
ta
nk
s 
to
 c
om
ba
t b
y 
th
e 
en
d 
of
 th
e 
w
ar
. 
1) 
D
up
uy
: E
lu
si
ve
 V
ic
to
ry
, p
. 6
06
, 6
08
 —
 6
09
 a
nd
 6
12
 —
 6
17
. 2
) M
ilit
ar
y 
Ba
la
nc
e 
19
73
 —
 1
97
4.
 p
i 3
1 
—
 3
6 
an
d 
3) 
Co
rde
sm
an
 & 
Wa
gn
er:
 Th
e 
Le
ss
on
s 
o
f M
od
er
n 
W
ar
, v
ol
. 1
, p
. 1
5 
—
 1
6 
an
d 
18
. 
0 km t 
r111101,M11110.,,102119, 
6116101121,,,"=, 
O 	 utiles 
.•'. 
Cberrirn Peak 
LEBANON 
, ,..,c• 
 
paratroopers 
* 	 - Mazrat 
Israeli C1 eonon 	 .,,. ,\‘\.. --," 	 Bet Jan 
	
„,, •, I, 	 A 	 :-•” 
." 'aolani 
`',.. 	 Brig. s -- 
1111 1r0016 
ISRAEL Dii)::::nitli% Mech. 
, 	 Rafies 6. 1  
['Why of7'ears 	 Div. 
, os 
Golan iketer,, 	 ' 
,--) Heights .4-1 Kuneitra :,----- 
Nafeq 
Bnot•Yaake% 
, 	 co 
441.N1 "119th 
lech. 
Division 
Damascus 
SYRIA 
3rd 
Armored 
Division 
Aril 
Bridg 
Rafid!,' 
• 
r • aren,,A. 
JORDAN 
,,„ ••.'' 
	
1967 cease-tire 	 tsraeli flyrcz 
•. line 
	
.; hhig grolin 
	 Syrian force 
and peak 	 Iraqi force 
1st 
Armored 
Division 
APPENDIX 18 
OPERATIONS ON THE SYRIAN FRONT DURING THE YOM KIPPUR WAR 
Van Creveld: The Sword and the Olive, p. 230. 
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APPENDIX 19 
ISRAELI OPERATIONS ON THE EGYPTIAN FRONT DURING THE YOM KIPPUR WAR 
Israeli counterattack on 8 October 1973 
Gawrych: The 1973 Arab-Israeli War, p. 47. 
Coastal IIfighwaY 
xx 
Adan- 
Moves south 
14-15 October 
Qantara CD 
Passes through 
corridor and 
bridgehead 
held by 
Sharon 
Ismaili 
Tasa 
Bit Gild  
,Sharon—Opens cordabk,,,   
secures bridgehead, < 
and installs bridges 
Note: 
Numbers indicate sequence of movement. 20km 
Operation "Gazelle" 
2 
Gawrych: The 1973 Arab-Israeli War, p. 66. 
APPENDIX 20 
THE STRENGTH OF THE ISRAELI DEFENCE FORCES IN 1982 
Manpower 
Total manpower 	 573 500 
- regular 	 51 700 
- conscripts 	 120 300 
- mobilisation 	 400 000 
Army (including civil defence units) 
	 485 000 
- regular 	 25 000 
- conscripts 
	 110 000 
- mobilisation 	 350 000 
11 armoured divisions 
33 armoured brigades (3 tank, 1 mechanised infantry battalions) 
10 mechanised infantry brigades (5 para-trained) 
12 territorial/border infantry brigades with NAHAL 
15 artillery brigades (each 5 battalions of 3 batteries) 
Air Force 	 65 000 
- regular 	 21 000 
- conscripts 	 7 000 
- mobilisation 	 37 000 
Navy 	 19 000 
- regular 	 5 700 
- conscripts 
	 3 300 
- mobilisation 	 10 000 
Border Guards and Coastguard 	 4 500 
2 
Armament and equipment 
Army 
3 500 tanks (1 100 Centurions, 650 M-48 Pattons, 810 M-60 Pattons, 
100 Merkavas, 250 T-54/55s and 150 T-62s). 
8 000 AFVs and APCs (4 000 M-113 Zeldas, Shoet Mk 2, RBY Ramta, 
BRDM-1/-2, M-2/-3, different types of BTRs). 
Some 950 self-propelled guns (500 Soltam 155mm on Sherman chassis, 
M-107, M-109, M-110), different types MRLs. 
Different types of ATGW (TOW, Cobra, Dragon, Picket). 
900 different types of AA guns, 2 batteries of with 24 VulcanIChaparral 
gun/missile systems. 
Air Force 
602 combat aircraft (some 150 in storage; 25 F/TF-15 Eagles, 138 F-4E 
Phantoms, 27 Mirage ///s, 85 Kfir C-2s, 53 F-16 Fighting Falcons, 246 A-4 
Skyhawks of different type and 14 RF-4Es). 
Some 50 transports (4 Boeing 707s, 22 C-130 Hercules, 21 C-47s and 6 
Avaras). 
12 AWACS and ECM planes (including 4 E-2C Hawkeye AWACS and 4 
Boeing 707 ECM planes). 
32 armed helicopters (AH-1Gs, Hughes). 
43 transport helicopters (10 Super FreIons, 33 CH-53s). 
15 SAM battalions (improved HAWK). 
Navy 
Over 70 vessels and boats 
22 missile boats (10 Reshef, 12 Saar) 
3 submarines (Type 206) 
2 corvettes (Aliya, 4 Gabriel missiles, helicopter) 
40 coastal patrol craft 
6 landing craft 
Naval commandos 
1) Military Balance 1981 — 1982, p. 52 and 2) Gabriel: Operation Peace for Galilee, p. 21. 
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